



UNIVERSITY *of* NICOSIA

**The Modalities of Ethnic Homogenisation in Cyprus:
Hard and Soft Ethnic Cleansing**

Andrea Petronyi

A thesis submitted to the University of Nicosia
in accordance with the requirements of the degree of Ph.D. (Doctor of
Philosophy) in International Relations and European Studies

Department of Politics and Governance

December 2020

Abstract

The term “ethnic cleansing” entered academic, political and informal discourse in the 1990s with the breakup of Yugoslavia. There is growing consensus in the social sciences about the links between modernity and ethnic cleansing and its distinction from genocide, but the concept still lacks formal classification in public international law.

This research aims to contribute, within the Cypriot context, to understanding ethnic cleansing not as a monolithic process solely aimed at the removal of a targeted group, but as a non-linear, hybrid enterprise that is not constrained to a narrow time period. This examination of the post-1974 Cyprus context, specifically the Greek Cypriot “enclaved” in the Karpass peninsula, leads to the need for a more nuanced understanding of ethnic cleansing.

This research hopes to demonstrate that ethnic cleansing can take place over several decades, in different phases and with different modalities, according to what best suits contemporary political elites and decision-makers controlling the specific territory. It can thus be classified into *hard ethnic cleansing* and *soft ethnic cleansing*. The former constitutes a targeted and swift removal of a population from a specific territory, as well as the territory’s “right-peopling” and consolidation of strategic and political power of the instigator-elite behind the cleansing.¹ This is demonstrated to have taken place between 1974 and the summer of 1977, after which mass expulsions wound down. *Soft ethnic cleansing* denotes the incendiary and indirect pressures applied to a targeted population, including “ethnic harassment”² or “ethnic policing”³ once forced evictions of large groups had stopped. The hostile environment makes conditions for a dignified life very difficult, if not impossible. The discrimination, harassment and intimidation may lead smaller units (family) of the targeted population to take the “personal” choice and leave, without being subjected to direct expulsion orders.

By examining the fate of the Karpass peninsula’s autochthonous Greek Cypriot population, this thesis aspires to contribute to the study of ethnic cleansing in both empirical and conceptual terms. It thus seeks to offer new insights into an understanding of ethnic cleansing both in Cyprus and beyond its shores.

Keywords: Cyprus, nationalism, ethnic conflict, soft ethnic cleansing, hard ethnic cleansing

¹ Brendan O’Leary, Ian S. Lustick, and Thomas Callaghy, eds., *Right-Sizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 29.

² James Ron, *Frontiers and Ghettos: State Violence in Serbia and Israel* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 82-84.

³ Ron, *Frontiers and Ghettos*, 190.

Dedication

To Michalis Z. Ultimately this has always been for you.

And to Georg Hoffmann, who passed away before his time in February 1989.

You were personally touched by the unfolding humanitarian tragedy you were documenting.

You tried to stop it.

It was not to be.



Acknowledgements

I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to Professor Andreas Theophanous for his amazing support and tremendous encouragement, especially as he had to guide me from Nicosia, while I was in Washington or Geneva. I am so fortunate to have had a supervisor with his patience and clarity of thought, pushing me towards the finish line with constructive critiques and a guiding hand. Thank you.

I am also grateful to my reviewers, Professor Spyros Sakellaropoulos, Dr. Yiannos Katsourides, and the Examination Committee Chair, Dr. Michalis Kontos for the October 2020 interactive and thought-provoking *viva voce* examination (or better termed as a constructive discussion), during which the Committee made very targeted and astute suggestions, the so-called “cherry on the cake”.

Fabrizio Bensi at the ICRC archives was instrumental in digging up dusty box files that he claimed no other academic researcher had ever examined. This thesis would never have been completed had it not been for the understanding of my boss, George K., who urged me to utilise my time wisely during the COVID-19 lockdown during the last (and most difficult) stretch.

A shout out to my “Dr” family, including Tina, Dan, Jenn, Ellada, and to my non-“PhuDs,” Anna, Yiorgos, Myria, Meropi, Deniz, Sherry, Annie and numerous other amazing friends, with whom discussions of the thesis’ central tenets over copious amounts of coffee or wine inspired countless vital “aha” moments for further critical engagement.

To the real doctors as well, Maria, Gyula and Gyula M., as well as our matriarch Athena.

And to the person without whose support I would never have completed this journey, who gently nudged me to focus and stop procrastinating: my wonderful husband Jay. He was a star, with seemingly unlimited patience, especially as I became a complete antisocial hermit in the final weeks and days of the process.

Without you all, it wouldn’t have happened. Thank you.

Declaration

I declare that the work in this thesis was carried out in accordance with the regulations of the University of Nicosia. It is a product of original work of my own, unless otherwise mentioned through references, notes, or any other statements.

Signed

Date



Table of Contents

Abstract.....	i
Dedication.....	ii
Acknowledgements.....	iii
Declaration.....	iv
Table of Contents.....	v
List of Figures.....	vii
List of Appendices.....	viii
Abbreviation Index.....	ix
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. METHODOLOGY: ETHNOGRAPHY AND ARCHIVAL RESEARCH.....	15
2.1 Controversial numbers and archival examination.....	16
2.2 Soft and hard ethnic cleansing: Personal histories.....	20
2.3 Conclusion.....	26
2.4 Terminology and Language.....	26
3. LITERATURE REVIEW.....	28
3.1 Nationalism.....	28
3.2 Ethnic cleansing and its distinction from genocide.....	29
3.3 Modern ethnic cleansing.....	35
3.4 Working Definition of Ethnic Cleansing: Hard and Soft Ethnic Cleansing.....	37
3.5 Cyprus.....	39
3.6 Lessons from Bosnia-Herzegovina.....	46
3.7 Conclusion.....	47
4. HISTORICAL REVIEW.....	49
5. PORTRAITS I: THE GREEK CYPRIOT ENCLAVED.....	73
5.1 1974.....	74
5.2 Release of POWs as modality to pursue ethnic homogenisation?.....	76
5.3 The Greek Cypriot Enclaved.....	81
5.3.1 August 1974-August 1975.....	82
5.3.2 August 1975-1978: From the Third Vienna Agreement to the second mass wave of expulsions.....	109
5.4 From hard to soft ethnic cleansing:.....	136
5.4.1 1978-1983.....	136
5.4.2 1983-2003: From the UDI to the new millennium.....	142
5.4.3 2003-2020: The Last of the Mohicans.....	152
5.5 Conclusion.....	166
6. PORTRAITS II: TURKISH CYPRIOTS AND SETTLERS.....	168

6.1 The Turkish Cypriot community’s demographic consolidation	169
6.2 From the aftermath of the invasion to 3 August 1975 (Third Vienna Agreement)	173
6.2.1 The “Milikouri incident”	182
6.3 Third Vienna Agreement	183
6.3.1 Vienna III and the UN’s role	185
6.3.2 Vienna III: The Aim of the Turkish side	186
6.4 Introduction of Turkish mainland settlers: 1974-1983	188
6.5 Consolidating secession: 1983-2004	204
6.6 Rootless.....	207
6.7 Rooted.....	210
6.7.1 Rooted and Voting.....	213
6.8 The Flipside of the Coin: Turkish Cypriots and the Government-controlled areas	219
6.9 Conclusion	224
7. CONCLUSION.....	226
7.1 Potential future research	235
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	237
APPENDIX I: UNSG REPORTS: “GREEK CYPRIOTS REMAINING IN THE AREA UNDER TURKISH CONTROL”.....	278
APPENDIX II: UNFICYP REVIEW, JUNE 1995: RECOMMENDATIONS.....	281
APPENDIX III: LIST OF INTERVIEWS.....	285

List of Figures

	Page
Figure 1: Distribution of Turkish Cypriot population, 1946, 1960 and 1973.....	3
Figure 2: ICRC Map of the villages “affected by Turkish settlement”.....	192



List of Appendices

	Page
Appendix I <UNSG Reports: Greek Cypriots in Turkish-Occupied Area>.....	278
Appendix II <UNFICYP Review, June 1995: Recommendations>.....	281
Appendix III <Interviewees>.....	285



Abbreviation Index

AKEL	Progressive Party of Working People (Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού)
EDEK	United Democratic Union of Centre (Ενιαία Δημοκρατική Ένωση Κέντρου)
ELAM	National Popular Front (Εθνικό Λαϊκό Μέτωπο)
EOKA	National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών)
EU	European Union
GC	Greek Cypriot
GOC	Government of Cyprus
GOT	Government of Turkey
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
TC	Turkish Cypriot
TMT	Turkish Resistance Organisation (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı)
UN	United Nations
UNFICYP	United Nations Force in Cyprus
UNPOL	United Nations Police

1. INTRODUCTION

Writing in 1956, four years before Cyprus' independence from British colonial rule, Alexander Melamid, the late German-born economics geographer specialising in the Middle East, argued that ethnic cleansing in Cyprus was too economically costly "if not impossible" to take place:

Several territorial disputes, especially between Greece and Turkey, have been solved by territorial partitions and/or exchanges of population. In Cyprus, however, the present geographical distribution of the communities and their comparatively high economic status would make a solution of this nature extremely costly, if not impossible.⁴

Less than two decades later, however, mass-ethnic cleansing in Cyprus took place very swiftly and at a huge economic, social and political cost. Contrary to Melamid's predictions, it did not prove impossible.

Norman Naimark and Philipp Ther have defined ethnic cleansing as separate from genocide, whereby the intention is not to murder but to remove a targeted population from a particular geographic area.⁵ While fatalities may occur in the process, it is substantially less than genocide. Michael Mann and Norman Naimark, meanwhile, have analysed how ethnic cleansing has been used by modern nation states to deal with "minority problems".⁶

This research seeks to contribute, within the Cypriot context, to understanding ethnic cleansing not as a monolithic process solely aiming at the removal of a targeted group but a non-linear, hybrid enterprise that is not restrained by a narrow timespan. Ethnic cleansing can take place over several decades in different phases and according to the contemporary political needs of elites and decision-makers. The dissertation poses the need to separate ethnic cleansing into *hard ethnic cleansing* and *soft ethnic cleansing*. The former, it will be argued, is the swift expulsion of a targeted population within a shorter timeframe, be it a few weeks or months. *Soft ethnic cleansing* denotes the incendiary and indirect pressures applied to a targeted population, making life so unbearable that smaller numbers of people and family units depart with little incentive or possibility to return. The latter is a term borrowed

⁴ Alexander Melamid, "The Geographical Distribution of Communities in Cyprus," *Geographical Review*, 46, no. 3 (1956): 74 <https://doi.org/10.2307/211885>.

⁵ Philipp Ther, *The Dark Side of Nation-States: Ethnic Cleansing in Modern Europe* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2014), 1.

Norman M. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).

⁶ Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3.

from James Ron who defines *soft ethnic cleansing* as “ethnic harassment”⁷ or “ethnic policing”.⁸ Ultimately both end with the purge of a targeted population. However, *soft ethnic cleansing* could theoretically be mitigated or reversed, as ties to the area from which the expulsions happened may have weakened but still remain, and on this future community building could theoretically occur. However, there is nothing to prevent *soft ethnic cleansing* from potentially sliding back to *hard ethnic cleansing* if the hostile environment deteriorates and expulsion orders are issued.

During and in the aftermath of the 1974 Turkish invasion, close to 90% of the total Greek Cypriot population in the area under Turkish military occupation fled or was forced out of their homes and properties.⁹ By 1977, some 41,700 Turkish Cypriots (almost 100%) had transferred to the Turkish-occupied area of Cyprus, accounting for over a third of the island’s entire territory. Although demographic changes had taken place before 1974, the enormity of the uprooting was unprecedented. It led to an almost-total segregation of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities into two largely ethnically homogenous areas in Cyprus.

Gone are the days when Cyprus’ two communities were interspersed throughout the island, as was the case when it gained its independence from Britain in 1960.¹⁰ With the rise of opposing nationalist narratives and ethnic tensions, homogenisation along ethnic lines was already taking place, within the context of modernity.¹¹ However, it was the 1974 Turkish invasion that brought on the almost complete geographical segregation of Cyprus’ two communities into two distinct mono-ethnic areas.

To this day there remains a dwindling pocket of a few hundred Greek Cypriots on the island’s Karpass northeastern peninsula. For reasons that will be explained, these individuals stayed put as an acute “anomaly” in the context of demographic transformation

⁷ James Ron, *Frontiers and Ghettos: State Violence in Serbia and Israel* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 82-84.

⁸ Ron, *Frontiers and Ghettos*, 190.

⁹ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/11568, 6 December 1974.

¹⁰ See *Figure 1*.

¹¹ PRIO Cyprus Centre, “Internal Displacement in Cyprus: Mapping the Consequences of Civil and Military Strife,” <http://www.prio-cyprus-displacement.net/default.asp?id=24>, accessed 7 September 2015.




Figure 1: Alexander-Michael Hadjilyra, "The Turkish-Cypriots: Distribution of Turkish-Cypriot population, according to the 1946, 1960 and 1973 censuses", https://www.academia.edu/34209782/The_Turkish-Cypriots, accessed 2 May 2020.

that occurred between 1974-1977 and despite the Turkish Army's view, especially during this period, that a pocket of enclaved persons in Karpasia posed a security threat.¹²

Furthermore, within the academic literature on Cyprus dealing with ethnic cleansing, the fate of the enclaved has been frequently overlooked. This was made more apparent because the single fundamental legal texts specifically providing for these people's safekeeping, the 1975 Third Vienna Agreement (henceforth also denoted as Vienna III or Third Vienna), was never fully implemented, precisely because the Turkish Army overruled it.

This was a security consideration by Turkey based on internal and external geostrategic aspects and significance of Karpasia. The former included ensuring that both the Turkish Cypriots felt secure (so, according to Denktash, there could not be a sizable Greek Cypriot community) and for the Turkish Army to be able to control the area and not contend with problems arising from the residing Greek Cypriots.¹³ Furthermore, there was a greater geostrategic consideration for the Turkish military: the Karpas Peninsula was detached from the main body of the island and was ideally situated in accessing major Turkish ports. It is therefore not surprising that the 1964 Acheson Plan, US President Lyndon B. Johnson's attempt to solve the already simmering problems arising in and from Cyprus, provided for Turkey establishing a large military base on the peninsula precisely because of its geostrategic significance due to its proximity to Turkish ports.¹⁴ Sixty years later, this significance may have increased given the Eastern Mediterranean natural gas finds and Turkey's attempts to carve a role and share of these. The "Mavi Vatan" or "Blue Homeland"¹⁵ doctrine, originally propagated in 2006 by then Turkish Rear Admiral Cem

¹² Grüneck, "Situation générale à fin octobre 1975 des minorités CYPGK dans les territoires sous contrôle CYPTK", 31 October 1975: [ICRC 7834].

Georg Hoffmann, "Meeting with the Turkish Ambassador, Candemir Ünho on the 14th January, and President Denktash on the 15th January, 1977", 20 January 1977 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7391].

¹³ William Crawford, "Displaced Cypriots: Part II, Political Aspects", 2 February 1976, 14:10, Nicosia 0303, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1976NICOSI00303_b.html.

Georg Hoffmann, "Meeting with the Turkish Ambassador, Candemir Ünho on the 14th January, and President Denktash on the 15th January, 1977", 20 January 1977 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7391].

Hoffmann, "Note No. 586: My visit with Mr. Grinling on the 20th January, to Rizokarpaso, Ayia Trias, Ayios Andronikos and Leonarisso", 25 January 1977: [ICRC 7375].

¹⁴ Spyros Sakellaropoulos, *Ο Κυπριακός Κοινωνικός Σχηματισμός (1191-2004) Από Τη Συγκρότηση Στη Διχοτόμηση [The Cypriot Social Transformation (1191-2004): From the Establishment to Partition]* (Athens: Topos, 2017), 494.

¹⁵ Cem Gürdeniz, "What Is the Blue Homeland in the 21st Century?" *United World International* (blog), 31 July 2020, <https://uwidata.com/12952-what-is-the-blue-homeland-in-the-21st-century/>.

Gürdeniz and subsequently was adopted by Turkish President Erdoğan, has been adopted as “a means to expand Islamist influence”:¹⁶

The main strategic aim is that Turkey should not be hemmed in the Mediterranean and the Aegean sea which could impact the country’s trade, defence and security.¹⁷

Towards this end, Turkey’s continued control of the Karpass peninsula in Cyprus has been deemed of utmost importance:

The control of the Karpass provides the Turkish side with the opportunity to control developments in the field of natural gas and oil exploration in the eastern Mediterranean and in the peripheries of Cyprus. That is why Turkey is called upon to pay special attention to this region.¹⁸

Indeed, Bülent Ecevit, Turkey’s Prime Minister who greenlighted the 1974 Cyprus invasion, elucidated in the late 1990s that

Cyprus is of indispensable strategic interest to Turkey and Ankara would not withdraw its troops from the island even if there were not a single Turkish Cypriot living on it.¹⁹

A handful of years later, Ahmet Davutoğlu, academic and Turkey’s Foreign and Prime Minister-to-be, also described the geostrategic importance of Cyprus to Turkey, in what has become in recent years a popular social media meme:

Even if there was not one Muslim Turk there, it would have been necessary for Turkey to have a Cyprus problem. No country can stay indifferent towards such an island, located in the heart of its very own vital space.²⁰

Turning away from the geostrategic significance of Karpasia to an increasingly irredentist and neo-Ottomanist Turkey²¹ to the demographic aspect, it is unlikely that the geographic separation of Cyprus’ two communities in the near- to medium-term future will be

¹⁶ Aykan Erdemir and Philip Kowalski, “‘Blue Homeland’ and the Irredentist Future of Turkish Foreign Policy”, *War on the Rocks*, 30 September 2020, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/blue-homeland-and-the-irredentist-future-of-turkish-foreign-policy/>.

¹⁷ Elis Gjevori, “Turkey’s ‘Blue Homeland’: Striking a Balance in the Eastern Mediterranean”, *Turkey’s ‘Blue Homeland’: Striking a Balance in the Eastern Mediterranean*, 7 August 2020, <https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/turkey-s-blue-homeland-striking-a-balance-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-37356>.

¹⁸ Nikos Stelgias, “Με το βλέμμα στην Καρπασία η Άγκυρα” [Ankara has its eye on Karpasia], *Kathimerini*, 19 December 2016, <https://www.kathimerini.gr/888476/article/epikairothta/politikh/me-to-vlemma-sthn-karpasia-h-agkyra>.

¹⁹ Hansjörg Brey, “Turkey and the Cyprus Question,” *International Spectator*, 34, no. 1 (January–March 1999), 111, https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/iai/iai_99brh01.html#txt2.

²⁰ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik, Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu* [Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position], Istanbul: Küre Yayinlari, 2001, 179.

²¹ Marwa Maziad and Jake Sotiriadis, “Turkey’s Dangerous New Exports: Pan-Islamist, Neo-Ottoman Visions and Regional Instability”, Middle East Institute, 21 April 2020, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/turkeys-dangerous-new-exports-pan-islamist-neo-ottoman-visions-and-regional>.

overturned. This, regardless of whether or not a solution to the Cyprus question is reached, and what form that settlement takes. However, it is possible that the Greek Cypriot enclaved bear a longer-lasting footprint barring full-scale nationalist homogenisation than previously examined.

I counter that ethnic cleansing in Cyprus post-1974 has been four-pronged:

1. ridding the Turkish-controlled area of its Greek Cypriot majority;
2. transferring Turkish Cypriots from the areas not under Turkish military control to the newly occupied territory;
3. settling people from the Turkish mainland into the area of Cyprus under military occupation (colonisation);
4. repressing the small minority of Greek Cypriots who remained in the Turkish-occupied area by limiting their rights in ways that would effectively put an end to the existence of a “normal” existence and dignified life.

The majority of Greek Cypriots fled from the Turkish military advance in the summer of 1974. By September 1974, the UN report in the name of the Secretary-General estimated that only some 20,000 Greek Cypriots had remained, from the initial population of around 200,000.²² That is, 90% of the Greek Cypriots residing in the areas of Cyprus that came under Turkish military occupation were uprooted from their ancestral homes and villages within a very short space of time. By Autumn 1975, some 42,000 Turkish Cypriots had transferred to the Turkish-occupied northern part of Cyprus,²³ with only 200 remaining in the Government-controlled areas by 1978.²⁴

As part of consolidating its territorial gains and attempting to prop up a failing economy, Turkey further re-engineered Cyprus’ demographic makeup by commencing a settlement policy in the area of Cyprus it had occupied. Ankara needed to enhance its long-term direct and indirect control over Cyprus, among others, by ensuring that a functioning economy in the occupied territory would fill the void from the labour shortage due to mass Greek Cypriot

²² United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/11488/Annex, 4 September 1974. The estimates were later proven to be somewhat overstated, as data are often prone to miscalculation during times of turmoil. A later revision denoted that the number of Greek Cypriot displaced came to over 160,000. Many who fled initially had lived close to the ceasefire lines and sought shelter but eventually returned to their homes. See Claire Palley, *An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary-General’s Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004* (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), 173.

²³ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/11900, 8 December 1975 and United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the General Assembly, A/32/282, 25 October 1977.

²⁴ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/12723, 31 May 1978.

displacement.²⁵ Meanwhile, there were abundant now-empty Greek Cypriot properties into which these new settlers could be moved.²⁶ The total number of people who were brought into Cyprus over forty-plus years is unknown and various estimates are frequently quoted – ranging from tens of thousands to even half a million. Persistent calls for an independent census – from leftist Turkish Cypriot politicians, the Government of Cyprus, and the international community, (UN, including Security Council resolution 789 of 23 November 1992, as well as by independent Special Rapporteurs of the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly) – have fallen on deaf ears as an impartial headcount has never taken place.

The introduction of the first wave of settlers took place almost immediately upon the cessation of hostilities and continued until 1979. These people were primarily moved to remote areas, including the Karpass Peninsula (Karpasia), where Turkish Cypriots were less willing to move. These settlers were an ethnically and culturally mixed group of underprivileged agricultural labourers. Some estimated their numbers to be between 20,000-30,000,²⁷ during this first wave. Other sources have deemed they totalled 82,500, with 20-25% of them eventually moving back to Turkey.²⁸ As the US Ambassador cabled in July 1975:

Some 8,000 Turks from Turkey, mainly farmers, have already been brought over, and according to existing plans the transfer of some 40,000 Turks from Turkey will soon be completed. Moreover, the transfer of 20,000 members of families of troops who served or are still serving in Cyprus will be brought over in the next few months. It is estimated that by the end of the year the number of Turks brought over from Turkey for permanent settlement will go up to some 100,000 including the 40,000 or more Turkish troops who are serving in Cyprus and who are considered by the Turkish authorities as permanent citizens of Cyprus.²⁹

Subsequent waves of settlers were not afforded the economic and other benefits of the first wave (housing, agricultural land, seeds for sowing, etc.), and were often moved to Cyprus

²⁵ Andreas Theophanous, “The Republic of Cyprus in Perspective: The Record and Future Challenges” in *Cyprus and the EU: Appraisal and Challenges*, eds. Jean-François Drevet and Andreas Theophanous, Policy Paper No. 58, Paris/Nicosia, Cyprus Centre for European and International Affairs/Notre Europe, September 2012: 56-57.

²⁶ Helge Jensehaugen, “The Northern Cypriot Dream – Turkish Immigration 1974–1980”, *The Cyprus Review* 26, no. 2 (Fall 2014): 79.

²⁷ Yücel Vural, Başak Ekenoğlu and Sertaç Sonan, “Politically Motivated Migration: The Case of Turkish Migration to Northern Cyprus” in *Turkish Migration Conference 2015 Selected Proceedings* (London: Transnational Press, 2015), 93.

²⁸ Vural et al., 88.

²⁹ Crawford, “Expulsion of Greek Cypriots from Turkish controlled areas of Cyprus”, 1 July 1975, 11:00, Nicosia 2090, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI02090_b.html.

from Turkey with the sole intention of securing their votes in upcoming elections, while business elites gained access to a cheap labour force.³⁰

As previously mentioned, the total number of settlers from mainland Turkey is disputed but the Turkish side has persistently resisted an independent census as this demographic black hole could always be used as an important bargaining chip during negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus question. In general, the leftists in the Turkish Cypriot community have opposed the introduction of settlers, while the right has either downright encouraged or tolerated this influx.³¹ Estimates that the settler populations outnumber Turkish Cypriots has raised alarm across the island and beyond, underlining how demographic engineering has fundamentally changed the social, political and ethnic landscape of Cyprus.

The fourth element in the deliberate alteration of the demographic landscape can be found in the half-dozen or so villages mostly in the Karpass peninsula, where some 20,000 or so Greek Cypriot villagers initially remained in the immediate aftermath of the Turkish occupation.³² This number was reduced drastically within a couple of years: by June 1977 there were only 2,000 Greek Cypriots from the original 200,000 and largely concentrated in the villages of the Karpass peninsula, especially Rizokarpaso and Ayia Triada.³³ At the time of writing, the number of enclaved Greek Cypriots living in the Turkish-occupied area is estimated to be fewer than 330, composed mostly of elderly people.

This shrinking community of Greek Cypriots, who had been cut off behind Turkish lines, was subsequently used as a bargaining chip by all sides. Threats were made for their mass-expulsion in the earlier period of *hard ethnic cleansing* or else they were subjected to undue harassment and intimidation (as recently as the 2017 “customs levy” on the humanitarian supplies they receive or during the 2020 COVID-19 lockdown), for political point-scoring. However, in over forty-six years the remnants of Greek Cypriot community life north of the ceasefire lines has

³⁰ Vural, et al., 94.

³¹ Despite this left-right divide, regardless of politics, every governing party has approved “citizenships,” especially prior to electoral processes.

³² United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council. S/11488/Annex, 4 September 1974. Around 1000 Maronite Cypriots also remained in their ancestral villages such as Kormakitis. Albeit not the focus of the dissertation, please see “Portraits I: The Greek Cypriot enclaved” for further details.

³³ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/12342 and Addendum 1, 7 June 1977. A word on usage: Αγία Τριάς or Αγία Τριάδα in the demotic, is either transcribed as “Agia Trias/Triada” but more frequently in the primary documents I have used, as “Ayia Trias/Triada”. As such, I have used the latter English spelling.

persisted despite the adversity and severe hindrance to leading a normal life. Why would they endure this treatment?

This dissertation attempts to establish how ethnic cleansing was and remains a political tool used by Turkey to consolidate its territorial foothold over a third of Cyprus. It is a policy whereby Ankara's control is exercised not via open warfare, but *inter alia* through demographic change. Complementing extensive archival research with ethnographic fieldwork, I have attempted to weave a historical narrative that documents the post-1974 period as it affected the Karpass region of Cyprus, including Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and mainland settlers from Turkey.

In order to showcase that ethnic cleansing is not a "simple" and linear process, I seek to demonstrate through the Cyprus context that ethnic cleansing is a hybrid phenomenon. It was not simply about removing an undesired population from a given area; it also entailed filling that void. It began with *hard ethnic cleansing* in the form of a swift removal of the unwanted group of people, followed by a *soft ethnic cleansing* relying on harassment and discrimination, allowing the "passage of time [to] do the rest."³⁴

Examining this, the use of archival material was essential, but many of the most pertinent documents (such as on the discussions between the leaders of Cyprus' two communities in early August 1975 in Vienna) remain classified. Furthermore, most of the open-access diplomatic and other correspondence does not concern itself with the daily aspects of what was taking place in the Karpass, although extensive primary source materials are available in the declassified section of the Geneva-based ICRC archives. The newspaper reports at the time were also more concerned with the bigger issues. Stories of the enclaved would only hit headlines upon expulsions, but there was arguably never a comprehensive examination of what was really taking place on the ground.

Thus, it was necessary to complement the archival examination with even limited ethnographic research. The latter allowed for on-site exploration by asking directly affected individuals to retell their experiences in their own words.

³⁴ Crawford, "Displaced Cypriots: Part I, An Overview", 27 January 1976, 16:30, Nicosia 0262, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1976NICOSI00262_b.html.

The Literature Review provides an analysis of what political scientists, historians and anthropologists have defined as *ethnic cleansing*, illuminating the multiple variations in the definitions. It also highlights that this body of knowledge is by no means exhausted or exhaustive, as evidenced by the lack of focused examination of solely ethnic cleansing in the Cypriot context. As *ethnic cleansing* is the focus of this dissertation, an entire chapter is a necessary tool to frame the differentiation I posit, between its *soft* and *hard* forms.

The Historical Review provides a background to the Cyprus question that led to the point from which post-1974 ethnic cleansing will be examined.

Two main chapters are subsequently devoted to analysing what took place on the ground. The first concentrates on the autochthonous population at risk of being forced out, and the subsequent chapter on the newly transferred inhabitants introduced into this same landscape, be they Turkish Cypriots or mainland settlers from Turkey.

The chapter documenting the Greek Cypriot enclaved community in the Karpass peninsula describes how and why after the first Turkish invasion in July 1974, a population of 20,000 Greek Cypriots remained “enclaved” behind enemy lines. At present they number barely over 300 people. I will explore the ways in which the Greek Cypriot enclaved community has *shrunk* so drastically. I also showcase that especially in the mid- and late-1970s the Karpass’ Greek Cypriot community was deemed a security threat by the Turkish military,³⁵ which led to the non-implementation of the 2 August 1975 Vienna Third Agreement that was supposed to provide them with a semblance of normality. This was the period of *hard ethnic cleansing*. Furthermore, this community was constantly subjected to the political aims and whims of either side of the conflict. For the Greek Cypriot leadership, they gave hope that Turkey’s territorial consolidation was not permanent. For the Turkish side’s negotiators, the community’s presence provided bargaining power: before the final mass transfer of Turkish Cypriots to the Turkish-occupied areas, mass expulsions of Greek Cypriots were taking place and further evictions threatened with the aim of getting what the Turkish side had sought. This community remains a pawn of power-politics. I therefore deem it important to give its members agency and demonstrate their own views on events from their

³⁵ Hoffmann, “Meeting with the Turkish Ambassador, Candemir Ünön on the 14th January, and President Denktash on the 15th January, 1977”, 20 January 1977 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7391].

own perspective, in full knowledge that memory and social contexts play their own tricks on people.

The final substantive chapter of the dissertation focuses on the mirror-element of this narrative: the post-1974 “newcomers” to the area of the Karpass, both Turkish Cypriots who had transferred from the Cyprus Government-controlled areas, as well as a settler-population introduced from mainland Turkey. These people constituted the “preferred” ethnic group of the new territorial masters of the area; another aspect of territorial consolidation via “right-peopling”.³⁶ However, the settlers’ presence has mostly been examined vis-à-vis their relations with the Turkish Cypriot community. The angle as regards their relations with the Greek Cypriot enclaved has largely been ignored and the separate chapter attempts to provide a comprehensive overview mostly from the perspective of how the “newcomers” had affected the lives of the autochthonous Greek Cypriots.

As Paul Sant Cassia deliberated on the missing, the refugees and the enclaved, “each of these three categories has become a vehicle for collective ethnic imagining, both in the past and in the future, ‘meta-narratives’ between history and individual experiences.”³⁷ However, in looking *within* the Greek Cypriot meta-narrative it became necessary to hone in on the stories behind the headlines and give the enclaved agency to retell their experiences both in the fifth and sixth chapters from different perspectives.

Towards this end, the hypotheses tested are as follows:

1. Ethnic cleansing cannot only be viewed as the “mass removal of a targeted population from a given territory,”³⁸ especially when the void is filled with a more desirable population. via ‘post-conquest arrangement’ *sürgün* whereby Moslems were introduced into newly seized territories, enabling “Ottoman rulers to establish and secure their political control.”³⁹ This translates into a hybrid phenomenon.
2. Ethnic cleansing can take different forms and can last decades. *Hard ethnic cleansing* is the swift removal of an undesired population in a relatively short span of time. *Soft*

³⁶ Brendan O’Leary, Ian S. Lustick, and Thomas Callaghy, eds., *Right-Sizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 29.

³⁷ Paul Sant Cassia, *Bodies of Evidence: Burial, Memory and the Recovery of Missing Persons in Cyprus* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007), 79.

³⁸ Steven Béla Várdy, T. Hunt Tooley and Agnes Huszar Vardy, eds., *Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 3.

³⁹ Vural, Ekenoğlu, and Sonan, “Politically Motivated Migration: The Case of Turkish Migration to Northern Cyprus,” 88.

ethnic cleansing is when the mass expulsions stop but long-term discriminatory policies are in place, pushing out smaller units of the targeted population such as a family rather than an entire community. As such it is not a linear phenomenon and *hard* and *soft* ethnic cleansing can theoretically occur simultaneously.

3. *Soft ethnic cleansing* may be resisted and through this resistance may even provide the opportunity to be mitigated.

The value of this research is what the Karpass in the past four-and-a-half decades can contribute to a broadening of the understanding of ethnic cleansing.

Annex VII of the controversial 1995 Dayton Peace Accord for Bosnia provides for return and reinstatement of the original inhabitants. Quarter of a century after Dayton, return is at 60%, albeit reinstatement into former properties has not been successful, with many selling their homes instead.⁴⁰ The Greek Cypriot enclaved questioned in this study explained that part of their reason to remain in the Karpass was because they wanted to hold onto their homes and wanted their children and grandchildren to claim their properties once they passed away. Will Cyprus Government incentive programmes for resettlement of enclaved relatives until the age of 45⁴¹ be eventually realised, given the obstacles presented? By January 2020, some 50 Greek Cypriots had utilised this scheme but news reports indicated that they are required to apply for “residency permits” on a monthly basis as they are viewed as “third-country nationals” by the Turkish side.⁴² In an interview, the author was told that in fact those who had been issued “TRNC identity cards” are not barred from resettling. Those who had left before such cards were issued to the enclaved (mostly people in school in the 1970s and early 1980s) do not have this right and are deemed as “third-country nationals”.⁴³ Under such conditions, is such resettlement sustainable?

If one elucidates from the example of the Maronite Cypriot community, by “2007 the overwhelming majority of Cypriot Maronites had rebuilt their houses in Kormakitis for

⁴⁰ 2015 UNHCR Subregional operations profile: South-Eastern Europe, <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48d766.html>.

⁴¹ Evie Andreou, “Govt expects strong interest in scheme to resettle villages in north,” *Cyprus Mail*, June 19, 2019, <https://cyprus-mail.com/2019/06/19/govt-expects-strong-interest-in-scheme-to-resettle-villages-in-north/>.

⁴² “Government Relocation Scheme to Turkish-Held Villages: The Problems and the Numbers,” *In-Cyprus/Phileleftheros*, 22 January 2020, <https://in-cyprus.philenews.com/government-relocation-scheme-to-turkish-held-villages-the-problems-and-the-numbers/>.

⁴³ Interview with Petroulla, 2 November 2019.

permanent or temporary accommodation,”⁴⁴ this may be a possibility. After the 2003 decision on opening of crossing points, many Maronite Cypriots took the opportunity to restore their abandoned homes in Kormakitis.⁴⁵ In contrast to the case of the relatives of Greek Cypriot enclaved who were not provided the opportunity until over a decade later, the Turkish side formalised a decision to allow resettlement of displaced Maronites by 2006.⁴⁶ Utilising the Cyprus Government incentives for resettlement of Greek Cypriot and Maronite Cypriot couples up to 45 years old, by January 2020 an estimated 170 Maronite Cypriots had thus relocated to their ancestral villages of Kormakitis and Karpasha.⁴⁷

Although this dissertation focuses almost exclusively on the fate of the Greek Cypriot enclaved, the story of the Maronite Cypriot enclaved, runs parallel. Maronite Cypriots have been able to utilize the Government resettlement for a longer period, and this has also gone hand-in-hand with the efforts to revive Sanna, the community’s endangered Arabic dialect.⁴⁸ However out of their four traditional villages, resettlement has only so far been in Kormakitis, Karpashia, since Asomatos and Ayia Marina (Skyloura) are Turkish military areas. Declarations of works to make the latter habitable have been occasionally aired,⁴⁹ with the Turkish Cypriot residents of Ayia Marina also lobbying towards welcoming Maronite Cypriots back, but as of yet, this has not taken place.⁵⁰ Ultimately, reviving the Maronite Cypriot villages and the Karpass villages will only be possible to the extent that they also serve – or at least don’t undermine – the interests of those who really hold the cards north of the ceasefire lines in Cyprus: the Turkish military. If their strategic interests don’t align, full resettlement and revival are out of the question.

One important distinction between the villages at the core of this dissertation – Ayia Triada and Rizokarpaso – from the Maronite villages in terms of the resettlement efforts is the

⁴⁴ Djordje Stefanovic and Neophytos Loizides, “The Way Home: Peaceful Return of Victims of Ethnic Cleansing,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 33, no. 2 (2011): 408–30. <https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.2011.0029>.

⁴⁵ Amberin Zaman, “Pulse Returns to Maronite Village in Cyprus”, *Los Angeles Times*, 21 March 2005.

⁴⁶ John Leonidou, “Maronites Ponder Kormakitis Return”, *Cyprus Mail*, 17 October 2010, <http://archive.is/OpqiV>.

⁴⁷ “Government Relocation Scheme to Turkish-Held Villages: The Problems and the Numbers,” *In-Cyprus/Phileleftheros*, 22 January 2020.

⁴⁸ Agence France-Presse, “Chance to Save Ancient Language”, *Kathimerini*, 7 December 2016, <https://www.ekathimerini.com/214375/article/ekathimerini/community/chance-to-save-ancient-language>.

⁴⁹ “Οζερσάι: Προχωρούν οι εργασίες για επανεγκατάσταση Μαρωνιτών [Özersay: Work is Underway to Resettle Maronites]”, *Phileleftheros*, 7 February 2019, <https://www.philenews.com/koinonia/eidiseis/article/652569/ozersai-prochoroyn-oi-ergsies-ga-epaneggatastasi-maroniton>.

⁵⁰ Anna Misiaouli, “Νέα Κίνηση Προς Τους Μαρωνίτες [New Move towards Maronites]”. *Dialogos*, 20 October 2018, <https://dialogos.dgmedialink.com/351803-2/>.

presence of the mainland settlers in the enclaved Karpass villages, who vastly outnumber the Greek Cypriots. Furthermore, the Maronite villages are in close proximity to the ceasefire lines and to Nicosia. Daily or weekly contact with the Government-controlled areas in terms of physical distance is easier, as the community is less isolated physically compared to the faraway Karpasia peninsula and as such more attractive to both retirees but also to younger couples who can easily commute to work south of the ceasefire lines.

However, the problems arising from the COVID-19 pandemic have shown that coupled with the assumption of the Turkish Cypriot leadership by a hardline nationalist in October 2020 vying for a two-state solution,⁵¹ such resettlement efforts and access to enclaved villages be they Maronite Cypriot or Greek Cypriot may have stalled in the short- and possibly medium- and long-term due to the obstacles to crossing and the limitations extended for stays of returnees.⁵²

The literature on ethnic cleansing views the ethnic homogenization resulting from the removal of a target population as *permanent*. This thesis intends to add nuance to both the modalities of the cleansing, arguing that there are various stages (hard and soft) as well as a hybridity via the removal of one population and the introduction of a desired group. But it also poses the question whether the locals on the ground may provide a resilience to *soft ethnic cleansing* in potentially perplexing ways, providing a paradigm shift by countering “ethnic purification.”⁵³ As regards future research and extrapolating from Melamid’s logic, could the impossible happen and ethnic cleansing not fully succeed? Within the Cyprus context, ultimately only time will tell, but examining contexts where *soft ethnic cleansing* was instituted, it is possible that its reversal is an interesting line of inquiry for future research.

⁵¹ Stelgias, “Turkish-Cypriot Leader Insists on Two-State Solution”, *Kathimerini*, 30 November 2020, <https://www.ekathimerini.com/259700/article/ekathimerini/news/turkish-cypriot-leader-insists-on-two-state-solution>.

⁵² Stelios Xiouris, “Οι Εγκλωβισμένοι Τα Πρώτα Θύματα Του Τατάρ Και Της Λύσης 2 Κρατών [The Enclaved the First Victims of Tatar and the Two-state Solution]”, *24sports.com.cy*, 1 December 2020, <https://www.24sports.com.cy/gr/news/nea/politiki/oi-egklobismenoi-ta-prwta-thymata-toy-tatar-kai-tis-lysis-2-kratwn>.

⁵³ Jacques Sémelin, *Purify and Destroy: The Political of Massacre and Genocide* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 138.

2. METHODOLOGY: ETHNOGRAPHY AND ARCHIVAL RESEARCH

To effectively examine ethnic cleansing in the Cyprus context, complex epistemological research has to be utilised to reflect the complexities to which the central question ultimately relates: history, political science, political economy, sociology and anthropology. Ethnic cleansing, by its nature, has been studied from the perspectives of a wide array of social science and other disciplines, using diverse methodological approaches.

Archival research, especially of primary source material at the ICRC Headquarters in Geneva, was complemented by small-scale ethnographic study, giving agency to the Greek Cypriot enclaved whose fate this project seeks to examine. While a challenge, the hypotheses that are sought to be addressed, which entail a nuancing of the notion of *ethnic cleansing*, cannot be elicited or expanded upon without a multidimensional examination.

By the end of summer 1974, what had been laid down as a political aim of nationalist Turkish Cypriot ideology (*taksim* or partition) in the 1950s, became a *de facto* reality as Turkey had now occupied over a third of the island. And to consolidate this victory on the ground, it was vital to ensure its political, social and economic functioning after the “socio-economic disruption”, which “included the expulsion of thousands of Greek Cypriots and the gradual transfer of all Turkish Cypriots to the occupied part of Cyprus.”⁵⁴ Added to this, Turkey introduced thousands of people from the Turkish mainland, to make up for the labour shortage created by the mass expulsion of Greek Cypriots, but also to consolidate its political power via “right-peopling”⁵⁵ the Turkish-occupied area.

The US State Department speculated just two days after the first landings of Turkish troops on Cyprus on 20 July that the Turkish side’s intention was partition:

The Turks will probably insist on consolidating their position on the island so they will have a realistic basis for partition or at least negotiation. If their position creates a *de facto* partition, they will also have strengthened their hand for negotiating some other settlement.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Theophanous, “Revisiting the Cyprus Question and the Way Forward,” *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 15, no. 4 (2017), 41.

⁵⁵ O’Leary, Lustick, and Callaghy, *Right-Sizing the State*, 29.

⁵⁶ Laurie van Hook, ed., *Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976*. Vol. XXX, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007), Document 112. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/96606.pdf>.

In direct contrast, the Greek Cypriot leadership viewed the more than 10,000 Greek Cypriots in the occupied areas of Cyprus in the summer of 1975⁵⁷ as strategically and politically very important. According to Glafkos Clerides' testimony (written several years after the events), then-President of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios III held that "it was more important to keep Greek Cypriots in the north, and particularly in the Karpass area, than Turkish Cypriots in the south."⁵⁸ As such, Clerides as Greek Cypriot negotiator framed his side's political position as follows:

not only that the Greek Cypriots still living in the north would not be expelled, but also those already expelled would be allowed to return, and that conditions would be such that it would be possible for Greek Cypriots to remain.⁵⁹

These two antithetical political aims have been at odds in all subsequent rounds of negotiations.

2.1 Controversial numbers and archival examination

To analyse the rate at which the demographic re-engineering took place, primary source data from the organisations that were present and dealing with the humanitarian situation was examined. These included documents by the United Nations (UNHCR and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) and the International Committee on the Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC).

Initial data collected in a crisis situation can understandably be imprecise. In the wake of the Turkish invasion, UNHCR totalled Greek Cypriot displaced persons requiring humanitarian help and/or shelter at 200,000. The actual number of Greek Cypriot displaced in 1974 was eventually revised downward to 164,000⁶⁰ as many close to ceasefire lines returned to their homes once the fighting had stopped. This is the figure used by the United

⁵⁷ United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council, S/11717, 9 June 1975.

⁵⁸ Glafkos Clerides, *Cyprus: My Deposition: Volume 4*. (Nicosia: Alithia Publishing, 1992), 297.

⁵⁹ Clerides, 297.

⁶⁰ United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the General Assembly, A/32/282, 25 October 1977.

Nations whereas Cyprus Government statistics on Greek Cypriot refugees still cite the rounded figure of 200,000,⁶¹ despite having previously used the 160,000 total.⁶²

Notwithstanding discrepancies as regards who and how the displaced persons were counted, this dissertation primarily concerns itself with what has happened to the members of the Greek Cypriot enclaved community. In order to analyse the demographic data regarding this community, the figures published by the United Nations (via UNFICYP) as well as the ICRC are the most reliable. The reasoning behind this choice is simple: UNFICYP has maintained a field presence in Cyprus since March 1964 and has been at the forefront of providing humanitarian aid to the Greek Cypriot enclaved since 1974. The ICRC's Cyprus Mission, meanwhile, was able to access civilians in need of humanitarian assistance even before UNFICYP could get to them.⁶³

Not infrequently, the freedom of movement of UNFICYP⁶⁴ and ICRC⁶⁵ was severely restricted in the Turkish-occupied area. Furthermore, whenever access was permitted, representatives of these organisations would meet with enclaved Greek Cypriots strictly in the presence of Turkish or Turkish Cypriot "minders". As such determining "voluntary" requests for transfers or guised expulsions was challenging:

Some of the reasons why it is becoming more difficult to learn about the cases which interest us, in view of our work of protection, seem to me the following:-

- a) Our interlocutor has a personal interest not to give us a clear picture of the situation in order to avoid any investigations on our part which would lead us to report to, at least, the local police, as this may have adverse consequences for him and deteriorate his relations with the police.

⁶¹ PIO and Statistical Service, "Cyprus in Figures: 2019," Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus, 2019, [https://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/All/C91603BD82050327C22582030022C7F2/\\$file/CYPR_US_IN_FIGURES-2019-EN-201219.pdf?OpenElement](https://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/All/C91603BD82050327C22582030022C7F2/$file/CYPR_US_IN_FIGURES-2019-EN-201219.pdf?OpenElement).

⁶² In a 1992 Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office Publication entitled "The Refugees of Cyprus," the following explanation was given:

A number of 162 000 refugees is given for 1974 while a *footnote* comments on the discrepancy to former statements as follows: 'In 1974 the actual number of refugees was 201 000. But about 40 000 people, who became refugees in 1974 because they lived in dangerous areas close to the line of occupation,... returned to their homes in 1977.' [italics my own]

Hansjörg Brey, and Günter Heinritz, "Ethnicity and Demographic Changes in Cyprus: in the 'Statistical Fog'," *Geographica Slovenia* 24 (1993): 201. https://giam.zrc-sazu.si/sites/default/files/gs_clanki/GS_2401_201-222.pdf.

⁶³ T. Germond and R. Baeriswyl, "Report by the ICRC on the visit made to 3 concentrations of Greek Cypriot civilians in Morphou-Lefka area," 23 September 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.007 / 231 (35): [ICRC 7736].

⁶⁴ See United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council on developments in Cyprus, S/11353 and annexes, 21 July-29 August 29, 1974 and for later reports, United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the General Assembly on the Question of Cyprus, A/32/282, October 25, 1977.

⁶⁵ ICRC, "Note Verbale addressed to the Chief Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces in Cyprus, General Bedrettin Demirel", 26 September 26, 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.007 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 7725].

- b) Our interlocutor does not dare to speak freely in front of the present Turkish Cypriot liaison officer.
- c) Our interlocutors show no more interest in the destiny of their village as the burden of their own problems is already too heavy for them and their private arrangements take first priority.⁶⁶

By delivering humanitarian and other goods, UNFICYP and ICRC were able to gauge how many Greek Cypriots remained, as well as the numbers of transfers taking place. While mistakes could not be ruled out and discrepancies between the two organisations' figures existed on occasion,⁶⁷ this should not detract from what both datasets indicated: the steep decline in the number of Greek Cypriots. In 1974 there were 20,000 Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the newly occupied areas of Cyprus, which by September 1975 had halved.⁶⁸ This drastic reduction in barely a year indicates *hard ethnic cleansing*.

Until January 2018, the UN biannually published the numbers of Greek Cypriots in the Karpass, and this is used as the basic reference. Appendix I includes the full table of figures.

The number of Turkish Cypriots who had transferred also depends on the source. Michael Moran, a confidante of Turkish Cypriot nationalist politician Rauf Denktash, put it at 65,000.⁶⁹ The United Nations estimated 41,800.⁷⁰ Constitutional expert for the Greek Cypriots, Claire Palley also notes that the UN “figure correlates with the 1973 census figures of Turkish Cypriots who had been in that part of Cyprus which remained under Government control after the invasion”.⁷¹

⁶⁶ Alain Lennartz, “Activity Report Northern Sector: 1-31.12.76”, 4 January 1977 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7155].

⁶⁷ In early 1976, UNFICYP recorded 36 villages with a Greek Cypriot presence (compared to the ICRC’s 32), and 8840 Greek Cypriot enclaved (instead of 8593) in the Turkish-occupied areas. See Lennartz, “Note No. 437: Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.1.1976 to 31.1.1976” 10 February 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7191], and the cable by Ambassador Crawford, “Displaced Cypriots: Part I, An Overview”, 27 January 1976, 16:30, Nicosia 0262, https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1976NICOSI00262_b.html, which relays UNFICYP figures.

⁶⁸ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/11717*, 6 September 1975.

⁶⁹ Michael Moran, ed., *Rauf Denktash at the United Nations: Speeches on Cyprus* (Huntingdon: Eothen Press, 1997), 157.

⁷⁰ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the General Assembly, A/32/282, 25 October 1977, para 23. It should be noted that Moran (1997) quotes the figure of 65,000 Turkish Cypriots

⁷¹ Claire Palley, *An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary-General’s Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004* (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2005), 173.

The 1973 micro-census did not account for the entirety of the island’s population, as the Statistical Services were not given access to Turkish Cypriot enclaves, nor did they attempt to count the entire population but extrapolated figures from a smaller sample size.

Of all the figures, the most contentious relates to the settlers or *Türkiyelliler* in informal Turkish Cypriot nomenclature.⁷² This population group refers to mainlanders from Turkey who arrived in Cyprus after 1974. The Turkish Cypriot hegemonic nationalist account was initially a complete denial of persons coming from Turkey (they were referred to as repatriated Turkish Cypriots), which eventually turned into a justification of a normal immigration process.⁷³ Palley referred to Greek Cypriot estimates of over 115,000 in 2002,⁷⁴ but regardless it is contended that they form a majority compared to the autochthonous Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus.⁷⁵ Despite calls from the international community, including Security Council resolution 789 of 23 November 1992, and by Council of Europe Special Rapporteurs in 1992 and 2003,⁷⁶ no impartial census has been conducted. As a result, speculation about the total number of settlers has not been put to rest.

Not that there has been a lack of attempts to estimate population totals in the Turkish-occupied areas, including its composite groups. Hatay, focusing on voting patterns, noted that by 2003 over 45,000 had been granted “citizenship” and could partake in electoral procedures.⁷⁷ Loizides indicated that even Turkish Cypriot negotiators at the Cyprus talks are unaware of accurate figures, highlighting that the 2006 “TRNC census” with at least one parent who is a “citizen” born in Cyprus came to 132,636.⁷⁸ The US Ambassador, evaluating the same 2006 data, assessed that “‘native’ Turkish Cypriots continue to outnumber their mainland Turkey-born brethren,”⁷⁹ and that both parents of some 145,000 people with “TRNC citizenship” were born in Cyprus versus the 43,000 with both parents born in Turkey. During the COVID-19 outbreak, it was announced that out of the 52,760 foreign persons with “work permits” some 11,282 had departed, together with 28,896 foreign

⁷² Yael Navaro-Yashin, *The Make-Believe Space: Affective Geography in a Postwar Polity* (Kindle: Duke University Press Books, 2012), 245.

⁷³ Brey and Heinritz, “Ethnicity and Demographic Changes in Cyprus: In the ‘Statistical Fog’”: 205.

⁷⁴ Palley, *An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary-General’s Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004*, 67.

⁷⁵ Andrea Borowiec, *Cyprus: A Troubled Island*. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 157.

⁷⁶ Alfons Cuco, “Report on the Demographic Structure of the Cypriot Communities” (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, Council of Europe Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, 27 April 1992) <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=6916&lang=EN>, and Jakko Laakso, “Report on the Colonization by Turkish Settlers of the Occupied Part of Cyprus” (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, 2003) <http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=10153&lang=EN>.

⁷⁷ Mete Hatay, *Beyond Numbers: An Inquiry into the Political Integration of the Turkish ‘Settlers’ in Northern Cyprus*, (Nicosia: PRIO Cyprus Centre, 2005).

Hatay, *Population and Politics in North Cyprus: An Overview of the Ethno-Demography of North Cyprus in the Light of the 2011 Census*. (Oslo: Peace Research Institute, 2017).

⁷⁸ Oded Haklai and Neophytos Loizides, eds., *Settlers in Contested Lands: Territorial Disputes and Ethnic Conflicts* (Kindle: Stanford University Press, 2015), 3235-3245.

⁷⁹ Ronald Schlicher, “Turkish Cypriot Census Debate Focuses on Natives Versus ‘Settlers’”, 18 May 2007, 11:12, Nicosia 0434.

students out of a total of 56,963.⁸⁰ These numbers demonstrate that prior to March 2020 there were at least 100,000 non-permanent residents in the Turkish controlled areas. These are not people who have been provided with “TRNC citizenship,” nor the progeny of the first or even second wave of Turkish mainlanders categorised as Cyprus-born “citizens”.

To this day, there appears to be no consensus even amongst the Turkish Cypriot political leadership. As the 2019 public disagreement between Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akıncı and the “interior minister” showed concerning holders of “identity cards”:

the number of citizens was 220,000. It had been conveyed to us that 190,000 of these were in the country and 30,000 abroad, three to three-and-a-half years ago. Today the interior minister says there are 350,000. Yesterday at the assembly it was said there were 252,000 in the country. The number of 350,000 was given as a total. If this number is correct, there are around 100,000 TRNC citizens who live abroad,” said Akıncı.⁸¹

As Brey and Heinritz so eloquently noted in 1993,

Dealing with demography and population change in Cyprus, any researcher will find himself within a highly controversial field. Even presumably harmless demographic figures turn out to be politically much more explosive than expected.⁸²

The purpose of this study is not to proceed with an empirical examination. Until an impartial census is conducted, upholding international principles, such an undertaking is likely impossible.

2.2 Soft and hard ethnic cleansing: Personal histories

What the empirical data, primarily from the United Nations and ICRC sources, demonstrate is the decrease of the number of Greek Cypriots and the parallel introduction of settler communities in the Karpass peninsula. These figures can be separated into periods of *hard* and *soft ethnic cleansing*. The former is defined as rapid removal of the “wrong” population, coupled with the swift introduction of the “right” population. More indirect forms of pressure continued when the mass expulsions stopped, whereby individual families or family members would “choose” to transfer to the Government-controlled areas because of lack of secondary schooling, for example. This period, when the rate of decrease fell, is what I term

⁸⁰ “Coronavirus: Baybars’ Statements: ‘40,000 persons have departed from the TRNC,’” *Diyalog*, 17 April 2020.

⁸¹ Jean Christou, “Utter confusion over population in the north,” *Cyprus Mail*, 27 March 2019.

⁸² Brey and Heinritz, ‘Ethnicity and Demographic Changes in Cyprus: In the ‘Statistical Fog’’, 201.

as *soft ethnic cleansing*. For the sake of contrast, the 20,000 total of Greek Cypriots in 1974 fell to 2000 in 1977.⁸³ From June 1977 the rate of annual decrease of the population accounted for less than 10% and thus a very different phenomena compared to the initial three-year period of population decline.⁸⁴

Ethnography is being used more frequently in political science, as well as other disciplines. As Lisa Wedeen (2010) gracefully explains:

Ethnography can demonstrate that previous generalizations were wrong (thereby producing new ones), replicate findings (but not necessarily encounters), explicate mechanisms that can have wide-ranging application, and bring new ways of seeing and understanding into plain view.⁸⁵

My aim through fieldwork was to attach a story to the stark figures showing the enclaved community in decline. The ethnographic component of this research was mostly undertaken in 2013, almost forty years after the events of 1974, trying to gauge the perspective of the surviving members of this community – both those who remained and those who had been evicted.

The methodological basis of the ethnographic work was based on participant observation and conducting semi-structured and unstructured interviews. The aim was to collect responses from as wide a demographic as possible with the central question to Greek Cypriot enclaved being “why did you stay?”. I also wanted to know the flip side of the story, from the perspective of the officers working on the humanitarian deliveries, as well as the “settlers” who comprise the majority of the villagers in Ayia Triada and Rizokarpaso.

My “reflexive story” is that I am connected via a second-degree kinship to members of the Greek Cypriot enclaved community. My own identity has therefore been influenced by the enclavement of the Greek Cypriots in the Karpass peninsula and this is the personal motivation behind this thesis: highlighting the fate of the enclaved of Cyprus.

After the partial lifting on the freedom of movement in April 2003, Cypriots could travel – albeit with restrictions – across the island. This meant that I, too, could visit relatives in the Karpass with relative ease and even stay for a few days. Despite the provisions of the 1975

⁸³ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/12342 and Addendum1, 7 June 1977.

⁸⁴ See Appendix I.

⁸⁵ Lisa Wedeen, “Reflections on Ethnographic Work in Political Science”, *Annual Review of Political Science* 13 (1 June 2010): 255–72. <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1691305>.

“Vienna III Agreement” whereby “priority will be given to the reunification of families, which may also involve the transfer of a number of Greek Cypriots, at present in the south, to the north,”⁸⁶ families were not reunified but kept apart. Children above twelve who left in pursuit of a secondary education were occasionally allowed back to visit during holidays. However, this was the exception, not the rule. By the mid- and late 1990s a slight thaw after considerable international pressure on Denktash meant that a decision was once granted to some grandchildren to visit, and I recall being bundled onto a dilapidated old bus at the Ledra Palace crossing point, with two cousins and various elderly village women in black kerchiefs. It was the first time that I met many of the people who became the inspiration behind this thesis, some of whom even played a role through the conversations conducted.

This insider/outsider role as grandchild-villager-stranger meant that in the capacity as interviewer-scholar, I was able to ask personal questions of the Karpass Greek Cypriots. The assumption was that people would give their responses in a safe space to someone they considered one of their own. However, it could also mean that precisely because of personal affiliations the truth became even more subjective.

In trying to hone in on the difference between *hard* and *soft ethnic cleansing* I sought to know whether there had been indirect political pressure applied to the Greek Cypriot enclaved community to resist transfer and remain?⁸⁷ Did it subside over the years? Were there other forces at play? Were the Greek Cypriot enclaved under the impression that their predicament was temporary, only lasting for a few months or years? Were the enclaved of the impression that a political solution would be reached swiftly, despite President Makarios’ public pronouncements of a “long struggle” as a means to reach a “just settlement”?⁸⁸ Did they believe that upon a resolution of the Cyprus question, their insistence upon remaining in the Karpass would pay off in terms of territorial adjustments in the event of a settlement?

These were the questions that archival research was unable to answer substantively. Therefore, juggling the memories and the personal reflections of those who stayed behind, delving into the individual sacrifices made in doing so, became a methodological necessity. It was the only way to understand why despite the apt hardships – never gaining any

⁸⁶ “Text of the press communiqué on the Cyprus talks issued in Vienna, on 2 August 1975”, *Interim reports of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 370 (1975)*, Documents S/11789 and Add.1-2, Annex, 5 August 1975.

⁸⁷ Clerides, *My Deposition: Volume 4*, 297.

⁸⁸ Stanley Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 1981), 263.

semblance of full, democratic and fair livelihood in their ancestral surroundings – remained. Questioning the expelled was another important element.

Individual interviews and oral histories were taken both “on site” as well as outside the context of the enclaved villages. In the Malinowskian tradition of ethnography, I practiced “participant observation” by undertaking detailed observations of the social rituals of the enclaved, as well as anyone who interacted with them, including mainlanders from Turkey who had settled in the Karpass.

I also sought to interview UN officers involved in the humanitarian deliveries of food and household items, who almost exclusively deliberated on the “kindness” of the Greek Cypriots of the Karpass and the beauty of the landscape.

It should be noted that I tried to arrange to talk to Turks and Turkish Cypriots who had policy bearings on the livelihood of the enclaved, such as local representatives. While there was one who didn’t reject being recorded in conversation with an enclaved Greek Cypriot, requests for direct interviews were never met.

Despite multiple problems, both in terms of the time limitations on field work, the small sample size and other issues expanded on later, the participant-observation revealed a world that has all too often been ignored or only documented within a very confined narrative.

The aim of the interviews was to test the three underlying hypotheses of the project, whereby:

1. Ethnic cleansing should not be viewed solely as the “mass removal of a targeted population from a given territory”,⁸⁹ since in the Cyprus context the void was filled with a more “desirable” population. It was a modern version of the Ottoman *sürgün* “post-conquest arrangement”.⁹⁰ As such, the removal of the undesirables and the introduction of a desirable group in their place illuminates the hybridity of demographic re-engineering.
2. The population group targeted for removal would either be victims of *hard ethnic cleansing* policies or *soft ethnic cleansing*.

⁸⁹ Várdy, Tooley, and Vardy, *Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe*, 3.

⁹⁰ Vural, Ekenoğlu, and Sonan, “Politically Motivated Migration: The Case of Turkish Migration to Northern Cyprus”, 88.

3. *Soft ethnic cleansing* integrates removal and “right-peopling” in such a way that, theoretically, the effects can be dulled.

Towards this end, the discussion themes with Greek Cypriot enclaved and those who had been expelled from the Karpass revolved around three distinct periods, as follows:

1. 1974-1977:
 - a. summer of 1974 (anyone in the family among the “missing”, did the family manage to remain integrated amidst the upheaval? Were they or their next-of-kin detained tortured, beaten, raped or “missing”?)
 - b. Third Vienna Agreement (how the was agreement received and subsequent expulsion of the Greek Cypriots of Yialousa).
 - c. Introduction of the first waves of Turkish settlers; Turkish language skills.⁹¹
2. 1977-2003: Daily life, including lack of secondary schooling for children, family separations.
3. 2003-Present: The opening of the crossing points, the subsequent opening of a secondary school in Rizokarpaso and the early stages of an inducement scheme to resettle.

In contrast, I was curious to learn from the non-autochthonous residents, the settler community,⁹² their “origin-story” and how they self-identified, how their relations with Greek Cypriots developed, what they view of the enclaved family members visiting their relatives, and ultimately, were Cyprus to be reunified, would they wish to remain?

As regards UNFICYP/UNPOL officials, the interviews were more formalised in the form of a sit-down meeting, with the crux of the question being the work they performed in terms of the humanitarian deliveries, the difficulties entailed, and the relationships developed with the enclaved villages.

As for the numerous challenges presented by the fieldwork, I was overwhelmingly hampered by the problems of recollection and memory when speaking to most enclaved or formerly enclaved who were inevitably older. The aforementioned insider dimension of my status as participant-observer when conducting the field worker may have also influenced the

⁹¹ The reasoning behind inquiring of Turkish language skills was to see whether the indigenous Greek Cypriot population learnt the language of their new masters. As shall be shown later, a greater percentage of the Turkish settlers are even moderately conversant in the Greek Cypriot vernacular than the Greek Cypriot enclaved in Turkish, making Greek the *lingua franca* of intercommunal interactions.

⁹² All interactions with this group took place in Greek Cypriot vernacular. This alone, not to mention purpose of inquiry, inevitably meant the sample was self-selective.

“recollection”. Were my interlocutors skipping over details because they couldn’t recall certain events or refused to recollect because of trauma, or any other motivation?

One definite problem that arose, underlining the urgency of the enterprise, was that several people with whom initial interviews were conducted have since passed away. It meant that I could not go back for follow-up questions and clarifications. Those who witnessed first-hand the events of 1974 as *young* adults are now in their mid-60s; the mean age of the enclaved community is in fact much higher. It was by its nature a skewed sample, but that was the nature of the beast. Recording their stories is all the more prescient.

Another severely constricting part of the ethnographic component was the general political and security situation. I am an “other” in the Karpass. I need “permissions” just to go. If I am deemed a nuisance, asking too many questions on subjects of particular sensitivity about the past or even the present, I would likely have been barred from ever visiting the peninsula in the future. I have therefore disguised the identities of my interviewees by giving them aliases. The recordings are only identifiable to me via the date and place of each recording. I had assured my interlocutors that I would neither include a full transcript of these recordings, nor use their real names to protect their identities. Without these assurances I am certain that they would not have agreed to the voice recording of conversations.

I should note that technology was also unkind, as the initial recordings in 2013 and 2014 were made prior to widely available smartphones with good memory and recording options. The dictaphone let me down several times, with the sound not fully coming through or the batteries dying in the middle. Embarrassing mistakes, but I thankfully took notes, so I have handwritten records of the major issues discussed, when and with whom.

I also very much hoped that I could reach out to ICRC delegates who had worked in Cyprus in the 1970s, particularly Georg Hoffmann, whose reports are frequently referenced. He had passed away in the 1980s. It was not to be.

Due to these problems with participant-observation examination I studiously avoided relying solely on the ethnographic component. My dataset was ultimately too small, unrepresentative (more women than men, more from one village and not the other). But my interlocutors managed to put flesh on the bones of the dry reports of primary sources and some of the anecdotes they told have ended up in the final version of this dissertation.

Epistemologically speaking, tracking ethnic cleansing and demographic re-engineering is very difficult. This is one reason why even in legal fora, proving genocide (a war crime, while ethnic cleansing is not) is challenging. One awaits how the Myanmar case at the International Court of Justice will unfold, but it is likely that one of the biggest hurdles will be over the evidence presented aiming to prove genocide.⁹³

2.3 Conclusion

Examining ethnic cleansing and specifically what I term as *hard* and *soft ethnic cleansing* in the Cyprus context is a puzzle with many missing pieces. One can look at the numbers of people during certain periodic increments to establish a fast-paced and then a slower-paced decrease of Greek Cypriots in the Karpass, as well as locate sources showing the increasing arrivals from Turkey. However, because the numbers of the latter are disputed, the only route forward was a qualitative analysis, supplemented by personal interviews aiming to reach consistency in the narrative and give an indication of a general “trend”.

2.4 Terminology and Language

It is not just demography that is highly politicised in Cyprus, terminology is also. I have used Government-controlled and Turkish-occupied areas, although sometimes for the sake of eloquence, “northern part of Cyprus” or “south of the ceasefire lines” have been utilised to designate which geographical area of Cyprus I am referencing. This type of shorthand seemed far neater than the EU parlance of “the areas of the Republic of Cyprus where the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control.” A train ride of a sentence. Titles and institutions in inverted commas were used when referring to Turkey’s subordinate local administration in Cyprus – the latter being the phraseology of choice of the European Court of Human Rights. Also, while acknowledging that the people transferred to Cyprus from mainland Turkey from 1974 onwards do not constitute a homogenous ethnic and socioeconomic unit, the shorthand “settler” was frequently employed vis-à-vis the autochthonous Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.

⁹³ The *Gambia v. Myanmar* (Application) (International Court of Justice, 11 November 2019).

As regards place names of the Karpass or Karpasia, I use the original toponyms in English phonetic spelling, while for the village “Ayia Trias” I also use its vernacular version “Ayia Triada.” Although for Turkish names I use Turkish spelling, for the historic leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, I use the anglicised version of his name, since he published books in English with that spelling.

Many of the original documents in the ICRC are in French. I undertook the translation into English of all references from these sources, as well as translation of all Greek-language text that has been cited wherever there was no official English-language translation available.



3. LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1 Nationalism

The rise of modernity and increased incidence of ethnically targeted violence, and the propagation of policies cleansing a certain population group from a specific territory – the definition of ethnic cleansing by Naimark and Ther⁹⁴ is, of course, based on the notion that modernity goes hand-in-hand with the rise of nationalism and the narrow construct of the nation-state peopled by a singular ethnic group. Drawing on this, violence against a population group is no longer described along religious or social-class lines but based almost exclusively on ethnic markers. The state, which has “monopoly on legitimate use of physical force,” as Weber contends, thus has the ability to turn against or encourage turning against sections of its own people or on another state’s population, while making the case for legitimacy in these actions.⁹⁵ Beyond the army, private forces can be used too, as long as they are legitimised by the state. Thus, paramilitary groups which frequently carried out ethnic cleansing on non-Serbs in the Yugoslav conflict, for example, were, similarly to the SA in Nazi Germany, state-sanctioned and often state-trained and funded. Especially in Europe, nationalism seeped into the people and imagined communities were constructed in the form of so-called nation-states by the early/mid-eighteenth century, and organic conceptions of the nation had abounded on the continent by the mid-nineteenth century.⁹⁶ By the twentieth century, nationalism had been exported successfully to much of the world, together with the violence that would be undertaken in the name of the nation state and using more conducive means towards this end that modernity was able to provide. But nationalism was used to fuel not only conflict between nation-states, but also the homogenisation of nation-states, where minority communities were seen to impede the nationalist nation-building enterprise. The ethnic purification of a territory included transfer/deportation of targeted populations, as well as their extermination at a far greater scale than evidenced in pre-modernity. If that did not work, secession or partition were the options assumed to bring about homogenisation and thus allay ethnic divisions.⁹⁷

⁹⁴ Norman M. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*.

Philipp Ther, *The Dark Side of Nation-States: Ethnic Cleansing in Modern Europe* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2014).

⁹⁵ Max Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. and trans. by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Abingdon: Routledge, 1991), 78.

⁹⁶ Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*, 55.

⁹⁷ Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 589.

3.2 Ethnic cleansing and its distinction from genocide

It was not until the 1990s and the breakup of the former Yugoslavia that the term “ethnic cleansing” entered regular discourse,⁹⁸ a verbatim translation of the Serbo-Croatian phrase *etničko čišćenje*. Since then it has been applied to the Caucasus, Africa (especially Somalia and Rwanda), as well as Asia. Despite gaining prominence in journalistic and academic discourse in the past twenty years, the Serbo-Croatian phrase was used as far back as 1941 by the Ustaša, the Croatian extreme nationalists, who in a blueprint documented their intention to kill one-third of Serbs, expel another third, and convert the remainder to Catholicism. Thus, while the term “ethnic cleansing” may already be in its seventh decade of usage, some scholars such as Andrew Bell-Fialkoff have tabled the idea that cleansing of populations predates the rise of nationalism, going as far back as the Assyrians who forcefully removed “up to 4.5 million people”,⁹⁹ albeit the first time that this type of cleansing took place on the basis of ethnic identity was not until the mid-seventeenth century when Irish Catholics were expelled from Ulster,¹⁰⁰ and even then was couched in religious terms.

Klejda Mulaj subscribes to the notion that nationalism cannot solely explain ethnic cleansing, as there are historical examples which precede it, while arguing that nation-state building and concerns related to state security gave rise to ethnic cleansing, as in the former Yugoslavia.¹⁰¹ Other scholars, however, contend that premodern forms of population eviction or massacres should not be overlooked. Michael Mann himself uses the famous example of Carthage in 146 BC (though a city and not an ethnically homogenous grouping of people) where a specific community was targeted with the aim of its removal from the territory which it inhabited.¹⁰² Thucydides’ *Melian Dialogue* regarding Athens’ annihilation

⁹⁸ In April 1992 *The New York Times* first used the term in a Chuck Sudetic article from Sarajevo, specifically in “Breaking Cease-Fire, Serbs Launch Attacks into Bosnia,” (*New York Times*, April 15, 1992); Bell-Fialkoff’s definition that “At the most general level, however, ethnic cleansing can be understood as the expulsion of an ‘undesirable’ population from a given territory due to religious or ethnic discrimination, political, strategic or ideological considerations, or a combination of these” was proposed as early as 1993 in Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, “A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing”, *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993.

⁹⁹ Bell-Fialkoff, *Ethnic Cleansing* (New York; St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 7.

¹⁰⁰ Bell-Fialkoff, “A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing”: 113.

¹⁰¹ Klejda Mulaj, *Politics of Ethnic Cleansing: Nation State-Building and Politics of In/Security in Twentieth Century Balkans* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008), 10-11.

¹⁰² Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy*, 37; Mulaj, *Politics of Ethnic Cleansing*, 10.

of the inhabitants of the island of Melos in 416 BC is another example of wholesale extermination of a targeted, less-powerful population.¹⁰³

Nevertheless, ascribing ethnic cleansing with a timelessness overlooks the fact that, according to Norman Naimark, the twentieth century examples are “highly dependent on the particular characteristics of the state, society, and ideology during the period itself.”¹⁰⁴ Mann concedes that ethnic self-consciousness emerged some 6000 years ago¹⁰⁵ and provides examples of cleansing of territories of its inhabitants in pre-modernity. However, he centres his argument on how it was not until the emergence of modernity and specifically democratic nation-state building – interlinking the demos, the masses, with the state – that together with democratisation led to more frequent inter-group violence than ever before.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, this violence often results in civilian populations being forcefully removed from territories they inhabited. When the population group is ethnically linked, it is derived that this is a form of ethnic cleansing. But how is this different from the cleansing of a whole ethnic group to establish ethnic homogeneity? How is this different from the Nazi’s *final solution* and genocide?

Raphael Lemkin is famously behind coining the Greek-Latin hybrid term “genocide” – merging the Greek prefix *genos*, meaning race/kind with the Latin suffix *cide*, meaning killing – before the atrocities of the Holocaust and the Nuremberg trials.¹⁰⁷ Lemkin was the driving force in what in 1948 was adopted as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide by the UN General Assembly and which came into force in 1951. However, this seminal legal text was frozen during the Cold War when countless instances of what could be termed as genocide were ignored (Pol Pot’s brutality, the US’ conduct in Vietnam, Saddam Hussein’s attack on the Kurds in Iraq are but a few examples of those times that were not dealt with). It was not until the early 1990s when events in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia gave way to legal prosecution through ad-hoc tribunals (ICTR and ICTY).

¹⁰³ The classical Greek term *andrapodismos* (deporting the population and enslaving them) is considered by Bell-Fialkoff (1996) as a prototype of ethnic cleansing.

¹⁰⁴ Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*, 6.

¹⁰⁵ Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy*, 37.

¹⁰⁶ Mann, 3.

¹⁰⁷ Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress* (Clark, New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange, 1944, 2008 ed.), 79.

Ethnic cleansing appeared as a term in 18 December 1992 in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 47/121 on Bosnia-Herzegovina, whereby the phrase was to denote it as a component of genocide: the Resolution's Preamble provided that "the abhorrent policy of 'ethnic cleansing' is a form of genocide".¹⁰⁸ However, in the case of *Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro*, the 1997 Judgement of the International Court of Justice ruled that ethnic cleansing was not within the legal definition of genocide:

Neither the intent, as a matter of policy, to render an area "ethnically homogeneous", nor the operations that may be carried out to implement such policy, can *as such* be designated as genocide [as per the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide]: the intent that characterizes genocide is "to destroy, in whole or in part" a particular group, and deportation or displacement of the members of a group, even if effected by force, is not necessarily equivalent to destruction of that group, nor is such destruction an automatic consequence of the displacement. This is not to say that acts described as "ethnic cleansing" may never constitute genocide [...]. As the ICTY has observed, while "there are obvious similarities between a genocidal policy and the policy commonly known as 'ethnic cleansing'" (*Krstić*, IT-98-33-T, Trial Chamber Judgement, 2 August 2001, para. 562), yet "[a] clear distinction must be drawn between physical destruction and mere dissolution of a group. The expulsion of a group or part of a group does not in itself suffice for genocide." (*Stakić*, IT-97-24-T, Trial Chamber Judgement, 31 July 2003, para. 519.)¹⁰⁹

The European Court of Human Rights in *Jorgic v. Germany*, upheld the ICJ's ruling that ethnic cleansing is not a euphemism for genocide:

Amongst scholars, the majority have taken the view that ethnic cleansing, in the way in which it was carried out by the Serb forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to expel Muslims and Croats from their homes, did not constitute genocide.¹¹⁰

Arguably, there was a political reason behind it: ethnic cleansing is not a war crime. Indeed, in her attack on the international community's failure to stop genocide, Helen Fein raises the point that the problem of non-recognition of ethnic cleansing as a war crime has, in fact, meant the failure of its prevention, stemming precisely from the problem related to its definition.¹¹¹

Legally, ethnic cleansing is not classified as an independent crime in international law. A United Nations Commission of Experts was mandated to investigate violations of the

¹⁰⁸ United Nations General Assembly Resolution, "The Situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina," A/RES/47/121, 7 April 1993.

¹⁰⁹ *Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro* (International Court of Justice, 26 February 2007), §190, 84.

¹¹⁰ *Jorgic v. Germany*, No. Application No. 74613/01 (European Court of Human Rights, 12 July 2007), §47.

¹¹¹ Helen Fein, *Human Rights and Wrongs-Slavery, Terror, Genocide* (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2007), 154.

Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia. These experts defined ethnic cleansing in two separate reports as “rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area,” and later as “a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas.”¹¹² However, there still is no agreed legal definition. Indeed, ethnic cleansing is a crime against humanity still insofar as it is viewed through the lens of forced deportation of a population in violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention and its Protocols, or by encompassing other acts that are prohibited by the 1948 Genocide Convention. This was also upheld by The Gambia in its application against Myanmar, whereby:

The Gambia is acutely aware that acts of genocide are distinct from other prohibited acts – such as discrimination, ethnic cleansing, persecution, disappearance and torture – but that there is often a close connection between all such acts. It is equally aware that acts of genocide are invariably part of a continuum, as Raphaël Lemkin recognised in his pioneering work, and for this reason it is important to place the acts of genocide in their broader context. Thus, when referring in this Application to Myanmar’s acts of persecution and other violations of international law that have been committed against the Rohingya, The Gambia’s case is based on those aspects constituting genocidal acts under the Genocide Convention.¹¹³

The debate in academia regarding the similarities and differences between ethnic cleansing and genocide looms large in various disciplines from history to sociology and political science. Some view it as a component of genocide, with a difference in scale (Mann),¹¹⁴ some as a stepping-stone that may lead towards genocide (Browning, Lieberman),¹¹⁵ or a nuanced distinction whereby the onus lies on whether or not there was intention to commit genocide (Naimark, Schabas).¹¹⁶ Most, however, agree that the forced dislocation of an ethnic group from a particular territory can be defined as ethnic cleansing.

First of all, when does pressured migration become forced migration, and when does forced migration become ethnic cleansing? Thereafter, when does ethnic cleansing become

¹¹² United Nations Secretary-General’s letter to the Security Council, S/25274, 10 February 1993.

United Nations Secretary-General’s letter to the Security Council, S/1994/674, 27 May 1994.

¹¹³ *The Gambia v. Myanmar* (Application) (International Court of Justice, 11 November 2019).

¹¹⁴ Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy*.

¹¹⁵ Christopher R. Browning, *The Path to Genocide: Essays on Launching the Final Solution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

Benjamin David Lieberman, *Terrible Fate: Ethnic Cleansing in the Making of Modern Europe* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006).

¹¹⁶ Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*.

William A. Schabas, *Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

genocide? Christopher Browning has written extensively of the Nazis' "demographic engineering" that commenced with the persecution of Europe's Jews, and went through a phase of ethnic cleansing and ended with genocide, the Final Solution.¹¹⁷ Browning looks at a process arguing that once ethnic cleansing has taken place, genocidal killing – the Shoah – commences; one bleeds into the other.

Others, however, argue that not all forms of ethnic cleansing are synonymous with or leads to the total liquidation of a group (composed of members with similar signifiers such as ethnic or religious identity). Furthermore, there are those who underscore that not all genocide derives from ethnic cleansing; the literature on the subject denotes a difference. Naimark accentuates this point by stating that "ethnic cleansing and genocide are distinguishable only by the ultimate intent."¹¹⁸ He defines genocide as the "intentional killing of part or all of an ethnic, religious, or national group," while denoting that ethnic cleansing is the removal of a people "and often all traces of them from a concrete territory."¹¹⁹ He concedes, however, that ethnic cleansing potentially can lead to genocide.¹²⁰ Therefore, according to Naimark, while not all ethnic cleansing will bleed into genocide, ethnic cleansing could be a step towards genocide.

Fein provides even more nuance to the definition of ethnic cleansing, whereby it is either an alternative, a step towards, or "the means of genocide."¹²¹ Mann, however, espouses that ethnic cleansing is the "removal by members of one [ethnic group that "defines itself or is denied by others as sharing common descent and culture"] of another such group from a locality they define as their own."¹²² Mann thus sees genocide as a *subcategory* of ethnic cleansing.

Meanwhile, Mulaj argues that there are core differences between large-scale ethnic cleansing and genocide: while members of the targeted groups in campaigns of ethnic cleansing may be murdered in the process, the aim is not to kill,¹²³ unlike in the instance of genocide.

¹¹⁷ Browning, *The Path to Genocide*.

--- *Nazi Policy, Jewish Workers, German Killers* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

---and Jürgen Matthäus. *The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939-March 1942* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), 35,

¹¹⁸ Naimark, 3.

¹¹⁹ Naimark, 3.

¹²⁰ Naimark, 15.

¹²¹ Naimark, 152.

¹²² Mann, 11.

¹²³ Mulaj, 3-4.

This idea is also echoed by historian Philipp Ther who reasons that the aim of ethnic cleansing is to remove a population from an area and not to “murder and destroy a population group”.¹²⁴ He pinpoints flight, expulsions and deportations all as elements of ethnic cleansing as well as “contractually arranged forced resettlements”, to which he adds that the term “population exchange” is one euphemism used by ethnic-cleansing proponents.¹²⁵

Indeed, another variant is the number of those killed in the process, with the scale of murder during ethnic cleansing being significantly smaller than genocide, where the physical destruction of a group is the aim. Várdy et al. suggest that “genocide” is “the planned, directed, and systematic extermination of a national or ethnic group”, differentiating it from “ethnic cleansing” which is the “mass removal of a targeted population from a given territory, including forced population exchanges of peoples from their original homelands as well as other means,” therefore also connecting the targeted group and the locality from which they are expelled.¹²⁶

The French historian Jacques Sémelin notes that genocide

comes within the same destructivity continuum as ethnic cleansing but is essentially distinguishable from it. Their respective dynamics are indeed both aimed at eradication. However, in the case of ethnic cleansing, the departure or flight of the targeted population is still possible, while in that of genocide, all ways out are barred.¹²⁷

He argues that genocide aims at the “total eradication of a community,”¹²⁸ whereas ethnic cleansing may not even be the aim, merely a consequence of violence.¹²⁹

Toal and Dahlman, investigating the Bosnian example, give a geopolitical dimension to the term, denoting it as part of a “larger strategic vision”, whereby an out-group is removed, from a location that is being “ethnicised”, as it is claimed as a national homeland that “‘belong’ to certain groups” but not others, who are thus expelled violently and thereafter

¹²⁴ Ther, *The Dark Side of Nation-States*, 1.

¹²⁵ Ther, 1-2.

¹²⁶ Várdy, Tooley, and Vardy, *Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe*, 3.

¹²⁷ Jacques Sémelin, “What Is Genocide?” *European Review of History* 12, no. 1 (March 2005): 81–89, doi.org/10.1080/13507480500047837.

¹²⁸ Sémelin, “What Is Genocide?”.

¹²⁹ Jacques Sémelin, “Analysis of a Mass-Crime. Ethnic Cleansing in the Former Yugoslavia (1991-1999),” in *Spectre of Genocide: Mass Murder in a Historical Perspective*, eds. Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan, (Cambridge: University Cambridge Press, 2003), 353-370.

this out-group's "historic presence" is also erased with them, with the view of homogenisation of the homeland, which they term as "ethnoterritorialism",¹³⁰ signifying "erasure and refoundation on purely ethnic lines."¹³¹

Regardless of the various nuance given to the terms, there is one aspect that unifies them: the end-result of both genocide and ethnic cleansing is homogenisation. With the spread of nationalism taking on a racially/ethnically purified form, this is one reason why in modernity the population transfers and even mass killings of out-groups has become so widespread and have taken place at such a massive scale.¹³² Naimark contends it was the Balkan Wars and World War I that brought about "forced deportation and population exchange" at a mass scale and made it a "regular part of peacemaking as well as warmaking."¹³³ This he states as a contrast to events marked in the past where population removal had occurred. The twentieth century, along with modernity, made such phenomena easier and more frequent; rather than an oddity, Naimark arguably contends that it has almost become the norm in violent conflict.

3.3 Modern ethnic cleansing

The modern nation-state is capable of a level of unprecedented organisation and control. Together with a nationalist project abused by politicians using the 'ancient hatreds argument' to further their own political ends and consolidate power, and the help of technological means not available beforehand, *ethnic* homogenisation within state territory in the twentieth century is arguably vastly different from previous iterations, argues Norman Naimark.¹³⁴ This was history from the above, with political elites ultimately responsible. Bell-Fialkoff agrees with Naimark that the advancement of technology has meant that both the means to deport populations, as well as ridding them, have become faster and easier.¹³⁵

Mann takes this argument further by giving particular emphasis to democratisation and the rise of the majority, in ethnic terms, trumping class or other divisions in terms of social stratification. His eight-part thesis on how ethnic cleansing arises has modernity at its core,

¹³⁰ Gerard Toal and Carl T. Dahlman, *Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and Its Reversal* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 5.

¹³¹ Toal and Dahlman, *Bosnia Remade*, 6.

¹³² Naimark, 7.

¹³³ Naimark, 9.

¹³⁴ Naimark, 6.

¹³⁵ Naimark, 9; Bell-Fialkoff, *Ethnic Cleansing*.

but most importantly, the “dark side of democracy” to explain the greater frequency at which cleansing takes place now than ever before.

As previously mentioned, for Mann genocide forms a sub-category of ethnic cleansing, because he argues that the variable is the level and the force of the violence. He argues that ethnic cleansing encompasses violent repression on an increasing scale, from pogroms and communal riots, to unpremeditated mass deaths as part of a “callous” or civil war termed “ethnocide”, to premeditated mass killing, that is, genocide.¹³⁶ The fact that the modern phenomenon of cleansing is based on ethnic identity, rather than other markers related to class or religion is, according to Mann, a result of the fact that “ethnicity trumps class as the main social stratification.”¹³⁷ Mann’s inclusion of ethnic cleansing into a spectrum that ends with genocide indicates his all-encompassing, broad view, unlike other scholars such as Naimark whose focus is more nuanced and distinguishes ethnic cleansing from genocide.

Hannah Arendt was seminal in highlighting the association between modernity and genocide.¹³⁸ She drew on the fact that the totalitarian state was able to utilise modern technology and communications for mass mobilisation, propaganda, but also ultimately making wide-scale genocide and terror not only possible, but the outcome.

While it is obvious how a totalitarian state, which has all means at its disposal can easily execute genocide, Mann’s 2005 thesis points to the role of nationalist and democratisation ideologies in generating organic conceptions of the nation and the state in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and subsequently an escalating targeting of groups with violence and removal of populations. Nationalism entwined the *demos* with the dominant ethnos, leading to forms of democratic nation state-building that, according to Mann, produced and legitimised attacking ethnic minority populations – the “dark side of democracy.” Although it has been argued that it was the nation-state and not democracy that gave rise to what he broadly defines as ethnic cleansing (as discussed previously, that is anything from pogroms to genocide), he proposes the thesis that states in the process of democratisation are more likely to commit such acts of cleansing than stable authoritarian states, with Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s USSR deemed as the exceptions.¹³⁹

¹³⁶ Mann, 12.

¹³⁷ Mann, 5.

¹³⁸ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, (London: Penguin UK, 1951; 2017 reprint).

¹³⁹ Mann, 4. Mann further states that the Nazi and Communist examples of ethnic cleansing and genocide should also be seen in the light of states that initially emerged in democratising contexts.

Naimark offers a different take, whereby the cover of war allows rulers to carry out ethnic cleansing, something which in peacetime they may not have effected or would not have been able to implement.¹⁴⁰ One example he suggests is how the NATO bombing of Kosovo that commenced in March 1999 merely fuelled Milosevic's ethnic cleansing that had started a few months beforehand, instead of putting a stop to it.¹⁴¹

“Μόχθος δ'εκ μόχθων ᾗσσει” (trouble from trouble came) in *Iphigenia in Tauris* is an apt quotation, how violence begets violence. Stathis Kalyvas makes the case against the simplicity with which civil wars have been examined, resulting in the argument that political actors are viewed “as unitary and a derivation of individual motives from the decisions of elites along the ‘modular’ themes of religion, ethnicity, or class”.¹⁴² He propagates that even in ethnic wars, violence is not “necessarily ethnic” and that including microlevel inquiry into a multi-layered analysis sheds light on why in certain cases violence is unconstrained while in other circumstances it is rampant, regardless of the simplistic grievances sometimes prescribed to explaining the conflict.

Within this overall context, Donald Horowitz is one of the strongest voices against enforced partition or secession. He argues that “the only thing secession and partition are unlikely to produce is ethnically homogenous or harmonious states.”¹⁴³ In viewing the post-1974 history of Cyprus, it is arguable that Horowitz' thesis is not completely off the mark, especially when one examines relations in the Turkish-occupied areas between autochthonous Turkish Cypriots and settlers from mainland Turkey.

3.4 Working Definition of Ethnic Cleansing: Hard and Soft Ethnic Cleansing

What a synthesis of genocide and ethnic cleansing showcases, despite the aforementioned distinct analyses of either and both, is that at the core the policies target an unwanted population group for removal from a particular area. Genocide incurs the extermination of

¹⁴⁰ Naimark, 188.

¹⁴¹ Naimark, 175 and 188.

¹⁴² Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 390.

¹⁴³ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 589.

the targeted group, its destruction “in whole or in part”, as characterised by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

The working definition for ethnic cleansing, for the purpose of this doctorate, is the dissolution of the targeted group by their expulsion from a particular geographical area, or the creation of a hostile environment via small-scale violence or intimidation barring the inability of the remaining targeted population from living a full and dignified life as a community. While killings and physical destruction of property may take place, the aim is not to kill, unlike with genocide which incurs this intention.

A point that has not been adequately examined in the literature on ethnic cleansing is the variance in the modalities and the phasing of rendering an area ethnically homogenous. While the swift removal of an undesired population (a targeted ethnic group) in a relatively short time-span is generally accepted as the modality whereby ethnic cleansing takes place, the consistent decrease of the undesired and targeted population, pushing them out in smaller units, over a much larger period of time should also be brought under the ethnic cleansing umbrella, while acknowledging its distinct modality acknowledged.

James Ron has used the term *soft ethnic cleansing* to describe the incendiary pressures subjected on a certain ethnic group by hostile administrations via “ethnic harassment”¹⁴⁴ or “ethnic policing”.¹⁴⁵ To juxtapose the hostile environment created to enable conditions where a dignified life by the targeted and undesired group under circumstances of *soft ethnic cleansing*, the term *hard ethnic cleansing* is an apt definition of the targeted and swift removal of a population from a specific territory. Nuancing the definition assists in understanding ethnic cleansing not as a monolithic and linear process, solely aimed at removal of a targeted group, but a hybrid enterprise of demographic re-engineering. It can also accommodate an organic and less pernicious potential reversal of the expulsion of a targeted group, not by revenge policies, but because a targeted population is able to regenerate naturally through increased births or through the resettlement of those expelled.

A more complex and nuanced understanding of ethnic cleansing thus allows for a better conceptual grasp of ethnic cleansing that could be found to be pertinent in explaining what took place in the Karpass peninsula of Cyprus after 1974, but also in various other regions

¹⁴⁴ Ron, *Frontiers and Ghettos*, 82-84.

¹⁴⁵ Ron, *Frontiers and Ghettos*, 190.

of the world, especially once acute *hard ethnic cleansing* policies gave way to less headline-grabbing hostile environment through *soft ethnic cleansing*.

3.5 Cyprus

The literature dealing with ethnic cleansing in Cyprus is neither extensive, nor detailed, and often remains partisan. Bell-Fialkoff's 1996 seminal work included a whole chapter on Cyprus, arguing that "relations between the two communities began to sour during the War of Greek Independence in the 1820s, when a number of Greek Cypriots fought against the Turks of the mainland", including the repercussion from the Ottoman authorities' execution of Cyprus' Archbishop and several bishops "accused of supporting the revolt".¹⁴⁶ He then traces the deterioration of the situation to the aspirations of the Greek Cypriots for *enosis*, where one year before Cyprus' 1960 independence, he posits that 500 people died, with only 60 being Turkish Cypriots. Bell-Fialkoff adds that more than 30 villages had been destroyed, leading to the displacement of 6000 Turkish Cypriots "according to some accounts".¹⁴⁷ He notes the counter-insurgency by Turkish Cypriots calling for partition of Cyprus targeting Greek Cypriots, while anti-Greek riots took place in Turkey in September 1955. Bell-Fialkoff continues his historical overview by remarking that the intercommunal violence that commenced in December 1963 eventually led to "hostilities [that] engulfed the entire island" concentrating on the Turkish Cypriot victims – who had fled or had been forced out of 103 villages, with 500 having been killed, and "1,000 wounded, and 200 missing" as he cites Rauf Denktash.¹⁴⁸ Bell-Fialkoff fails to mention how many Greek Cypriots were displaced, went missing or were wounded in this same period. In the post-Turkish invasion period, Bell-Fialkoff concentrates almost solely on the Greek Cypriot community – 200,000 refugees, 1,619 missing (the historically cited figures), while also noting that at the time of writing some 65,000 Turkish mainland settlers had been moved to Cyprus in order to "strengthen the Turkish element in the northern part of the island."¹⁴⁹ Bell-Fialkoff's sweeping summary propels one to look at Cyprus' ethnic cleansing history in two categories, whereby in pre-1974 the Turkish Cypriots were the victims and in a post-1974 it was the Greek Cypriots. Bell-Fialkoff's wide-ranging book examines various other examples (Bosnia, Transylvania and Sri Lanka among others) to underscore his argument that ethnic cleansing has always taken place and is not limited to geographical areas or cultures. He

¹⁴⁶ Bell-Fialkoff, *Ethnic Cleansing*, 138-139.

¹⁴⁷ Bell-Fialkoff, 140.

¹⁴⁸ Rauf Denktash, *The Cyprus Triangle* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982).

¹⁴⁹ Bell-Fialkoff, 142.

uses large brush strokes, avoids examples of genocide, while also overlooking some of the varied nuances in his case-studies.

In the Cyprus chapter, Bell-Fialkoff uses as his sources Denktash for the Turkish Cypriot community or the Republic of Cyprus' Press and Information Office for events negatively impacting the Greek Cypriot community. While the figures he gives are aligned to accepted numbers, some have since been revised, especially those related to the missing persons in light of the excavations and exhumations that have since been conducted by the Committee on Missing Persons, Cyprus' bicomunal body entrusted with a mandate to "recover, identify, and return to their families, the remains of 2002 persons (492 Turkish Cypriots and 1,510 Greek Cypriots) who went missing during the inter-communal fighting of 1963 to 1964 and the events of 1974."¹⁵⁰

Since 1964, Security Council resolution 186 (1964) has mandated the deployment of UN Peacekeeping troops to Cyprus, otherwise known as the UN Force in Cyprus, or UNFICYP.¹⁵¹ For more than half a century, UNFICYP has collected figures pertaining to the victims of violence and reported them for the public record to the Security Council (more frequently, sometimes daily or hourly, when the violence was at its worst). The ICRC's open archives also documented these instances of violence, and especially in the 1974-1977 period arguably with better access than UNFICYP, whose freedom of movement was more restricted than the delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. The most substantial institutional examinations on the issue of the introduction of settlers were conducted in 1994 and 2003 by Council of Europe Special Rapporteurs Cuco¹⁵² and Laakso¹⁵³ who both called for an impartial census in the face of the demographic re-engineering taking place in Cyprus.

Richard A. Patrick's doctoral thesis *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict: 1963-1971* details in great depth incidents of fatal violence in Cyprus (mostly intercommunal but also the rarer intra-communal political killings). Patrick's analysis ends in 1971, thus not accounting for the 1974 period. It is a stark and often very surgical description of Cyprus' early years of independence and the brewing tensions between the two communities. Based on contemporary

¹⁵⁰ "About the CMP," Committee on Missing Persons, accessed 14 August 2015, <http://www.cmp-cyprus.org/content/about-cmp-0>.

¹⁵¹ United Nations Security Council Resolution, S/RES/186, 4 March 1964.

¹⁵² Cuco, "Report on the Demographic Structure of the Cypriot Communities".

¹⁵³ Laakso, "Report on the Colonization by Turkish Settlers of the Occupied Part of Cyprus".

newspaper articles, UN figures, and interviews with key actors in both communities, Patrick's analysis is a comprehensive document of what had preceded the complete physical segregation of Cyprus' two communities upon the 1974 invasion by Turkey. It laid down a narrative of increasing fragmentation of Cypriot society. It is most valuable not in its theoretical framework and conclusions, but in the fastidious minuting of events, including his summary that by 1970 there were already "a few hundred" Greek Cypriots who had fled or been ousted from their homes, as well as "about 20,000 Turkish-Cypriots who were registered as refugees with Turkish-Cypriot welfare authorities."¹⁵⁴

The Heart Grown Bitter: A Chronicle of Cypriot War Refugees, Loizos' second book on Cyprus aimed at detailing the experience of displacement of the Greek Cypriots of Argaki and "to commemorate the village of Argaki and its people."¹⁵⁵ It is a temoinage, bearing witness to the villagers' plight and is more personal in tone, "because the formal impersonality of [his previous book] *The Greek Gift* seemed inappropriate for the subject matter of this book."¹⁵⁶ In other words, Loizos found the contemporary conventions of anthropological study inadequate to write about 1974 displacement of an entire community he had initially researched while in their village before the upheaval brought on by war. The significant value of this work, first published in 1981, was the author's revisiting of the central characters and documenting their plight just a few months after their displacement, thus illuminating feelings yet to be overwrought by memory, politics and sentimentality.

Loizos documents that for most of his subjects the "Turkish advance had to be *visible* before it was *credible*" for them to pack up and depart.¹⁵⁷ Some thirty mostly elderly people remained even after the village came under Turkish occupation,¹⁵⁸ but were eventually expelled.

Roger Zetter also worked extensively with Greek Cypriot refugees both in the immediate aftermath of the invasion, as documented in 1986 in "Rehousing the Greek-Cypriot Refugees From 1974,"¹⁵⁹ and in his 1998 article "'We Are Strangers Here': Continuity and Transition:

¹⁵⁴ Richard A. Patrick, *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict: 1963-1971* (Department of Geography Publication Series 4. Waterloo, Iowa: University of Waterloo Press, 1976), 74-75.

¹⁵⁵ Peter Loizos, *The Heart Grown Bitter: A Chronicle of Cypriot War Refugees*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), ix.

¹⁵⁶ Loizos, *The Greek Gift: Politics in a Cypriot Village* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975).

¹⁵⁷ Loizos, *The Heart Grown Bitter*, 205.

¹⁵⁸ Loizos, 107.

¹⁵⁹ Roger Zetter, "Rehousing the Greek-Cypriot Refugees From 1974" in *Cyprus in Transition: 1960-1985*, John T. A. Koumoulides, ed., (London: Trigraph, 1986).

The Impact of Displacement and Protracted Exile on the Greek Cypriot Refugees.”¹⁶⁰ Both pieces complement Loizos’ analysis of the trauma of the immediate aftermath of displacement by giving valuable understanding from a psychological viewpoint of the displaced persons’ feelings of loss after fleeing their villages and town.¹⁶¹ This type of analysis is useful in that it brings insight to the victims of *hard ethnic cleansing*, those who without much advance warning, had to abandon their homes and livelihoods. It also underscores some of Loizos’ findings that many held that their displacement was temporary, since they believed in imminent return, while with protracted “exile” the desire to return remained, even though they had built new lives, homes and communities. The very concentrated examples of especially Maronite Cypriot resettlement of their ancestral villages in the Turkish-occupied area, shows that links with ancestral villages of communities where the enclaved remained is very strong. If the political decisions are there to allow and to facilitate, those who have endured *soft ethnic cleansing* may be the conduits of mitigating such an enterprise.¹⁶²

There is a wealth of primary and secondary sources documenting displacement, the missing, as well as the plight of the Greek Cypriot enclaved, especially by the humanitarian agencies on the ground such as UNFICYP and the ICRC. But frequently these are dry, institutionalised accounts. Furthermore, the “facts” and “figures” are often approximations as events would develop more rapidly than fact-checking could verify. This dissertation relies on these documents as an indication of the scale of the uprooting, the pace at which it happened and data from the ground to make the case that ethnic cleansing can take place over decades, but it can be compartmentalised into a period of mass-expulsions in the form of *hard ethnic cleansing* and more subtle forms of discrimination, harassment and intimidation that ends with further demographic homogenisation of an area. How from 20,000 Greek Cypriots in September 1974,¹⁶³ by June 1977 there were only 2,000 left in the area of Cyprus under Turkish occupation.¹⁶⁴ Whereas in the period since then, the numbers continued to decrease, but in smaller increments (see Appendix I) to the most recently reported number of 328.¹⁶⁵ This latter period is characterised by *soft ethnic cleansing*. This is a term that has been used by James Ron in the Serbian context to describe conditions where a certain ethnic group is not subjected to

¹⁶⁰ Roger Zetter, “‘We Are Strangers Here’ - Continuity and Transition: The Impact of Displacement and Protracted Exile on the Greek Cypriot Refugees” in *Cyprus and Its People: Nation, Identity, and Experience in an Unimaginable Community, 1955-1997*, Vangelis Calotychos ed., (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998).

¹⁶¹ Loizos (1981) also alludes to similar feelings of bitterness held by the Argaki refugees and compares them to the Gwembe Tonga people of Zambia and the people of Bikini in Central Africa (203-206).

¹⁶² Stefanovic and Loizides, “The Way Home”.

¹⁶³ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/11488/Annex, 4 September 1974.

¹⁶⁴ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/12342 and Addendum1, 7 June 1977.

¹⁶⁵ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/2019/37, 11 January 2019

violence leading to expulsion but “ethnic harassment”¹⁶⁶ or “ethnic policing”.¹⁶⁷ In the Cyprus context, this policy was aptly described by the then-US Ambassador as follows:

it is clear that [the] Turkish tactic is to allow minimum school facilities in Greek Cypriot villages, thereby stimulating decisions to move south, and let passage of time do the rest.¹⁶⁸

Arguably one of the most comprehensive whole-of-Cyprus examinations of mapping displacement is the EU Commission-funded project undertaken by the Cyprus branch of the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), namely *Internal Displacement in Cyprus: Mapping the Consequences of Civil and Military Strife*.¹⁶⁹ It maps displacement in Cyprus by comparing British colonial census figures, the 1961 and 1973 Republic of Cyprus census figures, as well as later headcounts. For the enclaved villages of Ayia Trias and Rizokarpaso, the most “recent” numbers of 2006 only enumerate a “TC” (Turkish Cypriot) column, ignoring the autochthonous Greek Cypriots residing there, as well as the fact that almost all the residents of these two villages are the people settled from Turkey in the mid-1970s, as well as their descendants. Nonetheless, this effort remains to the present the most extensive and open-sourced mapping of demographic change island-wide in Cyprus.

There is also growing academic exploration of the mainland Turks who settled in Cyprus after 1974, such as Oded Haklai and Neophytos Loizides’ *Settlers in Contested Lands: Territorial Disputes and Ethnic Conflicts*.¹⁷⁰ Loizides previously examined the case of Turkish colonists, arguing that the group’s general non-mobilisation and politicisation is at odds with other examples (Israel), despite their ultimate fate in Cyprus remaining highly politicised and contentious.¹⁷¹

Helge Jensehaugen examines the demographic engineering by Turkey after the 1974 occupation of Cyprus, whereby settlers from the mainland were introduced into Cyprus with the aim to consolidate “economic self-sufficiency and political independence” of the Turkish-occupied area. She analyses a series of push and pull factors to explain how the initial Turkish settler presence came about. One push factor was the attempt to institute a

¹⁶⁶ Ron, *Frontiers and Ghettos*, 82-84.

¹⁶⁷ Ron, *Frontiers and Ghettos*, 190.

¹⁶⁸ Crawford, “Displaced Cypriots: Part I”, 27 January 1976.

¹⁶⁹ “*Internal Displacement in Cyprus: Mapping the Consequences of Civil and Military Strife*,” PRIO Cyprus Centre, <http://www.prio-cyprus-displacement.net/default.asp?id=24>, accessed 7 September 2015.

¹⁷⁰ Haklai and Loizides, *Settlers in Contested Lands: Territorial Disputes and Ethnic Conflicts*.

¹⁷¹ Neophytos Loizides, “Settlers and Mobilization in Cyprus: Antinomies of Ethnic Conflict and Immigration Politics”, Presented at the American Political Science Association, 2009.

---- (2011) “Contested Migration and Settler Politics in Cyprus”, *Political Geography*, 30 (7): 391-401.

functioning economy and fill the gaps in the labour market created by the displacement of Greek Cypriots¹⁷² The pull factors included swift allocation of “free” Greek Cypriot housing, cultivatable land.¹⁷³ Jensehaugen’s work also illustrates that the ethnic composition of the initial waves of Turkish settlers was not homogenous, as they included “Turkish, Yörük, Laz – a people from the East Black Sea sub-region; and Kurdish”.¹⁷⁴ Initially these settlers, bar a few exceptions, were directed towards the “peripheries”, including the Karpass villages, since Turkish Cypriots preferred being close to the “centre”.

In her non-academic *The Past in Pieces: Belonging in the New Cyprus*, anthropologist Rebecca Bryant delves into perceptions of both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot autochthonous inhabitants of Lapithos, Kyrenia.¹⁷⁵ The Lapithos Turkish Cypriots now constitute a minority amidst those Turkish Cypriots who had transferred from the Government-controlled areas, as well as settlers from Turkey who now reside in the formerly mixed village. Bryant also co-authored the aforementioned PRIO project entitled “Internal Displacement” as regards Turkish Cypriots.¹⁷⁶ She has argued that settlers were initially brought to Cyprus temporarily, and as such “do not resemble settlers in other colonial nationalist projects such as Israel [...] and quite a few knew little about Cyprus when they arrived.”¹⁷⁷ In her work, Bryant also details the manner in which Turkish Cypriots have distinguished themselves from Turkish settlers.

Turkish-born anthropologist Yael Navaro-Yashin was at the forefront of writing about the way settlers affected the autochthonous Turkish Cypriot community, pinpointing that prior to the opening of the crossing points in 2003,

conflict with Greek-Cypriots did not preoccupy or worry Turkish-Cypriots as much as their everyday experience of living with immigrants from Turkey, who had been granted housing (Greek-Cypriot property), jobs, and citizenship privileges by the regime.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷² Jensehaugen, “The Northern Cypriot Dream – Turkish Immigration 1974–1980”: 60.

¹⁷³ Jensehaugen: 60.

¹⁷⁴ Jensehaugen: 64, 75.

¹⁷⁵ Rebecca Bryant, *The Past in Pieces: Belonging in the New Cyprus* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010).

¹⁷⁶ ---- *Life Stories: Turkish Cypriot Community*. Displacement in Cyprus: Consequences of Civil and Military Strife, Report 2 (Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2012).

¹⁷⁷ ---- and Chrystalla Yakinthou, *Cypriot Perceptions of Turkey*, (Istanbul: TESEV, 2012), 27.

¹⁷⁸ Navaro-Yashin, *The Make-Believe Space*, 53.

---- “De-ethnicizing the Ethnography of Cyprus: Political and Social Conflict between Turkish Cypriots and Settlers from Turkey”, in *Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History and an Island in Conflict*, eds. Yiannis Papadakis, Nicos Peristianis and Gisela Welz (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006), 87.

Building on Jensehaugen's arguments on the initial wave of settlers, in *Politically Motivated Migration: The Case of Turkish Migration to Northern Cyprus*, Yücel Vural, Başak Ekenoğlu and Sertaç Sona argue that the first two waves of Turkish migration were politically motivated:

methods and motives of the first wave resemble the Ottoman massive migration policy and practice very closely. The Ottoman *sürgün* policy was a politically motivated 'post-conquest arrangement' aiming at transforming Moslem population into the newly captured territories to enable the Ottoman rulers to establish and secure their political control.¹⁷⁹

The paper presents a secret protocol "providing for agricultural labour force" that was signed in 1975, aiming at moving 30,000 agricultural workers to Cyprus, albeit one could not "identify the number of people [who] migrated to the island since there were no strict control or legal records kept for that period."¹⁸⁰ The authors underline the basic problem: that hard, double-checked and double-sourced data is not available and possibly never existed. They quote a politician's estimate that 82,500 mainlanders from Turkey had settled in Cyprus in 1975. The "provision" of Greek Cypriot housing, allowance money, as well as seeds and fertilisers did not end in 1982, when the second wave of settlements began but were less substantial. However, those introduced during this period solidified two-fold clientelist and economic motives: Turkish Cypriot politicians buying votes in exchange for granting "citizenship", while business elites gaining a cheap, less-demanding labour force.¹⁸¹ While the Fourth Geneva Convention explicitly prohibits colonisation, "it does not provide any explicit model to deal with the consequences of such state acts."¹⁸² This, the authors deem, is a "humanitarian" aspect, but they also underscore the "political dimension" whereby this population "was nothing but a clientele or a natural vote base against the [Turkish Cypriot] parties in favour of the reunification of the island".¹⁸³

There remains a lack of in-depth academic examination of the Greek Cypriot enclaved, including their experience living alongside Turkish settlers, living in vulnerable conditions whereby everyday life could be uprooted at the whim of politicians. One exceptional first-hand account of the early period of enclavement is the *Notebook of Memories: Diary, 15*

¹⁷⁹ Vural, Ekenoğlu, and Sonan, "Politically Motivated Migration: The Case of Turkish Migration to Northern Cyprus", 88.

¹⁸⁰ Vural et al., 89.

¹⁸¹ Vural et al., 94.

¹⁸² Vural et al., 95.

¹⁸³ Vural et al., 93-94.

July 1974-29 August 1975 by the Netherlands-based artist Toula Liasi.¹⁸⁴ Her diary entries, document the day-to-day existence of a 17-year old child witnessing the Turks entering Yialousa in the Karpass on 19 August 1974, the first ICRC and UNFICYP visits, the curfews, the opening of the high school in April 1975 and its subsequent closure at the end of June that same year, together with the expulsions of Greek Cypriots commencing on 27 June 1975 and the arrival of the first settlers from Turkey. Her journey as a member of the enclaved community ended upon her departure in August 1975 to pursue tertiary education together with her graduating class. It highlights the story of many families in the enclaved villages, where children in pursuit of continuing their education were forced to leave behind their homes and families, and as such bringing about a demographic unsustainability that has added to the sharp decline of the remaining Greek Cypriots in the Karpass region.

3.6 Lessons from Bosnia-Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina, with its three principal communities of Bosniaks (almost 50%), Serbs (over 30%) and Croats (almost 15%), may be deemed a more complex conundrum than Cyprus where the population of two and not three major communities (Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot) has an historic demographic balance of 80% Greek Cypriot majority to the 18% Turkish Cypriot minority.

The example of what took place in Bosnia – which included genocide – offers an interesting basis for further examination vis-à-vis the Cyprus context given also that Annex VII of the Dayton Peace Accord provides for repatriation. During the four-year war, an estimated 2.1 million people were forced out or “voluntarily” abandoned their homes from a pre-war population of 4.3 million. After UNHCR unveiled plans in early 1996 regarding the return/repatriation of these displaced persons,¹⁸⁵ due to extensive problems with unclear modalities, by 2000 only 10 per cent of the Serbs from Croatia, 5 per cent of Muslims and Croats from western Bosnia and Herzegovina and only 1 per cent of those expelled from eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republika Srpska) had returned to their homes.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁴ Toula Liasi, *Notebook of Memories: Diary, 15 July 1974-29 August 1975* [Τετράδιον Αναμνήσεων: Ημερολόγιον, 15 Ιουλίου 1974-29 Αυγούστου 1975] (Nicosia: Phileleftheros 21 July 2019; Proteas Press Ltd., 2019).

¹⁸⁵ *Press Release: UNHCR Presents Bosnia Repatriation Plan*, Ref/1131, 17 January 1996, <http://www.un.org/press/en/1996/19960117.ref1131.html>, accessed 20 September 2015.

¹⁸⁶ Simon Bagshaw, “Benchmarks or Deutschmarks? Determining the Criteria for the Repatriation of Refugees to Bosnia and Herzegovina”, *International Journal of Refugee Law* 9, no. 4 (1997): 566–92.

Twenty years on, Annex VII never realised the *status quo ante*, the mixed, integrated living of the years prior to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Initially refugees returned to areas where their ethnic group was in the majority. Nevertheless, while there is contention on the success of return and repossession, one highly significant element for all examples of post-ethnic cleansing was that the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina were given the right to return and repossess their original homes. They had the right to choose. Often, the expansive literature cites education, employment, healthcare and access to services as the main reasons for the lack of return. Stefanovic and Loizides pick the example of Bosnia's Drvar, where the pre-war Serb majority successfully regained its position, in order to posit that for resettlement to be successful, security provisions and material incentives are as important as cordial relations with other communities (contact) and the role of ideology (nationalism) that might prevent resettlement moves.¹⁸⁷

3.7 Conclusion

The literature on ethnic cleansing mostly alludes to a permanent demographic change and mostly fails to establish a nuance of the modalities inherent in the ethnic homogenisation of a specific geographic area, beyond distinguishing it from genocide (the physical extermination of a targeted population). As the subsequent chapters seek to demonstrate, ethnic cleansing (broadly, targeting an outgroup via their expulsion from an area) can take different forms, all with this intent of realising an ethnically homogenous and consolidated territory. This demographic re-engineering is a hybrid phenomenon, as it includes the removal of the undesirables and the introduction of the desirable group, or "right-peopling". Furthermore, ethnic cleansing is not a linear phenomenon, and this non-linearity may provide the opportunity for its mitigation but could potentially mean recommencement of expulsions.

Specifically, the following chapters examining the post-1974 Cyprus context will demonstrate that overnight expulsions of hundreds of people belonging to a similar grouping (*hard ethnic cleansing*) is different in its modality and potential long-term effect than the more subtle *soft ethnic cleansing*. Elaborating on James Ron's use of the term,¹⁸⁸ I argue that *soft ethnic cleansing* entails discrimination, harassment and intimidation which drives smaller units of people away, but still has homogenisation as its ultimate aim. However, *soft ethnic cleansing*

¹⁸⁷ Stefanovic and Loizides, "The Way Home".

¹⁸⁸ Ron, *Frontiers and Ghettos*.

may also be open to reversal. Exploration of this distinction within different contexts could provide ample opportunities for further research and a more nuanced understanding of ethnic cleansing, not merely in Cyprus but in various other contexts.



4. HISTORICAL REVIEW

Cyprus' location at the crossroads of three continents and major sea routes in the Eastern Mediterranean – just over 60 km from Turkey, over 170 km from Syria, less than 200 km from Lebanon and 230 km from Israel/Palestine, 350 km to the small island of Castellorizo (900 km to the Greek mainland) and 370km to Egypt – has made her a coveted location by empires, fiefdoms, pirates and modern tourists, as well as migrants and refugees mostly fleeing Syria.

Since the first Neolithic human settlements some nine millennia ago, Cyprus has been continuously inhabited and her ruins speak volumes of her wide array of rulers and conquerors – from ancient times with Mycenaeans, Phoenicians, Assyrians, Ptolemies, Persians and Romans conquering the island, to the middle ages when Cyprus was part of Byzantium, followed by the Crusades where it changed hands between various factions until finally the Franco-Lusignans and consequently the Venetians called it their own. After three centuries of Ottoman rule, the British Empire enveloped Cyprus in 1878. Even in 1960, the year Cyprus officially gained its independence from Britain, its chequered history of subjugation had not ended.

The advent of modernity and nationalism also reached the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean, which in Cyprus eventually took on the form of conflicting ethno-nationalisms. Under Ottoman rule that commenced in 1571, heavy shifts in Cyprus' demography took place, especially with the introduction of new settlers, who according to Hunt “numbered about 20,000” with about four times as many Christians.¹⁸⁹ However, both these estimates and the ratio between the island's Christians and Moslems shifted during Ottoman rule, partly, according to Hill (1952), because “the harshness of the taxation and conditions generally provoked a flight of the Greeks from the island.”¹⁹⁰

Three years after Cyprus came under British administration, the census showed that out of the total 186,173 people, 137,631 (73.9%) were Christian and 45,458 (24.4%) Muslim.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁹ David Hunt, *Footprints in Cyprus* (London: Trigraph, 1990), 227.

¹⁹⁰ George Hill, *A History of Cyprus, The Ottoman Province. The British Colony, 1571–1948, Vol. 4.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), 31-32.

¹⁹¹ Or as per terminology echoing Edward Said's *Orientalism*: “Mohammedan” for Muslims, “Non-Mohammedan” for the Greek Orthodox, Maronites, Armenians and Latins, and “Others.” Frederick Barry, *Colonial Government: Report on the Census of Cyprus, 1881 with Appendix* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1884).

Seventy-nine years later, the new independent Republic of Cyprus conducted its own first census, with the total population figure amounting to 573,566 people, of whom 442,138 (77.1%) were identified as Greeks and 104,320 (18.2%) as Turks.¹⁹² It should also be added that beyond the (eventually) slight demographic shift in terms of proportions, there was another change that had taken place in Cyprus under British rule: in “1891, 346 of the 702 population centres were composed of both Greek-Cypriot and Turk-Cypriot residents. By 1970, only 48 of 602 centres could be classified as ‘mixed’.”¹⁹³ Yet, as Bryant (2004) notes, when Britain took over the island, it saw a unified territory and a people “they called Cypriots”, even though she writes “For the inhabitants themselves ‘Cypriot’ (*Kıbrıslı* in Turkish or *Kıprıos* in Greek) was a designation of origins, but not a significant designation of identity.”¹⁹⁴ Furthermore, while there is a general assumption that all the inhabitants of Cyprus had lived in peace, regardless of religious or linguistic identifiers, by cooperating and sharing customs, values and cultural references, in 1912 and 1922 clashes based on ethnic identification and using ethnic markers as its cause had taken place.¹⁹⁵ With the advent of the British administration there came a change in the Cypriot subject who had until then been categorised according to the Ottoman *millet* system – the Cypriot subject would now become a citizen. With the change in form and mentality of the new rulers, the subject-citizen would be asked to represent oneself via script and writing, and as this was taking place so was the establishment of the public space that was being developed in parallel with newspapers – Greek and Turkish language press.¹⁹⁶

The change in the terminology in between the bookends of British rule – from religious to ethnic – spells out the sweeping changes in identity-building as had been developed by two strains of nationalism gaining a foothold in Cyprus. As Bryant summarises, the difference for the Turkish Cypriots was influenced by “Atatürk in the republican period. The Greek Cypriot version [...] has emphasized ethnic continuity (“Cyprus is 3,000 years Greek”) and the pure Greek identity of the island.”¹⁹⁷ The differences between these two communities

¹⁹² The 1946 census was the first that did away with “Mohammedans” and “non-Mohammedans”, in favour of Greek Orthodox, Moslem Turkish and Others.

D.A. Percival, *Census of Population and Agriculture 1946 Report* (Nicosia: Government Printing Office, 1949).

¹⁹³ Patrick, *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict: 1963-1971*, 8.

¹⁹⁴ Rebecca Bryant, *Imagining the Modern: The Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 21.

¹⁹⁵ Jan Asmussen, “Early Conflicts Between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot Communities in Cyprus,” in *Colonial Cyprus 1878-1960: Selected Readings*, eds. Emiliou Solomou and Hubert Faustmann (Nicosia: University of Nicosia Press, 2010), 57.

¹⁹⁶ For a more informed discussion of the evolution of the public sphere, see Bryant, *Imagining the Modern: Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus*.

¹⁹⁷ Bryant, *Imagining the Modern: Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus*, 213.

were further exacerbated as these nationalisms were used and abused by Cyprus' various elites, fermenting two major narratives of contrasting desires that led to inter-ethnic violence in the final years of British rule, at the height of the Cold War.

One of the two main strands of nationalism in Cyprus was the Greek, pro-*enosis* movement that gained greater prominence after the end of World War II when the principle of self-determination was increasingly raised in colonies the world over. In Cyprus the mainstream manifestation of self-determination was not about seeking independence, but it was embedded in the context of Hellenism and unifying the island with mainland Greece – *enosis*. The island had been offered to Greece in 1915, as a bribe to get it to side with the Allies in World War I, but Greece refused the deal until 1919, by which time Britain had no reason to stick to its initial offer.

Meanwhile, in parallel and in response, the Turkish Cypriots' counter-nationalist claim was becoming more prominent in the form of *taksim*, which entailed that Cyprus should be divided between Greece and Turkey. The strands were manifested in the religious and intellectual elites of the communities and since the schools were in the hands of the former and not under the central government, the Greek and Turkish national curricula were copied in their entirety, schooling primarily young boys in two disparate education systems, glorifying two different and sometimes conflicting national histories.

The first inter-ethnic clashes took place in the 1920s, which was also the period when the first expression of a “Cypriot nationalism” was recorded.¹⁹⁸ Nevertheless, the latter's emphasis of an atheist-proletariat, anti-imperial independence movement did not gain ground in a highly religious, agrarian society.

The offshoots of these leftist political movements would later unite under the umbrella of AKEL, that had sprung out of the 1926 Communist Party of Cyprus that was banned by the British colonial rulers in 1931. Nevertheless, while AKEL officially denounced an armed struggle for *enosis* that was supported by all other political formations and Greek Cypriot elites, it did not oppose the goal of *enosis* and many Turkish Cypriots were swayed by ethnic rather than class identity in opposing the Greek Cypriot national liberation struggle. For

¹⁹⁸ Nicos Peristianis, “Cypriot Nationalism, Dual Identity and Politics” in *Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History, and an Island in Conflict*, eds. Yiannis Papadakis, Nicos Peristianis and Gisela Welz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 102.

both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot right-wing parties and politicians, AKEL was a national threat, since it did not fully support the armed struggle, as well as an ideological menace that could hold sway over a respectable mass of people whose interests opposed a right-wing agenda. As Sotos Ktoris notes:

The separateness of the electoral basis made it impossible to establish electoral co-operation between politicians or parties of either community, on the basis of a common political or ideological platform. Even at the Municipal level it was almost unthinkable, particularly after 1946, for the Turkish Cypriots to support a Greek Cypriot candidate for the positions of Mayor and Deputy Mayor.¹⁹⁹

Furthermore, trade union PEO, which was AKEL's labour movement, had also established *enosis* as a goal, which caused a number of Turkish Cypriots who had once been members to dissociate themselves and establish separate Turkish Cypriot trade unions. Not even the 1948 protocol between PEO and the Turkish Cypriot trade union KTIBK, nor the strikes that were staged by miners hailing from both communities in the same year would lead to a united leftist front. The Cypriot left was not united since AKEL had tried to induct Turkish Cypriot leftists to the cause of *enosis*, the political aim of which was overwhelmingly rejected by the latter. However, 2000 Turkish Cypriots remained in PEO²⁰⁰ – as many as in the newly formed Turkish Cypriot trade unions – but this was because “PEO as the largest federation, could secure better terms and conditions of employment for its members.”²⁰¹ Thus, the Greek Cypriot left and its trade unions equating self-determination from Cyprus' imperial master with the aim of *enosis* meant that there was not a single organised entity or popular block which had similar political aims and truly represented all communities of Cyprus. However, *enosis* was still mostly a right-wing driven enterprise. As Christopher Hitchens had observed, Cyprus was “unique” in that its anti-colonial battle was “in part against the Communist Party.”²⁰²

In the historical context of the time, the 1946-1949 Greek Civil War between the Greek government (supported by Britain and the United States) and the Greek communist party's military wing (backed by Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania), had devastated and divided the Greek mainland, and its effects were felt in Cyprus as well. In the aftermath, Greece acceded

¹⁹⁹ Sotos Ktoris, “AKEL and the Turkish Cypriots (1941-1955),” *Cyprus Review* 25, no. 2 (2013): 15-38

²⁰⁰ Pantelis Varnava, *Κοινοί Εργατικοί Αγώνες Ελληνοκυπρίων και Τουρκοκυπρίων (Γεγονότα Μέσα Από την Ιστορία)* [Common Labour Struggles of Greek and Turkish-Cypriots: Events Through History] (Nicosia: PEO Publications, 1997).

²⁰¹ Varnava, *Common Labour Struggles of Greek and Turkish-Cypriots*, 23.

²⁰² Christopher Hitchens, *Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger* (London: Verso, 1997), 38.

to NATO, meaning that it entered into the same security alliance as Turkey and Cyprus' colonial master, Britain.

For the colonial power amidst the peak of the Cold War, communism was obviously a threat as a result of Moscow's links with leftist anti-imperialist movements throughout the world. But together with Britain withdrawing from Egypt in 1954, the Baghdad pact in 1955 (an alliance, including Iraq and Turkey, that aimed at preserving British interests in the Middle East against the Soviet's and increasing US interest) and the 1956 Suez crisis, meant that Cyprus' strategic importance grew and Britain was not about to give up its hub in the Eastern Mediterranean.²⁰³ After all, Britain had moved its Middle East Headquarters from Egypt to Cyprus in 1952. However, the British Government of Anthony Eden faced growing demands for self-determination across its colonies, which coupled with the fiasco of the Suez Crisis that had caused severe strains in Anglo-American relations, as well as domestic unpopularity, culminated in a new conservative government led by Harold Macmillan.

In 1954 Greece appealed to the United Nations for self-determination for Cyprus, but after intense efforts by Britain, with the eventual assistance of the United States, as well as Turkish collusion, the UN General Assembly decided not to consider the issue.²⁰⁴

By 1957, two years after *EOKA* (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) commenced its armed *enosis* struggle after the UN's rejection, Cyprus faced a complex situation: the majority of Greek Cypriots supported the *EOKA* struggle, the Turkish Cypriot elite upon Turkey's coaxing was calling for *taksim*, or a double-*enosis*, and Britain was resolute in maintaining its complete hold on the island.²⁰⁵

While these broad brushstrokes neither give justice to a much more nuanced narrative, nor represent the attitudes and aspirations of all political and non-political actors and observers in Cyprus at the time, the two strands – *enosis* and *taksim* – were the most significant part of the nationalist narrative, representing the island's two communities.

²⁰³ William Mallinson sums up how the "perceived Communist threat" was used both as an argument within the British administration in the late 1940s in order to cede Cyprus to Greece, but also as the reason why Cyprus had to remain under British control. See Mallinson, *A Modern History* (London and New York: I.B. Taurus, 2005), 12-15.

²⁰⁴ Robert Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 44.

²⁰⁵ Diana Weston Markides, *Cyprus 1957-1963: From Colonial Conflict to Constitutional Crisis: The Key Role of the Municipal Issue* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2001), 4.

On the one hand, there was the leader of the Greek Orthodox Church, Archbishop Makarios, who acceded to the archiepiscopal throne the same year as the 1950 plebiscite (which was organised, despite British disapproval and while Makarios was still a Bishop) resulting in an overwhelming 97.5% pro-*enosis* result. The Archbishop used this to launch a campaign to internationalise the cause. Robert Holland notes that “from the sidelines the Muslim minority watched proceedings with mingled uninterest and apprehension.”²⁰⁶ Nevertheless, as the Turkish Cypriot community’s most famous twentieth century leader, Rauf Denktash, noted in a lecture he gave in London in 1986, “I was twenty-six in 1950 when the Church organized what they called a plebiscite for *enosis*, which the British Government rightly regarded as a sham, and which Turkish Cypriots took as a calculated threat and a provocation.”²⁰⁷ It was not until several years later though, after the *EOKA* campaign had commenced, that the Turkish Cypriot nationalists calling for *taksim* organised themselves and began a campaign of violence – with Denktash being their main behind-the-scenes political agitator and prosecutor of captured *EOKA* fighters on behalf of the Crown. Britain’s role in fuelling *divide et impera* also included the creation of the solely Turkish Cypriot (Epicourical) reserve force to fight *EOKA* fighters.

The military wing of the *EOKA* campaign was organised by the Cypriot-born Greek Army colonel, Georghios Grivas, who during WWII had “headed a royalist underground organization ‘X’ in Athens toward the end of the war.”²⁰⁸ He was a known anti-communist,²⁰⁹ and the pro-*enosis* struggle under his military leadership fuelled the growing rift between the Greek Cypriot left and the right.

Although Turkish Cypriots began to mobilise in 1955 (under Volkan), it was not until late 1957 that the organised paramilitary group, the Turkish Resistance Organisation, or *TMT* was formed. One of its main leaders was the aforementioned British-trained barrister Rauf Denktash, who was Crown Counsel against *EOKA* fighters who had been arrested. *TMT* was manned and equipped from Turkey²¹⁰ and many of its victims were Greek Cypriots – but also Turkish Cypriots who spoke up or acted against *taksim*, such as journalists and trade

²⁰⁶ Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959*, 18.

²⁰⁷ Moran, *Rauf Denktash at the United Nations*, ix.

²⁰⁸ Borowiec, *Cyprus*, 31.

²⁰⁹ Mallinson, *Cyprus*, 71.

²¹⁰ Markides, *Cyprus 1957-1963*, 58; Mehtap Söyler, *The Turkish Deep State: State Consolidation, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy* (New York: Routledge, 2015).

unionists. In the comments section to a controversial article by former *EOKA* henchman Loucas Charalambous that appeared on the 1963 intercommunal killings in the English-language daily *Cyprus Mail*, long-term trade unionist Costas Karseras wrote the following, detailing the above point:

In 1958 in a show of unity and to express their will to live in the communities, Greek and Turkish Cypriots celebrated May Day together. In addition to the traditional banners some were also carrying Greek and Turkish flags. However, this could not be accepted by the Turkish extremists. It was against their plans. They needed strife, discord and conflict rather than co-operation. That May Day night the Turkish progressive sport and educational association in Nicosia was set on fire and its members were accused of selling out to the Greeks. The first attempted murder occurred on the 22 of May 1958 against the Turkish Cypriot trade union leader of PEO (Pan Cyprian Workers Federation) responsible for the Turkish section, Ahmet Sadin. Three Turkish Cypriots shot him on his doorstep. The gunmen did not hesitate to shoot his wife leaving them both badly wounded. Luckily, they both survived. In order to save their lives, they left Cyprus and settled in England (many others were also forced to leave Cyprus) where they continued to work for Turkish and Greek Cypriot friendship until their deaths.

Two days later on 24 May 1958, in a locality mostly inhabited by Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia, Fazil Ontour (also known as Sellas) was murdered. Fazil Ontour was 32 years old, married with a child. He was killed because he was working for friendship and cooperation between the two communities.²¹¹

But with the backdrop of the Suez Crisis that shamed Britain, as well as Greece in economic shambles post-civil war, Turkey now forcefully entered the scene. Diana Markides demonstrates that Turkey, through the Turkish Cypriot elite, had never quite washed its hands of Cyprus, even after Britain took control in 1878, as evidenced by how it was egging on Turkish-Cypriot elite using the municipal control issue. Turkey was consistently determined in having a say and influencing developments in Cyprus. Britain gave her the pass to do so when in August 1955 Prime Minister Eden hosted representatives of Greece and Turkey – but no Cypriots – to discuss Cyprus. Nevertheless, the conference

showed the enormous gap dividing the two NATO partners: Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rustu Zorl  stated bluntly that if Britain was to give up Cyprus, the island should be returned to Turkey. And Greece once more demanded a self-determination referendum that would amount to a vote on *enosis*.²¹²

The conference was followed by anti-Greek pogroms in Turkey that were set off illicitly with the Turkish government’s consent, partly fuelled because the Greek Orthodox

²¹¹ Comment by Costas Karseras to the newspaper article by Loucas Charalambous, “How was it possible to honour the fighters of 63?” *Cyprus Mail*, 12 January 2014, <http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/01/12/how-was-it-possible-to-honour-the-fighters-of-63/>, accessed 12 January 2014 (comments section no longer available at time of submission).

²¹² Borowiec, 35.

Patriarchate in Istanbul was accused of collecting funds for the *enosis* campaign in Cyprus. The anti-Greek feeling led to a substantial decline in Istanbul's Greek population in the following years. It also led to the end of an era of cordial relations between ethnic Greeks and Turks since 1930.

In 1957 a UN General Assembly resolution for Cyprus' self-determination garnered a simple majority. Britain, now assessing the growingly intense situation on the ground, concluded that as long as it could retain its strategic interests in Cyprus on a permanent basis, it would be willing to discuss an agreement on the future of Cyprus with Greece and Turkey, the sponsors of the two communities, who had been assisting their respective disparate aspirations by fuelling propaganda and providing arms.

The "Macmillan Plan", as it became known, provided for a tridominium of Britain, Greece and Turkey, providing for ethnically separate assemblies for communal affairs, safeguarding British bases and installations, while providing a council chaired by the British Governor with representatives from Greece and Turkey. Greece and Turkey would be consulted, as was the United States. Its rejection by Greece in 1958 eventually led to bilateral Greek-Turkish talks on Cyprus' independence, with the "discreet encouragement of the United States."²¹³

With an "overreliance on Turkish Cypriot policemen", 1958 saw more arrests of Greek Cypriots than Turkish Cypriots,²¹⁴ even though by now the *TMT* was established as a well-organised counterweight to *EOKA*, with support from Ankara.²¹⁵ This led to a severe flare-up in the violence, including intercommunal clashes,²¹⁶ which Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot community used to insist on partition.²¹⁷ The growing discord between the two communities led to the first documented incidents of ethnic cleansing in Cyprus,²¹⁸ as Turkish Cypriots were encouraged or forced by their leadership to leave their homes in areas

²¹³ Markides, "The Politics of Honour and the Greek Divide at Cypriot Independence," *Cyprus Review* 22, no. 2 (Fall 2010): 127.

²¹⁴ Preston Jordan Lim, *The Evolution of British Counter-Insurgency during the Cyprus Revolt, 1955–1959*, (London: Malgrave Macmillan, 2018), 59.

²¹⁵ David French, *Fighting EOKA: The British Counter-Insurgency Campaign on Cyprus, 1955-1959* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 257.

²¹⁶ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 262.

²¹⁷ French, 262.

²¹⁸ Mallinson, *Cyprus*, 32 and Lim, *The Evolution of British Counter-Insurgency during the Cyprus Revolt, 1955–1959*, 58.

such as Kaymakli, and Greek Cypriots fled their homes from places such as Omorfita.²¹⁹ It also caused Greece to withdraw its contingent from NATO's Southeastern Headquarters in Izmir, Turkey, while the "Macmillan Plan" negotiations were still under way.

Greece's rejection of the Macmillan Plan, due to its acceptance by Turkey, was followed by a motion sponsored by Colombia at the UN calling for a "period of self-government for Cyprus, leading to independence, with guarantees for the Muslim community."²²⁰ Nevertheless, the Iranian motion calling for talks between Britain, Greece and Turkey, as well as representatives of the Cypriot communities, was supported by the US,²²¹ but would probably not have received the two-thirds majority needed at the General Assembly. Eventually, a Mexican compromise solution passed, after the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey agreed on it, since the resolution called on the earnest desire that a solution would be reached by the parties, without naming them, in line with the UN Charter. The Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers, recognising how their relations were being affected by Cyprus, decided on direct talks. They agreed on independence for Cyprus, with guarantees against *enosis* or *taksim*.

The particularities of the 1959-1960 negotiations involving Britain, Greece and Turkey but only later opening up to the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, have been well-documented. The meetings between the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, after the initial approach in the sidelines by the latter during the 1958 UN resolution, led to further secret encounters at various international summits, which ended with an agreement under the UK's aegis on 11 February 1959 in Zurich. The main points were then refined into basic articles of the Constitution and a series of treaties, whereby Britain gained sovereign bases as well as various other "sites" on Republic of Cyprus territory and Greece and Turkey given the right to "guarantee" the Constitution by being able to intervene and restore the Government if this was infringed upon. While Makarios initially was reluctant to sign, he eventually conceded. The specifics of the Treaty of Establishment, dealing with the transition from British colony to Cyprus independence, were then hammered out by a

²¹⁹ "Internal Displacement in Cyprus: Mapping the Consequences of Civil and Military Strife: Omorfita," PRIO Cyprus Centre, http://www.prio-cyprus-displacement.net/default_print.asp?id=339, accessed 17 January 2015.

²²⁰ Mallinson, 32-33.

²²¹ Ronald D. Landa, James E. Miller, David S. Patterson, and Charles S. Sampson, eds. *Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus*. Vol. X, Part 1, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), Document 293, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v10p1/d293>.

Transitional Committee in Nicosia making the necessary administrative arrangements and the Joint Commission that was tasked to draft the Constitution. The latter had run into problems over the modalities relating to executive power and the extent of the British bases. What eventually became the Constitution and the Treaties that underwrote the Republic of Cyprus was a truncated and divisive independence protecting three NATO members' interests. As David French summarised,

The outcome of the Cyprus insurgency hammered out in Zurich and London in 1959 was an awkward compromise that gave each of the main protagonists something of what they had sought, but none could claim an outright victory.²²²

The constitution soon proved to be complicated and mired with clauses that were anything but seamless. Its core philosophy was based on the separation of the island's two communities, including the institutionalisation of power-balancing between them in the new democracy. The State Department's Cyprus Desk Officer (1960-1964) recalled Under Secretary of State George Ball describing the London-Zurich Agreements as an "impressive diplomatic tour de force" which were "too complex to be workable."²²³

This constitutionally bound arrangement meant that the aspiration for *enosis* or 'union' with Greece, supported by a great majority of Greek Cypriots, had not been realised, while the Turkish Cypriot elite who feared the eventuality of becoming an even smaller minority had responded by setting up their own guerrilla organisation that looked to partition Cyprus in two, with each half uniting with the respective "motherlands" of Greece and Turkey. Nevertheless, the agreement between Britain, Greece, Turkey and the leaders of Cyprus' two communities cheated both nationalist dreams via consociational arrangements whose purported core principle was that neither union nor partition of the island would come about. Ironically, the constitutional provisions led to more intercommunal and intracommunal infighting, paving the way for a breakdown and a renewed outbreak of hostilities that claimed lives on both sides and allowing the "motherlands" to fight out a proxy war.

The Greek Cypriot community, disappointed at the time because its aspiration for *enosis* had not been fulfilled, also had to contend with the fact that with the given constitution, the Turkish Cypriots as a minority was granted greater per capita rights. The principle, of course,

²²² French, 3.

²²³ Association for Diplomatic Studies & Training, "Country Reader: Cyprus, 1948-2004: Charles W. McCaskill, Economic/Commercial Officer Nicosia (1960-1964)", *Country Reader: Cyprus, 1948-2004*, <http://www.adst.org/Readers/Cyprus.pdf>, accessed January 19, 2015.

was Turkey's condition that the 18% minority would become partners in the new state and be able to form a blocking minority on most crucial aspects of governance, as well as the fact that they would have affirmative representation in the various branches of the administration. The disagreements over the Constitution were merely an update over the stand-off between the two communities regarding the municipal issue that presented itself in the late 1950s. But in 1960 – at a time when groups fighting in the name of their respective communities had also been known to fight each other; one pitted against the other in an ostensible power struggle, with three foreign powers at bay “guaranteeing” the new state – a pressure cooker full of hot water was now put on the boil. As Andreas Theophanous surmised, “the level of tolerance, political maturity, and trust was low,”²²⁴ creating a situation that was to explode.

Bryant describes that “in Turkish Cypriot nationalist mythology, 1963 is the defining moment [...] the first breakdown of the Cyprus Republic, when at Christmastime of that year, a group of extreme nationalists began a series of attacks on Turkish Cypriots in which women and children were shot and Turkish Cypriot homes were set ablaze.”²²⁵

However, what led to this path was the failure to meet the pre-1960 independence aspirations of the elites of either community, although for the Greek Cypriots the newfound independence was still seen as an intermediary step towards their ultimate goal of *enosis*.

The two contradicting mainstream narratives of the 1960-1963 period can be summed up thus: for the Turkish Cypriot nationalists, the Greek Cypriots were dissatisfied by the over-representation of the minority community in decision-making. For the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriot veto, the 30% representation for a population of 18% in the executive (Council of Ministers), the legislature (15 out of the 50 seats), the public service and the security forces, were deemed excessive, together with the veto powers based on community status (Turkish Cypriot Vice President, voting block by Turkish Cypriot Members of Parliament in the House of Representatives). However, despite their blocking minority status, Turkish Cypriots did not have “any specific jurisdiction over territory.”²²⁶ Nevertheless, Article 173 of the new Constitution, provided for Turkish municipalities to be set up in the major towns, a provision that had been insisted upon by the Turkish side during

²²⁴ Theophanous, “Revisiting the Cyprus Question and the Way Forward”: 38.

²²⁵ Bryant, *Imagining the Modern: Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus*, 233.

²²⁶ Markides, *Cyprus 1957-1963*, 160.

the negotiations and the only element that allowed control associated with territory.²²⁷ The process that had commenced in 1958 and was included in the Macmillan Plan, with a Commission that had been established during the colonial period, had run into difficulties with the delineation of municipal boundary lines due to the physical intermixing of the two communities with heightened urbanisation. With independence, this task rested with the new President, who was none other than Archbishop Makarios, the historic leader of the Greek Cypriots, together with Vice President Fazil Kuchuk, who had been at the forefront of Turkish Cypriot nationalist aspirations. The process inevitably stalled and the Turkish Cypriots started using their separate blocking majority to obstruct tax legislation in a power play to ensure that the President would implement all Constitutional provisions related to the Turkish Cypriots that had been delayed. Negotiations to provide ways to overcome the problem between Rauf Denktash, then the President of the Turkish Communal Chamber, and Glafkos Clerides, President of the House of Representatives, ultimately failed because the Turkish Cypriot side pulled the plug, upon Ankara's urging. In turn, the Greek Cypriot demands for changes to the Constitution became more strident. What at the time had not been known fully, only suspected, was that the Turkish Cypriot side's insistence on separate Municipalities was a first step towards partition, with the help of Turkish intervention.²²⁸

Ignoring the Supreme Constitutional Court's April 1963 ruling that Article 173 had not been implemented led to the resignation of the German head of the Court. Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriots argued that their role as "equal partners" in the new Republic was not being respected by the Greek Cypriots. Makarios' subsequent "Thirteen Points" tabled in November 1963 including provisions for a unified army and doing away with the provisions for separate municipalities, in their eyes simply proved this very point. Furthermore, they believed that the so-called "Akritas Plan" had been formulated as a way to cleanse the island of Turkish Cypriots – although it was defended by Greek Cypriots as a means to challenge potential strife and possible Turkish Cypriot partition with the help of Turkey. This plan, as Patrick notes, was based on the "assumption of a quick Greek-Cypriot victory":

²²⁷ Markides, 160.

²²⁸ Markides, 116.

The issue of local government was the one outstanding issue between the Clerides-Denktash talks of 1972. But Makarios refused to concede, which Clerides described as a "cardinal error". Clerides, *My Deposition: Volume 4*, 466.

The proposal subsequently produced by Dekleris and Aldıçasti on unresolved constitutional issues was finalised on 13 July 1974 and conveyed to Athens and Ankara, with the understanding that the negotiations would resume on 16 July 1974. The plans were cut short. On 15 July 1974 the coup against Makarios and his Government was staged. See Michael Dekleris, *Κυπριακό: Η Τελευταία Ευκαιρία, 1972–1974 [The Cyprus Problem: The Last Opportunity]* (Athens: I. Sideris, 2003 [orig. 1981]), 272-273.

Once inter-communal fighting was precipitated, Greek-Cypriot forces, which had been secretly armed and trained, would concentrate in Nicosia and over-run the Turkish-Cypriot quarter. These forces would then move on to neutralize other Turkish-Cypriot centres in turn. Meanwhile, Turk-Cypriot villages and quarters would be blockaded until sufficient Greek-Cypriot forces became available to disarm and occupy them. The whole operation was to be completed within a few days so that a *fait accompli* would confound any attempt by Turkey or Britain to restore the 1960 status quo.²²⁹

According to mainstream Turkish Cypriot historical narrative, President Makarios' Thirteen Points was the first stage in implementing the Akritas Plan,²³⁰ followed by his alleged dismissal of Turkish Cypriots from all branches of power and the civil service in 1963. According to Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots by and large chose to abandon their government posts, albeit some remained, especially in the judiciary. The fact that some remained shows that there was no concerted effort to purge the government of Turkish Cypriots, but that Turkish Cypriot nationalist elites were intent on establishing their own, parallel structures – an institutional step towards partition.

Paramilitary groups on both sides were being armed and ready to fight, only escalating the problem, and with the first shots fired in Nicosia on 21 December 1963, intercommunal strife broke out. The Turkish Cypriots left their villages and created fortified enclaves mostly in the urban areas. It also led to the delineation between Greek and Turkish Cypriot sectors of Nicosia via the “green line” that divided the city.

Patrick wrote that “approximately 350 Turk-Cypriots were killed in this period together with about 200 Greek-Cypriots and mainland Greeks.”²³¹ The hostility prompted the eviction of the Armenians in March 1964 from their homes in Nicosia²³² – once again, an early example of ethnic cleansing. Revenge murders also ensued for killings in the late 1950s, together with the taking of hostages. The British troops who had been manning the hastily drawn Green Line dividing Greek and Turkish Cypriots, were soon formally relieved of those duties when the UN Security Council mandated the establishment of a peacekeeping force in March 1964. Nevertheless, mainland Greek troops were illegally entering Cyprus and, under the recently returned Grivas, attacked the Turkish Cypriot village of Kokkina. This elicited reprisal by the Turkish air force, which did not hesitate to use napalm. The US feared war

²²⁹ Patrick, *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict: 1963-1971*, 36.

²³⁰ Patrick, 41.

²³¹ Patrick, 47.

²³² Patrick, 74.

in NATO's southeastern flank and worked with Britain to prevent this from taking place. The blunt warning in May 1964 by the US President addressed to Turkish Prime Minister İnönü to refrain from intervening in Cyprus was respected by Ankara. However, the events in Cyprus once again were used as an "excuse" to expel the vast majority of Istanbul's remaining Greek community.²³³

The "Acheson Plan" (named after the then-US Secretary of State), providing for Turkish Cypriot self-administration and a Turkish base, was deemed by the Greek side as thinly veiled partition. Meanwhile, Galo Plaza, the UN Secretary-General's mediator was sent to the island to seek a resolution and rejected partition, instead supporting further integration and a unitary state.²³⁴ The UN presence and involvement did not eventually prevent the 1974 Turkish invasion, nor massacres and intercommunal attacks from taking place; nevertheless the question one asks is what would have happened without UNFICYP's presence (a question to be posed to many who criticise the continuing mandate of the peacekeeping force on the island). The basis of their involvement, however, was a Security Council resolution (186 of 1964), which resolutely affirmed that the Government of the Republic of Cyprus had sovereignty over the island, giving Makarios legitimacy and international endorsement.

While the intercommunal clashes resulted in population movement, according to Patrick, "Probably less than 200 Greek-Cypriots from six mixed villages became refugees because of fighting or tension after 21 December 1963."²³⁵ The majority of those who were victims of this era were Turkish Cypriots, as, according to Patrick, they evacuated 72 mixed villages, while also abandoning 24 Turkish Cypriot villages²³⁶ for urban areas or places where there were high concentrations of Turkish Cypriots and which were guarded by fighters, and therefore ensured safety.²³⁷ Keith Kyle noted that Greek Cypriot irregulars assaulting Turkish Cypriots was ultimately exploited by Turkish Cypriot paramilitary units for their own ends:

Although the TMT organized the defence of the Turkish minority and there were a number of acts of retaliation directed at the Greek Cypriots, there is no doubt that the main victims of the numerous incidents that took place during the next few months

²³³ Mallinson, 40.

²³⁴ Andreas Theophanous and Odysseas Christou, "The Cyprus Question and the Role of the UN: An Overall Assessment", *Journal of Modern Hellenism* 30 (1 January 2014): 76.

²³⁵ Patrick, *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict: 1963-1971*, 74.

²³⁶ Patrick, 74.

²³⁷ Patrick, 78.

were Turks. 700 Turkish Cypriot hostages, including women and children, were seized in the northern suburbs of Nicosia. The mixed suburb of Omorfita suffered the most from an independent gang of Greek Cypriot irregulars led by Nicos Sampson who, claiming to be rescuing a Greek section surrounded by Turks, in fact made a full-dress assault on the Turkish Cypriot population. During the first half of 1964, fighting continued to flare up between neighbouring villages. 191 Turkish Cypriots and 133 Greeks were known to have been killed while it was claimed 209 Turks and 41 Greeks remained missing and could also be presumed dead. There was much looting and destruction of Turkish villages. Some 20,000 refugees fled from them, many of them taking refuge in Kyrenia and Nicosia. Food and medical supplies had to be shipped in from Turkey. 24 wholly Turkish villages and Turkish houses in 72 mixed villages were abandoned. Later Turkish Cypriots returned to 5 of their own villages and 19 of the mixed villages. Most of the moves seem to have been spontaneous and hasty, following a local incident of violence, the people leaving clothing, furniture, and food behind. But in some cases, orders were received for the people to go, and once villagers had moved, the Turkish paramilitaries, now much expanded in numbers and known simply as 'the Fighters', exercised substantial coercion to prevent returning in most cases to government-controlled areas. The necessary territorial basis for partition was being found.²³⁸

Between 1964 and 1967, there were flare-ups in the intercommunal relations between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, but mostly they were isolated events. The fact that a coup took place on 21 April 1967 in Greece and a right-wing military dictatorship by the Colonels followed is directly related. Grivas was deemed "enthusiastic" for the overturn of a democratic system of government in Greece, where it was likely that left-wing parties were to have otherwise succeeded in the May elections.²³⁹ The left in Cyprus enjoyed Makarios' protection (granted five seats in the House of Representatives), but Grivas, the former Colonel who had served the pro-Nazi forces in Greece during World War II, despised leftists.

Yet with his former colleagues and allies now pulling the strings in Athens, Grivas felt a sense of power and entitlement. Makarios still paid lip-service to the cause of *enosis* but saw that eventuality as placing Cyprus firmly in NATO hands that would erode its new-found independence and potentially establish further NATO bases on the island. Grivas on the other hand, was embittered because *enosis* had not been achieved. He was intent on making it happen, regardless of the fact that by now it was apparent that any such action would elicit a response by Turkey and in fact double-*enosis*, *taksim*, would result. While Makarios held popular support among Greek Cypriots, it was Grivas who commandeered the National Guard, via its officers from Greece. The events of Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou in

²³⁸ Kyle, *Cyprus: In Search of Peace*, <https://web.archive.org/web/20070208042536/http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main.html>, initially accessed 16 February 2015.

²³⁹ Mallinson, 49.

November 1967, according to Patrick, were planned by the National Guard. “The hand of General Grivas was obvious. The government’s complicity is less clear,” he wrote six years later, “It is, however, unlikely that Makarios expected Grivas either to provoke the incident as he did, or to mount such an unnecessarily large operation.”²⁴⁰ The incident was highly unsettling, as well as provocative to Turkey, which on 17 November 1967 had “decided to settle the problem once and for all by partition”.²⁴¹ However, with Greece succumbing to Ankara’s demands regarding the withdrawal of Greek officers, the preparations for an invasion were halted, most likely because Turkey realized that while it could eventually overrun Cyprus, in the meantime the National Guard could inflict a severe blow to the Turkish Cypriots before the Turks had managed to advance. There was no way out but negotiations.

The bicomunal negotiations began officially in Nicosia in July 1968 and, until September 1971, Glafkos Clerides and Rauf Denktash represented their respective communities. Between June 1972 and July 1974, Greece and Turkey supported the process by sending two constitutional law experts.²⁴² The Greek Cypriots’ goal in the negotiations was not only a unified state, but also abolition of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. The Turkish Cypriots were strongly opposed to this.²⁴³

Something that was to have repercussions for decades in terms of the Cyprus problem was that it was agreed that the two interlocutors would represent their respective communities and not the Republic of Cyprus or the “Temporary Turkish Cypriot Administration”.²⁴⁴

The negotiations took on multiple issues that had been confounding and problematic including, among others, the municipal issue and the veto rights of the Turkish Cypriot Vice President. One of the most important issues that also arose, however, was the Turkish Cypriot claim for the return to their houses of those who had abandoned them in 1963. The Greek Cypriot side responded soberly and adopted the position that this was achievable except for some vulnerable places such as Omorfita and Neapolis. Nevertheless, the Government of Cyprus did not proceed, despite the UN having already prepared a plan for

²⁴⁰ Patrick, 136.

²⁴¹ Patrick, 142.

²⁴² See Dekleris, *Κυπριακό: Η Τελευταία Ενκαιρία, 1972–1974* [*The Cyprus Problem: The Last Opportunity, 1972-1974*], 53-83 for the intricacies behind this decision.

²⁴³ Dekleris, 57.

²⁴⁴ Glafkos Clerides, *My Deposition: Volume 2* (Nicosia: Alithia Publishing, 1989), 225-227.

the resettlement of Turkish Cypriots, with the Government of Greece urging Nicosia to move on this.²⁴⁵ Clerides as negotiator agreed and counselled the President to accept, but the thorny issues of local government was once again a factor for the latter. According to Clerides, Makarios believed that buying time in the negotiations and not agreeing would mean that the deteriorating economic conditions of the enclaved Turkish Cypriots would pressure them into becoming “more reasonable”, abandoning their insistence of wanting separate central authorities for local governments in the two communities respectively.²⁴⁶

Meanwhile, 1968 and 1969 were marked by the establishment of new political parties in Cyprus, which despite the objections of the military junta in Greece, conducive to a healthy development fostering democracy. Until then, only the left-wing AKEL party had been a unified force – all other political matters, including political figures represented in the House, was based on personalities. However, 1968 also saw the year when “a number of clandestine organizations both anti-Leftist and anti-Government had been formed. The largest and most active of these assumed the title of the ‘National Front’.”²⁴⁷ As Patrick noted, “Militant enosisists maintained their goal of immediate union with Greece and decided to use armed violence against Greek-Cypriots supporting independence.”²⁴⁸

Initially, Makarios’ government turned a blind eye towards the National Front – or at least never went far enough to curb it – and this by no means quelled the expressed Turkish Cypriots’, as well as foreign diplomats’ fears of renewed violence. The increasing tensions within the Greek Cypriot community between groups (violent or not) demanding *enosis* and those faithful to keeping Cyprus’ independence would culminate in a plot to assassinate President Makarios, who survived. His former Interior Minister, Polykarpos Georgatzis, who had famously escaped prison twice during the *EOKA* rebellion against Britain, was not so lucky. Implicated in the assassination attempt on Makarios’ life, Georgatzis was silenced, via a bullet to his head, a week later in suspicious circumstances. He had made no secret of his liaisons with Colonel Papapostolou, a Greek junta officer serving in Cyprus.

The Greek military junta, which came to power in April 1967, persistently pressured Makarios to stay in line, but since the Cypriot President often deviated from Athens’ wishes, the Colonels began to openly support Makarios’ opponents and “began a broader campaign

²⁴⁵ Clerides, *My Deposition: Volume 2*, 304.

²⁴⁶ Clerides, 312.

²⁴⁷ Patrick, 147.

²⁴⁸ Patrick, 187.

of subversion”.²⁴⁹ The relations between Makarios and Greek government deteriorated and the cooperation between Greece and Cyprus seemed untenable. Meanwhile, in Turkey, Kissinger’s one-time student, Bulent Ecevit came to power, who favoured the idea of a functional federal solution to the Cyprus problem.²⁵⁰

In Cyprus the illegal clandestine organisation “National Front” orchestrated armed attacks, but it was not the only such group that spread violence within the Greek Cypriot community. In August 1971, Grivas illicitly returned to Cyprus and with direct support from Athens, recruited and trained Greek Cypriots who still aspired for *enosis*, forming *EOKA B* to target the government. Furthermore, there were “clumsy attempts [...] made to overthrow Makarios at the ‘political’ level as well”,²⁵¹ including an attempt by the bishops of Kition, Kyrenia and Paphos who called for the President’s resignation as he allegedly was violating Canon Law by holding in parallel to his ecclesiastical position the state’s highest political office. It points to the popularity and respect of the Archbishop-President both within the Greek Cypriot community but also within the Cyprus Church that these three members of the synod eventually were defrocked.

Makarios, meanwhile, imported weapons from Czechoslovakia in order to equip his supporters (and not the National Guard) against *EOKA B*, which had infiltrated the security services of the state. This drew a reaction from the Greek government, which was already preparing to mount a coup against Cyprus’ leader. Following Makarios’ outwitting of the Generals’ demands, the Greek junta became even more infuriated.²⁵²

Meanwhile, against the backdrop of the Cold War and tensions in NATO’s southeastern flank, intercommunal negotiations between Cyprus’ two communities resumed in July 1972, flanked by representatives from Greece and Turkey. There was agreement on the constitutional aspects, and convergence reached on the elusive municipalities issue. The Turkish Cypriot side abandoned its claim to group all Turkish villages to create integrated territories under Turkish supervision and accepted that the House of Representatives would legislate by simple majority on all issues pertaining to local administration, to be implemented by the respective Greek and Turkish local authorities. Moreover, the communal assemblies would function as coordinators of the local authorities and a public

²⁴⁹ Hitchens, *Hostage to History*, 71.

²⁵⁰ Glafkos Clerides, *My Deposition: Volume 3* (Nicosia: Alithia Publishing, 1990), 111, 124-130.

²⁵¹ Hitchens, 71.

²⁵² Borowiec, 80-82.

officer would exercise administrative supervision. Agreement was also reached on the functions of the local authorities.²⁵³

An agreement had seemed imminent but in December 1972, Makarios under the mounting pressure from *EOKA B*, rejected the deal, even though all his demands tabled since 1963 had been met.²⁵⁴ When Makarios rejected the proposal, he badly underestimated the likelihood of a coup being staged by the Greek military authorities in Cyprus, acting on behalf of the Greek junta, as well as Turkish counter-action to such a development. In April 1973, Clerides reminded Makarios of the warning by the US Ambassador in Nicosia whereby “if Greece had to choose between a war with Turkey or to oust Makarios, it would choose the second.”²⁵⁵

As Brigadier Ioannides, head of the Greek Military Police, launched a bloodless ousting of Papadopoulos and his entourage in Athens (the former placed under house arrest) on 21 November 1973, the final chapters of Cyprus’ lacklustre and problematic independence were sealed. Ioannides’ “dislike for Makarios has bordered on the pathological”.²⁵⁶

What until then had been rumours, including intervention on behalf of the US to pull the plug on an attempted coup d’état against Makarios,²⁵⁷ were now fervently being etched out in the headquarters Ioannides occupied, which happened to be just opposite the American embassy in Athens.

Around this time, the CIA was reporting on Turkey’s influence and supply of military equipment to Turkish Cypriots, counteracting Greek Cypriot domination, as follows:

Turkey trains and arms the 10,000-man defense forces of the Turkish Cypriots and provides Turkish officers to command them. Without Turkey’s moral, military, and increasing monetary support—now about \$30 million a year—the Turkish Cypriots would probably be forced to knuckle under to the Greek majority or to leave the island.²⁵⁸

²⁵³ Clerides, *My Deposition: Volume 3*, 181.

²⁵⁴ Hubert Faustmann, “British Colonialism and Conflicting Nationalisms in Pre-1974 Cyprus,” in *Nova Graeca: Festschrift Für Heinz A. Richter* (Mannheim: Bibliopolis, 2004), 16.

²⁵⁵ Clerides, *My Deposition: Volume 3*, 267.

²⁵⁶ Laurie van Hook, ed., *Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976*. Vol. XXX, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007), Document 77. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/96610.pdf>.

²⁵⁷ Clerides: *My Deposition: Volume 3*, 130–140.

²⁵⁸ van Hook, ed., *Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976*. Vol. XXX, Document 73.

In January 1974 General Grivas died of natural causes and a three-day period of national mourning was called by the Cyprus government, which had expected that *EOKA B* would cease its anti-government activities. However, this did not take place so the organisation was declared illegal in April 1974.

In July 1974, days before the coup eventually took place, the advisors of two sides, Greek Judge Dekleris and Turkish Professor Aldiçasti, submitted mutually accepted formulae on the unresolved aspects on the local self-administration. Unfortunately, these proposals were not examined because of the problems Makarios was facing emanating from Athens.²⁵⁹ However, some primary documents of the time, including the US Embassy reporting, showcase that Dekleris' optimism of reaching a pre-agreement may not have been – at least publicly – acknowledged. Upon his meeting with Denktash, the US Ambassador informed Washington that

On specifics of negotiations, Denktash confirmed that Aldikacti and Dekleris currently discussing municipalities issue. He said agreement not reached, despite Dekleris optimistic report to five party group.²⁶⁰

On 2 July, Makarios dispatched a “*j'accuse*” letter to Greece's President, accusing him and the military junta of directly supporting *EOKA B* and demanding that Greece recalls its officers from Cyprus. Four days later, the letter was published, although a day beforehand, daily *Apogevmatini* ran an editorial speaking of a coup and that the Turks would thus be given the opportunity to partition Cyprus.²⁶¹

On 15 July 1974, pro-*enosis* National Guard dissidents under the command of Greek officers staged a coup against the Cypriot government, but Makarios yet again escaped, first to Paphos and then by helicopter to the British Base at Akrotiri before being flown to London. Meanwhile, the United States washed its hands of the whole affair, going on record to state that “In our view there has been no outside intervention.”²⁶² As Hitchens summarised:

To the rest of the world, two things were obvious about the coup. The first was that it had been instigated from Athens and carried out with the help of regular Greek forces, and was thus a direct intervention in the internal affairs of one country by another. The second was that it violated all the existing treaties governing the status of Cyprus.²⁶³

²⁵⁹ Clerides: *My Deposition: Volume 3*, 313.

²⁶⁰ Rodger Davies, “Denktash on Intercommunal Talks”, 11 July 1974, 07:40, Nicosia 1313, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974NICOSI01313_b.html.

²⁶¹ Hitchens, 82.

²⁶² Borowiec, 85.

²⁶³ Christopher Hitchens, “A Nation Betrayed,” *Guardian*, 26 February 2001.

The coup was deemed a clear threat to the Turkish Cypriot minority, especially as the President selected by the junta was Nikos Sampson, a known former *EOKA* execution squad leader who had brutally murdered Turkish Cypriots in the 1963 clashes and who was dubbed the “Butcher of Omorfita”.

With Washington mired by the imploding Watergate scandal and no Western nation openly condemning the act of the coup, Turkey, using the pretext of the Treaty of Guarantee’s provision for the guarantor powers to restore constitutional order and having understood that Britain would not get involved, green-lighted its troops to land on Cyprus on 20 July 1974.

As Turkish journalist Mehmet Ali Birand described, Britain’s Ambassador to Ankara in a meeting with Turkey’s Foreign Minister during the ceasefire negotiations

kept reiterating that his Government was firmly opposed to intervention, but he did not suggest – as Callaghan was to do later in Geneva before the second phase – that the troops at the British bases, or the UN forces in the island, would prevent the operation. In other words, he made no threats.²⁶⁴

The 20 July invasion was alleged to be motivated by constitutional matters insofar as the Constitution had been undermined via a coup d’état by one of the three powers mandated to respect, uphold, and reinstate it. But two days later the Greek junta crumbled in Athens, voiding Turkey’s act of any purported legality. Sampson resigned from his puppet role on July 23 and “the Greek junta collapsed and Greek politician Constantinos Karamanlis returned from Paris to Athens to reestablish democracy.”²⁶⁵ A hurried Geneva conference was called together by the United Nations Security Council (Resolution 353) where the foreign ministers of Greece, Turkey and Britain (the three Guarantor Powers) were present. There was no representation from Cyprus,²⁶⁶ echoing the way Cyprus’ independence had been cobbled together without Cypriot agency some fifteen years earlier. However, all this time the threat of further Turkish advance loomed. US Secretary of State Kissinger finally emerged from the shadows on 13 August by talking about the need of Cyprus’ Turkish community requiring “considerable improvement and protection.”²⁶⁷ As Hitchens argued, the US administration that had refrained from condemning the coup in Cyprus, semi-recognising Sampson’s puppet regime (which included a number of extremist anti-Turkish

²⁶⁴ Mehmet Ali Birand, *30 Hot Days* (London: K. Rustem and Brother, 1985), 17

²⁶⁵ Theophanous, “Revisiting the Cyprus Question and the Way Forward”: 39.

²⁶⁶ Clerides, *My Deposition: Volume 4*, 35.

²⁶⁷ Hitchens, *Hostage to History*, 99.

Cypriot elements), remembered the Turkish Cypriots and “chose to invoke Turkish rights only when Turkey, not Greece, had become the aggressor.” A day later, on 14 August, Turkey launched another full-scale invasion.

Yet, only a day beforehand, according to Birand,

Güneş once again laid out that the Turkish proposals provide for “two autonomous administrations. For convenience, and to allay the Greek fear of partition, I shall call this a federal system. Not one, but several Turkish and Greek-Cypriot cantons can be created. Moreover, **the people of both communities could be free to live in the area of their own choice** [own bold]. We need not fix all the boundaries here tonight, so long as we reach agreement on the ceding of 34% of the territory to the Turkish-Cypriot cantons and on the borders of the main Turkish Cypriot canton which will cover 17% of the island. This area will be treated as a buffer zone and will be completely demilitarised except for the area held by the Turkish Security Force.”²⁶⁸

It was Denktash who argued, using the issue of the safety of the Turkish Cypriot community, that Cyprus’ population ought to be separated along ethnic lines. The second invasion advanced and consolidated, under Turkish military control, over one-third of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. The officers who led the charge were soon to be compensated generously with Greek Cypriot properties, from which the owners had either fled or been forced out at gunpoint. Ethnic homogenisation of the Turkish-occupied areas had taken place at a rapid rate (*hard ethnic cleansing*) but this was only the initial stage of forcibly separating Cyprus’ two communities at such a large scale. The numerous UN Secretary-General Reports that were updated almost on a daily basis initially mostly concerned themselves with the advance of Turkish forces, the cease-fires that UNFICYP was desperate to negotiate and then ensure they were observed. By August these reports started detailing the humanitarian impact. S/11353/Add.15 of 5 August 1974 was one of the first times that the mass displacement of the population was depicted, as follows:

After the outbreak of hostilities, the greater part of the Greek Cypriot population [“in areas occupied by Turkish forces”] tried to leave the area where landings had occurred. Those who remained in Greek Cypriot towns and villages were brought by Turkish troops to several assembly points, principally in Kyrenia (Dome Hotel), Bellapais, Karmi and Trimithi. After some time most foreign nationals could leave the area with the help of UNFICYP and a rescue operation by the British navy.²⁶⁹

By mid-October, however, the situation was more dire:

²⁶⁸ Birand, 109.

²⁶⁹ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/11353/Add.15, 5 August 1974.

A large number of Greek Cypriot displaced persons, estimated to be 163,800 have fled their homes in the northern part of the island and are now in the south.²⁷⁰

Anthropologist Peter Loizos returned to Cyprus to examine what happened to the villagers of Argaki. “One after another of them told me that they left the village thinking they were only going to be away for a few days, thus taking little more than food and clothes.”²⁷¹ As the months passed and the Turkish occupation was being consolidated, many of the Argaki villagers were beginning to realise that “their return to Argaki would be at best problematic, and was at worst distant, if it ever were to happen at all.”²⁷²

Not only was there mass-displacement but as early as 9 September, “the Turkish mainland authorities announced that 5,000 farm workers were to be sent to Cyprus as ‘seasonal workers’ to look after the abandoned farms and orchards.”²⁷³ From a purported “peace” operation, Turkey was now executing an occupation operation. A top secret “Protocol for Agricultural Labour Force” was signed between the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Ankara in February 1975, whereby 30,000 people from mainland Turkey were to be introduced to the occupied areas²⁷⁴ as part of the initial wave of Turkey’s settlement policy.

Between 31 July and 2 August 1975 talks were held in Vienna between Clerides and Denktash on humanitarian issues. The “Third Vienna Agreement,” has been also referred to as the “population exchange agreement” (by Turkish Cypriots), whereby remaining Turkish Cypriots in the area south of the ceasefire lines and Greek Cypriots to the north of the ceasefire lines would be given safe passage, if they chose to transfer. Turkish Cypriots had long argued that it was a legalisation of a “safe” population exchange and indeed over 10,000 Turkish Cypriots moved northwards, albeit amid reports stating the “reluctance with which many left their homes.”²⁷⁵ With this agreement, the Turkish side undertook to give the 10,000-strong Greek Cypriot enclaved population in the Turkish-occupied areas “every help to lead a normal life, including facilities for education and for the practice of their

²⁷⁰ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/11468/Add.4, 17 October 1974.

²⁷¹ Loizos, *The Heart Grown Bitter*, 105.

²⁷² Loizos, 115.

²⁷³ Hitchens, 105.

²⁷⁴ Hatice Kurtuluş, and Semra Purkis (2013) “Spatially Segregated and Socially Excluded Turkish Migrants in Northern Cyprus: An Alternative Perspective”, *İ.Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 48 (14 December 2013): 5.

²⁷⁵ Palley, *An International Relations Debacle*, 326.

religion, as well as medical care by their own doctors and freedom of movement in the north.”²⁷⁶

Despite what was agreed, the provisions regarding the Greek Cypriot enclave were not implemented. The US Ambassador relayed that the Turkish

mainland commander has shown open contempt for Denktash and Vienna III undertakings -- although we are confident these were approved by GoT [Government of Turkey] at the time. [...] an objective reading would be that while the Turkish Cypriots have received almost 100 percent of the benefits due them the Greek Cypriots have yet to gain even a small portion of the benefits theoretically assured by the agreements at Vienna III.²⁷⁷

The next two chapters will go into further analysis of the way in which the Vienna III Agreement vis-à-vis the enclave Greek Cypriots was never fully implemented.

On the political front, the “bizonal, bicomunal federation” was placed as the framework of a solution, whereby a federal Cyprus would be made up of two zones (bizonal) and two communities (bicomunal). The Turkish side almost since the inception of this phrase of “bizonality” equated zone and community – that is, a demographically homogenous and geographically contiguous zone. The Greek Cypriot official position has countered that this is not the case. Nonetheless, in the by now countless settlement-plans that have been tabled, the proposed maps have been constantly shifting towards the official Turkish Cypriot position, as have other provisions that strengthen the demographically homogenous and politically disparate zones.

The 1983 unilateral declaration of independence, or UDI, by Denktash pronounced to the world that his nominal dominion of 36% of the island was now the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”. It was the first in a series of steps towards legitimising the *status quo* of *de facto* partition, which Turkey mans with its tens of thousands of troops and financially supports through “grants” or “aid” or “loans” doled out annually. To this date, only Turkey has recognised the UDI.

Despite the numerous efforts, rounds of talks, raised and dashed hopes, Cyprus to this day remains *de facto* partitioned.

²⁷⁶ “Text of the press communiqué on the Cyprus talks issued in Vienna on 2 August 1975,” S/11789, 5 August 1975.

²⁷⁷ Crawford, “Non-Implementation of Vienna III Agreements”, 10 October 1975, 15:00, 1975 Nicosia 2999, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI02999_b.html.

5. PORTRAITS I: THE GREEK CYPRIOT ENCLAVED

“Εν θέλω να φύω με τίποτε, τον τόπο μου αγαπώ τον.”²⁷⁸

In June 1974, 173,000 Greek Cypriots resided in various towns and across 155 villages in the districts of Nicosia, Kyrenia, Famagusta and Larnaca. Nicosia, Kyrenia, Famagusta and Larnaca were mixed Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot towns, as were 44 of the villages, while another 4 were inhabited by Maronite Cypriots. The Cypriot economy depended largely on agriculture (20%), with 60% of exports of agricultural products coming from these aforementioned areas (most of the citrus growing land), where some 70% of its capital and natural resources were also located.²⁷⁹ Famagusta and Kyrenia accounted for 70% of Cyprus’ tourism sector and as far as tourism infrastructure was concerned, were by far the island’s most developed areas. The largest port was in Famagusta, the only airport was in Nicosia. By September of 1974 all of this was under Turkish control.²⁸⁰

In September 1974, the UN Secretary-General’s report estimated that some 20,000 Greek Cypriots were still residing in the Turkish-occupied area.²⁸¹ By early summer 1975, the Red Cross assessed that only some 10,000 Greek Cypriots remained in the northern part of Cyprus, mainly in the Karpass region,²⁸² an estimate reaffirmed by the UN. Around this time, the US Embassy was warning Washington that

by the end of the year the number of Turks brought over from Turkey for permanent settlement will go up to some 100,000 including the 40,000 or more Turkish troops who are serving in Cyprus and who are considered by the Turkish authorities as permanent citizens of Cyprus.²⁸³

How did this drastic shift in the demography of the Turkish-occupied areas, and all of Cyprus, come about so swiftly?

²⁷⁸ Alpha News, “16^ο Επεισόδιο: Εγκλωβισμένοι της Καρπασίας 28/12/2019 Β’ Σεζόν” [16th Episode: The Enclaved of the Karpass 28/12/2019 Second Season], 24 Hours, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0cqE1A5n4U0>.

²⁷⁹ Theophanous, “Economic Growth and Development in Cyprus 1960-1984”, *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook* 7 (1991): 111.

Sakellaropoulos, *Ο Κυπριακός Κοινωνικός Σχηματισμός (1191-2004) Από Τη Συγκρότηση Στη Διχοτόμηση [The Cypriot Social Transformation (1191–2004): From the Establishment to Partition]* (Athens: Topos, 2017), 682.

²⁸⁰ The Nicosia airport was, after a bloody fight, retained by UNFICYP and is now in the area which houses the force’s headquarters.

²⁸¹ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/11488/Annex, 4 September 1974.

²⁸² ICRC Nicosia, “Annexe II: Note: The Present Medical Situation on the Island at the Time of Departure of the MMT’s”, 9 June 1975, ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229(35-53 CY): [ICRC 8866].

²⁸³ Crawford, “Expulsion of Greek Cypriots from Turkish controlled areas of Cyprus”, 1 July 1975, 11:00, Nicosia 2090.

This rapid and drastic decrease of Greek Cypriots north of the ceasefire lines is an example of *hard ethnic cleansing*, which continued until the summer of 1977. After this initial post-occupation period, a slower decrease in population occurred via a more subtle expulsion of autochthonous Greek Cypriots. This latter phenomenon is what I argue to be *soft ethnic cleansing*, with the result that fewer than 330 Greek Cypriots still remain in the Karpass peninsula at the time of writing. This chapter is dedicated to understanding the need for a distinction between types of ethnic cleansing through the examination of what took place in Karpasia since 1974.

5.1 1974

On 14 August 1974, as negotiations in Geneva collapsed, the Turkish General Staff ordered the second phase of Operation Attila. The 28th and 39th Divisions of the Turkish Army advanced beyond the previously agreed UN ceasefire lines from the Kyrenia to Nicosia areas, occupying Morphou to the west and advancing to Famagusta in the southeast. This effectively cut off the Karpass peninsula from the Government-controlled areas. Within a few days over one-third of Cyprus' territory came under Turkey's military control. Cyprus-based delegates of the ICRC visited at that time eight Karpass villages inhabited by Greek Cypriots, between Trikomo and Rizokarpasso, underscoring that the "geographical situation of this region explains the impossibility to flee."²⁸⁴

"A handful" of people had already left Yialousa by early August, according to interviewee Gavriella.²⁸⁵ deciding that it was better to leave with their furniture than being expelled with only "the clothes on our backs".²⁸⁶ But "everybody" put aside essentials and boxed them up, as a precautionary measure, in case the order came to vacate.²⁸⁷ The Turkish tanks rolled through the middle of Yialousa²⁸⁸ on 19 August.²⁸⁹ Meanwhile, Turkish Cypriot men from nearby Ayios Andronikos, donning military fatigues, reassured the residents that the "Turks came in peace" and that "no one will be hurt".²⁹⁰

²⁸⁴ ICRC Nicosia, "Telegram 250 to ICRC Geneva", 27 August 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.007 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 7798].

²⁸⁵ Interview with Gavriella, 23 October 2013.

Interview with Demetra, 13 August 2013.

²⁸⁶ Demetra, 13 August 2013.

²⁸⁷ Demetria, 13 August 2013.

²⁸⁸ Gavriella, 23 October 2013.

²⁸⁹ Liasi, *Notebook of Memories*, 21.

²⁹⁰ Gavriella, 23 October 2013.

However, the brutality of war for civilians meant incidents of rape, torture and killings, as well as acts of revenge, all paving the way towards ethnic cleansing. On 3 August 1974 the ICRC was reporting to its headquarters that “14 summary executions had been carried out” of Turkish Cypriots by Greek Cypriots to avenge²⁹¹ the Turkish occupation. That same day, the ICRC informed Geneva of “simultaneous evictions of all remaining civilian populations from Greek villages in the occupied zone [...] without luggage”.²⁹² Days later, in the village of Palekythro in Mesaoria, 22 Greek Cypriots, mostly women and young children were shot dead by Turkish Cypriots.

Such reprisals, perpetrated by armed individuals, whether in uniform or by “irregulars”, were not targeted against individual victims, but against the ethnic group the victims represented. Loizos (1981) transcribed one Greek Cypriot woman’s explanation for espousing revenge vis-à-vis a Turkish Cypriot woman, as she explained that “when the blood is hot, *any* member of the enemy group will do for a reprisal, no matter how remotely connected to the specific issue”.²⁹³

By 20 August 1974, the ICRC was estimating that some 100,000 Greek Cypriot displaced from the Turkish-occupied areas had congregated across Dhekelia and the Troodos mountains.²⁹⁴ Some displaced Greek Cypriots were occupying the homes of Turkish Cypriots who were picking up and moving to the Turkish-controlled area.²⁹⁵

On 20 August 1974, the Secretary-General designated the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Coordinator of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance for Cyprus. Security Council Resolution 361 (1974) of 30 August mandated that “one of the foremost purposes of the United Nations [is] to lend humanitarian assistance in situations such as the one currently prevailing in Cyprus”, with UNFICYP in the role of coordinator. UNHCR’s mandate was assisted by the United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), as well as the ICRC, as it became evident that a large-scale and more organised relief effort was needed.

²⁹¹ ICRC Nicosia, “Telegram 81 to ICRC Geneva”, 3 August 1974. ICRC / BAG 231.049.002 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 8256].

²⁹² ICRC Nicosia, “Telegram 84 to ICRC Geneva”, 3 August 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.002 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 8258].

²⁹³ Loizos, *The Heart Grown Bitter*, 146.

²⁹⁴ ICRC Nicosia, “Telegram 193 to ICRC Geneva”, 20 August 1974 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 229 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 9305].

²⁹⁵ ICRC Nicosia, “Telegram 324 to ICRC Geneva”, 6 September 1974 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 229 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 9316].

The impact of the events of July and August 1974 had devastating consequences in the areas that came under Turkish control, as “a majority of villages were totally abandoned. In others the majority fled leaving behind the old and the sick.”²⁹⁶ The mass expulsions of Greek Cypriot residents contravened international humanitarian law, warned the Cyprus team of the ICRC:

this expulsion of Greek Cypriot citizens is contrary to the assurances given by the [Turkish] Prime Minister both privately and publicly, and is contrary to paragraph 1 of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.²⁹⁷

The demographic balance of towns and villages had shifted in such a dramatic way that where Greek Cypriots remained, these communities were considered “unbalanced”: unsustainable populations in terms of self-sufficiency, wholly dependent on outside humanitarian aid.²⁹⁸ Unsustainable populations, even if they are not directly expelled and subject to *hard ethnic cleansing*, are more vulnerable to discrimination, harassment and intimidation. Not allowing these communities to become sustainable, by not allowing former residents to return, is a form of ethnic cleansing. It is *soft ethnic cleansing*, more indirect than expulsion orders handed over by people carrying weapons.

5.2 Release of POWs as modality to pursue ethnic homogenisation?

In early August 1974, the Government of Cyprus had already declared that it was “prepared to liberate immediately all Turkish civilian detainees in its hands [...] provided that the other side is prepared to do the same.”²⁹⁹ The Government’s position relayed to Ankara stated that POWs

shall return with their families to their homes and be given all facilities to do so immediately. Permanent security of life and property should be assured to Greek Cypriots living in Turkish controlled areas to the satisfaction of the Government of Cyprus, as is assured for Turkish Cypriots living outside [sic.] Turkish controlled areas.³⁰⁰

This call was ignored, even though the ICRC had communicated to the Turkish Government the need to release civilians and commence POW exchanges “without delay”.³⁰¹ Furthermore,

²⁹⁶ F. Peter Küng, “Report on Economical and Food Situations of the Greek-Cypriot population living in the North”, 1 January 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8085].

²⁹⁷ ICRC Nicosia, “Telegram 247 to ICRC Geneva”, 27 August 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.007 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 7799].

²⁹⁸ Küng, “Report on Economical and Food Situations”: [ICRC 8085].

²⁹⁹ ICRC Nicosia, “Telegram 105 to ICRC Geneva”, 8 August 1974 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 229 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 9273].

³⁰⁰ ICRC Nicosia, “Telegram 105”: [ICRC 9273].

³⁰¹ ICRC Geneva, “*Note Verbale* from the Permanent Mission of Turkey to ICRC”, 3 August 1974 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.001 / 229 (35)): [ICRC 8590].

civilian detainees had to be able to “freely choose the place or zone where they wish to be released” and that “no detainee should be obliged to return to his habitual place of residence, nor, on the other hand, to leave such habitual place of residence against his will.”³⁰²

However, the Turkish side’s purported resolve to release civilians and commence POW exchanges was part of its intended consolidation of the physical separation of the island’s two communities. Turkey was already arguing by early September that the “evacuation of a few hundred Greeks in distress can take place only on the condition that the ICRC transfers an equal number of Turks in distress to the northern zone of the island.”³⁰³ Only a few days later, on 6 September 1974, Clerides and Denktash would agree to the humanitarian principles as regards “members of the same family caught on opposite sides of the lines,”³⁰⁴ with an emphasis on family reunification, assisted by the ICRC.

Concerning the release of detainees and prisoners of war, the ICRC’s protocol was that each detainee was asked in confidence, and without the presence of guards, to reply to the question “when liberated where do you want to go and live?”. This question alone infers that it was not a given that Turkish Cypriots would be sent to the northern part of the island under Turkish military occupation and that Greek Cypriots would be automatically released into the Government-controlled areas.³⁰⁵ Yet, in practice what was happening, as per ICRC reporting:

while the majority of the Greek Cypriots are asking to be released to their homes, almost all Turkish Cypriots leave their families to settle in the northern zone without any assurance of a subsequent family reunion. It is likely that the families of these left unsupported prisoners in the south will strongly demand to go join the heads of the families in the area controlled by the Turks.³⁰⁶

Clerides, however, gave a different explanation as to Turkish Cypriot prisoners being allowed to proceed northwards. He wrote in 1992 that despite receiving criticism that Turkish Cypriots should not be “allowed to proceed north”³⁰⁷ his hands were effectively tied. He defended his concession to release Turkish Cypriots northwards because it was mandated by international law:

³⁰² ICRC Geneva, “Telegram 22344 to ICRC UN”, 5 August 1974 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.001 / 229 (35)): [ICRC 8595].

³⁰³ Lix Simonius, “Visite reçue: Mr. Arim, Représentant permanent adjoint, Mission Permanente de la Turquie à Genève”, 2 September 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.007 / 231 (35)) : [ICRC 7782].

³⁰⁴ ICRC Nicosia, “Position of members of the same family caught on opposite sides of the lines”, 6 September 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.001 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 8221].

³⁰⁵ ICRC Geneva, “Telegram 296 to ICRC Nicosia”, 10 September 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.001 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 8212].

³⁰⁶ Michel Convers, “Chypre”, 23 September 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.001 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 8211].

³⁰⁷ Clerides: My Deposition: *Volume 4*, 112.

because the Turkish Cypriots held by us had been listed as prisoners of war on lists submitted to the International Red Cross, and according to the Geneva Convention the prisoners could not be released behind the lines of the forces which held them as prisoners,” they could not remain in the Government-controlled areas.³⁰⁸

Significantly, there is no evidence in the declassified archives of the ICRC to back Clerides’ justification that it was mandated to release prisoners in the respective areas on either side of the ceasefire lines, depending on their ethnic background. Indeed, the ICRC underlined the principle of family reunification, but many of those detained hailed from areas south of the demarcation line: releasing them into the Turkish-controlled areas undermined the integrity of the family unit. And it was for this reason that many thousands of Turkish Cypriot family members would later apply to move north: with the excuse that their next-of-kin (husbands, fathers, sons) were already there. As such, the way the agreement was executed facilitated ethnic homogenisation and demographic re-engineering. It was an integral aspect of *hard ethnic cleansing*.

The US Embassy in Nicosia assessed that the effects of the Clerides-Denktaş prisoner-exchange contributed to the homogenisation of the Government- and the Turkish-controlled areas of Cyprus:

Appears that general release will be implemented quickly, accelerating trend toward *de facto* communal segregation. In exchange for giving up demand that all released persons go back to original homes, Clerides managed to defer family reunification which Greeks have insisted would bring some 10,000 Turks north. Unclear how many of released Turk Cypriots will defer move north to Turkish zone, pending formal decision on whether they can bring their families to join them. However, as earlier noted, some northward movement by Turk Cypriots already underway.³⁰⁹

A follow-up cable by US Ambassador William Crawford entitled “Clerides-Denktaş Private Meeting, September 20” remains classified.³¹⁰ The accessible primary sources from the ICRC archives relating to the meeting demonstrate that the ICRC was under the impression that the Turkish Government intended for a separation of the two communities upon the invasion, regardless of whether there was on paper an agreement “as to the free choice of the place of repatriation”.³¹¹ The Turkish Government’s plans as to ethnic homogenisation were confirmed by other US Embassy communications:

³⁰⁸ Clerides, 112.

³⁰⁹ Crawford, “Denktaş-Clerides Meeting, September 20”, 21 September 1974, 11:35, Nicosia 3233, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974NICOSI03233_b.html.

³¹⁰ Crawford, “Clerides-Denktaş Private Meeting, September 20”, 21 September 1974, 00:00, Nicosia 3236, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974NICOSI03236_b.html.

³¹¹ Georg Hoffmann, “Concerne: Impasse dans le rapatriement des PG”, 30 September 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.001 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 8198].

It is increasingly clear from conversations with Turkish and Turk Cypriot civilian and military officials here that they are determined to get their compatriots from south into their zone of occupation. If this can not be done by negotiations, there will be considerable temptation [sic.] resort to force.³¹²

Crawford also assessed that preventing the consolidation of all Turkish Cypriots in the Turkish-occupied areas would be very difficult to prevent, unless by force, and could theoretically be used as a bargaining chip for the Greek Cypriots gaining control of greater territory:

Assuming GoTurkey [sic] truly concerned over welfare Turk Cypriots located in south, and interested in definitive settlement current crisis, trade of people for territory would make continuing Turkish population transfer easier for Greek Cypriots to accept and still negotiate. Communique issued after second Denktash-Clerides meeting Sept 11 (Septel) indicates some degree of acceptance re Turk Cypriot migration.³¹³

A UN source confidentially informed the US Ambassador in Nicosia that at the 11 September private Clerides-Denktash meeting, discussions included allowing respective “minority” groups to remain in their ancestral homes. Clerides also showed readiness to accept Turkish Cypriots transferring to the Turkish-controlled areas in exchange for a swift return of large numbers of Greek Cypriot displaced via handing back Morphou to the Greek Cypriots, and allowing the autochthonous Greek Cypriot residents of Varosha (new Famagusta) to go back, as follows:

They spoke in terms of allowing some minorities to remain in/return to emergent zones. Denktash strongly hinted that demarcation line would (1) run north of Morphou, thus giving back large part of valuable plantation area to Greek Cypriots, and (2) allow Greeks return to new Famagusta. Clerides implied willingness allow Turk Cypriots move north freely to enclave, once this happens.³¹⁴

Whatever the stakes, agreeing to moves that would effectively segregate the population would ultimately lead to ethnically homogenous territories. Could *hard ethnic cleansing* have become the collateral damage of negotiations which aimed at bigger picture political gains?

Indeed, the exchange of prisoners was “temporarily suspended” when “some 164 Greek Cypriot detainees who had opted to return to their homes in areas under Turkish control had not been permitted to do so by the Turkish forces and were being held in the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Nicosia.”³¹⁵ In the ICRC’s assessment, the Turkish side was dismayed when they realised that a large number of released Greek Cypriot POWs refused to go along with ethnic segregation and

³¹² Crawford, “Anticipated Movement of Turk Cypriot Population”, 11 September 1974, 18:00, Nicosia 3041, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974NICOSI03041_b.html.

³¹³ Crawford, “Anticipated Movement of Turk Cypriot Population”, 11 September 1974.

³¹⁴ van Hook, ed., *Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976*. Vol. XXX, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Document 151.

³¹⁵ Hook, ed., Document 151.

uprooting.³¹⁶ These people wanted to go home. Clerides had also called upon prisoners of war from the Karpass to return to their ancestral villages.³¹⁷ Denktash in turn allegedly “received a signal from Ankara which affirmed that the Greek Cypriots concerned could return to Karpass and it was arranged that ICRC would implement.”³¹⁸

The Turkish Army prided itself as the fierce guarantors of Kemalism – Turkish secular-nationalism. The Turkish government at the time included the Islamist-nationalist MHP in the role of kingmaker, a coalition which was on its last legs as Prime Minister Ecevit was unable to win a confidence vote in September 1974. It seems unlikely that the Turkish government was able or willing to allow for freedom of choice as regards the place of repatriation of POWs, especially those Greek Cypriots who had been forcefully taken to Adana in Turkey. But beyond that, would the nationalist Denktash who aired his desire for an independent secessionist entity³¹⁹ really agree to continued demographic heterogeneity in the aftermath of fighting, or was he convinced that “peer pressure” would ensure Turkish Cypriots to be “pushed” to the Turkish-occupied areas, and the Greek Cypriots to be pressured into “voluntary” expulsion southward?

An internal note demonstrates that the ICRC’s then-Head of Cyprus Mission, Laurent Marti, was of the opinion that *hard ethnic cleansing* could take place with the agreement of the Greek Cypriot side:

the political concessions that for Mr. Clerides would represent acceptance that all Turkish Cypriots go north would pass unnoticed by Greek Cypriots’ delighting at seeing theirs heading south: on this subject, Mr. Marti thinks that the more tense the situation becomes in the south, the easier it will be for Mr. Clerides to accept a general exchange and population transfers.³²⁰

What transpired on the ground was that Greek Cypriot POWs who were detained and transported to Turkey had been intimidated from voicing their desire to be released into the Turkish-controlled area. The last group arriving back in Cyprus on 24 October were reportedly told that

³¹⁶ Hoffmann, “Concerne: Impasse dans le rapatriement des PG”, 30 September 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.001 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 8198].

³¹⁷ Laurent Marti, “Activités CICR – collaboration avec les Forces armées”, 26 September 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.009 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 7630].

³¹⁸ “Meeting of Mr. G. Clerides and Mr. R. Denktash at Ledra Palace UN Conference Area, Monday 30 September 1974”, 9 October 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.001 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 8193]

³¹⁹ William Crawford, “Conversation with Turkish Ambassador”, 19 September 1975, 15:22, Nicosia 2815, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI02815_b.html.

³²⁰ Christian Michel, “Note de Dossier”, 7 October 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.001 / 231 (35)). [ICRC 8186-8187]. The precise wording in French was as follows:

Monsieur Marti relève que la concession politique que représenterait pour Monsieur Cléridès l’acceptation que tous les cypriotes-turcs aillent au nord passerait inaperçue sous le joie des cypriotes-grecs de voir arriver les leurs au sud: Monsieur Marti pense à ce sujet que plus la situation se tiendra au sud, plus Cléridès acceptera facilement un échange général et des transferts de populations.

if they chose to return to the northern part of Cyprus they would be subsequently re-arrested, costing “them their heads.”³²¹ Indeed, those Greek Cypriot POWs released into the occupied area of Cyprus were placed under psychological pressure, requiring them to report twice daily to Turkish law enforcement.³²²

By June 1975 the overall number of Greek Cypriots in the Turkish-controlled areas had dwindled to just over half of the original residents: 11,500 Greek Cypriots.³²³ By June 1977 there were only 2,000 Greek Cypriots in the whole of the northern part of Cyprus from the 160,000 from before the Turkish occupation.³²⁴ The most recently reported number (January 2019) of all Greek Cypriots is 328.³²⁵ One should add that since January 2019, the number of Greek Cypriots in the Turkish occupied areas are no longer included in the UN Secretary-General’s report. This omission highlights how even the United Nations can contribute to normalising ethnic cleansing. Indeed, in the summer of 1975 the UN Secretary-General argued that he will accept population transfers that had been agreed to between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities at the negotiation table, because they were part of a political agreement.³²⁶

5.3 The Greek Cypriot Enclaved

The main focus of this chapter examines the pattern and the methodology behind the decreasing Greek Cypriot population in the Karpass panhandle of Cyprus in order to identify *hard ethnic cleansing* versus a milder *soft ethnic cleansing*. This will be done by analysing what took place in four periods, as follows:

1. August 1974-1977: “Refugees in their own homes”:³²⁷ the period after the “hot” conflict ended, including the Vienna III Agreement between Clerides and Denktash. The Turkish Cypriot official narrative terms it as “population exchange.” Days before the conclusion of the Vienna III Agreement, Denktash stated that the “Greek Cypriots who want to leave from the north now can pack their bags while those who do not want to leave will be

³²¹ Lix Simonius, “Chypre”, 14 October 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.001 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 8176].

³²² Philipp Zuger, “Note No. 143: Les problèmes à fin janvier 1975”, 30 January 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 8346].

³²³ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/11717*, 9 June 1975.

³²⁴ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/12342 and Addendum1, 7 June 1977.

³²⁵ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/2019/37, 11 January 2019.

³²⁶ A. Dominique Micheli, “Note de Dossier: À l’attention de M. Borsinger”, 9 July 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049-007.03 / 229 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 9218].

³²⁷ Thames TV, “The Sad Face of Cyprus”, *This Week*, 6 May 1976, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3YcbVFAPg_o, accessed March 30, 2020.

kicked out.”³²⁸ This period is marked by a steep fall in the number of Greek Cypriots residing in the Turkish-occupied territory and very harsh policies endured by those who remained. It is a period that I characterise as *hard ethnic cleansing*, to distinguish it from what took place in the later decades.

2. 1978-2003: this period covers the aftermath of the Vienna III Agreement, the 1983 UDI by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, while also seeing a parallel importation of waves of settlers from Turkey (examined in the following chapter). It includes some examples of *hard ethnic cleansing*, but most of the policies vis-à-vis the Greek Cypriot enclaved were softening as greater freedoms were introduced, thus subjecting the enclaved to *soft ethnic cleansing*.
3. 2003-2020: The April 2003 partial lifting of freedom of movement drastically changed the lives of the Greek Cypriot enclaved. But were they now becoming the Last of the Mohicans, as even UNFICYP since 2019 has failed to record how many of them remain in the peninsula?

5.3.1 August 1974-August 1975

At the beginning of August 1974 (and before the second invasion by Turkey), while the fighting had temporarily subsided, ICRC delegates recorded the “expulsion of all the remaining civilian population from all Greek villages in the occupied zone.”³²⁹ They were barred from accessing certain villages, while for places they had received authorisation they found that these had already been emptied of their autochthonous residents.

It is in instances such as these, where testimonies of the Greek Cypriot enclaved become an essential source. In her 2013 interview, Gavriella relayed that in August 1974, the villagers were rounded up in the churchyard.³³⁰ Turks and Turkish Cypriots in military fatigues ordered the women, men and children to separate, with younger, fit-looking military-aged men told to get on buses that were to leave the village, many of whom ended up as POWs in

³²⁸ Lix Simonius, “Chypre – Evacuations, 28 July 1975”, 29 July 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.06 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8769].

³²⁹ ICRC Nicosia, “Telegram 84 to ICRC Geneva” 3 August 1974 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 229 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 9256].

³³⁰ Gavriella, 23 October 2013.

Turkey. Gavriella relays that a few nights later, her household was awoken by the noise of shattering glass, as the windowpanes of shops were broken with the use of guns.

The writing on the wall about the Turkish side's motivations for *hard ethnic cleansing* as regards the Greek Cypriot enclaved in the Turkish-occupied areas was not lost on ICRC officials working in Cyprus, even before the second phase of the invasion took place. They relayed a concisely worded and stark warning about the Turkish "manoeuvres"³³¹ on 12 August 1974, which detailed a policy of ethnic cleansing that was to be instituted, as follows:

- a) to empty the occupied area of the entire Greek population (currently, most villages in this area are empty). Tens of thousands of refugees are in the Greek zone.
- b) to attract the Turkish male population to the occupied zone and to make the villages currently empty available to their heads of household.
- c) through this process, to push the rest of the family in the Greek zone to join the head of the family in the Turkish zone (conventional or forced family reunion).³³²

The ICRC delegate was not mincing his words when issuing a stark warning to his superiors in Geneva:

The manoeuvre here seems absolutely clear to us and we fear that the ICRC will one day be accused of having participated in population transfers or, in any case, of having been fooled throughout this whole affair.³³³

What had and would subsequently take place proved that the ICRC-Nicosia teams' warnings would, unfortunately, be realised. The ICRC bore witness to the *hard ethnic cleansing* in violation of the Geneva Conventions they were mandated to uphold.

In its attempt to ensure Greek Cypriot civilians who remained in the Turkish-occupied areas would be safe and treated in accordance with international humanitarian law, the Nicosia office of the ICRC was instructed by headquarters to clarify situations, as follows:

We think that there are borderline cases where encircled villagers could be considered as civilian interns, in which case it would be for you to ask the authorities what their category is, whether they are interned or not.³³⁴

³³¹ The word "manoeuvre" is used in the original document, written in French. Beyond the same meaning in English, the French word also translates to "manipulations," which is the more apt definition that applies in this context.

³³² D. Borel "Compte Rendu D'entretien: D. Borel-Pierre Du Pasquier", 12 August 1974 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 229 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 9284].

³³³ Borel "Compte Rendu D'entretien: D. Borel-Pierre Du Pasquier": [ICRC 9285].

³³⁴ Michel Convers, "Note No. 7: Concerne: Procédure pour rapports de visite Geneva", 20 August 1974 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 229(35-133 CY)): [ICRC 9304].

In the initial days after the occupation in the village of Yialousa, people sheltered exclusively in their homes. As the days passed and restrictions on movement were eased (to the extent they were allowed to go as far as the last house in the village), the men would gather in the coffeeshop. One day, “probably a month later?”, mused Gavriella, as the Greek Cypriot men were huddled together drinking coffee, the streetlights suddenly went on, indicating that power had finally returned. This, for many of the villagers, was exceptionally important news, as the water came via an electric pump. Those who didn’t have large water tanks were thus put in a dire situation of having to not just ration whatever water they had, but be extremely cautious as there was no indication when the water supply would recommence.³³⁵ Sometimes neighbours would request a bucket of water from those who had larger water tanks or go to the local cooperative to refill portable water containers.

Another shortage that many initially faced was that of gas canisters, used for heating food. Those who ran out would have to wait for the UN relief convoys that would eventually include gas canisters in their deliveries to Greek Cypriot enclaved, allowing them to prepare hot meals in their homes and not rely on burning wood or petrol.³³⁶

Restrictions on the Greek Cypriot population during the early weeks of the Turkish occupation would be lifted at different times in different areas, while also further clampdowns would be reported. The authorisation allowing the Greek Cypriot women and children of the village of Bellapais to return to their homes came in early August,³³⁷ while some 1700 Greek Cypriots had been enclaved in that village under UN protection.³³⁸ On that same day, however, the ICRC was also reporting mass expulsions at the hands of the Turkish army and humanitarian aid distributions not ending up feeding those in need.³³⁹

The ways in which Greek Cypriot vulnerable populations were treated in the Turkish-occupied areas was a laundry list of breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 that provides for the humane treatment of civilians. In Ayios Amvrosios, for example, “severe cases of raping”

³³⁵ Gavriella, 23 October 2013.

³³⁶ Gavriella, 23 October 2013.

³³⁷ ICRC Nicosia, “Telegram 98 to ICRC Geneva”, 6 August 1974 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 229 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 9271].

³³⁸ ICRC Nicosia, “Telegram 80 to ICRC Geneva”, 3 August 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.010 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 7130& 7186].

³³⁹ ICRC Nicosia, “Telegram 80”.

of girls sixteen and younger were documented by the ICRC,³⁴⁰ similarly in Marathovouno.³⁴¹ Turkish Cypriot journalist and activist Sevgül Uludağ who has won several international awards for her investigate work into missing persons across Cyprus has documented multiple cases of rape, including in the Karpas, of very young girls, but also an old man.³⁴²

In Morphou, “100 old people were living in an old, dirty house, under totally unacceptable conditions,”³⁴³ had been discovered by chance by the ICRC.³⁴⁴ The conditions of the facilities bore the usual neglect, but also “lack of interest and organization” as regards food distributions, etc., by the occupying Turkish Army. The ICRC, which had assumed much of the humanitarian heavy-lifting to provide for vulnerable civilians, together with UNFICYP, found that it was not able to carry out its mandate in the Turkish-controlled area because, among others, “the ‘free movement’ of the International Committee of the Red Cross delegates is not respected.”³⁴⁵ Curbing freedom of movement of humanitarian aid agencies is a direct violation of International Humanitarian Law.

Even weeks after ceasefires had been agreed, and the fighting had died down, ICRC delegates “discovered” some 217 persons in three different locations in Morphou, some in the “most difficult conditions”.³⁴⁶ Apparently the mostly elderly Greek Cypriots (with a mean age of 75) were gathered by Turkish military with the excuse to “protect them” from Turkish Cypriot civilians. The same military personnel would guard them and not let them leave, and only intermittently allowed them food in what was deemed as insufficient portions. The ICRC and UNFICYP had to step in, the former assisting with the distribution of mostly tinned goods as UNFICYP’s relief was deemed insufficient in quantity due to lack of stocks.³⁴⁷

³⁴⁰ Dr. Erik Andersen, “Special Report: Ayios Epiktitos”, 18 September 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.007 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 7752].

³⁴¹ Dr. Ph. Wacker, “Medical Report on the investigation of three rape cases in Ayios Amvrosios”, 18 September 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.007 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 7723].

³⁴² Sevgül Uludağ, “Yeraltı Notları, 17 Nisan 2008” [Underground Notes, 17 April 2008], https://www.stwing.upenn.edu/~durduran/hamambocu/authors/svg/svg3_17_2008.html.

³⁴³ Dr. Erik Andersen, “Medical Report on Visit to Morphou”, 11 September 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.007 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 7750].

³⁴⁴ T. Germond and Rene Baeriswyl, “Report by the ICRC on the visit made to 3 concentrations of Greek Cypriot civilians in Morphou-Lefka area”, 23 September 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.007 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 7736].

³⁴⁵ ICRC Geneva, “Note Verbale addressed to the Chief Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces in Cyprus, General Bedrettin Demirel, Nicosia”, 26 September 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.007 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 7725].

³⁴⁶ ICRC Nicosia, “Cyprus: Report on visit to three Greek Cypriot communities in the Morphou region”, November 1974 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.01 / 229 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 8912].

³⁴⁷ ICRC Nicosia, “Rapport sur la visite de deux concentrations de civils chypriotes grecs à Morphou”, 19 November 1974 (ICRC / BAG 229.049-002.01 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8927-8928].

Initially, the rounding up of Greek Cypriot civilians was solely done on instructions from the Turkish army but the ICRC assessed that by mid-October the responsibility had been handed over to civilian Turkish Cypriot control (so-called District Officers), who would permit Greek Cypriots expelled from their ancestral homes to take their personal belongings in suitcases as they transferred to the Government-controlled areas.³⁴⁸ Beforehand, interned civilians expelled could not take any additional belongings, only what they were wearing that day.

Regardless of who was responsible for certain day-to-day administrative decisions, the ICRC was under no illusion who was ultimately in control of the fates of Greek Cypriot civilians in the Turkish-occupied area of Cyprus: “fundamentally, the Turkish Army is responsible for the population in the area it occupies.”³⁴⁹

All visits to Greek Cypriot civilians in the Turkish-occupied areas by ICRC delegates would take place only in the accompaniment of a Turkish Cypriot police guard or a soldier, who answered to the Turkish Army. When ICRC delegates visited Greek Cypriots in the Karpas they were unable to “speak freely with the population because the police was always present.”³⁵⁰ During two disparate incidents on 10 October 1974, ICRC delegates also faced difficulties in moving freely *en route* with young patients to Nicosia,³⁵¹ and upon their return to the peninsula and despite local Turkish Cypriot authorities allowing them freedom of movement,³⁵² they would be physically blocked by the Turkish Army.³⁵³ It took a few months for the situation to get incrementally better, but still international humanitarian law continued to be violated: “there is no integral respect of the 4th Convention.”³⁵⁴

³⁴⁸ ICRC Nicosia, “Rapport sur la visite de deux concentrations de civils chypriotes grecs à Morphou”: [ICRC 8928].

³⁴⁹ J. F. Borel, “Chypre”, 22 October 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.010 / 231 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8712].

³⁵⁰ N. de Keller, “Report on ICRC visit to Karpasia, Famagusta District”, 10 October 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.007 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 7702].

³⁵¹ Dr. E. M. Spirgi, “Incident in Karpasia during evacuation of Ionnis Harpas, 6 years old”, 13 October 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.007 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 7703].

³⁵² Denktash during intercommunal talks where Clerides raised the issue of ICRC delegates’ freedom of movement replied that he himself was for it, but the Turkish Army command was against – See Lix Simonius, “En Chypre: Divers”, 15 January 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8077].

³⁵³ Dr. E. M. Spirgi, “Incident in Karpasia during transfer operation on 10 October 1974”, 16 October 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.007 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 7690].

³⁵⁴ Dr. E. M. Spirgi, “Position Paper on Medical Situation in Karpasia”, 5 December 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.007 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 7660].

Paradoxically, Greek Cypriot POWs imprisoned in the areas controlled by the Turkish army would be able to see ICRC officers in private, without “witnesses”,³⁵⁵ thereby their Geneva Convention rights were arguably paid greater respect than that of civilians.

As of November 1975, the Turkish authorities instituted that all incoming or outgoing Red Cross “message forms” to and from Greek Cypriot enclaved had to first go through “censorship”.³⁵⁶ This subjugation and control also meant that the ICRC’s humanitarian workers could not gather the data needed or assess whether the enclaved were departing “voluntarily”. In the presence of a “minder” the Greek Cypriots were not forthcoming during their meetings with ICRC delegates and therefore “it’s almost impossible to get information from them.”³⁵⁷

According to the Turks, 343 Greek Cypriots remained in Morphou, while the ICRC was aware of 315.³⁵⁸ One of the reasons for discrepancies in headcounts, according to the ICRC, was that “some Greeks are moved quite often from one place to another without any alleged reason.”³⁵⁹ Tracking people down would be compounded by the time spent getting “various oral authorisations.”³⁶⁰ This discrepancy shows the difficulties in gathering accurate information, especially at this time.

By early November the ICRC humanitarian staff could not meet Greek Cypriot civilians without “minders,” and were forced to rely on information from the occasional helpful “source” from within the Turkish military on Greek Cypriots still residing behind enemy lines.³⁶¹ Furthermore, the attitude by Turkish military and other officials towards ICRC and UN delegates was not congenial, with the latter having to exert every effort to remain “polite and conciliating.”³⁶²

³⁵⁵ ICRC Nicosia, “Rapport sur la visite de deux concentrations de civils chypriotes grecs à Morphou”: [ICRC 8930].

³⁵⁶ ICRC Nicosia, “Rapport sur la visite de deux concentrations de civils chypriotes grecs à Morphou”: [ICRC 8930]. This was underscored by various witness testimonies, such as in the recorded interview with Gaviella, 23 October 2013.

³⁵⁷ ICRC Nicosia, “Rapport sur la visite de deux concentrations de civils chypriotes grecs à Morphou”: [ICRC 8937].

³⁵⁸ Rene Baeriswyl, “Report on the Activities in Morphou Area from 5.11.74-11.11.74”, 25 November 1974 (ICRC / BAG 229.049-002.01 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8936].

³⁵⁹ Rene Baeriswyl, “Report on the Activities in Morphou Area from 5.11.74-11.11.74”: [ICRC 8936].

³⁶⁰ Rene Baeriswyl, “Report on the Activities in Morphou Area from 5.11.74-11.11.74”: [ICRC 8937].

³⁶¹ Rene Baeriswyl, “Report on the Activities in Morphou Area from 5.11.74-11.11.74”: [ICRC 8934].

³⁶² Rene Baeriswyl, “Report on the Activities in Morphou Area from 5.11.74-11.11.74”: [ICRC 8937].

Four months after the second phase of Turkey's invasion, only four villages were still inhabited by some 460 Greek Cypriots in the Morphou district.³⁶³ In that same period, 699 Greek Cypriots were expelled from Voni and Gypsos, while nine other Famagusta district villages "will remain inhabited [...] with an estimated total population of 305."³⁶⁴

In Karpasia, "complete freedom of movement" for ICRC delegates had by now been granted.³⁶⁵ US Embassy officials also made their first visit to the area since the invasion, and found that in place of the Turkish Army,

Only few road blocks remain in place between Nicosia and Famagusta, and traffic moves almost unimpeded [...] Turk Cypriot TMT in control north of Boghaz and EmbOffs failed sight any mainland forces. Frequent check points between Famagusta and Yialousa.³⁶⁶

The freedom of movement enjoyed by the ICRC in the Karpass was not a freedom the local Greek Cypriot inhabitants were granted.³⁶⁷ To tend their fields, they would have to make sure they were out of sight of the army, who would reprimand them, even in instances where "officially" they had been granted permission to go.³⁶⁸

Medical evacuations of sick Greek Cypriots from the area of the Karpass to the Government-controlled areas had been suspended, as patients already transferred to the Government-controlled areas for treatment were barred from returning, thus dividing families.³⁶⁹ The US Ambassador documented that "only few abandoned Greek houses being occupied, though most had been thoroughly ransacked. Area was markedly different from north coast, where major effort underway to Turkify region", and as such there was "still room for considerable number Greek Cypriot refugees return to homes in Karpass."³⁷⁰

³⁶³ Zuger Intercross, "Telegram 666 to ICRC Geneva: Activities of the ICRC Delegation from 17/11 to 23/11", 27 November 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.009-002 / 229 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 8301 / ICRC 8689 / ICRC 9355].

³⁶⁴ Intercross, "Telegram 666 to ICRC Geneva": [ICRC 8301 / ICRC 8689 / ICRC 9355].

³⁶⁵ Intercross, "Telegram 666 to ICRC Geneva": [ICRC 8301 / ICRC 8689 / ICRC 9355].

³⁶⁶ Crawford, "Karpass Trip Report", 17 December 1974, 08:00, Nicosia 4500, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974NICOSI04500_b.html.

³⁶⁷ Alpha News, "16^ο Επεισόδιο: Εγκλωβισμένοι της Καρπασίας 28/12/2019 Β' Σεζόν" [16th Episode: The Enclaved of the Karpass 28/12/2019 Second Season].

³⁶⁸ Gavriella, 23 October 2013.

³⁶⁹ Intercross, "Telegram 666 to ICRC Geneva": [ICRC 8301 / ICRC 8689 / ICRC 9355].

Indeed, such issues would continue for years to come, such as in the case of a Yialousa resident who needed medical treatment, and upon recovery his wish to return to his wife and children was denied – see 27 August 1976 and 7 September 1976 letters by John Grinling addressed to Cyprus Red Cross VP Ziyad Hakki (ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7465-7467]

³⁷⁰ Crawford, "Karpass Trip Report", 17 December 1974, 08:00, Nicosia 4500.

Harassment and detentions were another method of exerting control and intimidating the Greek Cypriots north of the ceasefire lines. On 13 November 1974, two men from Yialousa in the Karpas district were reported to have been detained and thus unable to return to their homes.³⁷¹ By the end of the month, those in detention increased to 18. The ICRC, as per its mandate, was trying to meet its responsibility of visiting all detained civilians,³⁷² although the delegates were systematically barred from detention centres where Greek Cypriot civilians were held and kept uninformed of arrests that would often take place even for minor offences.³⁷³

Gavriella described an incident where her husband and two other villagers from Yialousa were given permission to go to their fields. However, despite these authorisations, they were rounded up and taken to the village's detention centre where they were mandated to stay overnight.³⁷⁴ Months later, in March 1975, her husband was detained yet again, at night and taken away. When her husband was freed, "for three nights in a row he didn't sleep," adding that he was the only one for whom they had come at night and was able to return alive. She believed that her husband's survival was due to a Turkish Cypriot from Ayios Andronikos who had put in a good word on her husband's behalf.³⁷⁵

By this time, the evacuation to the Turkish-occupied part of Cyprus of the thousands of Turkish Cypriots from the Government-controlled areas congregating on the British Bases awaiting transfer, had been agreed between Clerides and Denktash, and was swiftly executed in January 1975. The agreement to permit the Turkish Cypriots to depart for the northern part of Cyprus was part of a *quid pro quo*:

Denktash volunteered to discuss with Turkish army [a] plan whereby approximately 10,000 Greek Cypriots would be permitted to return to their homes in the area of Athienou village (northwest of British SBA Dhekelia) in near future. [...] Denktash has responsibility for discussing above with his higher authorities and is to reply on January 20.³⁷⁶

The ICRC held that it was the "oppressing presence of the Turkish Army" that would be

³⁷¹ ICRC Nicosia, "Problems and Difficulties in the North: Period 1-14 November 1974", 13 November 1974 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.06 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8686].

³⁷² Philipp Zuger, "Letter to R. Denktash", 13 December 1974 (ICRC / BAG 229.049-002.06 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8690].

³⁷³ Simonius, "Chypre", 30 January 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.06 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8692].

³⁷⁴ Gavriella, 23 October 2013.

³⁷⁵ Gavriella, 23 October 2013.

³⁷⁶ Brown, "Clerides-Denktash Substantive Negotiations (Session No. 2), January 17, 1975", 17 January 1975, 16:40, Nicosia 0212, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI00212_b.html.

hindering Mr. Denktash's certain goodwill promises given at the intercommunity talks (i.e. re Dome Hotel, return of evicted GKCYP, research for missing persons, etc...) by conflicting actions, over which he seems to have no control.³⁷⁷

Denktash's promises of 10,000 Greek Cypriots' return to their permanent residences was not kept. Instead, Greek Cypriot expulsions recommenced.³⁷⁸

Regardless of Denktash's assurances at the negotiation table, US Ambassador Crawford held that preparations to house the Turkish Cypriots who had left the Government-controlled areas were underway in the Turkish-controlled area, affecting the territorial chapter of the political negotiations. The wider the spread of newly settled Turkish Cypriots, the less likely that the Turkish side would abandon its newly occupied territory. The Embassy cabled Washington just days before the last of the "Paramali Turkish Cypriots" were evacuated from the British bases describing developments underway on the ground:

Resettlement efforts still limited to area north of new Famagusta road. None of villages on main highway had more than token number Turks established. In contrast, Lefkoniko-Gypsos-Trikomo road now heavily populated. We were told Turks evacuated from Paramali will be returned to island in village groups and that specific villages in north have been reserved for them.

[...]

Pattern of activity observed is consistent with an eventual Turkish area running from Morphou to Nicosia and on to Famagusta, with eastern boundary north of main highway. Road construction in west may indicate that portion of area around Morphou also is negotiable. Fact that Eagleton and EmbOff were not permitted visit Myrtou area and region around Kythrea may indicate troops concentrated there. Resettlement of Paramali refugees should be indicator of Turkish intentions re territorial concessions.³⁷⁹

In November, the ICRC had indicated that the inhabitants of Gypsos had been expelled from their village. Two months later, at the end of January, the US officers were documenting how it was now a heavily populated region. This example shows the pattern that would often ensue: expel the autochthonous Greek Cypriots from an area to make way for new arrivals approved by the Turkish authorities in control of demographic change and territorial

³⁷⁷ N de. Keller, "Main Violations of the Geneva Conventions Witnessed by I.C.R.C. Delegates in the Northern Zone Since the Beginning of 1975", 29 January 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 8062].

³⁷⁸ Zuger, "Note No. 143: Les problèmes à fin janvier 1975", 30 January 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 8346].

³⁷⁹ Crawford, "Visit to Turkish Occupied Area", 24 January 1975, 10:40, Nicosia 0332, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI00332_b.html.

consolidation. This swiftly enacted uprooting of a population is an example of *hard ethnic cleansing*.

Beyond developing the occupied area, and thus consolidating territorial gains, the ceasefire was still fragile and fear of a new Turkish advance among the Greek Cypriots was not without merit.³⁸⁰ What, however, was disturbing were reports of the speed at which the development of the occupied areas was expanding. The US Ambassador in late January was convinced that the Turks would keep within the triangle of Morphou-Nicosia-Famagusta, assuming the remainder would be part of a territorial compromise. In mid-February, he documented with apprehension that the Turks moved beyond the initial triangle:

this development most disturbing since Turk Cypriots, hitherto, had seemed to be holding this area open for negotiation. Once southern Turk Cypriots are firmly established south of main Nicosia-Famagusta highway, it will be difficult to return land to Greek Cypriot refugees.³⁸¹

Despite the negative developments on the ground, Greek Cypriots held onto the belief that there would be a political solution to the *de facto* division brought on by the events of the summer of 1974, and that displacement was temporary. On 13 January 1975, the 137 remaining enclaved Greek Cypriots who had fled to Kyrenia's Dome Hotel wrote to the ICRC noting that:

On several occasions Turkish high officials have visited us and promised that, those of us who decide to remain in the Turkish controlled area of Cyprus would be allowed to return to their homes, exercise their professions and be given back their vehicles and property.³⁸²

They spoke of the assurances they were given by Clerides *and* Denktash on 27 November 1974 that “those who remained would be allowed to return to their homes and the Turkish Cypriot Administration would provide the necessary household effects and assist in making these homes habitable.”³⁸³ But it only took a few weeks for conditions to deteriorate, as

all the houses of people interned at the Dome Hotel have been heavily looted and the majority inhabited by Turkish Cypriots. Humiliation and pressure are daily means to oblige us to leave our homes and properties, thus outrooting us, contrary to all human rights.³⁸⁴

³⁸⁰ Clerides: My Deposition: *Volume 4*, 125.

³⁸¹ Crawford, “Turk Cypriot Resettlement Program”, 18 February 1975, 10:00, Nicosia 0659, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI00659_b.html.

³⁸² Committee of the ‘Dome’ Greek Cypriot Internees, “Letter to the Chief Delegate of the ICRC”, 13 January 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8054].

³⁸³ Committee of the ‘Dome’ Greek Cypriot Internees, “Letter”, 13 January 1975. [ICRC 8054].

³⁸⁴ Committee of the ‘Dome’ Greek Cypriot Internees, “Letter”, 13 January 1975. [ICRC 8054].

The Greek Cypriots who had fled and set up a temporary life at the Dome Hotel (some 700 after the first invasion of 20 July 1974)³⁸⁵ were to soon realise that there was no hope left of returning to their ancestral homes, despite earlier promises by Denktash himself. Weapons apparently belonging to Greek Cypriots in Kyrenia, many of whom were at the Dome, had been “discovered” and used as justification for their expulsion.³⁸⁶ The 36 residents of the Dome Hotel still *in situ* in September 1975 demanded they be granted permission to return to their homes and properties.³⁸⁷ On 4 October 1975, the Commander of the Turkish Army replied via the ICRC saying that this request “will be complied with as far as possible.”³⁸⁸ On 13 October 1975, however, more than thirty Greek Cypriots at the Dome Hotel were forcibly transferred to the village of Bellapais.³⁸⁹ The town that had 1000 inhabitants before the 1974 invasion had transformed into the temporary “gathering place” for the remaining Greek Cypriots from the Kyrenia region.³⁹⁰ Arrests of Greek Cypriot civilians in the occupied areas continued taking place, with even four young boys detained in Bellapais in the spring of 1975.³⁹¹

It is not disputed that the Turkish Army and/or local Turkish Cypriot policing factions were behind forceful expulsions of some and sometimes all the villagers from their homes in places such as Xeros, Orga, Kapouti, Karavas, Syrianokhori and Pendayia, rounding them all up in a school in Morphou. Civilian intimidation or “systematic looting”³⁹² had at the very least the tacit consent and sometimes even the full-blown operational support of the Turkish Army or was conducted exclusively by the Turkish military.³⁹³

As regards the political negotiations, Clerides informed the National Council Meeting on 26 March 1975 that the Turkish side was now linking the “subject of the missing persons with

³⁸⁵ ICRC Geneva, “Telex to the DG of the UN Geneva”. 29 July 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 8458].

³⁸⁶ Harald Schmid de Grüneck, “Evolution probable de la situation des minorités cypristes-grecques dans les secteurs ouest et centres des territoires sous contrôle de l’armée Turque”, 22 February 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8000].

³⁸⁷ Grüneck, “Letter to General Vahid Güneri, Commander in Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces in Cyprus, Nicosia”, 23 September 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 7853].

³⁸⁸ Grüneck, “Concern: Dome Hotel”, 10 October 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 7850].

³⁸⁹ Petros Stylianou, “Letter to the ICRC President, Nicosia”, 14 October 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 Exp. (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 7849].

³⁹⁰ Grüneck, “Situation générale à fin octobre 1975 des minorités CYPGK dans les territoires sous contrôle CYPGK,” 31 October 31 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 7831].

³⁹¹ Küng, “Weekly Activities Report, 14.4.75-19.4.75: Specific Problems”, 21 April 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8832].

³⁹² Loizos, *The Heart Grown Bitter*, 116.

³⁹³ Grüneck, “Letter to General Bedrettin Demirel, Commander in Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces in Cyprus”, 10 March 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 7986].

the demand that 2,500 Turkish Cypriots from the south be allowed to move north.”³⁹⁴ In effect, the Turkish side’s tactic was to couple two separate political chapters to implement the overall policy aim of consolidating all Turkish Cypriots in the Turkish-controlled areas of Cyprus.

Meanwhile, another aspect of the homogenisation policy over the territory now controlled by Turkey was the continued intimidation of any remaining Greek Cypriot villagers to “voluntarily” leave their village. Sometimes this harassment to force people to submit applications was made at gunpoint³⁹⁵ with the threat of death.³⁹⁶ If these inhabitants didn’t bow to the pressure first time around, the villagers would be visited again by representatives of the occupation regime.³⁹⁷ Torture was also used, including electroshocks on genitalia,³⁹⁸ the removal of toes,³⁹⁹ and beatings of children.⁴⁰⁰

These incidents were targeted and applied to two or three individuals (sometimes a few more) at a time. According to ICRC reporting, “many of the previously arrested and often intimidated people were in fact prominent members of EOKA B, who had committed acts of looting against Turkish Cypriots between the first and the second rounds [of the Turkish invasion],” thus indicating that such harassment was not random, and often committed by members of the Turkish Cypriot paramilitary group “Turkish Fighters” or the Turkish occupation army, effectively out of revenge.⁴⁰¹ On other occasions, it was the recently

³⁹⁴ Clerides: My Deposition: *Volume 4*, 231.

³⁹⁵ ICRC Nicosia, “Cases of Intimidation and Ill-Treatment in Karpasia Area”, 8 March 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.06 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8702].

³⁹⁶ Incidents such as these were reported in Yialousa and Rizokarpaso in mid-January 1975. See Küng, “Visit to Karpasia Thursday 16 and Friday 17.1.1975 for Distribution of Individual Parcels and Red-Cross Food Parcels to Very Needy People” 17 January 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8047-8048]; N de. Keller, “Main Violations of the Geneva Conventions Witnessed by I.C.R.C. Delegates in the Northern Zone Since the Beginning of 1975”, 29 January 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 8046].

³⁹⁷ Grüneck, “Letter to General Vahid Güneri, Commander in Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces in Cyprus, Nicosia”, 21 May 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.06 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [8760].

³⁹⁸ P. Philippe Zutter and Bernard Munger, “Report on maltreatment in Ayios Andronikos”, 3 March 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 7993].

³⁹⁹ A. Matsoukaris, “Extracts from Statements to Cyprus Police by Greek Cypriots Held at the Seray Police Station, Nicosia and Released by the Turks on 28/7/75”, 29 July 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.06 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8789].

⁴⁰⁰ ICRC Nicosia, “Cases of Intimidation and Ill-Treatment in Karpasia Area”, 8 March 1975: [ICRC 7976].

⁴⁰¹ ICRC Nicosia, “Rapport Hebdomadaire Activités, 30.6.75-5.7.75”, 7 July 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [8885 & 8886]. One should add, that as regards looting from Turkish Cypriots, in her 1 April 2013 interview, Ariadne recalled that Greek Cypriots from the village of Ayia Triada would go and loot from nearby Turkish Cypriot village Galinoporni during the period after the 15 July coup and prior to the Turkish invasion of 20 July 1974.

arriving civilian Turkish Cypriots⁴⁰² who would harass and even molest the autochthonous Greek Cypriot residents. This was deemed not so much as targeted retribution but as vengeful “group think” attacks, although ultimately, the aim would still be the same: to get rid of “the other”. Physically threatening a few would be enough psychologically to create a hostile environment for the many.

However, local residents who had lived through the intimidation deny that it was only persons named by Turkish Cypriots as hostile or who had been involved with EOKA B, or who were community leaders, who were intimidated and detained. Gaviella relayed how her husband had been detained a number of times. When asked what she believed to have been the reason, her response was “to show their power, manamou [my dear].”⁴⁰³

The ICRC was aware that some of these incidents (especially those pressuring the Greek Cypriots victims to apply for a “transfer”) were targeted attacks applied to community leaders,⁴⁰⁴ with the ulterior motive that this would subsequently “inspire” other villagers to get up and leave if the village leaders were to “apply for a transfer.” And the objective was successful as people, feeling unsafe in their own homes and village, decided once they saw their community leaders depart, to follow suit and leave their ancestral home.

The process could be summed up in the following way by taking the example of Kondomenos:⁴⁰⁵ the Turkish Cypriot police would inform villagers that they would be transferred and a fortnight later it would be reported to the ICRC that these villagers had “now [expressed the] wish to leave”.⁴⁰⁶ Other times, this disguise of acting out of self-volition was completely skipped. Despite repeatedly expressing to ICRC officials a desire to stay in their homes in the occupied area, the residents would still be expelled.⁴⁰⁷

In early June 1975, ten months after the second phase of Turkey’s invasion, the Turkish Embassy’s Counsellor in occupied Nicosia reassured the ICRC Head of Mission, Harald

⁴⁰² ICRC Nicosia, “Situation Report of Larnaca tis Lapithou (Kyrenia District)”, 28 June 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8881].

⁴⁰³ Gaviella, 23 October 2013.

⁴⁰⁴ ICRC Nicosia, “Situation Report of Larnaca tis Lapithou (Kyrenia District)”, 28 June 1975 [ICRC 8881]

⁴⁰⁵ ICRC Nicosia, “Weekly Activities Report, 5.5.75-10.5.75”, 12 May 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8840].

⁴⁰⁶ ICRC Nicosia, “Weekly Activities Report, 19.5.75-24.5.75”, 26 May 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8852].

⁴⁰⁷ ICRC Nicosia, “Rapport Hebdomadaire Activités, 23.6.75-30.6.75”, 2 July 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8877].

Schmid de Grüneck, that despite the ICRC's "fear that some villages west of Kyrenia would be evacuated by force against the will of the Greek Cypriot population [...] such evacuations would not take place."⁴⁰⁸ These assurances, together with similar declarations from many other Turkish and Turkish Cypriots' (including by General Demirel),⁴⁰⁹ were empty promises. Ethnic homogenisation may not have been taking place overnight, but it was continuing, piecemeal.

Another important aspect of ethnically homogenous "state-building" of the Turkish-controlled areas was the amount of personal possessions that could be taken with the Greek Cypriots who were leaving their ancestral homes and properties for the Government-controlled areas.⁴¹⁰ On occasion, no restrictions were imposed, such as for the remaining villagers in Larnaca tis Lapithou, Karavas, Lapithos and Thermia in the Kyrenia area, where residents sought to evacuate after a spout of molestations and harassments in their homes.⁴¹¹ On other occasions, however, this was not the case, and frequently the expulsions would happen in a very short space of time (sometimes an hour) and very limited personal effects were permitted to be taken by those expelled.⁴¹² As Bella recalled, for decades she had boxed up necessities, including bedsheets, readied, in the event of expulsion.⁴¹³

The personal effects left behind by Greek Cypriots would be "stored in what were colloquially referred to as 'loot depots', or *ganimet ambarlar* in Turkish, and the *iskan rehberi* were responsible for redistributing these goods according to the needs and sizes of families"⁴¹⁴ of either Turkish Cypriots or Turkish settlers. Navaro-Yashin (2012) described the "particular disdain the people whom she, like other Turkish-Cypriots, called the '1974 rich,' who acquired wealth by trading in looted goods or by investing in looted property. 'We call them the *ganimettos*, those who became rich through *ganimet*,'" said a Turkish Cypriot woman to Navaro-Yashin.⁴¹⁵

⁴⁰⁸ Grüneck, "Minutes of Meeting, 2 June 1975, Nicosia", 4 June 1975 ((ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 229 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 9379].

⁴⁰⁹ Grüneck, "Note No. 283: Brèves réflexions sur l'évolution de cette situation," in "Développement de la situation à Chypre depuis le 17 juin 1975", 30 June 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 229 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 9389].

⁴¹⁰ ICRC Nicosia, "Rapport Hebdomadaire Activités, 30.6.75-5.7.75", 7 July 1975: [ICRC 8882].

⁴¹¹ ICRC Nicosia, "Situation Report of Larnaca tis Lapithou (Kyrenia District)", 28 June 1975: [ICRC 8881].

⁴¹² Melchior Borsinger, "Note à l'attention des membres du Conseil exécutive, concerne Chypre", 9 July 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.03 / 229 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 9208].

⁴¹³ Interview with Bella, 12 August 2013.

Interview with Harry (UNFICYP), 15 July 2014.

⁴¹⁴ Jensehaugen, "The Northern Cypriot Dream – Turkish Immigration 1974–1980", 74.

⁴¹⁵ Navaro-Yashin, *The Make-Believe Space*, 155.

Meanwhile, by May 1975, only three months after Denktash's February 1975 declaration of the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus," the Greek Cypriot enclaves were all mandated to carry newly issued "TFSC" identity cards.⁴¹⁶

Despite all their hardships, according to the ICRC, the number of Greek Cypriots surveyed during this period in east Kyrenia and Salamis Bay had overwhelmingly expressed their wish to *stay* rather than leave. On the 12 May it was in the order of 1022:189 individuals opting for stay *versus* leave in the former area, and 158:43 in the latter.⁴¹⁷ On 17 May, the ICRC was reporting that 1007 east Kyrenians expressed the wish to stay compared to 169 who wished to leave. That is twenty fewer people wanting to leave, but also 15 fewer people wanting to stay, showing a decrease in the overall number of people surveyed because people had been ousted to the Government-controlled areas.⁴¹⁸ A similar decrease in Greek Cypriot numbers could also be found for Salamis Bay residents, where 158 people maintained their wish to remain but the number of those who were documented expressing their desire to leave dropped to 37 from the previous week's 43.⁴¹⁹ A week later, the figures decreased again, with 999 east Kyrenians expressing their preference to stay, with 136 to leave, while 157 Salamis Bay residents preferred to remain in contrast to 32 who wished to leave.⁴²⁰ These weekly decreases in numbers showed that the policy of *hard ethnic cleansing* was taking place successfully.

One timely and effective rule of intimidation and control has been education – or the lack thereof, a policy that continued even after the most difficult period of *hard ethnic cleansing* morphed into *soft ethnic cleansing*. It was a policy that continued for decades. Initially, Greek-language schools were not opened for political expediency: unless Turkish Cypriot lycea and other schools in the south were transferred to the Turkish-occupied area, there would be no secondary, nor elementary education for Greek Cypriot schoolchildren in the occupied area.⁴²¹

⁴¹⁶ Denktash, "Letter ICRC Head of Mission in Nicosia, Harald Schmid de Grüneck", 24 May 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.06 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8751].

⁴¹⁷ ICRC Nicosia, "Weekly Activities Report, 5.5.75-10.5.75", 12 May 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8841].

⁴¹⁸ ICRC Nicosia, "Weekly Activities Report, 12.5.75-17.5.75", 17 May 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8847].

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁰ ICRC Nicosia, "Weekly Activities Report, 19.5.75-24.5.75", 26 May 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8853].

⁴²¹ ICRC Nicosia, "Note No. 206: Entretien avec M. Rauf Denktash, le 14 avril 1975 à 0800, en présence de M. Celik", 18 April 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.06 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8711].

The issue of reopening schools in the occupied area was one aspect of the ICRC team's humanitarian mandate in Cyprus. In April 1975, they were told by those in charge of the Karpass' Galatia village that schools for Greek Cypriots could, in their view, operate, but that the final approval had to come from Nicosia, including transporting the children from nearby villages to the schools that would be opened.⁴²² Highlighting the plight of Greek Cypriot enclaved children of school age – who had been denied their right to education since the Turkish occupation – ICRC documented that in desperation, Greek Cypriot minors had put their names forward⁴²³ to teach the 1124 children of elementary school age. Indeed, this unorthodox teaching system was in full operation for quite some time, as was a “correspondence course” with lessons corrected in the Government-controlled areas.⁴²⁴ Toula Liasi wrote in her diary in mid-November 1974 how bored she was and was wanting schools to open.⁴²⁵ It was not until April 1975 that schools re-opened,⁴²⁶ with many fellow students stepping in to teach classes.

In early June, Liasi documented how three schoolmates were detained and beaten, and asked about the classes they were attending.⁴²⁷ A few weeks later, schools closed. Ayia Triada's final-year students were permitted to pack up and leave on 29 August 1975, accompanied by UNFICYP.⁴²⁸ They were then required to take their final-year exams in September in Nicosia to get a school-leaving certificate.

In Yialousa, the Turkish Army saw fit to raise the Turkish flag over the school, citing that “the fears of the teachers go parallel with their bad conscience: They are all EOKA members” and threatening that whoever touches the flag would be killed.⁴²⁹ The fear was real. One teacher in Ayia Trias was made aware that his name was included in a list of “wanted” persons by the Turks, so he hid in an olive tree. The other nine individuals included on that list were detained and never seen again, until their remains were unearthed in 2007.⁴³⁰ To conclude the story of the teacher in the olive tree, he was forced to give

⁴²² ICRC Nicosia, “Elementary Schools in Karpasia”, 14 April 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.06 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8715].

⁴²³ ICRC Nicosia, “Students Willing to Teach in Elementary School”, 12 April 1975 (ICRC BAG 229.049.002.06 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8720].

⁴²⁴ Küng, “Situation of the GKCYP population living in the North of Cyprus by end June 1975”, 28 June 1975: [ICRC 7959].

⁴²⁵ Liasi, 35.

⁴²⁶ Liasi, 55 and 81.

⁴²⁷ Liasi, 59.

⁴²⁸ Liasi, 81.

⁴²⁹ ICRC Nicosia, “Weekly Activities Report, 19.5.75-24.5.75”, 26 May 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [8856].

⁴³⁰ Liasi, 77.

himself up after the Turks threatened to harm the entire village or kill all his children. He was detained, tortured and eventually expelled together with all the other teachers in the village, permitted only two suitcases on their route to exile.⁴³¹

Even after the “Third Vienna Agreement”, schooling remained an issue. Not only was it “difficult on the one hand to find teachers willing to go there”, but many of those who put their names forward would subsequently be rejected by the Turkish side.⁴³² Although the enclaved Greek Cypriots numbered 10,000, the high schools of Rizokarpaso, Yialousa and Ayia Trias in the Karpass peninsula were formally closed in the summer of 1975.⁴³³

It was a very difficult decision for parents who wanted their children to continue with a secondary education. The choice was between giving up their livelihoods and their homes for a future of displacement, or to remain, while sending their children to be schooled in the Government-controlled areas.⁴³⁴ This was a major reason behind “voluntary” transfers: a decision taken by a family because they couldn’t face the thought of the family unit disintegrating.⁴³⁵ At opportune times, Denktash would proclaim that the schools would reopen imminently.⁴³⁶ This promise was not kept until after Denktash finally retired in April 2005, after being effectively side-lined a year earlier. The Rizokarpaso High School opened its doors again in the Autumn of 2004. As such, lack of schooling was a very effective *ethnic cleansing* policy.

The very day the high schools were closed for good, Clerides and Denktash agreed that 45 Turkish Cypriot students would be permitted to cross to the Turkish-occupied area to take Turkish university entrance exams and three Greek Cypriot teachers would be allowed to return to Karpasia.⁴³⁷ Previously, Denktash had threatened to expel all Greek Cypriots from

⁴³¹ Liasi, 77.

⁴³² Lix Simonius, “Chypre – Votre Note no. 519”, 10 February 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7575].

⁴³³ ICRC Nicosia, “Rapport Hebdomadaire Activités, 23.6.75-30.6.75”, 2 July 1975: [ICRC 8879].

⁴³⁴ Kalia, 27 July 2014.

⁴³⁵ Alpha News, “16^ο Επεισόδιο: Εγκλωβισμένοι της Καρπασίας 28/12/2019 Β’ Σεζόν” [16th Episode: The Enclaved of the Karpass 28/12/2019 Second Season].

⁴³⁶ Such as on 19 September 1978 in the presence of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Galindo Pohl and his deputy, Remy Gorge.

⁴³⁷ ICRC Nicosia, “Développement de la situation à Chypre, depuis le 17 Juin 1975”, 30 June 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.03 / 229 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 9191].

the Karpass if these 45 students were barred from crossing to the Turkish-controlled areas.⁴³⁸ But Denktash's part of the deal was reneged, leading to Clerides also revoking his part.⁴³⁹

The enclaved schoolchildren were left without access to proper education. Telephone lines were cut, and thus Greek Cypriots could not "call each other or to contact the south by telephone."⁴⁴⁰ As per the ICRC reporting, the Karpass Greek Cypriot farmers had "given" the tobacco they had harvested to Turkish merchants, including ceding control of the cooperative tobacco production factory, in return for the promise to be paid at a later date.⁴⁴¹

Other methods of harassment were also used. In April 1975, the Greek Cypriot Mukhtar of Yialousa was reportedly handed an electricity bill by the Turkish Cypriot electricity entity demanding 400,000 pounds for public consumption, including for water pumps, schools and community buildings.⁴⁴²

Accessing doctors was almost an impossible feat for the Greek Cypriot enclaved, given that permission from the local Turkish Cypriot mukhtar or law enforcement officer was required.⁴⁴³ One interviewee noted that when her child suffered a major accident and needed stitches and professional care in the autumn of 1974, no permission was given for the child to be seen to by a Greek Cypriot medical professional.⁴⁴⁴ Instead, the mother and child were dispatched to the Famagusta hospital, with an armed Turkish army officer who escorted them throughout the way. The army officer could not communicate in Greek or English, making the journey even more stressful. This despite the fact that from the earliest agreement on humanitarian issues, at the 13 September 1974 meeting between Denktash and Clerides, the Turkish Cypriot politician had agreed that "there would be no problem for Greek Cypriot doctors to man and operate clinics in Greek Cypriot villages in the North."⁴⁴⁵ This was just another of the many promises the Turkish Cypriot side would renege, leading to ethnic homogenisation.

⁴³⁸ ICRC Nicosia, "Développement de la situation à Chypre depuis le 17 juin 1975", 30 June 1975: [ICRC 9191 & 9383].

⁴³⁹ ICRC Nicosia, "Rapport Hebdomadaire Activités, 14.7.75-19.7.75" 18 July 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY 229 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8896].

⁴⁴⁰ Küng, "Report on Economical and Food Situations of the Greek-Cypriot population living in the North", 1 January 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8090].

⁴⁴¹ ICRC Nicosia, "Weekly Activities Report, 14.4.75-19.4.75", 21 April 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY 229 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8828].

⁴⁴² ICRC Nicosia, "Weekly Activities Report, 14.4.75-19.4.75", 21 April 1975: [ICRC 8828].

⁴⁴³ ICRC Nicosia, "Annexe II: Note: The Present Medical Situation on the Island at the Time of Departure of the MMT's", 9 June 1975: [ICRC 8867].

⁴⁴⁴ Interview with Kalia, 27 July 2014.

⁴⁴⁵ ICRC Nicosia, "Meeting of the Sub-Committee on Humanitarian Matters held at the Ledra Palace UN Conference Area on Tuesday, 17 June 1975 (Fourteenth Meeting)", 17 June 1975: [ICRC 8575].

Indeed, when Denktash was asked about the few remaining Greek Cypriot residents of Lapithos, he merely retorted that they should move to Bellapais as “it is a burden for our police to protect them against hostile [Turkish Cypriot] civilians who might have suffered in the past.”⁴⁴⁶

The agricultural situation in the Karpass area was “normalizing visibly” by April 1975.⁴⁴⁷ By May 1975 the ICRC requested the Cypriot Government to deliver animal feed and veterinary drugs, as well as engine oil for tractors for use by the Greek Cypriot enclaved.⁴⁴⁸ The Turkish Cypriots had realised that they could not waste agricultural goods and produce, as more and more Turkish Cypriots’ also had to be fed. Since the demographic imbalance brought on via the exodus of such a large portion of the population, the need for agricultural workers was great. Therefore, allowing Greek Cypriots to contribute temporarily was a necessity. It was also one of the primary *economic* reasons for the introduction of low-skilled Turkish settlers as a cheap workforce, an issue detailed in the following chapter.

The UN distribution of food parcels and salaries/stipends to the Greek Cypriot enclaved was tenuous, as the occasional “misunderstanding” would block the humanitarian aid deliveries.⁴⁴⁹ The ICRC would step in to help the 11,500 enclaved.⁴⁵⁰

Although the ICRC eventually stopped catering to the Karpass, as it believed these communities were “balanced” and sustainable villages, it continued delivering humanitarian supplies to the western regions of Morphou where only a few hundred Greek Cypriots remained, as a means to monitor their safety and security.⁴⁵¹ By April 1975, only small groupings of Greek Cypriots remained, consisting mainly of elderly men.⁴⁵²

In east Karpasia, the ICRC was reporting that the situation had improved since December 1974.⁴⁵³

The fields give the impression of being well cultivated; the tractors are working. Also the former prisoners of war, who at the departure of the delegates, Zen Ruffinen for

⁴⁴⁶ Grüneck, “Minutes of Meeting, 2 June 1975”, 4 June 1975: [ICRC 8454].

⁴⁴⁷ ICRC Nicosia, “Weekly Activities Report, 14.4.75-19.4.75”, 21 April 1975: [ICRC 8830].

⁴⁴⁸ ICRC Nicosia, “Weekly Activities Report, 12.5.75-17.5.75”, 17 May 1975: [8849].

⁴⁴⁹ ICRC Nicosia, “Logistic North: Weekly Activities, 16-21.6.75”, 21 June 1975: [ICRC 8872].

⁴⁵⁰ Grüneck, “Letter to Rauf Denktash”, 9 April 1975: [ICRC 7615].

⁴⁵¹ ICRC Nicosia, “Weekly Activities Report, 14.4.75-19.4.75”, 21 April 1975: [ICRC 8831].

⁴⁵² Hoffmann, “Rapport sur sa visite à Chypre et à Ankara du 14 avril au 3 mai 1975”, 27 May 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.01 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8907].

⁴⁵³ Hoffmann, “Rapport sur sa visite à Chypre et à Ankara du 14 avril au 3 mai 1975”, 27 May 1975: [ICRC 8907-8908].

Phnom Penh, were very depressed, now seem to have good morale. I spoke to many of them. Some even recognized me, having seen me during my visits to the camps of Turkey. The system of major calls to police stations has been relaxed. In Yialousa, I have even noticed that former prisoners of war can announce themselves individually at the police station in the morning before going to work.⁴⁵⁴

Greek Cypriot civilians were also moved from their villages if Turkish military forces were to be stationed there (for example, the village of Kontemenos in the Kyrenia district) “to a region of no military importance”.⁴⁵⁵ But this was assessed optimistically by the ICRC. They viewed these moves from one location in the occupied areas to another as indication that these people would be eligible to remain, not as an initial step towards their eventual expulsion.

Just a month later, and only a handful of weeks before the “Vienna III Agreement”, the ICRC was reporting that “most of the population is under pressure and wants to leave [...]. There is no hope for the Greek Cypriots of the Karpas to be integrated with the Turkish Cypriot community.”⁴⁵⁶ The villages of Kalopsidha, Engomi, Agios Seryios, Spathariko, Yerani, Dhavlos had been completely “evacuated” in the dry terminology of the ICRC.⁴⁵⁷

The ICRC protested the swift expulsion of Greek Cypriot villagers in the summer of 1975 as it violated the Fourth Geneva Convention. However, Denktash maintained that 75% of those expelled had in fact expressed their desire to leave.⁴⁵⁸ The ICRC was not convinced, noting that

some of them made this request a long time ago and as a result of intimidation on the part of the Turk Cypriots. In the meantime, many people change their minds.⁴⁵⁹

Denktash, however, would not leave it at that: he threatened continued expulsions, warning that these

will continue at a rate of one hundred per day. They will not cease until the Greek Cypriot authorities authorize the transfer to the North of the 12 Turkish Cypriots and their families [who had been victims of the “Milikouri incident”], while those expelled on this occasion would not be allowed to return.⁴⁶⁰

⁴⁵⁴ Hoffmann, 27 May 1975: [ICRC 8907].

⁴⁵⁵ Hoffmann, 27 May 1975: [ICRC 8903].

⁴⁵⁶ ICRC Nicosia, “Rapport Hebdomadaire Activités, 23.6.75-30.6.75”, 2 July 1975: [ICRC 8879].

⁴⁵⁷ ICRC Nicosia, “Rapport Hebdomadaire Activités, 23.6.75-30.6.75”, 2 July 1975: [ICRC 8879].

⁴⁵⁸ ICRC Nicosia, “Développement de la situation à Chypre depuis le 17 juin 1975”, 30 June 1975: [ICRC 9383].

⁴⁵⁹ ICRC Nicosia, “Développement de la situation à Chypre depuis le 17 juin 1975”, 30 June 1975: [ICRC 9386].

⁴⁶⁰ ICRC Nicosia, “Développement de la situation à Chypre depuis le 17 juin 1975”, 30 June 1975: [ICRC 9387].

The day that assurances were made that the Turkish Cypriots of the “Milikouri incident” would be granted permission to cross into the Turkish-controlled areas, some 300 Greek Cypriots were being expelled, including the entire population of 228 of the village of Dhavlos in Kyrenia. Despite this, the Greek Cypriot side maintained its part of the bargain regarding the 12 Turkish Cypriots and their families.⁴⁶¹

In March 1975 the Commander in Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces General Demirel had assured the ICRC that forced expulsions of Greek Cypriots would not take place. Similar declarations subsequently by the Counsellor of the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia, the Commander of the Turkish occupation army (17 June), and even Denktash (18 June) were relayed to the ICRC.⁴⁶²

After 798 Greek Cypriots were expelled between 27 and 30 June 1975,⁴⁶³ a mid-level Turkish Embassy official was “surprised to learn that some people did not actually want to leave.”⁴⁶⁴ This conversation took place three weeks before the talks⁴⁶⁵ for what would be concluded as the seminal “Vienna III Agreement” that was to safeguard the Greek Cypriots in the Turkish-occupied area. Yet, the forced expulsions of June 1975 were to become one of the greatest single waves of evictions since the August 1974 ceasefire.

The Greek Cypriots that were forcibly removed were mostly young, with the ICRC reporting “there will only be old people in Karpasia who for the moment do not wish to leave.”⁴⁶⁶ According to the ICRC, 75% of the Greek Cypriots expelled as retaliation for the June 1975 “Milikouri incident” had at one time or another, expressed verbally or in writing a desire to transfer. They were not offered the question again to ascertain whether they retained this alleged preference to depart. They were forced to leave their homes within one hour and were only permitted to take a single suitcase.⁴⁶⁷ It was an example of *hard ethnic cleansing*,

⁴⁶¹ ICRC Nicosia, “Développement de la situation à Chypre depuis le 17 juin 1975”, 30 June 1975: [ICRC 9388]

⁴⁶² Almost identical letters dated 2 July 1975 by the ICRC’s Head of Mission Grüneck were addressed to Rauf Denktash as well as the Commander in Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces, General Vahid Guneri, included as annexes to ICRC Nicosia, “Rapport Hebdomadaire Activités, 30.6.75-5.7.75”, 7 July 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8891&8893].

⁴⁶³ Grüneck, “Letter to the Commander in Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces, General Guneri”, 2 July 1975: [ICRC 8890].

⁴⁶⁴ ICRC Nicosia, “Rapport Hebdomadaire Activités, 30.6.75-5.7.75”, 7 July 1975: [ICRC 8883].

⁴⁶⁵ ICRC Nicosia, “Rapport Hebdomadaire Activités, 30.6.75-5.7.75”, 7 July 1975: [ICRC 8883].

⁴⁶⁶ ICRC Nicosia, “Rapport Hebdomadaire Activités, 30.6.75-5.7.75”, 7 July 1975: [ICRC 8884].

⁴⁶⁷ Borsinger, “Note à l’attention des membres du Conseil exécutive, concerne Chypre”, 9 July 1975: [ICRC 9208].

where beyond the harshness of the expulsion modalities, the fact that young people were targeted, indicated that the Turkish side had no desire to allow a sustainable inter-generational community to remain in the Karpass.

The US Ambassador informed Washington that the Greek Cypriots who were expelled became the victims of a deal gone wrong:

Expulsion involves Clerides-Denktash deal reached June 25 to swap some Turkish students in south for permission for 10 Greek Cypriot teachers to go to Greek enclaves in Karpass. Deal fell through when Denktash allegedly claimed he was temporarily unable [to] make arrangements for Greek teachers, following which Clerides ordered halt to transfer of Turkish students. Situation exacerbated by reports that 48 Turkish Cypriots enclaved in Paphos were roughed up by Greeks June 25 and prevented from fleeing north.⁴⁶⁸

Denktash warned the US Ambassador in Nicosia at the end of June 1975 that he “took [a] hard line on expulsions and stated they would continue as long as Greeks interfered with movement of Turks north.”⁴⁶⁹ Denktash also openly threatened that he was seriously considering “eviction measures” indicating his use of Greek Cypriots in the northern part of Cyprus for political point-scoring to ensure that the remaining Turkish Cypriots south of the ceasefire lines would be transferred as soon as possible to the occupied area.⁴⁷⁰

Assessing the situation, the ICRC’s Head of Mission in Cyprus reported to his headquarters that: “In a word, the Geneva Conventions are openly violated (see Article 49).”⁴⁷¹ He further added that

The authorities in the North are increasingly using any incident as a pretext to justify their actions; the Milikouri incident was thus the pretext for the transfer of more than 800 Greek Cypriots out of the 10,000 still living in the northern zone.⁴⁷²

The ICRC officially linked the “Milikouri incident” as well as other incidents of maltreatment of Turkish Cypriots in detention in late June 1975 with the mass expulsion of Greek Cypriots from the Karpass that followed a few days later.⁴⁷³

⁴⁶⁸ Crawford, “Expulsion of Greek Cypriots in Karpass”, 30 June 1975, 17:30, Nicosia 2083.

⁴⁶⁹ Crawford, 30 June 1975.

⁴⁷⁰ ICRC Nicosia, “Rapport Hebdomadaire Activités, 23.6.75-30.6.75”, 2 July 1975: [ICRC 8880].

⁴⁷¹ Grüneck, “Note No. 283: Brèves réflexions sur l’évolution de cette situation”, 30 June 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 229 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 9389].

⁴⁷² Grüneck, “Note No. 283: Brèves réflexions sur l’évolution de cette situation”, 30 June 1975: [ICRC 9389].

⁴⁷³ ICRC Limassol, “Rapport d’activité bi-mensuel de la délégation de Limassol: Districts de Limassol et Larnaca, période du 16 au 30 Juin 1975”, 30 June 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049-007.02 / 229 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 9176].

The formal complaint by the head of Cyprus' ICRC mission over the expulsions as a clear violation of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention⁴⁷⁴ was met with resounding denial by the Turkish side. The Turkish Army did not even have the courtesy to reply, instructing the Turkish Cypriot ICRC liaison to do so on its behalf, with a cover letter provocatively stating that "the statements alleged in [the] letter are without foundation," and thus to return it.⁴⁷⁵

The Cypriot Government via Zenon Rossides, its Permanent Representative in New York⁴⁷⁶ officially protested the mass expulsions to the United Nations and the five permanent members of the Security Council.⁴⁷⁷ The Cyprus Government's view, as the US Embassy informed Washington, was that the intention of the Turkish side was to create a

new fait accompli aiming at blackmailing the government into allowing the transfer of Turkish Cypriots living in areas controlled by the government to Turkish controlled areas and coincides with moves to colonize the Karpass area with Turks from Turkey.⁴⁷⁸

Rossides, in a follow-up letter addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, protested that 750 Greek Cypriots were

uprooted and expelled from their homes and properties between 27 and 30 June 1975, in violation of international law, elementary human rights, the Geneva Convention of 1949 and the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus. Such arbitrary action is, furthermore, in breach of the specific agreement, by which enclaved persons would not be transferred without the consent and agreement of the two sides.⁴⁷⁹

Rossides wrote about a 90-year-old woman who despite ill-health was expelled and died *en route*, while many "were forced at gunpoint to sign 'petitions' for their transfer to the south."⁴⁸⁰ He further underlined that beyond ethnically cleansing the Turkish-controlled areas of Greek Cypriots, the areas under Turkish occupation were "beginning to be massively colonized by Turks from the mainland of Turkey [...] in a manner bringing out the criminal purpose of changing by force the demographic character of the island."⁴⁸¹ The situation was so stark that according to ICRC information provided to the US Embassy in Nicosia on 24 July 1975, there were no longer any Greek Cypriots left in Morphou,

⁴⁷⁴ Grüneck, "Letter to General Vahid Guneri", 2 July 1975: [ICRC 8890].

⁴⁷⁵ Behzat Aziz Beyli, "Letter by the ICRC's Turkish Cypriot Liaison to ICRC Head of Mission Gruneck", 7 July 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8887].

⁴⁷⁶ A. Dominique Micheli, "Note de Dossier: À l'attention de M. Borsinger", 9 July 1975: [ICRC 9218].

⁴⁷⁷ Crawford, "Expulsion of Greek Cypriots in Karpass", 30 June 1975.

⁴⁷⁸ Crawford, "Expulsion of Greek Cypriots from Turkish Controlled areas of Cyprus", 1 July 1975.

⁴⁷⁹ Zenon Rossides, "Letter to the United Nations Secretary-General, 2 July", 3 July 1975, S/11743.

⁴⁸⁰ Rossides, "Letter to the United Nations Secretary-General, 2 July", 3 July 1975.

⁴⁸¹ Rossides, 3 July 1975.

the last six having departed this week, presumably for the GOC south. ICRC expects there will be no Greek Cypriots living west of Kyrenia after August. Greek Cypriot population in the north is estimated by ICRC to be about 9,100. This number takes into account the 798 Greek Cypriots who left the north June 27-30.⁴⁸²

The US Embassy's assessment matched the ICRC's. It detailed that expulsions of Greek Cypriots continued even after the peak of late June, with evictions from Kyrenia due to the area's popularity with Turkish Cypriots. Even properties belonging to non-Kyrenia resident Turkish Cypriots would be seized for distribution among those who had arrived from the Government-controlled areas, as well as Turkish mainland settlers:

It appears that remaining Greek Cypriot population in Kyrenia and nearby villages is being forced to move south to vacate housing for Turkish/Turk Cypriot migrants. This area is first choice of residence for migrating Turks and pressure for housing has even led to efforts take over apartments and villas belonging to non-resident Turk Cypriots.⁴⁸³

The United Nations Secretary-General and his Nicosia staff were also concerned. However, the UN maintained that the matter should be dealt with in the political talks between Clerides and Denktash, and furthermore that henceforth "all population transfers should only be carried out with the agreement of Denktash and Clerides."⁴⁸⁴

Clerides conceded that the late June 1975 mass expulsion of Greek Cypriots (which he totalled at 788, compared to ICRC's aforementioned 798 figure) was a "reprisal" for the 26 June 1975 ill-treatment of Turkish Cypriot men and women. The ill-treatment of the Turkish Cypriots included molestations⁴⁸⁵ outside Kykkos Monastery⁴⁸⁶ and during their detention by police officers from the Greek Cypriot community.⁴⁸⁷ Clerides insisted that the Government had condemned the "Milikouri incident" and promised to punish the Greek Cypriot security personnel involved.⁴⁸⁸ By the end of July, the Government informed the ICRC that the officers involved have been reprimanded.⁴⁸⁹

⁴⁸² Crawford, "Greek Cypriots in Turkish-controlled North", 25 July 1975, 14:45, Nicosia 2327, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI02327_b.html.

⁴⁸³ Crawford, "Greek Cypriot Expulsion/Departures from Northern Cyprus", 18 July 1975, 13:45, Nicosia 2249, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI02249_b.html.

⁴⁸⁴ Micheli, "Note de Dossier: Á l'attention de M. Borsinger", 9 July 1975: [ICRC 9218].

⁴⁸⁵ Borsinger, "Chypre: Remise de la note destinée au gouvernement du Chypre", 23 July 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049-007.03 / 229 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 9223].

⁴⁸⁶ ICRC Limassol, "Rapport d'activité bi-mensuel de la délégation de Limassol: Districts de Limassol et Larnaca, période du 16 au 30 Juin 1975", 30 June 1975 : [ICRC 9176] and Alain Junod, "Note for the attention of Mr. Harald Schmid De Grunec, Head of Mission", 26 June 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049-007.03 / 229 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 9196].

⁴⁸⁷ Clerides, *My Deposition: Volume 4*, 295-296.

⁴⁸⁸ Clerides, 295-296.

⁴⁸⁹ Borsinger, "Chypre: Remise de la note destinée au gouvernement du Chypre", 23 July 1975: [ICRC 9224].

By the end of July 1975 the mass “evacuations” had halted as well, with people even returning to their villages in the north in the regions of Morphou, Kyrenia and the Karpass.⁴⁹⁰ However, the ICRC was unable to deliver its demarche to Denktash for violating the Geneva Conventions with the mass expulsion in late June.

According to Clerides, Makarios’ view was that it was more important for the 10,000 Greek Cypriots still in the northern part of Cyprus (especially the Karpass region) to remain than for the 10,000 Turkish Cypriots in the Government-controlled areas to be blocked from moving north.⁴⁹¹ This thinking according to Clerides was also underscored by the fear that if Turkish Cypriots in the Government-controlled areas were once again attacked or threatened in a serious incident, then Turkey could use it “as an excuse to mount a military operation in the south.”⁴⁹² Towards this end, it became clear even to the ICRC that the

Greek Cypriot authorities wish to maintain a Greek Cypriot population in the North and seem only to allow their ‘emigration’ to the South in the case of seriously ill persons or those who can claim ‘persecution’ in the North.⁴⁹³

But the Greek Cypriot enclaved felt that after political agreements failed to be reached, there was little hope, maintaining a “feeling of being misunderstood, if not forgotten by their compatriots in the South.”⁴⁹⁴ The diarist and artist Toula Liasi noted that the hopes for the enclaved for a “quick solution” had been completely dashed by early June 1975.⁴⁹⁵ The enclaved saw themselves as being “pushed around as a factor of political power games.”⁴⁹⁶

The enclaved were aware that their hope to stay and avoid uprooting had, by June 1975, turned them into political pawns on all sides. The condition of their livelihoods remained stark, and the Turkish side teased them with facilitating “optional” moves, as the US Ambassador described:

⁴⁹⁰ Borsinger, “Note de dossier : Résumé de la situation entre le 26 juin et le 23 juillet 1975”, 23 July 1975: [ICRC 9225].

⁴⁹¹ Clerides, *My Deposition: Volume 4*, 297.

⁴⁹² Clerides, 297.

The fear of renewed Turkish offensive was constant. A few months earlier, US Defence Intelligence was concerned that with the return of Archbishop Makarios to Cyprus in December, the safety of Turkish Cypriots remaining in the Government-controlled areas could be jeopardised and this would be the “main factor influencing a decision for a renewed Turkish offensive”. See van Hook, ed., *Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976*. Vol. XXX, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Document 162.

⁴⁹³ Simonius, “Chypre – Votre Note no. 519”, 10 February 1976: [ICRC 7575].

⁴⁹⁴ Küng, “Situation of the GKCYP population living in the North of Cyprus by end June 1975”, 28 June 1975: [ICRC 7965].

⁴⁹⁵ Liasi, 59.

⁴⁹⁶ Küng, “Situation of the GKCYP population living in the North of Cyprus”, 28 June 1975: [ICRC 7965].

Many Greek Cypriots are seriously questioning whether it [is] possible for them to continue living in Turkish controlled Cyprus after one year's occupation. Biggest complaint is lack of schooling and inability [to] work in any field but agriculture, and even then, only under very stringent conditions.

In some cases, Turks are making it attractive for Greek Cypriot residents to opt for move south, with those requesting move being permitted transport [of] all moveable property, as well as motor vehicles, across green line.⁴⁹⁷

The Turkish side's intimidation and threats together with the carrots (permission to move movable property) for the expulsion of Greek Cypriots were considerable push factors for the enclaved to consider seriously. It was a pernicious method to bring about ethnic homogenisation. The Greek Cypriot political establishment viewed the humanitarian element as part of the bigger issue of strengthening its own negotiating hand. There was thus a complete absence of a political pull factor for the Greek Cypriot leadership to agree to ethnic homogenisation of the Turkish-controlled areas.

The Cyprus Government was determined that the Greek Cypriot enclaved "stay where they are" and would only welcome them in the Government-controlled areas "if they have very imperative reasons for leaving the north which means, practically, if they were forced out of their homes and villages."⁴⁹⁸ Otherwise, the Government was reluctant to grant "authorisation [...] for the transfer to the South", even to people requiring medical attention.⁴⁹⁹

The ICRC was fully cognisant of the political end-goals of the respective sides: the Turkish Cypriots wanted an "ethnically homogenous state", while Greek Cypriots used the "9000 Turkish Cypriots, living mainly in the southwest of the island, as pawns in its fight against sharing the island."⁵⁰⁰

On the first anniversary of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Denktash declared that "for every Turkish Cypriot who will be prevented from going from the south of the island to the north,

⁴⁹⁷ Crawford, "Greek Cypriot Expulsion/Departures from Northern Cyprus", 18 July 1975, 13:45, Nicosia 2249, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI02249_b.html.

⁴⁹⁸ Simonius, "Letter to the Deputy Secretary General of the Australian Red Cross Society, N. Minogue", 23 March 1977 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7338].

⁴⁹⁹ Zuger, "Letter to President Makarios", 5 February 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7579].

⁵⁰⁰ Borsinger, "Note à l'attention des membres du Conseil exécutive, concerne Chypre", 9 July 1975: [ICRC 9207-9208].

5 Greek Cypriots will be evacuated from the north to the south.”⁵⁰¹ He also portrayed the late June 1975 expulsions of Greek Cypriots as “humanitarian acts”, arguing that

This measure is a very humanitarian act in comparison with the inhuman treatment of the turks [sic.] in the south *stop* because those greeks [sic.] who are being sent to the south are those who wanted to go there but were not allowed by the greek cypriot [sic.] leadership *stop* i [sic.] repeat the measures to be taken by us in order to save our brothers in the south is a matter which concerns us *stop* the red cross has no authority to deliver to us any note on this issue.⁵⁰²

Denktash repeated this position to the ICRC ahead of the resumption of negotiations in Vienna in the summer of 1975. He informed in his proposal to Clerides and UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim the following:

-on his return from Vienna, Denktash wants a daily flood of Turkish Cypriots [to be] allowed to go North: Mr. Denktash told me about a 100 people per day (negotiable);
-If this were not the case, Mr. Denktash would then order the evacuation of approximately 500 northern Greek Cypriots per day. Given that nearly 1000 applications for Greek Cypriot transfer requests were already in hand, it would take 2 days. Subsequently, and even if the world was to take him for a second Idi Amin, he would expel the rest of the Greek Cypriots, even against their will.⁵⁰³

To compare oneself with Idi Amin in the 1970s was no light feat. But it showed Denktash’s insistence to consolidate all Turkish Cypriots in the Turkish-occupied areas: if the Greek Cypriots refuse the transfer of the remaining Turkish Cypriots in the Government-controlled areas to the northern part of Cyprus, he would be forceful with the enclaved Greek Cypriots.

The US Ambassador was more explicit that consolidation of Turkish Cypriots was one aim, but the other – expelling Greek Cypriots in their entirety from the northern part of Cyprus, was not out of the question at a later point:

Turk Cypriot leader Denktash indicated to reporters that plan to expel Greeks from North may be postponed. Denktash said he had discussed “program” with Clerides and told him that it would be implemented “in coming weeks.” Denktash “hoped” problem would be settled “before it reaches point of action.” Said problem would be discussed in Vienna. (Comment: Implication appears to be that expulsions will be postponed at least until after Vienna III. End comment.)⁵⁰⁴

⁵⁰¹ Simonius, “Compte rendu d’entretien/téléphone – M.C. Neukomm (Nicosie) et Simonius & Borsinger”, 21 July 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.03 / 229 (35-133 CY)) : [ICRC 9220].

⁵⁰² ICRC Nicosia, “Telegram 1154 to ICRC Geneva”, 23 July 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.03 / 229 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 9227].

⁵⁰³ Grüneck, “Procès-verbal d’entretien – Rauf Denktash”, 30 July 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.002.06 / 229 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 8799].

⁵⁰⁴ Crawford, “Denktash Hints At Postponement of Expulsion Plan”, 22 July 1975, 13:30, Nicosia 2283, https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI02283_b.html.

The ICRC in early August 1975 summed up the antithetical political aims:

the political objectives thus pursued by the two parties are obvious: the total separation of the two ethnic groups on the one hand, reunification of an ethnically mixed island on the other. The result of these political attitudes is that the members of the ethnic minorities in the north and in the south are the helpless victims of circumstances and are under constant pressure which is tantamount [sic.] to intimidation.⁵⁰⁵

At this juncture, it should be emphasised that the Greek Cypriot position held onto the idea of return, as Loizos wrote:

the Argaki refugees were told throughout 1974 and 1975 by their political leaders nothing to suggest that their loss was irretrievable, and much to indicate that it was temporary. Certainly, for the first weeks or months of their dislocation, few of them thought that they had lost their village for ever.⁵⁰⁶

He adds: “It would have been political suicide for any Greek Cypriot leader to say, ‘Better to forget your villages, for the Turks will never surrender them’.”⁵⁰⁷ Loizos documented that only “six to nine months after the flight from Argaki, it began to look less likely that return was imminent, and people started to make plans which looked beyond a literal tomorrow.”⁵⁰⁸

5.3.2 August 1975-1978: From the Third Vienna Agreement to the second mass wave of expulsions

The August 1975 talks in Vienna between Clerides and Denktash in the aftermath of one of the most significant instances of *hard ethnic cleansing* wrapped up in three days. Denktash’s aim was to amass all remaining Turkish Cypriots south of the ceasefire lines and transfer them northward. It underscored his objective of consolidating the Turkish Army’s territorial gains. Meanwhile, President Makarios was determined that the remaining Greek Cypriot enclaved in the northern part stay to assist towards returning to the *status quo ante*, or as close as possible to an intercommunal, mixed but *unitary* and federal state.

The five-point agreement on the humanitarian aspect, became public in the form of a press communiqué, as follows:

⁵⁰⁵ Borsinger, “Letter the Secretary General of the Australian Red Cross Society”, 5 August 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 Exp. (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 7863].

⁵⁰⁶ Loizos, *The Heart Grown Bitter*, 198.

⁵⁰⁷ Loizos, 131.

⁵⁰⁸ Loizos, 173.

1. The Turkish Cypriots at present in the South of the Island will be allowed, if they want to do so, to proceed North with their belongings under an organized programme and with the assistance of UNFICYP.

2. Mr. Denktash reaffirmed, and it was agreed, that the Greek Cypriots at present in the North of the Island are free to stay and that they will be given every help to lead a normal life, including facilities for education and for the practice of their religion, as well as medical care by their own doctors and freedom of movement in the North.

3. The Greek Cypriots at present in the North who, at their own request and without having been subjected to any kind of pressure, wish to move to the South will be permitted to do so.

4. UNFICYP will have free and normal access to Greek Cypriot villages and habitations in the North.

5. In connection with the implementation of the above agreement priority will be given to the re-unification of families, which may also involve the transfer of a number of Greek Cypriots, at present in the South, to the North.

The question of displaced persons was also re-examined.

Although both sides again affirmed that they were not knowingly holding undeclared prisoners-of-war or other detainees, it was agreed mutually to extend full facilities for searches in response to information given by either side.⁵⁰⁹

The practicalities of this Third Vienna Agreement pertaining to the enclaved were summed up by the US Ambassador as follows:

Denktash undertook to give UNFICYP 'free and normal access' to the approximately 9,000 Greeks remaining in north (8,000 in Karpas, 1,000 elsewhere). UNFICYP was to be allowed to establish seven 'liaison' posts to reassure Greek villagers (four in Karpas, one each in Lapithos, Ayios Epiktitos and Bellapais). Turks were to cooperate in admission of sorely needed Greek teachers and doctors. Greek villagers were to be allowed freedom of visits between villages. Finally, Denktash agreed to a reunion of families that would allow up to 800 Greeks earlier expelled from Karpas to return.⁵¹⁰

The above details were part of the talks that had not been made public. According to Clerides, the 788 Greek Cypriots expelled in retaliation to the Milikouri incident would be "free to apply to proceed to the North," together with those who had been expelled "for security reasons."⁵¹¹ According to Palley, Clerides agreed to this compromise due to coercion after Denktash made explicit mention of a "limited military operation" if his demands were not met.⁵¹² These threats of a renewed Turkish military operation were made

⁵⁰⁹ The Third Vienna Agreement, 2 August 1975, S/11789 and Add.1-2, 5 August 1975.

⁵¹⁰ Crawford, "Non-implementation of Vienna III Agreements", 10 October 1975, 15:00, Nicosia 2999

⁵¹¹ Clerides, *My Deposition: Volume 4*, 298.

⁵¹² Palley, S.9-11, 172-173.

in the presence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Upon the Agreement, UNFICYP facilitated the transfer of Turkish Cypriots, with the “International Red Cross refusing to be party to such an act.”⁵¹³

Respective US State Department/Nicosia Embassy cables remain classified until this day. One of the few publicly available documents concerns the discussions between US Ambassador Crawford in Nicosia and Greece’s Ambassador to Cyprus, Michalis Dountas, a few days after the Third Vienna Agreement was reached, where they concurred as regards the:

GoC’s [Government of Cyprus’] wise decision [to] trade movement of Turks to the north for better treatment of Greeks remaining ther [sic.], and Denktash’s promise of free movement for UNFICYP to observe conditions of remaining Greeks. [...] Dountas confirmed that [Greek Prime Minister] Karamanlis has personally urged Makarios to support Clerides in characterizing Vienna III results as a clear step forward.⁵¹⁴

When the enclaved Greek Cypriots heard the news of this Third Vienna Agreement, some became very concerned. Gavriella recalled in 2013 how she viewed it:

As soon as they said this Agreement happened and they started certain population transfers of Turks, some were very enthusiastic, that they would gain freedom of movement or other freedoms. I told them that this is our end. I understood that as long as there were Turks on that side, and we were on this side, we were safeguarded. When the Turks left and came here, we were now at their mercy.⁵¹⁵

The above statement was probably the most political and politised reproach of Cyprus Government policy to which I was made privy. It is also likely to have been elicited so directly because it came from a woman who together with her family was forced out of her home in Yialousa a few years after the Third Vienna Agreement. Therefore, her assessment that this Agreement instead of protecting the enclaved was actually the conduit for further expulsions has to be seen within this framework. On the whole, those still enclaved decried that Vienna III as something that was never implemented.

By 18 August 1975, the ICRC was reporting that 3,000-4,000 Turkish Cypriots had already been swiftly transferred to the northern part of Cyprus.⁵¹⁶ In the same period only 16 Greek

⁵¹³ Palley, 173.

⁵¹⁴ Crawford, “Conversation with Greek Ambassador”, 7 August 1975, 16:55, Nicosia 2443, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI02443_b.html.

⁵¹⁵ Gavriella, 23 October 2013.

⁵¹⁶ Simonius, “P.V. de téléphone”, 18 August 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.06 / 210 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8806].

Cypriots were able to return to the Turkish-controlled area. This brought to the fore the question of whether or not the Greek Cypriots would break their end of the bargain by slowing down the departure of Turkish Cypriots, since the Turkish side hadn't kept its side of the deal.⁵¹⁷

A total of 937 Greek Cypriots had been included in a list compiled by the Government of people wishing to resettle in the northern part of Cyprus, with the sole purpose of family reunification. A month after the Agreement, 217 Greek Cypriots were reported to have resettled, principally in the villages of the Karpass, with three people allowed back to Bellapais.⁵¹⁸ "People from the main villages of Karpasia seem to be ready to live under Turkish rule,"⁵¹⁹ noted an ICRC delegate assisting with Greek Cypriot resettlement.

By February 1976, only a total of 327 had been permitted back, including former POWs.⁵²⁰ Clerides complained to the ICRC that the Turkish Cypriots "have hardly respected any of the Vienna III clauses concerning the problems of the [Greek Cypriots] in the North, namely: school problems, medical problems, freedom of movement."⁵²¹ Schools remained closed, doctors were not resettled⁵²² and freedom of movement was curbed for the Greek Cypriot enclaved.

Despite the seeming political backing of both Athens and Washington concerning the relocation of Turkish Cypriots, in effect this move hailed the full ethnic separation of Cyprus along the green line. EDEK party chief Vassos Lyssarides vociferously objected to the Agreement as a step towards instituting bizonality (or bi-regionalism as it was termed in the mid-1970s) and bicommunality.⁵²³

⁵¹⁷ Simonius, 18 August 1975: [ICRC 8806].

⁵¹⁸ ICRC Nicosia, "Telegram 1204 to ICRC Geneva" 5 September 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 7856].

⁵¹⁹ Munger, "Note : La situation en Karpasie", 22 September 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.010 / 231 (35)) :[ICRC 7118].

⁵²⁰ Simonius, "Chypre – Votre Note no. 519", 10 February 1976: [ICRC 7575].

⁵²¹ Grüneck, "Procès-verbal d'entretien – Glafkos Clerides", 12 November 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 8452].

⁵²² While the village of Yialousa had its Greek Cypriot doctor and dentist, Greek Cypriot patients in the other enclaved areas were not permitted to go to them for their healthcare needs. Only Turkish Cypriot doctors would be allowed to travel to tend to Greek Cypriot patients in their homes. By January 1976 the only Greek Cypriot doctor was expelled.

⁵²³ Clerides, *My Deposition: Volume 4*, 299.

Ayla Gürel and Kudret Özersay,⁵²⁴ analysing competing Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot vantage points on the property issue as a “human rights” approach versus “bizonality”, argue that it was in fact the Third Vienna Agreement that consolidated the Turkish Cypriot argument. They depict how the Third Vienna Agreement was a “regrouping” of the two communities on either side of the ceasefire lines, and that it indirectly accepted the notion of “property abandonment” of those who had fled:

It seems that the Turkish Cypriot side preferred to understand the Agreement as something like the 1923 Lausanne Exchange Treaty between Turkey and Greece, and probably partly for this reason actually called it the ‘Population Exchange Agreement’. And, since the Greek Cypriots agreed to this exchange, it was perfectly reasonable for the Turkish Cypriots to regard the properties of the Greek Cypriots who moved to the south as ‘abandoned’ (as was the case with the properties left behind after the exchange between Greece and Turkey some eighty or so years ago).⁵²⁵

Bicommunality and bizonality as the basis of a federal solution to the Cyprus question were only formally agreed in 1977 and 1979. However, in 1975, discussions already revolved around these notions during the negotiations:

There had been elements of apparent progress. In this regard we noted excellent atmosphere at Vienna III, Denktash’s commitment to discuss geography, GoC’s acceptance of bi-regionalism (by Makarios at Helsinki and by Clerides at Vienna).⁵²⁶

For Denktash, these concepts meant ethnic segregation, with each community residing in their respective zone/region. Towards this end he was prepared to hand over territory from the occupied region to allow for return of Greek Cypriots. However, he would bar any further returns to the Turkish Cypriot “zone”:

Denktash had given [UN Special Representative Muñoz] his personal assurance that he would present the outline of an overall solution. This would include offer to return new city of Famagusta, important areas south of new Nicosia-Famagusta road, and some citrus plantations in vicinity of Morphou. He would not deal in territorial percentages, but area to be relinquished would be sufficient to allow return of 100,000 refugees. Virtually no Greeks would be allowed to return to area which

⁵²⁴ Mr. Kudret Özersay has turned his back on his academic background in favour of politics, thus far achieving his highest position as “Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister”. He had partaken in the Annan Plan negotiations in 2003 and 2004, as member of the Turkish Cypriot team, and in various other advisory capacities until he became chief negotiator in 2014. He founded a political movement with an eye on the top Turkish Cypriot political position in 2015 but finished fourth (and last) in the first round, with Mustafa Akıncı ultimately elected into the coveted position. He retains his ambitions for the top job.

⁵²⁵ Ayla Gürel and Kudret Özersay, *The Politics of Property in Cyprus: Conflicting Appeals to ‘Bizonality’ and ‘Human Rights’ by the Two Cypriot Communities*, International Peace Research Institute Oslo Report 3/2006, Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo, 20.

⁵²⁶ Crawford, “Conversation with Greek Ambassador”, 7 August 1975, 16:55, Nicosia 2443.

thereafter remained under Turkish administration. Proposal would be essentially non-negotiable.⁵²⁷

The ICRC, assessing what was taking place on the ground, was of the impression that the Turkish authorities had grown to accept the presence of a Greek Cypriot minority in the Karpass integrated into their “state”.⁵²⁸ The organisation was working on the assumption that the Third Vienna Agreement would be implemented by all sides and was thus expecting that the Greek-language schools in the Turkish-controlled area would re-open. Schools were an integral element for Greek Cypriot families with school-aged children to remain in their homes and villages in the northern part of Cyprus and retain a normal life and ensure a “balanced” age distribution of the enclaved community.

An unexpected consequence of the resettlement of Greek Cypriot POWs to the Karpass after the Third Vienna Agreement, and possibly of the hope that if the Agreement were implemented in full a sustainable and balanced enclaved community could endure, was a “‘baby-boom’ [that] started in the whole of Karpasia.” In June 1976 the ICRC was seeking necessary permits for Greek Cypriot midwives in the Karpass village of Leonarisso to be granted freedom of movement.⁵²⁹

Despite the provisions of the 2 August 1975 Vienna Agreement, the Greek Cypriot enclaved were still not permitted to return to their jobs, except for the agricultural sector. Freedom of movement and trade had not been reinstalled. As such, the Greek Cypriots were “almost entirely” dependent on the UN convoys, which beyond food, cooking gas and diesel, would also deliver pensions, as well as a government allowance to the majority of the enclaved who had no other means of securing an income.⁵³⁰ The majority of them had been employed in

⁵²⁷ Crawford, “Weckmann Resigns”, 8 August 1975, 14:00, Nicosia 2450, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI02450_b.html.

⁵²⁸ Munger “Note: La situation en Karpasie”, 22 September 1975: [ICRC 7122]

⁵²⁹ Grinling, “Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.5.76-30.6.76”, 7 July 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7174].

⁵³⁰ Grinling, “Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.5.76-30.6.76”, 7 July 1976: [ICRC 7118].

Allowances took time to get established, with only pensioners receiving any regular money, and even so in January 1975 they had received two months’ worth out of the five they were owed; *see* Küng, “Report on Economical and Food Situations of the Greek-Cypriot population living in the North,” January 1, 1975: [ICRC 8097]. By June 1975 pensions varied between 14 and 22 Cypriot pounds, while the monthly welfare allowance amounted to 4 Cyprus Pounds (CYP) per head of family and then an additional 2 CYP for each member of the family household up to 5 persons, and 1.5CYP for additional members; *see* Küng, “Situation of the GKCYP population living in the North of Cyprus by end June 1975”, 28 June 1975: [ICRC 7963].

In a 2019 documentary, one of the Rizokarpaso enclaved noted that as a returning POW who had four young children, he was forced to become a fisherman, as the allowance he received only came to 9 CYP per month, which was not enough to provide for his family (Alpha News Production, “16° Επεισόδιο: Εγκλωβισμένοι της Καρπασίας 28/12/2019 Β’ Σεζόν” [16th Episode: The Enclaved of the Karpass 28/12/2019 Second Season]).

the now-ghost town of Varosha; working their fields and gardens would not constitute a long-term viable substitute, further hampered by the restrictions to accessing their fields.⁵³¹ A strict curfew between 10 in the evening and 6 in the morning was still in place;⁵³² beyond the permission needed to move freely to fields, going outside the confines of one's enclaved villages was heavily restricted.

Messages the enclaved wrote to their relatives and friends on the other side of the ceasefire lines, and delivered by the ICRC, were censored.⁵³³ They and their relatives on the other side of the ceasefire lines would rely on ingenious methods to avoid detection. As pharmaceutical supplies were delivered by the UN, some would buy extraneous medicine and use the dosage instructions to include clandestine messages.⁵³⁴ Or else they would get erasers, take off the outside paper wrapping, writing illicit messages on its back side.⁵³⁵

House searches and beatings of Greek Cypriots allegedly suspected of hiding arms or receiving uncensored messages continued.⁵³⁶ Ambassador Rossides protested the renegeing of key commitments by the Turkish side of its Vienna III obligations at the UN, describing how, six months after the agreement, the conditions remained dire:

As to the commitment to allow freedom of movement of the Greek-Cypriot people in the north, there is not even a semblance of such freedom of movement from the villages where they live. Each Greek Cypriot, furthermore, has to report to the 'Turkish police' twice a day at fixed hours. If one is late even by a few minutes, he is subjected to beatings and other ill-treatment.⁵³⁷

Despite this lack of liberty, a *modus vivendi* was established between the Greek Cypriots in the Karpas and their Turkish and Turkish Cypriot overlords, with the Greek Cypriots refraining from aggravating those in power in order to gain some semblance of normality.⁵³⁸ Many enclaved personally knew the Turkish Cypriots in command. There were instances when these Turkish Cypriots would come to the aid of women carrying the heavy bags of UN deliveries to their homes. As Gavriella recalled, those who had stayed in the village of

⁵³¹ Grinling, "Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.5.76-30.6.76", 7 July 1976: [ICRC 7119].

⁵³² Curfews were set between sunrise and sunset, for many months. If a need arose to step out of the home and only within the vicinity, people used torches to remain transparent about their movements, as per the interview with Gavriella, 23 October 2013.

⁵³³ Munger, "Note: La situation en Karpasie", 22 September 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.010 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 7119].

⁵³⁴ Gavriella, 23 October 2013.

⁵³⁵ Bella, 13 August 2013.

⁵³⁶ Munger "Note: La situation en Karpasie", 22 September 1975: [ICRC 7120].

⁵³⁷ Rossides, "Letter to the United Nations Secretary-General, 29 January 1976", S/11952.

⁵³⁸ Simonius, "Chypre – Votre Note no. 519", 10 February 1976: [ICRC 7575].

Yialousa after the second phase of the 1974 Turkish invasion “were determined to remain.”⁵³⁹ Thus they avoided provoking those in power.

Although there were exceptions, by and large, those who remained in their villages were able to hold on to their property. While those expelled left many of their possessions behind. “*Ganimet*”, the Turkish word for loot, was used to describe the animals, fields, houses and vehicles that had been seized from Greek Cypriots who no longer resided in the Turkish-occupied part.⁵⁴⁰

Beyond the serious problems regarding curtailed medical access, closed schools, and patchy employment that seriously tested the Greek Cypriot enclaved, religious services were also barred from regularly taking place. Cemeteries⁵⁴¹ and churches were desecrated. The ICRC recorded that even for funeral services the Turkish regime’s police had to search for priests, since half of the enclaved communities no longer had a priest in residence. To authorise burials of a Greek Cypriot enclaved person who passed away during hospitalisation in the Government-controlled areas, special permission had to be granted.⁵⁴² Had Denktash kept to his commitments under the Agreement, the Greek Orthodox faithful should at least have been allowed to attend services in a nearby village with a priest, if not effectively encourage those who had left to return and tend to their parishioners. However, the element of freedom of movement that was also a provision of the August 1975 Agreement was not respected. The restrictions to freedom of movement of Greek Cypriots were excused on the basis of the “sacrosanct reasons of security issued by all the armies of the world”.⁵⁴³

By this point, the UN was able to access all Greek Cypriot communities, in the accompaniment of a member of the Turkish Army or law enforcement. The ICRC was contemplating transferring its humanitarian mandate, with a view to wrapping up its operations in Cyprus,⁵⁴⁴ since the “Vienna Agreement” provided that humanitarian relief would slowly be in the hands of UNFICYP. It was not meant to be.⁵⁴⁵

⁵³⁹ Gavriella, 23 October 2013.

⁵⁴⁰ Munger “Note: La situation en Karpasie”, 22 September 1975: [ICRC 7120].

⁵⁴¹ Grüneck, “Letter addressed to Rauf Denktash”, 8 October 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 7845].

⁵⁴² Hoffmann, “Monthly Report: 21 November-31 December 1975”, 12 January 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 7827].

⁵⁴³ Grüneck, “Situation générale à fin octobre 1975 des minorités CYPGK dans les territoires sous contrôle CYPGK”, 31 October 1975: [ICRC 7834].

⁵⁴⁴ Munger “Note: La situation en Karpasie”, 22 September 1975: [ICRC 7123].

⁵⁴⁵ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/11900, 8 December 1975.

As with all the Greek Cypriot-related provisions of the Agreement, the Turkish side cherry-picked even this condition. A month after the August 1975 Agreement and already at a point when almost all Turkish Cypriots had been transferred to the northern part,

UNFICYP [was] still having problems establishing freedom of movement. While four [Liaison Posts, LPs] in Yialousa area operating effectively per Vienna III Accords, UN attempts to establish fifth LP in Rizokarpaso have not been successful. In Kyrenia area, UNFICYP is limited to one static camp (FinCon near summit of Nicosia-Kyrenia pass road). UNFICYP Commander LTG Prem Chand has been negotiating for additional three LP's to observe conditions in Greek population areas around Kyrenia town (approximately 1,000 persons to east, 500 to west). Thus far, Turkish army has refused and agrees only allow mobile UNFICYP patrols once weekly on Mondays.⁵⁴⁶

The Cypriot Government also protested this incursion of the UN peacekeepers:

there is no freedom of movement for UNFICYP. They cannot make contact with the Greek Cypriots or render any necessary assistance. In spite of the planned establishment of liaison posts as required in the area, the Turkish army not only refused to allow such establishment but also banned those UNFICYP members manning already existing posts, from going anywhere without a permit from the Turkish military. Moreover, next to each UNFICYP "liaison post", a Turkish post has been planted to keep the UNFICYP men under surveillance and prevent any contact between them and the Greek Cypriots contrary to the express provisions of the Agreement.⁵⁴⁷

The restrictions on UNFICYP led the ICRC to reassess its initial withdrawal plan. Another reason was the introduction by the Turkish Government of settlers from mainland Turkey, which by September 1975 already amounted to some 3,000 people.⁵⁴⁸ It was becoming increasingly clear that the Turkish side was not implementing its side of the Third Vienna Agreement.

The US was clear as to who was to blame: the "Turkish mainland Commander has shown open contempt for Denktash and Vienna III undertakings – although we are confident these were approved by [the Government of Turkey] at the time."⁵⁴⁹ Furthermore, the US Embassy's Deputy Chief of Mission in Nicosia raised with his Turkish Cypriot interlocutor a rather stark portrayal of what was (not) taking place on the ground:

⁵⁴⁶ Crawford, "UNFICYP Observations in Kyrenia and Famagusta Districts", 5 September 1975, 10:30, Nicosia 2683, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI02683_b.html.

⁵⁴⁷ Rossides, "Letter to the UN Secretary-General: Annex: Violations of the Vienna Agreement of 2 August in the intercommunal talks", 29 January 1976, S/11952.

⁵⁴⁸ Crawford, "UNFICYP Observations in Kyrenia and Famagusta Districts", 5 September 1975, 10:30, Nicosia 2683.

⁵⁴⁹ Crawford, "Non-implementation of Vienna III Agreements", 10 October 1975, 15:00, Nicosia 2999.

While the Turkish Cypriots have received almost 100 percent of the benefits due them the Greek Cypriots have yet to gain even a small portion of the benefits theoretically assured by the agreements at Vienna III.⁵⁵⁰

Instead of being a turning point towards the positive, the Third Vienna Agreement marked the beginning of a further wave of rapid decrease of the enclaved population. By the end of December 1975, the ICRC figures showed that 7,723 Greek Cypriots remained in Karpasia, with 92 in the Famagusta district, 795 in Kyrenia and 64 in Myrtou.⁵⁵¹ Gavriella, in referring to the Turkish Authorities after the Vienna Agreement, didn't mince her words when she exclaimed that "we were now at their mercy."⁵⁵²

The main reason for Greek Cypriot "intentional" transfers (and not forced "voluntary" transfers) was the lack of access to schools.⁵⁵³ The ICRC assessed that the Greek Cypriot community's ongoing presence in the region would be based on two factors: "the reopening of the schools" as well as their relations with Turkish Cypriots and Turkish settlers "who are settling steadily in the villages, one village after another moving from west to east."⁵⁵⁴ The US Ambassador assessed that it was the intention of the Turkish side all along:

it is clear that Turkish tactic is to allow minimum school facilities in Greek Cypriot villages, thereby stimulating decisions to move south, and let passage of time do the rest.⁵⁵⁵

In February 1975, Maronite Cypriots remaining in the northern part of Cyprus were granted their freedom of movement, since they came under the protection of the Vatican, as well as Lebanon, whose Ambassador in Nicosia assisted towards this end.⁵⁵⁶ The "special arrangements with the Turkish Authorities allow the Maronites to move freely even to the southern part of the island".⁵⁵⁷ The ICRC deemed the enclaved Maronite community to have become an "integrated (minority) part" of the Turkish-occupied area and no longer vulnerable, thus discontinuing its reporting.⁵⁵⁸ It should be recalled that Maronites had also been subjected to severe restrictions in the aftermath of the war, not permitted to cross the

⁵⁵⁰ Crawford, "Non-implementation of Vienna III Agreements", Nicosia 2999.

⁵⁵¹ Lennartz, "Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.11.75-31.12.75", 14 January 1976: [ICRC 7196].

⁵⁵² Gavriella, 23 October 2013.

⁵⁵³ Lennartz, "Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.11.75-31.12.75", 14 January 1976: [ICRC 7196].

⁵⁵⁴ Lennartz, "Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.11.75-31.12.75", 14 January 1976: [ICRC 7199].

⁵⁵⁵ Crawford, "Displaced Cypriots: Part I, An Overview", 27 January 1976, 16:30, Nicosia 0262.

⁵⁵⁶ Grüneck, "Evolution probable de la situation des minorités cypristes-grecques dans les secteurs ouest et centres des territoires sous contrôle de l'armée Turque", 22 February 1975: [ICRC 7997].

⁵⁵⁷ Küng, "Report on Economical and Food Situations", 1 January 1975: [ICRC 8085].

⁵⁵⁸ Küng, "Situation of the GKCYC population living in the North of Cyprus by end June 1975", 28 June 1975: [ICRC 7955].

Green Line, etc. Their children, on the other side of the ceasefire lines, were allowed to visit during Christmas, only after ICRC intervention.⁵⁵⁹

As the dust settled on the Vienna Agreement, it was becoming desperately apparent that there was little chance of its implementation as regards the Greek Cypriots. On 23 December 1975, the last of the Greek Cypriots left Lapithos, in the Kyrenia area, as they had been heavily “intimidated and disturbed” by incoming Turkish settlers and Turkish Cypriots.⁵⁶⁰ In both the villages of Bellapais and Ayios Epiktitos, the respective Mukhtars were evicted after being accused of possessing a gun,⁵⁶¹ which led to dozens of villagers requesting transfer.⁵⁶² Gavriella also attested to this tactic of intimidation as a precursor to expulsion.⁵⁶³ Other village Mukhtars’ animals would be stolen or stones were thrown at their house, in order to intimidate them to depart.⁵⁶⁴ The ICRC described these incidents as “camouflaged evacuations”,⁵⁶⁵ after all, targeting the community leader would effectively translate to all remaining residents wishing to depart.

In the Karpass region’s Patriki village, Greek Cypriots were subjected to importunities, which a month later led many to bunk together in the coffee shop.⁵⁶⁶ The east of Rizokarpaso was declared a military region, barring farmers from accessing their fields there, while the ICRC was documenting that in Ayia Trias the Turkish Army beat up a Greek Cypriot.⁵⁶⁷

Cyprus Permanent Representative Rossides succinctly described this policy of intimidation and the policy aims behind it:

Arrests, searches, beatings, threats, various modes of intimidation, destruction of property, firing of shots at houses and other acts of terror are among the means of expelling these unfortunate people whose only ‘crime’ is that they want to continue living in their ancestral homes and lands.⁵⁶⁸

⁵⁵⁹ Lennartz, “Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.11.75-31.12.75”, 14 January 1976: [ICRC 7197].

Maronites were able to work their fields, and those with special identity cards issued 16 December 1974 onwards, could visit the Government-controlled areas twice a month. Küng, “Report on Economical and Food Situations”, 1 January 1975: [ICRC 8092].

⁵⁶⁰ Lennartz, “Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.11.75-31.12.75”, 14 January 1976: [ICRC 7197].

⁵⁶¹ Lennartz, “Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.11.75-31.12.75”, 14 January 1976: [ICRC 7197].

⁵⁶² Grinling, “Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.1.76-31.1.76”, 4 February 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7193].

⁵⁶³ Gavriella, 23 October 2013.

⁵⁶⁴ Grinling, “Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.1.76-31.1.76”, 4 February 1976: [ICRC 7192].

⁵⁶⁵ Grinling, “Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.1.76-31.1.76”, 4 February 1976: [ICRC 7194].

⁵⁶⁶ Grinling, “Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.1.76-31.1.76”, 4 February 1976: [ICRC 7193].

⁵⁶⁷ Lennartz, “Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.11.75-31.12.75”, 14 January 1976: [ICRC 7198].

⁵⁶⁸ Rossides, Letter to the United Nations Secretary-General, 29 January 1976, S/11952.

Overturning their planned withdrawal, the ICRC started collecting figures of the “depopulation” percentage from the previous month. For January 1976, upon visiting 32 Greek Cypriot enclaved villages, it documented that the Greek Cypriots had decreased to 8593, from December’s total of 8678.⁵⁶⁹

The UN peacekeeping force, conducting humanitarian deliveries, had somewhat different records compared to the ICRC’s stocktaking. For 36 villages (instead of the ICRC’s 32), and 8840 Greek Cypriots (instead of 8593) in the Turkish-occupied areas:

U.N. forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) conducts its own count of selected population groups and analysis: (a) at present UNFICYP lists 8,840 Greek Cypriots in north (rather than 10,000 according to [Government of Cyprus]). UNFICYP figure is based on visits during bi-weekly deliveries of food, seeds, fertilizers, spare parts, money to Greek Cypriots in north. Greek Cypriots live at 36 locations (down from 75 locations in March 1975).⁵⁷⁰

Despite the discrepancy in the figures, one thing was absolutely clear: the population was shrinking and no aspect of the Vienna III Agreement that was supposed to protect the enclaved was being implemented. Ambassador Rossides in New York eloquently laid bare the dire situation and the political motivation behind it:

Beyond the refusal of the Turkish side to carry out its aforesaid commitments, the very opposite policy is systematically followed through the continuing expulsion of the remaining Greek Cypriots in the occupied areas and the massive settlement of colonists from Turkey in their places.⁵⁷¹

This was not a partisan reading of the political situation as regards the Turkish side’s motivation. The US representation in Cyprus had also come to a similar conclusion: the objective in the Turkish-controlled area was to consolidate the *de facto* partition and ethnic homogenisation along the green line. Writing in early February 1975 about the diminished prospects of return of Greek Cypriot refugees to their ancestral homes, the US Ambassador explained to Washington that

Prospects for return of substantial number of refugees – either to Turkish-controlled area or to areas to be relinquished as part of settlement – appear to be diminishing as diplomatic stalemate continues, *de facto* separation is consolidated, and Turkish security requirements in the north are defined. Widely held assumption here last year that Turk Cypriot administration could tolerate Greek Cypriot minority of up to 33 per cent has changed drastically. Turks here now made little secret of their view that presence of 8000 Greeks in north is ‘unnatural’ and that they would prefer to see Greeks depart. Thus, it is now more a question of preserving rather than augmenting

⁵⁶⁹ Lennartz, “Note No. 437”, 10 February 1976: [ICRC 7191].

⁵⁷⁰ Crawford, “Displaced Cypriots: Part I, An Overview”, 27 January 1976, 16:30, Nicosia 0262.

⁵⁷¹ Rossides, Letter to the United Nations Secretary-General, 29 January 1976, S/11952.

[sic.] present Greek population level in north.⁵⁷²

The continuous “depopulation” of Greek Cypriots in Kyrenia and Myrtou, and increased intimidation of the Karpas enclaved from incoming settlers from Turkey was amplifying the precarious situation on the ground. However, the enclaved were clinging to the hope arising from the intercommunal negotiations between Clerides and Denktash scheduled for February 1976. “Should the talks in Vienna not bring positive results,” an ICRC official warned, “the situation is expected to deteriorate considerably and a significant number of the remaining GKCYPs would apply for transfer to the south.”⁵⁷³

The talks failed to yield results and the policy of *hard ethnic cleansing*, expelling hundreds of Greek Cypriots, was to peak a few weeks later. In a telegram, underscoring the urgency of the situation, they wrote to their headquarters that the role of the ICRC witnessing this mass expulsion was in contravention of the Geneva Conventions and this was “becoming difficult.”⁵⁷⁴ They warned Geneva that

a pattern is becoming more and more evident; people are advised by the police to apply for transfer on such-and-such a date with the promise to get the necessary facilities to take all their belongings with them. Then follows the warning: ‘If you do not leave you might not have the same facilities later.’⁵⁷⁵

UN peacekeepers on the ground voiced similar concerns. In the local UNFICYP Commander’s eyes, the

TK CYP Authorities use primitive inhuman methods to create anxiety and to frighten and force people to apply to leave their homes and move South. They are ignoring the provisions of the Geneva Convention with regard to treatment of populations of occupied territories. [...] The situation in the KARPAS is critical and something must be done very soon at the highest level to secure and protect the GK Cyp population remaining in the area. This is a matter of 7,300 individual human beings and their rights to live normal lives.⁵⁷⁶

Towards this end, the Cyprus Red Cross President, Stella Soulioti, advised the ICRC that despite the “frustration of ICRC delegates having to be witness to a procedure they could not prevent [...] one should not deprive the victims of occupation of the little comfort ICRC

⁵⁷² Crawford, “Displaced Cypriots: Part II, Political Aspects”, 2 February 1976, 14:10, Nicosia 0303, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1976NICOSI00303_b.html.

⁵⁷³ Lennartz, “Note No. 437”, 10 February 1976: [ICRC 7190].

⁵⁷⁴ Hoffmann, “Telegram No. 1303 to ICRC Geneva”, 17 March 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7572].

⁵⁷⁵ Hoffmann, “Pressure on GKCYPs in the North to leave the Turkish-controlled area”, 22 March 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7566].

⁵⁷⁶ Magnus Olander, “General Resume of Conditions in the Karpas,” UNFICYP HQ Sector 6, 12 May 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7538].

could still provide,” thus effectively advising the international humanitarian organisation to persist with its work.⁵⁷⁷

April 1976 was a turning point in terms of the Greek Cypriot political landscape, as Clerides resigned from his position of negotiator and Tassos Papadopoulos assumed his place, which prompted Denktash to withdraw from the negotiations. That month also saw a 60% decrease in the populations of Myrtou district (mostly Maronite), while in Kyrenia, in March and April the population decreased by 23% and 27% respectively.⁵⁷⁸ Indeed, the situation was so dire that the Greek Cypriot interlocutor demanded that all such transfer applications be screened by both sides, an agreement to which the Turkish Cypriots conceded on 31 March 1976. However, this was quickly reneged by the Turkish side.

The Government did not stop there and used all diplomatic means at its disposal to highlight the plight of the enclaved at Turkish hands. Nonetheless, while the Turkish side’s actions were condemned, the continued protests by the Cyprus Government backfired as it led to a hardening of the Turkish side’s positions vis-à-vis the enclaved:

The political exploitation on the Greek Cypriot side of the difficulties encountered by the Greek Cypriots still in the north, strongly irritates the authorities of the north and leads to an increased hardening of their attitude towards these people rather than to a spirit of generosity or conciliation.⁵⁷⁹

The drastic reduction in numbers of Greek Cypriot enclaved was documented by John Fielding for the Thames TV “This Week” production that aired in May 1976. The British journalist documented how the expulsions affected the UN humanitarian aid convoys that would service the Greek Cypriots north of the ceasefire lines on a weekly basis:

In January [1976] the trucks which once numbered up to 22 a day, serving the 23 cut-off villages, were reduced to four by the Turks. The message was obvious and understood. In five months, two-and-a-half thousand people have gone south. In the Karpass, there are only six thousand people left.⁵⁸⁰

In denying that *hard ethnic cleansing* was taking place, Rauf Denktash told Fielding that “We are not pumping them out, however, we cannot stop them from going.”⁵⁸¹ The ICRC

⁵⁷⁷ Hoffmann, “Pressure on GKCYPs in the North to leave the Turkish-controlled area”, 22 March 1976: [ICRC 7567].

⁵⁷⁸ Hoffmann, “Pressure on GKCYPs in the North to leave the Turkish-controlled area”, 22 March 1976: [ICRC 7181].

⁵⁷⁹ Borsinger, “Note à M. J.-P. Hocke, Directeur des Operations”, 21 May 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7528].

⁵⁸⁰ Thames TV, “The Sad Face of Cyprus”, 1976.

⁵⁸¹ Thames TV, “The Sad Face of Cyprus”, 1976.

was unconvinced that the transfer requests were made out of personal volition, given that the expulsions in Myrthou came with the warning that if the Greek Cypriots did not leave immediately “with all their belongings, they might have to leave later with nothing.”⁵⁸² UNFICYP’s own reporting at the time noted that Turkish and Turkish Cypriot “physical and psychological pressures” caused people to leave their homes.⁵⁸³ These pressures could be summed up as consisting of curfews, absence of freedom of movement, maltreatment, censorship of mail, deprivation of newspapers and books, lack of educational, medical and religious facilities. As Fielding documented at the time:

Everything is all right, say the censored letters and pathetic Red Cross messages that pass for communication from those sealed in here. But in truth everything is deeply bitterly wrong. These people are watched, suspected, followed, searched; they are cowed, they’re almost broken and they leave one by one.

The last local Greek doctor was expelled six months ago after being tortured with electric shocks. No Greek replacement was allowed now. There’s only a Turkish doctor.⁵⁸⁴

Furthermore, by April 1976, the Turkish side’s position for the complete ethnic homogenisation of the Turkish-occupied area was made clear, when Denktash reflected that

The Turkish Cypriots have all left their homes in the South. There is no reason why Greek Cypriots in the North should not leave their homes aswell [sic.]. It is tragic for both. The reason that they could not leave [sic.] together is the fault of the Greek majority.⁵⁸⁵

In writing about the increased and organised arrival of mainland Turkish settlers in the framework of a Turkish Government policy, the US Ambassador in Nicosia cabled the State Department his analysis, whereby:

The [Government of Turkey or] GoT – through its Embassy, the Turkish military forces on the island, and the Bayraktarlik (covert military organization which answers directly to TGS [the Turkish General Staff] in Ankara) – has a key if not controlling voice in all important political and economic matters here. This control, we are reliably told, is more or less formalized at the highest level in a secret committee of three (composed of [the “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus president”] Denktash, Turkish Ambassador, and the Bayraktar) which reviews ministerial and legislative decisions. In this context – and particularly on a matter which could cause embarrassment for the GoT – it is difficult to believe that plans and policies for

⁵⁸² Grinling, “Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.3.76-30.4.76”, 12 May 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7183].

⁵⁸³ Olander, “General Resume of Conditions in the Karpas”, 12 May 1976: [ICRC 7536].

⁵⁸⁴ Thames TV, “The Sad Face of Cyprus”, 1976.

⁵⁸⁵ Hoffmann, “Note No. 477: ‘Future of the Delegation of ICRC’”, 3 May 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7554].

handling such a large inflow of immigrants could have been formulated and carried out without GoT coordination and approval.⁵⁸⁶

The introduction of Turkish mainlanders in the Turkish-occupied area, especially in villages where Greek Cypriots continued to reside, was another aspect of the organised policy of *hard ethnic cleansing*. It was not a mere passing issue; “the procedure of Turkish immigrants squeezing GKCYPs out of Karpasia will continue,” relayed ICRC Head of Mission Georg Hoffmann to his Geneva-based colleagues in May 1976.⁵⁸⁷ Even the Turkish Cypriot liaison of the ICRC spoke of 40,000 Turkish settlers, the figure also appearing in the Greek-language press.⁵⁸⁸

The appearance of Turkish mainland settlers in Cyprus was compounded by a parallel exodus of 30-50 Greek Cypriot enclaved on a daily basis by the summer of 1976.⁵⁸⁹ The Turkish settlers’ presence was directly affecting the enclaved Greek Cypriot population,⁵⁹⁰ as the settlers brought in from the Turkish mainland were now moving into the villages still inhabited by Greek Cypriots.

In many of the areas where Greek Cypriots remained, thefts, threats and physical aggression,⁵⁹¹ as well as psychological intimidation were reported. Even in villages where the Turkish settlers were still a minority of 300, such as Ayia Trias with 1,000 Greek Cypriots, the latter was intimidated.⁵⁹² Rizokarpaso’s Mukhtar, representing the largest Greek Cypriot village in Karpasia, denoted concern over the influx of settlers and how the changing demographic situation would play out. In other villages, the situation was deemed so difficult that the autochthonous Greek Cypriots of Koma tou Yialou (estimated at 236), Ayios Andronikos (514), Vathylakas (339) and Kilamenos (50) “declared that they will all leave because of the present conditions in the area.”⁵⁹³ It was estimated that around 1,500 Turkish settlers moved into the 23 Greek Cypriot villages/locations of 7,300 people.⁵⁹⁴

⁵⁸⁶ Crawford, “Turkish Immigration to Cyprus”, 19 February 1976, 15:28, Nicosia 0442, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1976NICOSI00442_b.html.

⁵⁸⁷ Hoffmann, “Note No. 481: New situation in Karpasia”, 11 May 1976: [ICRC 7546].

⁵⁸⁸ Hoffmann, “Note No. 481: New situation in Karpasia”, 11 May 1976: [ICRC 7546].

⁵⁸⁹ Simonius, “Téléphone - G. Hoffmann, Chef délégation Nicosie”, 18 August 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY): [ICRC 7488].

⁵⁹⁰ Grinling, “Note to G. Hoffmann: The Situation in Karpasia”, 18 May 1976: [ICRC 7177].

⁵⁹¹ Simonius, “Chypre: Expulsion de Cypriotes grecs du Nord et Immigration turque en provenance d’Anatolie”, 10 May 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7550].

⁵⁹² Grinling, “Note to G. Hoffmann: The Situation in Karpasia”, 18 May 1976: [ICRC 7178].

⁵⁹³ Grinling, “Note to G. Hoffmann: The Situation in Karpasia”, 18 May 1976: [ICRC 7179].

⁵⁹⁴ Olander, “General Resume of Conditions in the Karpas” 12 May 1976: [ICRC 7536].

The ICRC, which had already postponed its withdrawal date to 30 June 1976, decided that it would not depart since “a compact farmer population, attached to the land for generations, was being up-rooted.”⁵⁹⁵ The influx of the settlers led to “people being pushed out of their homes in increasing numbers”.⁵⁹⁶ Settlers openly took over homes still inhabited by Greek Cypriots, despite there being abandoned properties that remained empty.

Denktash was the Turkish Cypriot hardliner arguing for physical separation of the two communities. Turkey’s Ambassador alleged to the ICRC that a Greek Cypriot presence in the Karpas “within the framework of a solid TKCYP canton” was an “acceptable solution.”⁵⁹⁷ However, it was the Commander of the Turkish Army who had the “casting vote and absolute right of veto” over all decisions.⁵⁹⁸ Even Denktash, admitted as much in his conversations with the US Ambassador in Nicosia:

We discussed in the frankest terms the steady pressure of the mainland military to bring about removal of Greeks remaining in the north. Denktash asked me to tell him exactly what I knew. I cited a few of the most blatant instances of intimidation of such Greek leadership as remained in the north which I said I was convinced was calculated to break morale. Citing the case of Bellapais where the largest single group of Greeks outside the Karpas had now been brought to the point of signing ‘voluntary’ statements of a wish to leave, I said it was our conclusion that a military decision had been reached to clear all Greeks out of the greater Kyrenia area. Denktash nodded. I asked whether it was intended that Karpas be next. Denktash said yes, and that this was a military decision. He added, however, that the Greeks themselves realized this would be better for all concerned. He alleged that the Karpas Greeks were not happy and wanted to go. He had petitions from the Greeks to prove this. These petitions asked that Turkish authorities cooperate in enabling the Greeks to sell their flocks and lands at true market value. Denktash concluded that one had to look at this philosophically: Greeks and Turks of the present generation, alike, would suffer the effects of displacement, but coming generations would be happier for it.⁵⁹⁹

The ICRC Mission in Cyprus was extremely concerned and sought the US Embassy’s support to demarche the Turkish Government in Ankara. ICRC Head of Mission Georg Hoffmann believed that although not all could be reversed, at least some pressure on Ankara could help protect the enclaved in the Karpas:

⁵⁹⁵ “Aide-Memoire as to ICRC Activity in Cyprus”, 14 April 1977 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7331].

⁵⁹⁶ Hoffmann, “Note No. 481: New situation in Karpasia”, 11 May 1976: [ICRC 7546].

⁵⁹⁷ Hoffmann, “Note No. 477: ‘Future of the Delegation of ICRC’”, 3 May 1976: [ICRC 7554].

⁵⁹⁸ Grüneck, “Situation générale à fin octobre 1975 des minorités CYPGK dans les territoires sous contrôle CYPTK”, 31 October 1975: [ICRC 7837].

⁵⁹⁹ Crawford, “Conversation with Denktash”, 19 April 1976, 12:30, Nicosia 1024, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1976NICOSI01024_b.html.

Profound concern over what he was certain was a GOT policy decision to expel all Greeks remaining in northern Cyprus. Hoffman thought it was too late to save any Greek presence in the Kyrenia area, but he felt if there [was] prompt, forceful international action there might be a slim chance of preserving the remaining Greek communities in the Karpas consisting of approximately 7,300 persons.⁶⁰⁰

The Turkish side's obvious forced homogenisation of the area under its occupation was apparent to all, and internationally, pressure was mounting to contain it. The ICRC was now determined "to make a stand on Article 49, even if the success was by no means certain [since] it was worthwhile not only in order to get our point of view across in friendly discussions with the Turkish diplomats, but also for the record."⁶⁰¹ Probably the main reason for this was that

a new element has appeared in the context of the [Greek Cypriot] exodus: the immigration of Turkish citizens coming by plane or boat to the port of Famagusta to go to the region of Karpasia, previously considered a Greek "reservation" in the territory of the "Turkish Federated State."⁶⁰²

Such demarches had little effect,⁶⁰³ albeit Denktash still promised to the Greek Cypriot autochthonous residents of the Karpas that those of them "who wish to stay on in Karpasia, are entitled to do so."⁶⁰⁴ These words would ring hollow when the arrivals of settlers continued. In his 20 July 1976 anniversary speech, marking the two years since Turkish troops landed in Cyprus, Denktash spoke of two federated states living 'side by side', which alluded to ethnic segregation. This followed from his admission to ICRC delegates a month earlier, during "difficult discussions,"⁶⁰⁵ that "he wants to get the Greeks out of this 'canton' and fill the gaps with Turks."⁶⁰⁶

By June 1976 between 7,019⁶⁰⁷ and 7,371⁶⁰⁸ Greek Cypriots remained in the entire Turkish-occupied- area of Cyprus. The US Ambassador in Nicosia wrote eloquently of "The Last

⁶⁰⁰ Crawford, "ICRC concern over expulsions from northern Cyprus", 14 May 1976, 15:30, Nicosia 1324, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1976NICOSI01324_b.html.

⁶⁰¹ Hoffmann, "Internal Note: Concerning the telephone conversation between Mr. Borsinger and Mr. Hoffmann on 21st May 1976", 22 May 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7526].

⁶⁰² Hoffmann, "Base de discussion au conseil executive, du jeudi 3 juin 1976", 2 June 1976 [*sic.* ?] (ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY)) : [ICRC 7516].

⁶⁰³ Hoffmann, "Chypre: Réflexions de M. G. Hoffmann", 21 June 1976: [ICRC 7503].

⁶⁰⁴ Borsinger, "Letter to Turkey's Deputy Prime Minister, Türan Feyzioğlu", 16 June 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7509].

⁶⁰⁵ Hoffmann, "Report for the Summer Months 1976, 1st May-31st August", 31 August 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7472].

⁶⁰⁶ Hoffmann, "Note No. 507", 26 July 1976: [ICRC 7493].

⁶⁰⁷ Grinling, "Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.5.76-30.6.76", 7 July 1976: [ICRC 7172].

⁶⁰⁸ United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council, S/12093, 5 June 1976.

Days of a Greek Cypriot Village” of Bellapais where residents were evicted wholesale after almost two years of pressure:

what we saw last weekend was that 20 months of intimidation had done its work. By Denktash’s own admission what has happened in Bellapais reflects a larger military policy aimed at removing, not reassuring, Greek Cypriot communities remaining in Turkish Cyprus.⁶⁰⁹

The forced decline of the Greek Cypriot population in the Turkish-controlled areas had become so noticeable that it even received a write-up in the *New York Times* detailing that the Turkish side was “keeping few of its promises, [and] persisted in putting pressure on the remaining ethnic Greeks to leave,” even quoting Turkish Cypriot politicians who explained their policy as such: “We do not want the U.N. or anyone else to look on the Karpass as a Greek canton with special privileges.”⁶¹⁰

To “create another *fait accompli* for the time when the intercommunal talks might start again at the beginning of February,”⁶¹¹ the remaining 276 Greek Cypriot residents of Komi Kebir, Koma tou Yialou, Vassili and Lythrangomi in the Karpass “were asked by the police to sign applications for transfer.”⁶¹² These transfer papers addressed to Denktash under the title “His Excellency, the President of the Turkish Cypriot Federated States” went on to state “I would like to beg you to authorise my transfer to Nicosia on the Greek side” and then before signing them, they had to express gratitude for the forced expulsion by “thanking” in advance.⁶¹³ The autochthonous inhabitants of Yialousa, Leonarisso and Ayios Andronikos “had been told that their villages should be emptied by the end of the year [i.e. within a few weeks] and that they should, therefore, give their applications for transfer to the police.”⁶¹⁴

The Greek Cypriot enclaved had pinned their hopes on a political solution. But with the increased influx of Turkish settlers from the mainland and Turkish Cypriots displaced from Cyprus’ southern villages now occupying abandoned Greek Cypriot properties, the facts on the ground, the *faits accomplis*, made it apparent that returning to the *status quo ante* was no longer a viable possibility. This, of course, added another dimension to the precarious

⁶⁰⁹ Crawford, “The Last Days of a Greek Cypriot Village” 29 April 1976, 11:15, Nicosia 1132, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1976NICOSI01132_b.html.

⁶¹⁰ Steven V. Roberts, “Greek Cypriots, Bowing to Pressure, Are Leaving Northern Cyprus; Hopes for Political Solution Fade”, *New York Times*, 1 November 1976.

⁶¹¹ Hoffmann, “Note No. 570: Visit to Karpasia by Mr. Hoffmann and Mr. Grinling on 18th to 19th November, 1976”, 22 November 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7435].

⁶¹² Grinling, “Activity Report Northern Sector from 1-30.11.76”, 30 November 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7158].

⁶¹³ Hoffmann, “Note No. 570”, 22 November 1976: [ICRC 7435].

⁶¹⁴ Grinling, “Activity Report Northern Sector from 1-30.11.76”, 30 November 1976: [ICRC 7158].

situation of the enclaved; while pressured from the Greek Cypriot leadership to stay, they were subjected to a two-pronged push from the Turkish side by way of the introduction of mainland Turkish settlers into their villages and their subjugation into accepting to sign “voluntary” expulsion forms, thus strengthening the hand of the Turkish side both on the ground and at the negotiation table.

Allegedly, this was done “for the security of the Greek Cypriots, so that there would not be troubles with the Turkish newcomers,” although most had stated “clearly that it was not their wish to leave” and in fact many were subject to “systematic robberies” and intimidation after they had already signed an application for transfer.⁶¹⁵

In Yialousa in the Karpas, one of the largest Greek Cypriot enclaved villages, the situation was said to have become better as restrictions were eased. Some believed that “Yialousa will be the last village to go [since] the Turkish Cypriot authorities, backed by the Turks, will not admit any exception.”⁶¹⁶ In Ayia Trias, the ICRC was given the impression that if other Greek Cypriot villages would be evacuated, they would be leaving too. It was becoming glaringly obvious that a “main reason for the exodus is the pressure exerted by Turkish immigrants settling in the Greek Cypriot properties.”⁶¹⁷ Therefore *hard ethnic cleansing* not only took the form of expulsion orders, but policies that made life impossible for the “undesired” community of Greek Cypriots.

According to Gavriella, the Kokkina villagers had been bussed around the occupied areas “in the summer of ‘76” and when they broke for lunch at a Greek Cypriot coffeehouse in Yialousa, they told some of the Greek Cypriot villagers that “we like your village, we’ll come live here”.⁶¹⁸ But this warning was not taken seriously. However, in November 1976,⁶¹⁹ eleven of the village’s Greek Cypriot aldermen were called in by the Turkish Cypriots informing them that the Kokkina villagers would be moving in to Yialousa, as “the houses of Yialousa have been allocated” and they were arriving “before the departure of the

⁶¹⁵ Grinling, “Internal Note: The situation in Karpasia”, 11 November 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7442-7443].

⁶¹⁶ Hoffmann, “Note No. 507”, 26 July 1976: [ICRC 7492].

⁶¹⁷ Grinling, “Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.7.76-31.8.76”, 31 August 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7169].

⁶¹⁸ Gavriella, 23 October 2013.

⁶¹⁹ Hoffmann, “Note No. 570”, 22 November 1976: [ICRC 7436].

Greek Cypriots,”⁶²⁰ The advice was that requests of “voluntary transfers” be submitted.⁶²¹ Those who filed for “voluntary transfers” were permitted to take all their belongings.

These requests were in English, which meant that a few villagers who spoke English had to help all the others who did not. In an attempt to signal to the Government that this was a mass expulsion, Gavriella’s husband contrived to use carbon paper for all the “requests”, leaving blank merely the name. By using carbon-copy requests the idea was to prove that this was a mass and organised expulsion of the autochthonous residents and not personal requests of each and every one.

This clever cry for help had an impact: ICRC was soon protesting the violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. In a meeting with Denktash, an interesting twist to the Yialousa tale was relayed by the Turkish Cypriot leader. Apparently, the Kokkina villagers were intended to be resettled in the Maronite village of Kormakitis, but he himself “had prevented this move because his Government wished to be on good terms with the Lebanon.”⁶²² He showed no remorse over the expulsions as he embarked on a lecture on the “necessity to separate the two ethnic communities in Cyprus.”⁶²³ Denktash’s argument was discredited by his ICRC interlocutor who later that month went to visit the Karpasia region and discerned with his own eyes that:

There seems to be no friction between the Greeks and the Karpasia Cypriot Turks. On the contrary, one has the impression that the Karpasia Turks regret the departure of the Greeks.⁶²⁴

In what transpired to be a bizarre anecdote to the already harrowing tale of *hard ethnic cleansing*, the Turkish side relayed to the Greek Cypriots in Yialousa in the autumn of 1976 that if Jimmy Carter were to win the United States Presidential elections, they would be able to leave with their furniture, but if Gerald Ford were to triumph, they would be denied these rights.⁶²⁵ Jimmy Carter won the November 1976 elections in the United States and so the last residents of Yialousa were expelled *with* as much of their movable property as they could pack onto a truck, leaving behind their cars and animals.

⁶²⁰ Grinling, “Activity Report Northern Sector from 1-30.11.76”, 30 November 1976: [ICRC 7159].

⁶²¹ Gavriella, 23 October 2013.

⁶²² Hoffmann, “Meeting with the Turkish Ambassador, Candemir Ünhon”, 20 January 1977 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7386].

⁶²³ Hoffmann, “Meeting with the Turkish Ambassador, Candemir Ünhon”, 20 January 1977: [ICRC 7388].

⁶²⁴ Hoffmann, “: My visit with Mr. Grinling on the 20th January, to Rizokarpaso, Ayia Trias, Ayios Andronikos and Leonarisso”, 25 January 1977 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7374].

⁶²⁵ Gavriella, 23 October 2013.

The Turkish Deputy Minister rejected the ICRC's demarche in Ankara that the expulsions were violating the Fourth Geneva Convention. He further said that "frictions existing between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots evacuated from Erenkoy (Kokkina) to the Karpaz area" should be understood in the framework of the "sufferings of the people of Erenkoy for 14 long years, [under] the Greek Cypriot Administration," thus washing his hands of the situation.⁶²⁶ The Kokkina villagers happened on Yialousa as the place they wished to reside after they had been evacuated from their village to make way for the Turkish Army. The only problem was that they happened upon a place where people still resided. Therefore, the autochthonous Greek Cypriots were ordered to vacate their ancestral homes, at a daily average of 40 people.⁶²⁷ A later "offer" allowing the Greek Cypriots of Yialousa to change their minds (after pressure applied by multiple sources, including the ICRC) conveniently came too late.⁶²⁸

What the ICRC also found surprising, however, was that "not all houses have been taken over either by Cypriot Turks, Turks or even the Kokkina Turks in Yialousa."⁶²⁹ What this implies can either be explained as bad bureaucracy and/or malicious intent. Since there are houses and properties to "spare," why assign private homes in which the owner lives, unless those whose lives were about to be completely upended bore no consequence to those who took the decision to upend these lives? It indicates that malicious negligence is also an essential element of ethnic cleansing. The ICRC was convinced that the mass expulsions of the winter of 1976 were similar to other incidents of ethnic homogenisation in the past:

enforced by the Turks against the wish of the Cyprus Government and certainly the majority of the Greek population is a political event, like the exchange of Greek and Turkish population between Asia Minor and Thrace and other parts of Greece in the early 1920's, like the expulsion of Germans from East Prussia, Pommern, Schlesien and the Sedetenland at the end of the Second World War.⁶³⁰

⁶²⁶ Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, "Letter to the President of the ICRC, Geneva", 14 January 1977 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7397].

⁶²⁷ Lennartz, "Activity Report Northern Sector: 1-31.12.76", 4 January 1977: [ICRC 7152].

⁶²⁸ Hoffmann, "Note No. 580: Reflections concerning the demarches of ICRC in the present situation", 15 December 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7418].

⁶²⁹ Hoffmann, "My visit with Mr. Grinling on the 20th January, to Rizokarpaso, Ayia Trias, Ayios Andronikos and Leonarisso", 25 January 1977 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7374].

⁶³⁰ Hoffmann, "Note No. 559: Reflections concerning the presence of ICRC in Cyprus", 4 November 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7446-7447]

The expulsions of the Yialousa Greek Cypriots amounted to relatively swiftly organised *hard ethnic cleansing*. It shows how instances of ethnic cleansing can take place at different speeds, sometimes in slow motion, other times in haste.

Demonstrating how the fate of the enclaved was dependent on the state of political negotiations, Denktash's initiative to meet with President Makarios at the end of January 1977 was considered an encouraging development. A few weeks later and in the presence of the UN Secretary-General, one of the most-significant pillars of the negotiations was agreed upon: the High-Level Agreement of 1977 between Makarios and Denktash, as it became known, foresaw an "independent, non-aligned bicomunal, Federal Republic" as the basis of a solution.

This single-handedly "boosted the morale" of the enclaved Greek Cypriots.⁶³¹ Rizokarpaso's Greek Cypriots, despite their tensions with the newly arrived Turkish settlers, held on to the belief that in the near future they would be permitted to visit their relatives in the Government-controlled areas, and that pilgrimages to Apostolos Andreas Monastery would resume and visitors would once again pass through their village.⁶³² A return to normality.

However, the villagers' morale was also heavily influenced in either direction by "village leaders" or opinion-makers. With the departure of the Mukhtar in Ayia Trias by December 1976, who was hostile to the incoming settlers, the residents who stayed felt less anxious and fearful.^{633,634} Because they worked on forming an "open and good relationship" with the settlers.⁶³⁵

The timing of when liberties to the enclaved would be proclaimed (albeit not always implemented) was not coincidental. On the eve of the UN Security Council's deliberations on Cyprus, the Turkish side announced that freedom of movement of Greek Cypriot enclaved villagers would be restored, as would the use of their vehicles (provided they had

⁶³¹ Grinling, "Activity Report Northern Sector: 1-31.1.77", 31 January 1977 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7150].

⁶³² Lennartz, "Activity Report Northern Sector: 1-31.12.76", 4 January 1977: [ICRC 7154].

⁶³³ Lennartz, "Activity Report Northern Sector: 1-31.12.76", 4 January 1977: [ICRC 7154].

⁶³⁴ Hoffmann, "My visit to Rizokarpaso and Ayia Trias on the 4th February, accompanied by Mr. Grinling", 7 February 1977 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7361].

⁶³⁵ Lennartz, "Visit to Karpasia on 21st and 22nd June, 1977", 18 July 1977 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7317].

a Turkish Cypriot license plate). UNFICYP was granted more freedom of movement and Greek Cypriot POWs would only have to announce themselves once a week, instead of twice daily.⁶³⁶ Although these were welcome concessions to the Greek Cypriots living in an open-air prison, it was still a far cry from the implementation of the provisions of the Third Vienna Agreement. The enclaved parents' single hope was that their teenage children schooled in the Government-controlled areas would be permitted to visit during the Easter holidays.⁶³⁷ However, even allowing schoolchildren to visit their families during holidays was rarely permitted.⁶³⁸

Barring such visits was the Turkish side's way to retaliate to a proposed map the Greek Cypriots were to table in the negotiations. The map included Karpasia as coming under the control of the Greek Cypriot community.⁶³⁹ Justified with the excuse that the "Turkish people in Karpasia" were angered by these positions, the "safety of the visitors" such as Greek Cypriot schoolchildren could not be guaranteed.⁶⁴⁰

Occasional promises or permissions granted did little to lessen a sinister backdrop that "the Turkish Cypriot Authorities have not accepted the idea of leaving the remaining Greek population of Ayia Trias in place".⁶⁴¹ Therefore, at times, certain measures were announced for political expediency on the international stage, but with no intention of implementation, or if so, with the idea in mind that these were temporary measures for a temporary population. Other times, measures would be hardened because of political point-scoring or a tit-for-tat. At the political level, the Turkish side adamantly exclaimed that "the Greek Cypriots may live a normal life in the North and under the 'same terms as the Turkish Cypriots,'" but this was clearly not the case on the ground.⁶⁴²

At the time that political discussions were resuming, the Greek Cypriots north of the ceasefire lines would naturally "hope that a reasonable solution of the Cyprus problem might spare them the uprooting," but the ICRC was unconvinced that "strong-arm tactics" would

⁶³⁶ Hoffmann, "Note No. 578", 9 December 1976: [ICRC 7425].

⁶³⁷ Grinling, "Activity Report Northern Sector: 1-31.3.77", 6 April 1977: [ICRC 7136].

⁶³⁸ Interview with Laoura, 14 June 2015.

⁶³⁹ Hoffmann, "Karpasia after the Vienna Talks", 18 April 1977 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7325].

⁶⁴⁰ Hoffmann, "Karpasia after the Vienna Talks", 18 April 1977: [ICRC 7326]

⁶⁴¹ Hoffmann, "My visit to Rizokarpasso and Ayia Trias on the 4th February", 7 February 1977: [ICRC 7361].

⁶⁴² Grinling, "Activity Report Northern Sector: 1-31.3.77", 6 April 1977 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7137].

not be used on the inhabitants of Rizokarpaso⁶⁴³ to “make life harder for the Greek villagers in order to get them out before a political solution is reached.”⁶⁴⁴

The Turkish Ambassador in Nicosia had inquired from the ICRC’s Hoffmann whether in his opinion the Greek Cypriots of Rizokarpaso would remain if permitted. Hoffmann replied that most would remain if the children enrolled in schools in the Government-controlled areas could visit their parents during the holidays. Ambassador Ünhon was unconvinced, saying that the “people of the isolated village would feel ‘deraciné’ [uprooted].”⁶⁴⁵ When Hoffmann asked point blankly if Ünhon could “save Rizokarpaso,” the response was laconic and disheartening:

“Je ne peux rien promettre.”⁶⁴⁶
He could not promise anything.

The locals viewed themselves as “an outpost of the Hellenic world against hostile Anatolians.”⁶⁴⁷ It was for this reason that the ICRC’s Nicosia-based delegates were once again imploring Headquarters that withdrawal of their office at the end of March would be ill-advised. It was deemed that the issue of the Greek Cypriot enclave would be once more discussed at the negotiations.⁶⁴⁸ The State Department also sought ways to pressure the ICRC for a postponement of their withdrawal given the possible role the ICRC could play in examining the fate of the Cypriot missing persons.⁶⁴⁹ The ICRC postponed its departure.

By the spring of 1977, Yialousa’s inhabitants had dropped to a mere eight Greek Cypriots, with further transfer applications already submitted. This decline was immensely significant given a year earlier, in March 1976, there had been 1,833 Greek Cypriot residents. The other Karpas villages also suffered great decreases in the numbers of the enclave in the intervening year, as per ICRC estimates.⁶⁵⁰

Rizokarpaso:	From 1,897 to 1,531
Ayia Trias:	From 1,000 to 352

⁶⁴³ Hoffmann, “Reflections on the Present Situation”, 3 February 1977 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7366].

⁶⁴⁴ Hoffmann, “My visit to Rizokarpaso and Ayia Trias on the 4th February”, 7 February 1977: [ICRC 7362].

⁶⁴⁵ Hoffmann, “Meeting with the Turkish Ambassador, Candemir Ünhon”, 20 January 1977: [ICRC 7387].

⁶⁴⁶ Hoffmann, “Meeting with the Turkish Ambassador, Candemir Ünhon”, 20 January 1977: [ICRC 7388].

⁶⁴⁷ Hoffmann, “Meeting with the Turkish Ambassador, Candemir Ünhon”, 20 January 1977: [ICRC 7361].

⁶⁴⁸ Simonius, “Compte rendu d’entretien: Téléphone - G. Hoffmann”, 25 February 1977 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7349].

⁶⁴⁹ Cyrus Vance, “ICRC Cyprus”, 28 April 1977, 00:00, State Department 95893, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1977STATE095893_c.html.

⁶⁵⁰ Grinling, “Activity Report Northern Sector: 1-31.3.77”, 6 April 1977 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7134].

---- “Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.3.76-30.4.76”, 12 May 1976: [ICRC 7182].

Leonarisso: From 394 to 52
Ayios Andronicos: From 528 to 12

Denktash had mused that “between 700 or 800 Greeks would probably remain in the north after the regroupment of the two communities was terminated just as a few Turkish Cypriots remained in the south.”⁶⁵¹ Even with the mass expulsions in previous months, Denktash was not content. He still viewed more would take place as his aim was to prevent “in the north a compact Greek area”,⁶⁵² instead allowing only a token few members. He justified “the concentration of the two communities in their own areas” out of a “reality necessitated by the political mistakes of the Greek Cypriot leadership.”⁶⁵³ He did not want or believe in intermixing of the two communities, despite Hoffmann’s protests that on the ground in the enclaved villages there is no friction between the Greek Cypriots and other communities.⁶⁵⁴

The necessity of the *hard ethnic cleansing* of the early years of the Turkish occupation was framed and justified within a security framework. The Commander of the Turkish Forces in Cyprus, General Vahit Güneri, “had vetoed the implementation of the Third Vienna Agreement for military security reasons, particularly because of the question of teachers and priests supposed to go to north.”⁶⁵⁵ Despite military might, the Turkish occupation army was apparently scared of the power of education and religion.⁶⁵⁶

However, the security angle may have been the reason why the enclaved Greek Cypriots of Rizokarpaso and Ayia Triada were “spared” the fate of mass expulsions. In January 1977 Hoffmann argued that the village of Rizokarpaso, with the largest number of Greek Cypriots, is geo-strategically isolated from Ayia Trias, another major Greek Cypriot enclave.⁶⁵⁷ Ayia Trias and Rizokarpaso were separated by a 24km road “through isolated country,” and by this point they were effectively the only Greek Cypriot outposts in the Cypriot panhandle of the Karpass region. Even if in a fantasy scenario all the Greek Cypriot men, women and children of the two villages somehow banded together and armed themselves, they could barely wreak any havoc as they were surrounded by Turkish troops on the ground and, if

⁶⁵¹ Hoffmann, “Meeting with the Turkish Ambassador, Candemir Ünnon”, 20 January 1977: [ICRC 7389].

⁶⁵² Hoffmann, “Meeting with the Turkish Ambassador, Candemir Ünnon”, 20 January 1977: [ICRC 7389].

⁶⁵³ Denktash, “Letter to Alexandre Hay, President of the ICRC”, 31 January 1977 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7370].

⁶⁵⁴ Hoffmann, “Note No. 586: My visit with Mr. Grinling on the 20th January, to Rizokarpaso, Ayia Trias, Ayios Andronicos and Leonarisso”, 25 January 1977 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7374].

⁶⁵⁵ Hoffmann, “Meeting with the Turkish Ambassador, Candemir Ünnon”, 20 January 1977: [ICRC 7391].

⁶⁵⁶ Hoffmann, “Meeting with the Turkish Ambassador, Candemir Ünnon”, 20 January 1977: [ICRC 7391].

⁶⁵⁷ Hoffmann, “Note No. 586”, 25 January 1977: [ICRC 7375].

need be, from the air and sea. Indeed, had the Greek Cypriots posed a significant threat the ICRC and the UN would have noticed significant Turkish military presence in the area.

The predicament of the enclaved was never smooth sailing, though, since the threat of expulsion remained, coupled with the continued lack of a functioning secondary school. There was widespread “general dissatisfaction with the uncertain situation” in the Turkish-controlled areas, a sentiment also shared by Turkish Cypriots.⁶⁵⁸

Less than three years after the Turkish invasion, it was becoming all too clear to even the most optimistic observer that the situation on the ground had changed almost irreversibly. While the “overwhelming majority of the Cyprus refugees, including those who were transferred from the North on application would like to go back to their home or, at least, to their village,”⁶⁵⁹ this was *de facto* untenable. Already during the February 1977 intercommunal talks, the issue of property compensation was raised, indicating that the scenario of full return and repatriation was already justified as impracticable.

“Turkey intervened in Cyprus in Summer, 1974, for strategical reasons and not out of love for their Cypriot cousins,” and through its control of the territory it now occupied, the Turkish side had the final say on any adjustments to the area under its control.⁶⁶⁰ Thus, when the Greek Cypriots submitted the map including the Karpass in April 1977, Denktash was not able to hand one back. It was up to Ankara how much territory Turkey would be willing to relinquish, an Ankara facing elections in the summer and therefore unwilling and largely unable to show its hands, lest it be seen by its voting public as being weak and giving in. In the decades of intercommunal talks seeking a solution to the Cyprus question, one of the many errors that have prevailed is that the international community facilitated negotiations when it was surely known that they could and would not yield any positive results. And indeed, they did not.

Historic events, beyond the control of the UN Secretary-General and the Carter Administration, would intervene: President Makarios died in August 1977. By this time,

⁶⁵⁸ Lennartz, “Visit to Karpasia on 21st and 22nd June, 1977”, 18 July 1977: [ICRC 7317].

⁶⁵⁹ Hoffmann, “Note No. 602: Reflections on Greek Cypriot refugee problems based on a visit in an Old People’s home and various camps or camp-like refugee agglomerations in Nicosia and some former Turkish villages resettled by Greeks from the North: Mallia, Ayios Nicolaos, Kithasi, Stavrokono, Yialia Pelathousa, Plataniskia, Ayios Thomas (Evdhimou) (*)”, 3 March 1977 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7342].

⁶⁶⁰ Hoffmann, “Karpasia after the Vienna Talks”, 18 April 1977: [ICRC 7326].

only 1,928 Greek Cypriots were residing in the Turkish-occupied area of Cyprus. Nonetheless, three very difficult years after the occupation, the enclaved Greek Cypriots still showed resilience in the face of adversity and an undeniably deep-rooted attachment to their land.⁶⁶¹ By the summer of 1977, transfer requests were made by enclaved persons' relatives in the Government-controlled areas in the name of their kin in the Turkish-controlled areas. However, the enclaved relatives turned down such requests. The enclaved who remained through waves of expulsions and had endured significant hardships, without any hope that things would get better, were not going anywhere on their own volition. It would have to be via force or in a coffin.

5.4 From hard to soft ethnic cleansing:

5.4.1 1978-1983

The US Embassy in Nicosia periodically reported on the situation of the Greek Cypriot enclaved.⁶⁶² The US diplomats repeated their analysis that “barring change in Turkish Cypriot policy” there would be a “gradual depopulation of Greek Cypriots”, citing the various hardships they had to encounter, compared to “Maronites or other third-country nationals”:

In sum, Greek Cypriots face many restrictions and some unofficial harassment [...]

Turkish measures, which we understand are on mainland orders, such as denial of secondary school coupled with no return for those who leave to be educated, and severe restrictions on travel to the south spell elimination of the Greek community in the north over the longer term. As there have been no recent instances of departures by the able bodied, it seems that most of the tiny fraction of the original Greek Cypriot population that remained in the Karpas through the intense and successful Turkish pressures on the immediate post-war period are determined to hold on as long as they can.⁶⁶³

This was a new dawn in that mass expulsions had subsided leaving only slightly over 1,700 Greek Cypriots, mostly residing in Ayia Trias and Rizokarpaso.⁶⁶⁴ The ICRC finally withdrew its Mission in Cyprus by the end of June 1977, as the “transfers” of enclaved decreased significantly and UNFICYP was able to assume its humanitarian role. It marked the end of the period of *hard ethnic cleansing*. A more subtle form of “ethnic policing” and

⁶⁶¹ Hoffmann, “Report of Mr. G. Hoffmann’s Mission in Cyprus”, 30 September 1977 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7313].

⁶⁶² Crawford, “Status of Greek Cypriots in north”, 17 January 1978, 00:00, Nicosia 0132.

⁶⁶³ Crawford, “Status of Greek Cypriots in north”, 17 January 1978, 00:00, Nicosia 0132.

⁶⁶⁴ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/12723, 31 May 1978.

discrimination, in other words *soft ethnic cleansing*, emerged, whereby the enclaved remained an unwanted group, but there was no imminent strategic necessity for Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot political leadership to lose political capital by pursuing a complete purge.

In turn, the Cypriot Government disapproved of family reunions in the buffer zone and enclaved relatives from overseas (and who had non-Cypriot citizenship) directly flying to the Turkish-occupied area.⁶⁶⁵ This policy was based on the fact that the Government had pronounced ports of entry into the occupied areas as illegal. Family reunions in the buffer zone was deemed as a hollow proposition demoting the need to overcome the violation of the principle of freedom of movement. This led to instances of relatives from South Africa spending their entire vacation in the Government-controlled areas, without seeing parents, since permissions were not given for them to cross or for family members to convene in the buffer zone.⁶⁶⁶

Travel costs incurred by the enclaved to visit the Government-controlled areas was also deemed a problem by Cyprus Government mandarins, as these costs were deemed to finance the occupation and its enforcers: it would entail paying Turkish Cypriot minders in the taxis used for transporting the enclaved from the Karpass to the Ledra Palace crossing point, or take the form of backhanders to get the permissions. To overcome the problem, the Government tried to get the UN to facilitate enclaved crossings. To the ICRC, these were politically motivated decisions that undermined humanitarian principles and the human rights of an isolated community under occupation.⁶⁶⁷

Commencing in the winter of 1977/1978, some relaxations were gradually introduced by the Turkish side. By the autumn of 1978, the first family reunions were permitted to take place: some sixty Greek Cypriots were permitted to visit their relatives in the Government-controlled areas and to return afterwards to their ancestral homes.⁶⁶⁸ The reverse – of their

⁶⁶⁵ Simonius, “Visite Faite: Andreas Mavrommatis, Ambassadeur, Geneva”, 3 January 1979: [ICRC 7272].

⁶⁶⁶ Simonius, “Visite au Cypriotes grecs résident au Nord de l’île”, 5 and 7 December 1978 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7247].

⁶⁶⁷ Simonius, “Procès-verbal d’entretien du 9.13.78 avec le Gouvernement Cypriote”, 23 January 1979 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7266].

This was also echoed a year later by US Embassy officials who noted that “on occasion Greeks have been used as pawns in political dispute between the two communities. (for example, refusal last year to permit children studying in south to visit relatives in north during Easter.)” See Crawford “Status of Greek Cypriots in north”, 17 January 1978, 00:00, Nicosia 0132.

⁶⁶⁸ Stella Souliotis, “Letter to Melchior Borsinger, ICRC Delegate General for Europe and North America”, 29 December 1978 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7262].

relatives visiting them at home – would only be partially permitted by the Turkish side in the 1990s.

Monthly, around thirty children (girls under 18, boys under 16) would be given permission by the Turkish side to cross and spend a few days with their enclaved families.⁶⁶⁹ It considerably improved morale despite the uncertainty whether such permissions would be granted for future Christmases and other major Christian festivals.⁶⁷⁰

By 1979, the enclaved Greek Cypriots were also able to make the journey in the opposite direction to visit their children and friends:

situation seems to have improved, in particular thanks to temporary permits for southern visits granted by the Turkish authorities. [...] Generally the atmosphere in the villages is more relaxed [...].⁶⁷¹

As the year progressed, these crossings increased from a reported 30 in total in May 1979 to 150 by the end of the year.⁶⁷²

The Commander of the “Turkish Cypriot Forces” informed the ICRC’s Lix Simonius that it was out of a sense of fairness that the enclaved were now permitted to cross once a year,⁶⁷³ despite the security problems this limited movement allegedly entailed.⁶⁷⁴

While the yearly possibility of family reunifications was now granted, other discriminatory measures continued. Greek-language secondary schools remained closed. Censuring even English-language⁶⁷⁵ or mathematics⁶⁷⁶ textbooks for the functioning elementary schools caused delays in delivering books by the start of the school term. Tiles from the roof were

⁶⁶⁹ Simonius, “Rapport de mission à Chypre, 4-14.12.78”, 23 January 1979, (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7242].

⁶⁷⁰ Simonius, “Visite Faite: Andreas Mavrommatis, Ambassadeur – ‘Récente mission à Chypre’”, 3 January 1979 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7271].

⁶⁷¹ Simonius, “Rapport de mission à Chypre, 28.5.1979-6.6.1979”, 3 July 1979 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7229].

⁶⁷² Simonius, “Rapport de mission à Chypre du 14.01.1980-24.01.1980”, 14 February 1980 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7210].

⁶⁷³ Simonius, “Visite au Cypriotes grecs résident au Nord de l’île”, 5 and 7 December 1978: [ICRC 7249].

⁶⁷⁴ Simonius, “Visite au Cypriotes grecs résident au Nord de l’île”, 5 and 7 December 1978: [ICRC 7250].

⁶⁷⁵ Simonius, “Visite au Cypriotes grecs résident au Nord de l’île”, 5 and 7 December 1978: [ICRC 7246-7247].

⁶⁷⁶ Coordinating Committee for the Enclaved People in the Turkish Occupied Area of Cyprus, “Letter to ICRC DG for Europe and North America, Melchior Borsinger”, 21 August 1979 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7221].

removed from the school in Ayia Trias,⁶⁷⁷ but permission would not be granted for much-needed refurbishment of school buildings.

As for the numbers of Greek Cypriot enclaved remaining in the Turkish-controlled areas, January 1980 recorded a substantial decrease to 1,399,⁶⁷⁸ a drop of around 415 people in a single year, or around 23% in just over 13 months,⁶⁷⁹ although this represented a substantially lower expulsion rate than the 50% drop between December 1976 and December 1977.⁶⁸⁰

Beyond the cessation of organised expulsions at the hands of the Turkish side and the push factors driving ethnic cleansing, there was a change in the pull factors by the Cyprus Government to shield Greek Cypriot enclaved from making the choice to leave. The allotted remuneration in the form of various Government allowances (monetary and in kind, including clothing and groceries) had increased in value. It was a necessary subsidy for an effectively unemployed population whose only money-making ventures became subsistence farming or fishing. But these allowances were not lucrative, paying only enough so “that it will prove indispensable to prevent the Greek Cypriots from packing up” and leaving.⁶⁸¹

The ICRC’s Lix Simonius levelled a damning indictment at the Cypriot Government for treating the enclaved as nothing more than political pawns to consolidate its own positions at the negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus question, without truly empathising with the enclaved community’s plight and addressing their practical needs to enable them to live a dignified life under conditions of occupation:

For political reasons, they want to maintain a Greek community in the North (any integration with their Turkish Cypriot surroundings is discouraged). For political reasons too, the South wants to be able to reproach Mr Denktash for the living conditions he has for the minority. At the same time, the Greek Cypriot authorities regard as illegal the whole Turkish Cypriot administration and, therefore, any contact of the minority with that administration or its services. The government of (South) Cyprus therefore feels directly responsible for the Christians of the North (Maronites, as well as Greeks), pays them (through the United Nations troops) social assistance, annuities and pensions and transmits the massive international aid (food) which for the rest of the island is reserved for displaced persons. It is obvious that over the years this attitude which, in fact, consists of using this minority as a political pawn

⁶⁷⁷ Andreas Pouyouros, “Letter to the ICRC’s Melchior Borsinger”, 14 September 1979 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7217] and Coordinating Committee for the Enclaved People in the Turkish Occupied Area of Cyprus, “Letter to Borsinger”, 21 August 1979: [ICRC 7221].

⁶⁷⁸ Simonius, “Rapport de mission à Chypre du 14.01.1980-24.01.1980”, 14 February 1980: [ICRC 7210].

⁶⁷⁹ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/12463 and Add.1., 1 December 1977.

⁶⁸⁰ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/12253, 9 December 1976.

⁶⁸¹ Simonius, “Visite au Cypriotes grecs résident au Nord de l’île”, 5 and 7 December 1978: [ICRC 7252].

leads to ridiculous contradictions in the administration of a population with which there are no contacts since 1974 and whose daily needs, as long as they cannot be satisfied with increased material assistance, would require contact with the Turkish Cypriots, although this contact is considered illegal.⁶⁸²

The enclaved continued to be used as a political football by all sides. They would be damned if they left and damned if they stayed, as assessed by the ICRC:

They know that the northern administration wants the region to be Turkish Cypriot but that the Greek Cypriot administration wants to keep them there to prove otherwise. There is, therefore, a real danger that the Turkish Cypriot authorities will be uncomfortable with them in order to make them leave and that they will be badly received by the Greek Cypriots if they yield to this pressure or to the circumstances. They are stripped of all political, economic, and cultural life and their only means of contact with the Greek Cypriots of the south are the Red Cross family messages.⁶⁸³

On the political front, the 1979 Ten Point Agreement was signed between President Spyros Kyprianou and Rauf Denktash, prioritising the resettlement of the ghost-town of Varosha, while outlining in broad terms the resumption of negotiations and the modalities thereof.⁶⁸⁴ Markedly, this Agreement also included the provision that the sides “agreed to abstain from any action which might jeopardize the outcome of the talks, and special importance will be given to initial practical measures by both sides to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions.” The latter phrase “return to normal conditions” echoed the Third Vienna Agreement’s “every help to lead a normal life”. Once again, the new Agreement was largely ignored, with the enclaved again subjected to political point-scoring as the two sides faced off against each other.

The secondary schoolchildren of the enclaved were barred from spending the 1979 summer and Christmas holidays with their parents, after the Turkish Cypriots exploited the situation of the pending crossings by obliging the youngsters to sign transfer permits with the logo “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus”.⁶⁸⁵ The Cypriot Government immediately retaliated and forbade the children from signing the documents.⁶⁸⁶

⁶⁸² Simonius, “Rapport de mission à Chypre, 4-14.12.78”, 23 January 1979: [ICRC 7239-7240].

⁶⁸³ Simonius, “Rapport de mission à Chypre, 4-14.12.78”, 23 January 1979: [ICRC 7236].

⁶⁸⁴ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/13369, 31 May 1979.

⁶⁸⁵ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/13672, 30 November 1979.

⁶⁸⁶ Simonius, “Visite reçue: Andreas Pouyouros, Ambassadeur: Chypre”, 14 September 1979 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7219].

The International Postal Union declared “TFSC” stamps illegal in September 1979. Consequently, in October 1979, the Turkish Cypriots barred Red Cross messages addressed to the enclaved.⁶⁸⁷

These decisions were the reason given by the 120 Greek Cypriots who packed up and moved to the Government-controlled areas in the second half of 1979.⁶⁸⁸ The Government’s overall aim to retain as many enclaved as possible in their ancestral villages was proving difficult to maintain. The Government subsequently overturned its previous decision preventing the schoolchildren signing permission slips regardless of the letterhead.

Yet, just as the Cyprus Government reversed its policy, the schoolchildren would then be barred for a three-year period from visiting their parents in their enclaved villages by the Turkish side, aside from “so-called compassionate cases.”⁶⁸⁹

The pattern of easing and then tightening restrictions by the Turkish side continued throughout this period – an indication of the pernicious modalities of *soft ethnic cleansing*. At times the enclaved would be barred from visiting Famagusta (which they would do for trading or medical purposes). Former POWs were rounded up to perform hard labour.⁶⁹⁰ These moves were to demonstrate who was in charge and that whatever small freedoms the Greek Cypriot enclaved enjoyed, they could just as quickly be retracted.

But where did the Maronite Cypriots fit into this whole picture? Many had to abandon their ancestral village, when Ayia Marina was turned into a Turkish military site in 1975. However, by the late 1970s, they were permitted to cross the ceasefire lines in either direction. The “Turkish authorities seem to consider them as an ideal minority that makes no noise and does not create complications and whose movements across the green line do not pose major security problems (this community does not have an army).”⁶⁹¹ It should be underscored that the enclaved Maronite Cypriots were also subjected to harsh and

⁶⁸⁷ Simonius, “Rapport de mission à Chypre du 14.01.1980-24.01.1980”, 14 February 1980: [ICRC 7207] and United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/13672, 30 November 1979.

⁶⁸⁸ Simonius, “Rapport de mission à Chypre du 14.01.1980-24.01.1980”, 14 February 1980: [ICRC 7210].

⁶⁸⁹ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/15149, 1 June 1982.

⁶⁹⁰ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/15149, 1 June 1982.

⁶⁹¹ Simonius, “Rapport de mission à Chypre, 4-14.12.78”, 23 January 1979: [ICRC 7242].

undignified treatment. There were instances where their houses were demolished (allegedly because they were in a poor state) or requisitioned from them.⁶⁹²

5.4.2 1983-2003: From the UDI to the new millennium

Denktash issued a UDI on 15 November 1983. It symbolised Turkey's consolidation of its hold over the northern part of Cyprus. As Denktash relayed in a 1986 interview:

Naturally Turkey has strategic interests in Cyprus. It is fortunate for Turkey that the Turkish Cypriot community exists here. Even if the Turkish Cypriot community did not exist, Turkey would not have left Cyprus to Greece. [Turkey's President] Koruturk told me something which is very important. The honourable president told me: 'If Cyprus passes to Greece and is militarized then Turkey ceases to be a maritime nation'. This is an extremely important factor.⁶⁹³

Furthering its strategic interests, the illegality of secession was only recognised by Turkey, without whose political cover, army and taxpayer money, the UDI would have been impossible. The international community condemned the move via UN Security Council Resolution, 541 (1983) and 550 (1984), calling on all states to refrain from recognising the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" or in any way facilitating the secessionist entity.

As regards the enclaved, in the immediate aftermath

UNFICYP was advised by the Turkish Cypriot authorities that temporary transfers of Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north were provisionally suspended and that a final decision on this subject would be taken in the near future.⁶⁹⁴

Daily life continued and hardships had eased compared to the extremes of the post-1974 period. The enclaved were able to visit their families in the Government-controlled areas. They still contended with inadequate Greek-language schooling (no secondary school), a persistent delay in deliveries of primary school textbooks,⁶⁹⁵ no appointment to replace a teacher who transferred,⁶⁹⁶ barring children over 13 from visiting their parents in their

⁶⁹² United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council, S/15812, 1 June 1983 and United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council, S/19927, 31 May 1988.

⁶⁹³ Extract from Denktash's interview published in the Turkish newspaper *Milliyet*, 23 July 1984, as cited in "Submissions of the Cyprus Government" re the European Court of Human Rights case *Cyprus v. Turkey* (Application number 8007/77), Nicosia, 30 August 1986.

⁶⁹⁴ United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council, S/16192, 1 December 1983.

⁶⁹⁵ United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council, S/1999/1203, 29 November 1999.

⁶⁹⁶ United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council, S/15149, 1 June 1982.

villages,⁶⁹⁷ and even subjecting them to such indignities as refusing burial in the family plot if a coronary examination was undertaken in the Government-controlled areas.⁶⁹⁸

Prohibiting over-thirteens from being with their parents for the summer was extraordinarily callous. Secondary school started at the age of 12. Therefore, any mandate excluding children over thirteen from visiting their parents meant that parents of children continuing their education in the Government-controlled areas would only be allowed to reunite with them at home during their first summer. Thereafter those children would officially become displaced persons, effectively cleansed from their homes. It was not until 1986 that this policy was eased somewhat.⁶⁹⁹

The UDI also marked a change in the letterhead of entry forms that were now mandated to be filled out by everyone crossing – be they enclaved, their children visiting for school holidays, relatives exceptionally permitted to attend a funeral in the Karpas, and in a macabre twist, including the deceased if they died in the Government-controlled areas.⁷⁰⁰

Harassment also took on the form of cutting short summer vacations of the school children. Upon UNFICYP's representations that this went against past practice, the children were permitted to return.⁷⁰¹

In the 1980s, a number of the enclaved children of 1974 reached adulthood in the enclaved villages. These people required shelter if they were to move out of their parents' homes. In such cases, the Greek Cypriot enclaved would have to apply to the Turkish Cypriots to be allocated housing. In such events, an empty Greek Cypriot house would be assigned.⁷⁰² This also showed how much the enclaved were subject to the rules and regulations administered by the secessionist entity, however illegal the allocation of a Greek Cypriot home was without the explicit consent of the original owner.

Meanwhile, UNFICYP, which was responsible for weekly deliveries of the allowances and humanitarian supplies, still faced trouble in exercising its freedom of movement and

⁶⁹⁷ United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council, S/17227, 31 May 1985.

⁶⁹⁸ United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council, S/1999/1203, 29 November 1999.

⁶⁹⁹ United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council, S/18880, 29 May 1987.

⁷⁰⁰ United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council, S/19927, 31 May 1988.

⁷⁰¹ United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council, S/21981, 7 December 1990.

⁷⁰² Alpha News, "16^ο Επεισόδιο: Εγκλωβισμένοι της Καρπασίας 28/12/2019 Β' Σεζόν" [16th Episode: The Enclaved of the Karpas 28/12/2019 Second Season], *24 Hours*.

occasionally its soldiers stationed at the Liaison Post in the Karpass would be detained upon investigating complaints by the Greek Cypriot enclave.⁷⁰³

UNFICYP was able to use the tragic death of an elderly enclave woman in January 1991, where suspicions of foul play were afoot, to gain more frequent and better access to the enclave. They increased their humanitarian deliveries to twice a week. A medical officer would periodically accompany them to check on the Greek Cypriot enclave.⁷⁰⁴ Unfortunately, this agreement did not put an end to supply convoys being turned around, delays taking place, or verbal abuse being hurled at UNFICYP officers on their supply route.⁷⁰⁵

The severe restrictions to functional family life – either via the very cumbersome process through which the enclave had to go to apply to visit their relatives (frequently their children) on the other side of the ceasefire lines, or the lack of telephone contact⁷⁰⁶ – continued throughout the 1980s, examples of the subjugation of a targeted group to *soft ethnic cleansing*.

The late 1980s also saw a surge of protests, organised by Greek Cypriot women and students, vying to demonstrate how freedom of movement across the island was barred due to Turkey's continued occupation.⁷⁰⁷ Some would manage to break into the Turkish-occupied area, with arrests taking place, before being handed over to UNFICYP for eventual release.⁷⁰⁸

Hotels in the fenced-off area of Varosha were used in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions to house students who were attending a tertiary education facility in Famagusta,⁷⁰⁹ erected on Greek Cypriot property. In July 1990, the Turkish Government transferred the responsibility of the fenced area of Varosha to the “Turkish Cypriot security forces,” increasing political tensions as negotiations for a settlement between now-President

⁷⁰³ United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council, S/21981, 7 December 1990.

⁷⁰⁴ United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council, S/22665, 31 May 1991.

⁷⁰⁵ United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council, S/24050, 31 May 1992.

⁷⁰⁶ United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council, S/22665, 31 May 1991.

⁷⁰⁷ United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council, S/19304, 30 November 1987 and United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council, S/29319, 30 November 1988.

⁷⁰⁸ United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council, S/20663, 31 May 1989 and United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council, S/21340, 17 May 1990.

⁷⁰⁹ United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council, S/20663, 31 May 1989.

George Vassiliou and Rauf Denktash were underway.⁷¹⁰ Despite the announcement by the Turkish Government, the UN had not changed its position that as regards the security situation in Varosha, it held the Government of Turkey directly responsible, a responsibility it could not abrogate.

Looting and desecration of churches and antiquity sites was also on the rise in the late 1980s.⁷¹¹

Although the mass expulsions had ceased, due to the persistent policies that barred the enclaved from leading a dignified life, the population had decreased to just over 600 by December 1989.⁷¹² But the end of December 1999, the UN figures accounted for 427 enclaved Greek Cypriots.⁷¹³

In December 1991, the Turkish Cypriots enforced a “customs levy” on the UNFICYP-delivered humanitarian supplies.⁷¹⁴ This was eventually lifted, but as recently as 2017, such a measure was once again instituted as retaliation after the collapse of negotiations held in Crans Montana, Switzerland.

The 1990s were no better in terms of providing schooling for the enclaved children. The secondary schools were still closed, while the censorship of schoolbooks for elementary students continued, often meaning that even those textbooks that had been greenlighted did not arrive in time for the start of the school year.⁷¹⁵

In January 1995, one of the two Greek Cypriot primary school teachers in Karpasia, on her way back from Christmas with relatives in the Government-controlled area, resisted being searched, and was thus detained and ill-treated. The case ended up going all the way to the European Court of Human Rights. The teacher, Eleni Foka, was “known for her political activism”,⁷¹⁶ as she was outspoken in the Greek Cypriot press about harassment at the hands

⁷¹⁰ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/21981, 7 December 1990.

⁷¹¹ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/18880, 29 May 1987 and United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/20310, 30 November 1988.

⁷¹² United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/21010, 7 December 1989.

⁷¹³ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/1999/1203, 29 November 1999.

⁷¹⁴ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/24050, 31 May 1992 and United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/225912, 9 June 1993.

⁷¹⁵ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/24917, 1 December 1992.

⁷¹⁶ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights decision 1996/112, E/CN.4/1997/48, 7 February 1997.

of the Turkish occupation authorities, the textbook censorships and the deliberate damage to the school building. The Turkish Cypriot side insisted that if she is not removed, they would never agree to demands of replacing a retired teacher and priest. In 1997, when she went to a Cyprus Government hospital for treatment, she was barred from ever returning to her village. Borowiec (2000) remarked that the reason for her expulsion was her having “defiantly refused to ask for renewal of her [Turkish Cypriot] identity card”. He adds that while

She became a heroine to many Greek Cypriots [...] her act did not advance the cause of Hellenism – on the contrary, it deprived her school of a teacher.⁷¹⁷

Converting churches to museums and the desecration of cemeteries in the occupied areas continued throughout the 1990s,⁷¹⁸ together with the looting and the illegal sale of icons and other items of cultural heritage. The extent of the looting became apparent when in 1997, one of the largest art trafficking sting operations in European history, the “Munich case” took place. It revealed over 5,000 artefacts including frescoes, mosaics and icons that had been illegally smuggled out of Cyprus by Turkish art dealer Aydin Dikman. Central to the operation was then Honorary Consul to the Netherlands, Tasoula Hadjitofi, who has dedicated her life to recovering Cyprus’ cultural heritage looted from the occupied areas.

As regards the situation of the Greek Cypriot and Maronite enclaved communities, in June 1995, UNFICYP shared the outcome of a review it had conducted and found that they “are far from leading the normal life they were promised under the agreement reached between the two sides at Vienna on 2 August 1975.”⁷¹⁹ The recommendations were included in the Secretary-General’s Report of 10 December 1995 and can be found in Appendix II of this dissertation.

Six months after the review, a few telephones were installed in some of the Greek Cypriot enclaved homes, but initially they could only be used for calls within the village.⁷²⁰ Eventually they could call relatives living south of the ceasefire lines, via a complicated system routed through the United Nations, a system whose popularity was such that more lines soon had to be installed.⁷²¹

⁷¹⁷ Borowiec, 153.

⁷¹⁸ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/1994/680, 7 June 1994.

⁷¹⁹ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/1995/1020, 10 December 1995.

⁷²⁰ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/1996/411, 7 June 1996.

⁷²¹ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/1997/962, 8 December 1997.

In 1998, age restrictions of children wanting to visit their enclaved parents were removed. However, as with every measure introduced, a countermeasure would sour the optimism. In this instance, fees of 15 GBP per relative and for the Greek Cypriot and Maronite Cypriot enclaved, or Turkish Cypriots travelling the opposite direction a costly fee was also mandated.

In 1999, problems arose upon the crossing of a casket of an enclaved Greek Cypriot because his body had been examined by a coroner in the Government-controlled areas.⁷²² Applications could no longer be submitted via UNFICYP, except for schoolchildren, but had to be handed over directly to the Turkish Cypriots at the Ledra Palace crossing point, and within a strict period before travel.⁷²³

Furthermore, there were other issues that the enclaved faced that otherwise they arguably would not have had to endure, and which would not find themselves in official reports. For example, Greek Cypriot girls and women took care to only appear in public spaces in modest clothing, so as to avoid verbal harassment and catcalling by the Moslem men and boys in the village.⁷²⁴ Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriot “police officer” who maintained excellent relations with the Greek Cypriot enclaved residents was removed from his post on trumped-up charges of accepting bribes.⁷²⁵ The enclaved were convinced that the reason was precisely because, within his powers, he tried to help the Greek Cypriots instead of harshly subjugating them.

Some easing of the measures eventually ensued, including the frequency with which first-degree relatives were permitted to visit their enclaved families,⁷²⁶ as well as the reduction of the “fee” and the lifting of the age limit of schoolchildren visiting their enclaved relatives.⁷²⁷

In the autumn of 1998, the Turkish Cypriots informed UNFICYP that they were reviewing the obstacles barring Greek and Maronite Cypriots living in enclaved community to

⁷²² United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/1999/1203, 29 November 1999.

⁷²³ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/2001/534, 30 May 2001.

⁷²⁴ Alpha News, “16^ο Επεισόδιο: Εγκλωβισμένοι της Καρπασίας 28/12/2019 Β’ Σεζόν” [16th Episode: The Enclaved of the Karpass 28/12/2019 Second Season], *24 Hours*.

⁷²⁵ Interview with Marios, 25 September 2015.

⁷²⁶ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/1998/1149, 7 December 1998.

⁷²⁷ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/2000/496, 26 May 2000.

bequeath their possessions to their families who resided elsewhere.⁷²⁸ However, this “review” continued for a number of years without effect.⁷²⁹

As regards freedom of religion and freedom of worship, a Clerides-Denktaş agreement allowed for reciprocal pilgrimages to the holy sites of Apostolos Andreas Monastery in the Karpas and Hala Sultan Tekke mosque in Larnaca, and later granting Turkish Cypriots access to Kokkina.

This measure was also prone to politicisation by the Turkish side. It was cancelled in 1996 after the deaths of Anastasios Isaak and Solomos Solomou during demonstrations in the buffer zone,⁷³⁰ as well as later because of barring of three individuals from attending the pilgrimage,⁷³¹ and upon imposition of arbitrary fees upon crossing.⁷³²

In 1996, coroner-turned-Member of Parliament, Marios Matsakis, became the face of a weekly demonstration campaign at the Ledra Palace to dissuade tourists from crossing the buffer zone into the Turkish-controlled areas. The Turkish side reacted by closing the crossing point and barring enclaved Greek and Maronite Cypriots from returning to their homes,⁷³³ a measure that was removed, although the weekend demonstrations would continue for years to come.⁷³⁴

Civilian demonstrations and political protests across the buffer zone irked the Turks but also irritated the UN peacekeepers. However, the events of late summer 1996 were unparalleled as the aforementioned two Greek Cypriot demonstrators Isaak and Solomou lost their lives. Isaak was beaten to death by a mob of ultranationalist Turkish Cypriots and Turkish settlers and Solomou was shot dead by the military. In 2008, the European Court of Human Rights

⁷²⁸ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/1998/1149, 7 December 1998.

⁷²⁹ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/1999/657, 8 June 1999.

⁷³⁰ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights decision 1996/112, E/CN.4/1997/48, 7 February 1997.

⁷³¹ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/1997/437, 5 June 1997.

⁷³² United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/1998/488, 10 June 1998.

⁷³³ “Το κατοχικό καθεστώς έκλεισε το οδόφραγμα του Λήδρα Πάλας” [Occupied regime closes Ledra Palace crossing point], *Cyprus News Agency*, 6 November 1996, <http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/kypegr/1996/96-11-06.kypegr.html#06>.

⁷³⁴ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/1998/1149, 7 December 1998.

found Turkey guilty of violating Article 2 (right to life) of the European Convention on Human Rights in respect of the killing of both men.⁷³⁵

After years of Turkish overflight violations and Turkey's ATACMS long-range artillery rocket purchase, the Cypriot Government announced in January 1997 the procurement of a Russian S-300 anti-aircraft system, with delivery scheduled for mid-1998. Turkey's reaction was swift:

'If they are deployed, we will do what is needed, and if that means they need to be hit, they will be hit,' Turkey's Foreign Minister, Tansu Ciller.⁷³⁶

Turkey's threats spurred the UK, the United States and others into pressuring the Cypriot Government initially to postpone and eventually to agree to deploying the missile system on the Greek island of Crete, in order to avoid a collision course in the Eastern Mediterranean that could involve Turkey's NATO partner Greece. The European Union also warned that the deployment of the missiles could harm Cyprus' prospects for membership. Eventually, after the S-300 system was deployed in Crete, Cyprus commenced its EU membership negotiations in the spring of 1998. Denktash refused the Cypriot Government's offer to partake in these negotiations citing the "independence" of the occupied areas.

The EU accession talks came in parallel with a renewed negotiation effort for a solution to the Cyprus question that would lead to the ill-fated Annan Plan referenda of 2004. Once again, hopes of a compromise settlement were raised among the Karpasia enclaved, who still endured daily life with limitations on their personal freedoms, isolation and a dependence on political manoeuvrings beyond their control.

However, the most monumental decision that took place in the early 2000s wasn't the peaks and troughs of an ongoing negotiation process for a settlement, but the verdict by the European Court of Human Rights that found Turkey responsible for violations of the European Convention as regards the rights of displaced persons, missing persons and the enclaved.

⁷³⁵ European Court of Human Rights, 'Press Release Issued by the Registrar, 469: Two Chamber Judgements Concerning Turkey', 24 June 1998. <https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press#%7B%22fulltext%22:%7B%22isaak%22%7D,%22sort%22:%7B%22kupdate%20Descending%22%7D,%22itemid%22:%7B%22003-2396288-2593870%22%7D%7D>.

⁷³⁶ Tony Barber, "Turkey hints at strike on Cypriot missiles", *Independent*, London, 11 January 1997, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/turkey-hints-at-strike-on-cypriot-missiles-1282572.html>.

The May 2001 Judgement of the *Cyprus v. Turkey* case followed from an earlier decision by the Court in the landmark *Loizidou v. Turkey* that found Turkey in violation of Titina Loizidou's right to return and enjoyment of her properties. Loizidou had taken part in the "Women Walk Home" demonstration but was barred from accessing her home by Turkish soldiers and detained for several hours. The Court awarded Loizidou pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages (the latter for the loss of use of property and inability to develop or lease it).⁷³⁷

While the legal battles were ground-breaking in human rights case law, Turkey has only partially paid what is owed to Loizidou. Winning a legal argument does not necessarily lead to its implementation if there is no mechanism for its enforcement. Thus, similarly to countless UN Security Council Resolutions as regards the violation of international law in Cyprus, the ECHR judgements holding Turkey responsible for human rights violations remain paper tigers.

The life of the enclaved was not bettered overnight, despite the Court underscoring their rights to access medical services, to freedom of movement and assembly, to uncensored education, to exercise freedom of religion and worship, to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions, to bequeath property, or their right for respect of their private life and home and their correspondence, and the discrimination they faced amounting to degrading treatment.⁷³⁸ Day-to-day life remained the same. On 12 May 2014, the Court considered Cyprus' claim for just satisfaction for the violations relating to the missing persons and the enclaved arising from *Cyprus v. Turkey*. It decided that Turkey should pay 90 million euros in total, of which 30 million euros were to be paid to the relatives of the missing persons and 60 million euros to the enclaved.⁷³⁹ Yet nothing changed, not least because at the time of writing these non-pecuniary damages have not been honoured by Turkey and will likely never be fully paid, in light of the political cost such an indirect admission of guilt would entail for Ankara.

Nevertheless, the condition of the enclaved remained on the agenda of the Council of Europe. In February 2003, the Council of Europe's Committee on Legal Affairs and Human

⁷³⁷ *Loizidou v. Turkey*, No. (Article 50) 40/1993 (European Court of Human Rights, 28 July 1998).

⁷³⁸ *Cyprus v. Turkey*, Judgement (Merits), No. 25781/94 (European Court of Human Rights, 10 May 2001).

⁷³⁹ *Cyprus v. Turkey*, Judgement (Just Satisfaction), No. 25781/94 (European Court of Human Rights, 12 May 2014).

Rights published the findings of Swiss Special Rapporteur, Dick Marty,⁷⁴⁰ upon his visit to both the Maronite enclaved and the Greek Cypriot enclaved. Just a few months later, Finnish Special Rapporteur Jaakko Laakso presented his report on the “Colonisation by Turkish settlers of the occupied part of Cyprus” concluding that there was a “deliberate policy of changing the demographic structure of the northern part of the island”.⁷⁴¹ The latter report will be analysed further in the next chapter. The conclusions of Dick Marty, however, bear significant insight into the persistent problems faced by Greek Cypriot and Maronite Cypriot enclaved, as it was found that

violations principally concern freedom of circulation, freedom to choose to live in one’s area of origin, the right to education, the right to religion, the right to an effective remedy and the right to property.⁷⁴²

Marty framed these violations as part of a wider policy “aimed at deliberately annihilating the two very minority communities [the Greek Cypriot and Maronite Cypriot enclaved], living in the northern part of the island”, an issue which the case *Cyprus v. Turkey* was not mandated to examine. Thus, almost three decades after these communities’ “enclavement”, the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly was informed that a policy of “ethnic cleansing” (a phrase Marty used) was still in place.

In his presentation, Special Rapporteur Marty described the situation to the Parliamentary Assembly, among whose members was Mesut Çavuşoğlu (now Turkish Foreign Minister), in the following way:

The Turkish Cypriot authorities maintain a deliberate policy of confining and isolating members of these communities and making their living conditions so difficult that they are forced to leave. These conditions, characterised by a whole raft of adverse circumstances, mean that they are living in a hostile environment in which any private or normal family life is impossible.⁷⁴³

Although he never described it as such himself, Marty’s description is a very useful designation for how *soft ethnic cleansing* diverges from *hard ethnic cleansing*: the discrimination, harassment and intimidation amount to a “hostile environment”, making normal family life impossible.

⁷⁴⁰ Marty, “Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Greek Cypriots and Maronites Living in the Northern Part of Cyprus”, 20 February 2003.

⁷⁴¹ Laakso, “Report on the Colonisation by Turkish Settlers of the Occupied Part of Cyprus”.

⁷⁴² Marty, “Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Greek Cypriots and Maronites Living in the Northern Part of Cyprus”.

⁷⁴³ Council of Europe, *Official Report of Debates: 2003 Ordinary Session (third party), 23-27 June 2003, Volume III, Sittings 17 to 24, Pages 559 to 839*, Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing, December 2003, 645.

5.4.3 2003-2020: The Last of the Mohicans

As negotiations continued, with various drafts of various UN plans, and as elections took place and leaders changed, the most monumental positive change to the daily lives of the enclaved took place unassumingly in April 2003. Just weeks after the breakdown of negotiations under the UN Secretary-General's auspices when Rauf Denktash declined to pursue a settlement on the proposed "Annan Plan III", without much fanfare, Denktash announced the partial lifting of restrictions on the freedom of movement, via the opening of the Ledra Palace crossing point for two-way pedestrian traffic on 23 April 2003. A few days later, crossings at Strovilia and Pergamos were opened and in mid-May, the crossing point in Nicosia for vehicles in Ayios Dometios was added. Initially, there was a "Cinderella" clause of return within the same day by midnight, which was extended to three days and then to a duration of three months.

In the first week, 140,000 Greek Cypriots crossed one way and 34,000 Turkish Cypriots the other.⁷⁴⁴ While the opening of the crossing points has not solved the Cyprus question, it has changed the lives of the enclaved for the better. In a late December 2019 TV Greek Cypriot documentary, a Rizokarpaso resident described the apt change since "when the roads opened" in 2003.⁷⁴⁵

It meant a lifting on the restrictions on their own freedom of movement, both within their villages, within the Karpass, and for the first time they could visit relatives without completing permission slips and then awaiting approval. They no longer had to wait for the arranged transportation on a weekly basis on Fridays. They could, if they had vehicles or if their children took them, come and go with a freedom that they hadn't enjoyed in almost 30 years.

Furthermore, family life assumed a semblance of normality as relatives could gather at ancestral homes whenever they wanted. Boys and girls were no longer barred from visiting their parents over school holidays, or indeed returning to their ancestral homes once they finished their studies.

⁷⁴⁴ United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council, S/2003/572, 27 May 2003.

⁷⁴⁵ Alpha News, "16^ο Επεισόδιο: Εγκλωβισμένοι της Καρπασίας 28/12/2019 Β' Σεζόν" [16th Episode: The Enclaved of the Karpass 28/12/2019 Second Season], 24 Hours.

Slowly, life began to emerge among the Karpass Greek Cypriots. Slowly, there was hope that despite decades' of living without prospects, watching their communities age, and dwindle, the opportunity for people to resettle upon graduation from school or university was now possible.

Another significant step was when in August 2004 the operation of a Greek-language secondary school was announced by the Turkish side.⁷⁴⁶ In September 2004, the Rizokarpaso Gymnasium, after a silence of thirty years, reopened its doors to five girls and five boys for the first three years of secondary school.⁷⁴⁷ The next year, thirty-four children attended the six grades⁷⁴⁸ Children over twelve no longer had to abandon their families, with the prospect of seeing their parents only during school holidays, and only if permission was granted. No longer were these children barred from visiting or living in their ancestral village once they reached an arbitrary cut-off age (16 for boys, 18 for girls). They were able to remain at home.

This period cannot be examined without any reference to the negotiations initially between Clerides and Denktash (September 1999-February 2003) and subsequently Papadopoulos and Denktash/Talat (February 2003-April 2004). It resulted in the rejection by the vast majority of the Greek Cypriot community in 2004 of the final product of these efforts, which became known as "Annan Plan V". Beyond the historical gravity and possible consequences of this five-year process, it affected the Greek Cypriot enclaved in the Karpass peninsula both directly and indirectly.

The negotiation process commenced in 1999 and, as Theophanous (2012) describes, was interlinked with the EU accession process of the Republic of Cyprus as follows:

One-and-a-half years after the start of Cyprus' accession negotiations with the EU (March 1998), the UN Secretary-General K. Annan, encouraged by the US and the UK, began a new process of negotiations in the fall of 1999 for a settlement. This time the stakes were higher. In Washington the prevailing strategic thinking was that the EU could offer incentives for addressing several key issues simultaneously and effectively. Three of the major objectives were the following: (a) solution of the Cyprus problem and accession to the EU of a unified island in 2004; (b) EU candidacy for Turkey and subsequent accession negotiations with the objective of

⁷⁴⁶ United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council, S/2004/756, 24 September 2004.

⁷⁴⁷ Six-Grade Rizokarpaso Gymnasium, <http://gym-rizokarpaso-amm.schools.ac.cy/index.php?id=matets-2004-2005>, accessed 14 April 2020.

⁷⁴⁸ Six-Grade Rizokarpaso Gymnasium, <http://gym-rizokarpaso-amm.schools.ac.cy/index.php?id=matets-2005-2006>, accessed 14 April 2020.

full membership; (c) resolution of all Greco-Turkish problems by 2004 and thus the advancement of peace, security and cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean.⁷⁴⁹

This broader political strategy of coupling potential benefits of EU accession within Cyprus and the broader Eastern Mediterranean via a parallel track aimed at reunifying Cyprus was deemed to be in the interests of Greece and the United Kingdom (then EU member states and both Guarantor Powers of the Republic of Cyprus) as well as the third Guarantor, Turkey, as its own EU candidacy was now in play. The effort under UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was ostensibly navigated by his Special Advisor, the Peruvian diplomat Alvaro de Soto, even though it was the Secretary-General whose name would be used for the various iterations of the comprehensive settlement drafts. The first such version came about in November 2002.

The initial version came with two maps: one which included Karpasia under Greek Cypriot administration, and the other which in its territorial realignments excluded this area in favour of other territories. A month later, Annan II was tabled, which included the former map with the Karpass peninsula going to Greek Cypriots. On 26 February 2003, and just as Tassos Papadopoulos was to assume the Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus from Glafkos Clerides, a third version of a “comprehensive settlement” plan was unveiled. Karpass was no longer envisioned under Greek Cypriot territorial administration, but with the caveat that in four villages Greek Cypriots had an unlimited “right” to return. This plan was set to be put to separate but simultaneous referenda across Cyprus at the end of March 2003. At a marathon meeting hosted by Annan himself, Denktash refused to put the plan to a referendum and the talks collapsed. A month later, Tassos Papadopoulos, together with the Heads of State and Government of nine other EU candidate countries signed the Accession Treaty to be entered into force on 1 May 2004. The fact that less than a week later (23 April 2003) the Turkish side announced the partial lifting freedom of movement across the green line has to be placed within this political context.

What came to be Annan Plan IV and then a few days later Annan Plan V effected little change as regards the Karpass’ territorial overlords. The provisions laid bare that the administration of the territory would remain in the hands of the Turkish Cypriot “constituent state”. However, the villages of Rizokarpaso, Ayia Trias, Yialousa and Melanarga retained the previous iteration’s provision of special rights regarding cultural, religious and

⁷⁴⁹ Theophanous, “The Republic of Cyprus in Perspective: The Record and Future Challenges”, 57-58.

educational affairs, political representation, and would be consulted on issues of zoning and planning as regards their villages. Nonetheless, the Plan never mentioned how exactly these special rights would be exercised and how decisions on zoning/planning would be taken. It should be mentioned that in these four villages, the overwhelming majority of people are now Turkish Cypriots and settlers.

The reason behind the change in the maps to maintain the Karpass under the control of the Turkish side was and likely remains that it is considered to be of strategic significance to Turkey:

Although expected by many Cypriots, Kantara was not in any of Annan's plans, nor was the coastal road that would have incorporated dozens of Greek-Cypriot villages, but also the eastern anchorages. But Cape Apostolos Andreas was. Here, projecting like a dagger at the only two major southern ports of Turkey, Mersin and Alexandretta (Iskenderun), the Greek-Cypriots could become a nuisance to Turkish shipping and oil interests. This is the perceived value of Karpasia to Turkish national 'interests.'⁷⁵⁰

And yet when asked about the future, Greek Cypriot enclaved remain overwhelmingly hopeful for a "solution".⁷⁵¹ It is this hope that overwhelmingly came across as the overall most political position expressed in the interviews gathered. Without jumping to generalisations about the personal political leanings and party preferences of those interviewed (and almost without fail inferred and not explicitly stated during the recordings), there seemed to be little appetite to delve into characterisations of Government policy regarding the enclaved. The day-to-day problems, including that the vegetables the Government sent via UN humanitarian convoys were mouldy, formed a greater part of the narrative arc regarding anxieties, rather than any mistakes made by those putting together the supplies. Albeit almost all the time, the radio or television was on tuned into Greek Cypriot stations, the news would often feature as the soundtrack to many of the recorded conversations. As such, there was intermittent commentary on issues that politicians raised in the Government-controlled areas, but since that political and media discourse never featured the enclaved, the media and political landscape in which they lived was in fact

⁷⁵⁰ Andrekos Varnava, "Karpasia, the strategically important 'bit' of Cyprus", *Neos Kosmos English Weekly*, (March 2003),

https://minerva-access.unimelb.edu.au/bitstream/handle/11343/34239/66699_Varnava_Karpasia.pdf?sequence=1.

⁷⁵¹ "Οι εγκλωβισμένοι ψήφισαν με την ελπίδα της επανένωσης [The Enclaved Voted in the Hope of Reunification]", *Phileleftheros*, 26 May 2019,

<https://www.philenews.com/koinonia/eidiseis/article/709244/oi-egglobismenoi-psifisan-me-tin-elpida-tis-epanensis>.

disassociated from their own existence – it affected them only indirectly through their relatives. The only real political element was without fail that all those interviewed expressed a desire for reunification potentially because that would give a *raison d'être* to their endurance.

And this desire for reunification may explain why the enclaved brought into the Cyprus Government's consistent policy for them to stay and persevere. As shown at the beginning of the chapter, and by Loizos' instrumental work as regards the Argaka displaced, the overall sense was that the *status quo* brought on by the 1974 events was temporary. As such, staying was the sensible choice. My land is here, my family is here, as long as the conditions don't break me, I will not leave of my own accord. This held true in 1974. This held true whenever news of a "breakthrough" in the negotiations was announced. This held true some four daces later, as so aptly expressed by a woman in Rizokarpaso: "γιατί εν ο τόπος μου, αγαπώ τον, εν θέλω να ξενιτευτώ με τίποτα" ["this is my home,⁷⁵² I love it, I don't want to expatriate whatsoever"].⁷⁵³

The non-profit "Free United Karpasia" established in the immediate aftermath of the 1974 war, aims for the return of all refugees to their ancestral homes under conditions of safety and human dignity, with their human rights guaranteed.⁷⁵⁴ The most vocal of the groups representing Greek Cypriots hailing from the Karpas, the "Coordination Committee of Karpasia", under Nikos Falas until his death in 2019, was also firm in its position that upon a solution the Karpas must be returned to Greek Cypriot administration.⁷⁵⁵ At the very least, "if this is not possible, [...] Karpasia should be placed under the central government as a "third zone" or under a special status or Canton."⁷⁵⁶ The "Association of the Children of

⁷⁵² The Greek word "τόπος" can mean place, location, abode, dwelling-place, but even country and homeland.

⁷⁵³ Alpha News, "16^ο Επεισόδιο: Εγκλωβισμένοι της Καρπασίας 28/12/2019 Β' Σεζόν" [16th Episode: The Enclaved of the Karpas 28/12/2019 Second Season].

⁷⁵⁴ Panagiotis Papageorgiou, *Καρπασία: Πρακτικά Α' Επισημονικού Συνεδρίου «Ες γην των Αγίων και των Ηρώων [Karpasia: Proceedings of the First Scientific Conference "In the Land of Saints and Heroes"]* (Free United Karpasia, Limassol, January 2010), 11.

⁷⁵⁵ "Συντονιστική Επιτροπή Καρπασίας: Η Καρπασία να τεθεί υπό ελληνοκυπριακή διοίκηση" [Coordination Committee of the Karpasia: The Karpas to be placed under Greek Cypriot control], *Cyprus Times*, 22 August 2017, <https://cyprustimes.com/syntonistiki-epitropi-karpasias-i-karpasia-na-tethei-ypo-ellinokypriaki-dioikisi/>.

⁷⁵⁶ "Υπόμνημα επέδωσαν οι Καρπασίτες στον Πρόεδρο: Ζητούν όπως τεθεί υπό ελληνοκυπριακή διοίκηση, εφόσον επιτευχθεί λύση του Κυπριακού" [The Karpasites presented a memorandum to the President: They demand that it be placed under Greek Cypriot administration, if a solution to the Cyprus problem is reached], *Kathimerini*, 8 April 2014, <http://www.kathimerini.com.cy/gr/politiki/167886/?ctype=ar>.

the Enclaved” lobbies the Government to facilitate better conditions for the Karpas enclaved, in practical and targeted ways, and to keep the enclaved on the policy agenda.

This is not to diminish that policies of the Government have negatively affected the enclaved as the ICRC’s Lix Simonius noted in 1980.⁷⁵⁷ Deterring schoolchildren from spending holidays with their enclaved families because they would have had to put their names to documents with “TRNC” letterhead upon crossing, or barring families from abroad wanting to meet their relatives in the buffer zone, were part of a tit-for-tat sovereignty-related squabble which had dire negative effects on the enclaved for years. Prohibiting non-permanent residents from crossing with the excuse of the pandemic, may mean grandchildren who live abroad are barred from seeing their relatives. They have frequently become the collateral damage of generalised policies catering to delegitimise the secessionist entity in its attempts to gain “recognition” and protect the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, sometimes at the expense of its citizens.

During his trip to the peninsula in the summer of 2008, the US Ambassador to Cyprus, Ronald Schlicher, heard first-hand about the bleak prospects of Greek Cypriots remaining as a hold-out in the Karpas, the problems faced by *all* residents because of general neglect of their plight by the Turkish Cypriot establishment, coupled with how a settlement of the political problem could revive the Greek Cypriot community, as it might allow “in-migration”:

During their 2006 visit, [Embassy Officers] questioned whether the enclaved population could survive in the long run, and 18 months later, we have the same concern. Death, as well as the poverty of Karpas and better opportunities in the South, erodes the enclaved populations. Furthermore, G/C residents fear the expropriation of their lands after their death. Nevertheless, the GoC and the enclaved themselves seem committed to maintaining the enclaves for symbolic and historical purposes, and a future settlement may allow more G/C in-migration. Elsewhere in the Karpas, the Turkish settler mayor of [Rizokarpaso] tries his best to develop his town, but suffers his own version of neglect, this time from the T/C central government.⁷⁵⁸

Alexander Downer, UN Special Advisor and former foreign minister of Australia, radically downplayed any prospect of a settlement providing for Karpasia under Greek Cypriot administration when the intercommunal negotiations resumed in 2009. Downer informed the US Ambassador that “the return of the Karpaz/Karpas peninsula, another G/C demand

⁷⁵⁷ Simonius, “Rapport de mission à Chypre, 4-14.12.78”, 23 January 1979: [ICRC 7239-7240].

⁷⁵⁸ Schlicher, “G/C Enclaved in Karpas Are Enduring, But Dwindling”, 23 July 2008, 06:36, Nicosia 0559, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08NICOSIA559_a.html.

that was not achieved in the Annan Plan, was a non-starter.”⁷⁵⁹ Schlicher’s successor, Ambassador Frank Urbancic, relayed a more nuanced reasoning to Washington as to why this was the case:

A Talat adviser told us that Turkey is against the return of the Karpaz/Karpas peninsula. He added that the Turkish Cypriots also do not favor the return of Karpaz/Karpas, but were at least willing to discuss it.⁷⁶⁰

Beyond the political prospects of Karpasia upon a settlement, the US Embassy cables also drew an important picture of what and how US diplomats viewed the area and its inhabitants. Ambassador Schlicher visited in 2008, describing what he saw and conversations he had with enclaved persons, some of whom – despite the prying eyes and ears of Turkish Cypriot minders shadowing the Ambassador – remained uninhibited in voicing their frustrations:

[Leonariso resident, Panayiota] Kanaka will not move, she says, because her family has lived there for generations, she loves the land and she ‘could never live anywhere else.’ Furthermore, she voiced anger that in a future settlement the return of G/Cs might be limited in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state. She voiced anger that foreigners were free to buy property where they wanted to, just not G/Cs.⁷⁶¹

Ayia Trias’ alderman, Savvas Liasi, who had for decades liaised with local authorities and international officials, and the father of artist and diarist Toulia Liasi, also conveyed his fears regarding the future of the enclaved community once they pass away:

Though a few G/C youths still live in Agias Trias, the population is overwhelmingly elderly, and Liasi said someone leaves for the south or passes away almost every week. Liasi’s own children are gone – his only son went missing in the events of 1974, and his daughter lives in the Netherlands. He feared the T/C authorities would take his property instead of letting him bequeath it to his non-resident daughter. (Note: The 2001 ECHR decision, *Cyprus v. Turkey*, found that authorities in the north did not recognise the inheritance rights of G/C relatives of the enclaved, nor did they allow G/Cs from enclaves who took up permanent residence in the south to continue to enjoy their property rights. End Note.)⁷⁶²

When the July 2017 negotiations in Switzerland’s Crans Montana broke down under the watchful eye of UN Secretary-General Guterres, one of the six aspects that remained open was that of territory. The UN deemed that the Morphou area should be handed over to Greek Cypriot administration. The fact that Morphou, which in previous iterations of negotiations

⁷⁵⁹ Jonathan Cohen, “Cyprus: Solution Talks’ First-Reading Concludes, UNSyG S A Downer and Leaders ‘Cautiously Optimistic’”, 13 August 2009, 14:28, Nicosia 0533, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09NICOSIA533_a.html.

⁷⁶⁰ Cohen, “Cyprus: Solution Talks’ First-Reading Concludes, UNSyG S A Downer and Leaders ‘Cautiously Optimistic’”, 13 August 2009, 14:28, Nicosia 0533.

⁷⁶¹ Schlicher, “G/C Enclaved in Karpas Are Enduring, But Dwindling”, 23 July 2008, 06:36, Nicosia 0559.

⁷⁶² Schlicher, “G/C Enclaved in Karpas Are Enduring, But Dwindling”, 23 July 2008, 06:36, Nicosia 0559.

had consistently been assigned to Greek Cypriot administration, but in the latest round had been omitted, depicts how the passage of time can change the territorial paradigms of a settlement.

After the Annan Plan, a construction and property-sale boom in the northern part of Cyprus mushroomed. This was partly due to the fact that the settlement and prospects for one had failed, but also because the property regime within the proposed plan provided for benefits to the current user, rather than the property owner, if significant “improvements” to the property were made. Even as a bottom line, if the Annan Plan provisions on property were re-tabled, there seemed to be a stamp of approval that by investing in refurbishing Greek Cypriot-owned property, the current user would have improved chances to claim it and profit from it. Such Greek Cypriot properties could also be “sold”⁷⁶³ for quick profit, and the building boom intensified. It led to a new set of *faits accomplis* on the ground, making a settlement on the property issue more difficult as regards restitution (the long-held Greek Cypriot aim), but also compensation and exchange (the Turkish Cypriot position).⁷⁶⁴

The construction boom, however, which has often involved the development and sale of property owned by Greek Cypriots displaced in 1974, has further muddied the already cloudy property issue, complicating efforts to find any settlement acceptable to both sides.⁷⁶⁵

The post-Annan period also saw the increase in demolition of Greek Cypriot houses in the enclaved villages of the Karpass, “including residences of persons who had indicated their desire to return to the north.”⁷⁶⁶ Meanwhile, following the 2005 *Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey*

⁷⁶³ The *Apostolides v. Orams* case highlighted the precariousness of “land titles” bought mostly by foreigners. Apostolides, whose land David and Linda Orams “purchased” in 2002 and on which they built a villa with their retirement funds, was granted damages by the Nicosia District Court for the Orams’ trespassing on his property and ordered the Orams to demolish all structures on the plot and return it to its rightful owner. This decision was upheld by the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court of England, where Apostolides turned for execution of the judgement. However, a separate challenge brought by the Orams was successful at the High Court of Justice. Apostolides appealed at the Court of Appeal, which referred the decision to the ECJ. The Court in Luxembourg ruled in favour of Apostolides and the Court of Appeal in England in 2010 decided in favour of Apostolides. The Orams tried to appeal it in the Supreme Court, but they were refused. The case was significant because it clarified that Court decisions had to be implemented across all European Union member states. It also gave a “European seal of approval” to decisions of the Cyprus courts as regards a property in an area where the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control. Finally, it compelled the UK Government to issue travel advice about the precarious nature of title deeds in the northern part of Cyprus, as they relate to Greek Cypriot properties.

Apostolides v. Orams (Judgement), No. C-420/07 (European Court of Justice, 28 April 2009).

⁷⁶⁴ Theophanous, “Revisiting the Cyprus Question and the Way Forward”.

Theophanous, “Reassessing the Prospects for a Solution of the Cyprus Problem”, *In Depth* 12, no. 4 (September 2015): 10.

⁷⁶⁵ Schlicher, “Turkish Cypriot Economy Enjoying Double-Digit Growth”, 18 May 2006, 14:07, Nicosia 0757, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06NICOSIA757_a.html.

⁷⁶⁶ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/2007/699, 3 December 2007.

judgement by the European Court of Human Rights,⁷⁶⁷ an “immovable property commission” was established in the northern part of Cyprus. Five years later, the Strasbourg-based Court affirmed that the domestic remedies offered by this Commission was effective in providing a “realistic provision for redress in the current situation of occupation that it is beyond this Court’s competence to resolve” and that the Court would no longer examine property claims by those who had not initially applied to the Commission, as they are not deemed to “have exhausted available avenues of redress.”⁷⁶⁸

According to the IPC’s website, 6,684 applications had been submitted as of 11 March 2020. Of these applications, the vast majority were filed during the liquidity crisis in the Government-controlled areas, with 5,399 applications lodged by October 2013.⁷⁶⁹ The Cyprus Government raised concerns about these developments, as the compensation meant that people accepted their right to forfeit restitution.

As regards the enclaved, the IPC provided for the first time a possibility to bequeath their properties to their next-of kin. For post-27 February 2008 deaths, relatives who don’t permanently reside in the enclaved villages, are able to retain the right to enjoy or “administer” the properties of their deceased next-of-kin, subject to submitting required paperwork to this end.⁷⁷⁰ However, keeping the property is subject to “minimum contact”, which either entails *inter alia* a bank account or investment in the property, of which the relevant authorities have to be informed, upon which the “Ministry will assess your application and inform you of the outcome. This decision is subject to judicial review.”⁷⁷¹ If the review is not successful, or if an heir does not wish to maintain the property, then an application (presumably for compensation and not restitution) can be lodged with the IPC. In early 2014, speaking in her capacity as Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs, Katie Clerides, the daughter of Glafkos, noted that some enclaved have already pursued the route via the IPC to transfer their properties to their next-of-kin, and were awaiting results.⁷⁷²

⁷⁶⁷ *Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey* (Merits), No. 46347/99 (European Court of Human Rights, 22 December 2005).

⁷⁶⁸ European Court of Human Rights, Case of *Demopoulos and others v. Turkey*, App. Nos. 46113/99, 3842/02, et al., (Admissibility), Grand Chamber, Strasbourg, 1 March 2010.

⁷⁶⁹ Stefanos Evripidou, “GC properties ours within 96 years, says IPC”, *Cyprus Mail*, 17 October 2013, <https://cyprus-mail.com/2013/10/17/gc-properties-ours-within-96-years-says-ipc/>.

⁷⁷⁰ Immoveable Property Commission, “Information Booklet: Property Rights of Greek Cypriot Residents of the Karpaz and Their Heirs”, 10-11.

⁷⁷¹ Immoveable Property Commission, 6.

⁷⁷² Maria Antouna, “Commissioner for Humanitarian Issues outlines task in hand to CAN”, *Cyprus News Agency*, 6 February 2014, <http://www.cna.org.cy/webnews-en.aspx?a=be48ee8f55514616a6109b9f05895766>.

In the same interview, Katie Clerides also noted that 75 Maronite Cypriots were resettled in their ancestral village of Kormakitis, which they would repair and use as a second home, however, Greek Cypriot relatives of the enclaved were not provided the same opportunity.⁷⁷³ She spoke of a woman who would have liked to relocate to the Karpass to live with her parents but whose request was denied. Subsequently, a complaint was lodged with the UN's Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.⁷⁷⁴

Such examples indicate that despite relaxation of the most constricting measures (freedom of movement, family reunions), "normal life" as per the Third Vienna Agreement, has yet to be achieved. However, in 2017, following the collapse of the Crans Montana negotiations, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, Mustafa Akıncı, announced "that a decision had been made to allow Maronites to return to all their villages in the north of the island," by coordinating works with Turkish civil and military authorities "which will allow access to Maronite and mixed villages where Maronites and Turkish Cypriots used to live together."⁷⁷⁵ The Turkish side had formalised a decision to allow resettlement of displaced Maronites in 2006, but this was practically limited to Kormakitis and to a lesser extent the village of Karpasha.⁷⁷⁶

In 2019, a further announcement was issued about "contracts [that] would be signed within the week to remove current residents living in 10[,] in 15 houses in the village of Karpasha to which former Maronite residents will then be able to return."⁷⁷⁷ The Greek Cypriot press also reported that some 50 applications by Greek Cypriot young couples had been filed as part of a scheme to help these people resettle in their ancestral villages, providing financial assistance to families until the age of 45.⁷⁷⁸ Nonetheless, low-level bureaucratic barriers such as their need to apply for "residency permits" in their supposed capacities as "third-country nationals" shows that return is neither easy nor smooth-sailing.⁷⁷⁹ Furthermore, the

⁷⁷³ Antouna, "Commissioner for Humanitarian Issues outlines task in hand to CAN", *Cyprus News Agency*, 6 February 2014.

⁷⁷⁴ Antouna, "Commissioner for Humanitarian Issues outlines task in hand to CAN".

⁷⁷⁵ "Maronites to return to villages in the north (Updated)", *Cyprus Mail*, 26 July 2017, <https://cyprus-mail.com/2017/07/26/maronites-return-villages-north/>.

⁷⁷⁶ Leonidou, "Maronites Ponder Kormakitis Return", *Cyprus Mail*, 17 October 2010.

⁷⁷⁷ Evie Andreou, "Govt expects strong interest in scheme to resettle villages in north", *Cyprus Mail*, 19 June 2019,

<https://cyprus-mail.com/2019/06/19/govt-expects-strong-interest-in-scheme-to-resettle-villages-in-north/>.

⁷⁷⁸ Andreou, "Govt expects strong interest in scheme to resettle villages in north", *Cyprus Mail*, 19 June 2019.

⁷⁷⁹ "Government Relocation Scheme to Turkish-Held Villages: The Problems and the Numbers", *In-Cyprus/Phileleftheros*, 22 January 2020.

pandemic rules minimising one-time stays to a maximum thirty-days, will likely pose a long-term problem if these measures are not lifted, for both Greek and Maronite Cypriots.⁷⁸⁰

The enclaved continue to rely on the supplies by the Government, including “personal and general cleaning products, water, petrol, gas canisters, baby items (food, nappies), items for the elderly, as well as perishables.”⁷⁸¹ Furthermore, they receive a basic monthly pension and an allowance (at present, the basic allowance for an individual is set at 371.60 euros, and extras for additional members of the household, as well as the costs of a home carer, payments for whom is assumed by the Government).⁷⁸² The service undertaken by UNFICYP runs at a yearly 100,000 euro cost, which is over and above the voluntary contribution the Cyprus Government pays annually towards the UN peacekeeping force.⁷⁸³ Families complement these supplies when visiting their relatives.⁷⁸⁴ While the financial support is welcomed, many young enclaved find that it is not sufficient to open their own businesses or get a mortgage for a house.⁷⁸⁵

These humanitarian aid supplies, just as in the past, continue to be used for political point-scoring. In October 2017 the unilateral decision was taken to “impose taxes and fees on other humanitarian goods” following the collapse of the talks in Crans Montana.⁷⁸⁶ The justification by Tahsin Ertuğruloğlu, a self-described Turkish nationalist who was then the Turkish Cypriots’ “foreign minister”, was that the “UN convoys are not going to be allowed to carry these things, because it gives the impression that these people are enclaved in occupied territory.”⁷⁸⁷ The Cyprus Government, refusing to pay these taxes imposed by

⁷⁸⁰ Xiouris, “Οι Εγκλωβισμένοι Τα Πρώτα Θύματα Του Τατάρ Και Της Λύσης 2 Κρατών [The Enclaved the First Victims of Tatar and the Two-state Solution]”, *24sports.com.cy*, 1 December 2020.

⁷⁸¹ Official Website of the Office of the Presidential Commissioner, http://www.presidentialcommissioner.gov.cy/anthropos/anthropos.nsf/page04e_gr/page04e_gr?opendocument, accessed 19 April 2020.

⁷⁸² Official Website of the Office of the Presidential Commissioner, <http://www.presidentialcommissioner.gov.cy/anthropos/anthropos.nsf/All/A16A21DBAA311E62C22584230031C58C?OpenDocument>, accessed 19 April 2020.

⁷⁸³ “Φωτίου: Ξανά στην ΟΥΝΦΙΚΥΠ το θέμα των εγκλωβισμένων” [Fotiou: The issue of enclaved again with UNFICYP], *Sigmalive*, 10 October 2017, <https://www.sigmalive.com/news/politics/460803/fotiou-ksana-stin-ounfikyp-to-thema-ton-egklovismenon>.

⁷⁸⁴ Chryso and Christos, 12 August 2013.

⁷⁸⁵ Alpha News, “16^ο Επεισόδιο: Εγκλωβισμένοι της Καρπασίας 28/12/2019 Β’ Σεζόν” [16th Episode: The Enclaved of the Karpas 28/12/2019 Second Season], *24 Hours*.

⁷⁸⁶ “UNFICYP Press Statement on Humanitarian Deliveries”, 4 October 2017, <https://unficyp.unmissions.org/press-statement-humanitarian-deliveries>.

⁷⁸⁷ “Turkish Cypriots block UN aid convoy to Greek Cypriots”, *Middle East Online*, 4 October 2017, <https://middle-east-online.com/en/turkish-cypriots-block-un-aid-convoy-greek-cypriots>.

authorities it does not recognise, ceased sending supplies, with only medicines reaching the enclaved.⁷⁸⁸

Prior to April 2003, such a decision would have led to *hard ethnic cleansing* as the livelihoods of all Greek Cypriots would be put at risk and a significant number of enclaved would have decided they cannot live without this assistance. With relatives' access to their families in the Karpass, this decision demonstrated how political loggerheads exacerbated tensions whereby once again the Greek Cypriot enclaved bore the brunt of the fallout. It denotes the hybridity and non-linearity of ethnic cleansing. One day restrictions are imposed, the next they are lifted. Then they are back again. In early May 2018, the decision on the "customs levy" was lifted, likely because having failed to get re-elected in early 2018, Ertuğruloğlu was succeeded by the former academic and the 2020 "presidential" hopeful, Kudret Özersay who was trying to build his political profile.

To this date, the UN deliveries are shadowed by Turkish Cypriots. Once a year the UN comes into the homes of the enclaved, with a translator, the Greek Cypriot alderman of the enclaved village, and the local "policeman", and they ask the enclaved whether they are well and other personal details. The enclaved women of the house serve the UN with coffee and local delicacies. A community that still needs UN oversight is not a community that lives in freedom but one that is still vulnerable to persecution.

A December 2019 Greek Cypriot television programme dedicated its show to the enclaved of the Karpass, with the first question of "Why stay?" posed on camera to a Rizokarpaso woman in her mid-fifties. Her answer was simple: "γιατί εν ο τόπος μου, αγαπώ τον, εν θέλω να ξεριτεντώ με τίποτα" in Cypriot Greek, which in English would loosely translate to "this is my home,⁷⁸⁹ I love it, I don't want to expatriate whatsoever".⁷⁹⁰

This encounter is important in that it demonstrates that the hybridity of *soft ethnic cleansing* allows for a modicum of resistance to its ultimate aims, and even possibly to a small degree, its reversal.

⁷⁸⁸ "Φωτίου: Ξανά στην ΟΥΝΦΙΚΥΠ το θέμα των εγκλωβισμένων" [Fotiou: The issue of enclaved again raised with UNFICYP], *Sigmalive*, 10 October 2017.

⁷⁸⁹ The Greek word "τόπος" can mean place, location, abode, dwelling-place, but even country and homeland.

⁷⁹⁰ Alpha News, "16^ο Επεισόδιο: Εγκλωβισμένοι της Καρπασίας 28/12/2019 Β' Σεζόν" [16th Episode: The Enclaved of the Karpass 28/12/2019 Second Season].

In terms of the current state of relations with the settlers from mainland Turkey and their families, the consensus opinion has been that relations ranged from the cordial to the close.⁷⁹¹ This was most probably best illuminated in what has become a very acute problem for the whole of the Karpas, the whole of Cyprus and, indeed, the entire world.

The COVID-19 pandemic in the northern part of Cyprus was first detected among German tourists holidaying in the Karpas. Soon after, the tourist bus drivers and their families who reside in Yialousa tested positive. On 27 March 2020, a full two-week quarantine was imposed on 15 villages in the panhandle. No one was allowed in, no one allowed out, and the various mukhtars and local representatives repeated the mantra of “stay home”. As one elderly enclaved noted, “we lived through curfew when the Turks came, where with sunset we were locked in our houses,” pointing to the similarities of the measures taken to protect residents from a global pandemic over forty years later.⁷⁹²

The lockdown also affected the humanitarian deliveries by UNFICYP. In March 2020 it was announced that efforts by the peacekeepers “to prevent the spread” of COVID-19 “while we continue humanitarian deliveries is a key priority for UNFICYP.”⁷⁹³ However, after a first case of COVID-19 infection was announced by UNFICYP,⁷⁹⁴ Özersay barred UN, EU and foreign diplomats for a week from crossing from the Government-controlled areas, adding that medical and other supplies to the Greek and Maronite Cypriots will be allowed to proceed “but the transfer will be made by us under the supervision of a UN representative.”⁷⁹⁵ The decision was subsequently extended for another week, while the aid supplies were to take place by Turkish Cypriots under UN supervision,⁷⁹⁶ not via the usual method of UN trucks taking the cargo.

⁷⁹¹ Alpha News, “16^ο Επεισόδιο: Εγκλωβισμένοι της Καρπασίας 28/12/2019 Β’ Σεζόν”.

Interview with Chryso and Christos, 12 August 2013.

Interview with Frixos and Faruk, 15 August 2013.

⁷⁹² Interview with Vaso, 20 April 2020.

⁷⁹³ Antonios Gkildakis, “Preventing Covid-19 while continuing humanitarian deliveries ‘a key priority’, UNFICYP Spokesman tells CNA”, *Cyprus News Agency*, 27 March 2020

<http://www.cna.org.cy/WebNews-en.aspx?a=d21fa03715404950a7ce9b8098be0ef1>.

⁷⁹⁴ UNFICYP, “COVID-19 case confirmed in Cyprus”, 10 April 2020, <https://unficyp.unmissions.org/covid-19-case-confirmed-cyprus>.

⁷⁹⁵ Josephine Koumettou, “Ban on crossings to UN, diplomatic missions for a week, says Ozersay”, *In-Cyprus*, 12 April 2020, <https://in-cyprus.philenews.com/ban-on-crossings-to-un-diplomatic-missions-for-a-week-says-ozersay/>.

⁷⁹⁶ Antonios Gkildakis, “Humanitarian aid to the enclaved underway amid restrictions, UNFICYP to accompany the convoy”, *Cyprus News Agency*, 14 April 2020, <http://www.cna.org.cy/webnews-en.aspx?a=4746c101f525494ab48ae533edee0b46>.

The weeks-long quarantine led to a shortage of fresh fruits and vegetables, and the local authorities, via donations from Turkish Cypriot businessmen in the region, sent each and every resident a package of artichokes, oranges, pasta, flour and cooking oil, which was left outside their doorstep on 7 April in Ayia Trias and 8 April in Rizokarpaso. Given that the majority of Greek Cypriot enclaved belong to the vulnerable group, as a result of age and underlying conditions, even after the lifting of the very strict curfew, they were advised to stay indoors. Suphi Coşkun, who arrived in Cyprus at the age of four and since 2014 has been the “mayor” on the left-leaning Republican Turkish Party ticket, would periodically use social media to plead both in Turkish and in Greek Cypriot to his co-villagers to remain at home. Towards this end, he also invited the village Hodja and the Greek Orthodox Priest to his home to echo the message of the importance of staying at home to the community-at-large via a Facebook live feed.⁷⁹⁷

It didn't take a pandemic for Coşkun and others to rally behind the concerns of each and every resident in Rizokarpaso, at a time when it was felt that the “central authorities” were letting them down. He is known to come to the Greek-language school of Rizokarpaso and attend the celebrations on the International Day of Education, giving all the teachers a carnation.⁷⁹⁸

Carnations will not solve the Cyprus question, though. Ultimately, it will be a political solution that will, at least on paper, provide potential long-term safeguards to the enclaved. Unless, of course, such an agreement shares the fate of the Third Vienna Agreement, where differing interpretations and lack of political will turned what was supposed to assist the enclaved community into a vehicle of *hard ethnic cleansing*.

With the rise of Tatar's “sovereign equality” vision (a handy euphemism for a two-state solution), together with public health rules and regulations that effectively mean the enclaved are once again sealed off, and those repatriated not granted lengthy stays,⁷⁹⁹ potential reversal towards *hard ethnic cleansing* is not out of the question. The coming years will be crucial and how post-pandemic policies will be handled vis-à-vis the enclaved, when public health is no longer an excuse.

⁷⁹⁷ “Suphi Coşkun was live”, *Facebook*, 2 April 2020, <https://www.facebook.com/suphi.coskun.5>.

⁷⁹⁸ Interview with Tasoula, 12 April 2020.

⁷⁹⁹ Xiouris, “Οι Εγκλωβισμένοι Τα Πρώτα Θύματα Του Τατάρ Και Της Λύσης 2 Κρατών [The Enclaved the First Victims of Tatar and the Two-state Solution]”, *24sports.com.cy*, 1 December 2020.

The territorial fate of the Karpass seems to remain sealed. Turkey will not let go, since it is deemed essential for Turkey's geostrategic calculations, as highlighted during the territorial exchanges at the time of the 2016 intercommunal negotiations:

'If Karpasia surrenders to Greek Cypriot control at a time when the country's partition is being discussed in Syria, Ankara's national interests in the eastern Mediterranean will be jeopardized.' This point is emphasized by the experienced Turkish journalist Fikret Bila, who maintains close relations with the Turkish General Staff. Mr. Bila links the future of Karpasia with the debate over the complete withdrawal of the Turkish army from Cyprus. On this point, Mr. Bila is expressing concern, which finds bearing within Ankara's political circles.

[...]

This view is shared by academic Salih Saner, according to whom Karpasia is of particular importance for developments in the field of the Cypriot EEZ. The control of the Karpass provides the Turkish side with the opportunity to control developments in the field of natural gas and oil exploration in the eastern Mediterranean and in the peripheries of Cyprus. That is why Turkey is called upon to pay special attention to this region.⁸⁰⁰

As for the Greek Cypriot enclaved living in the region, the last time the United Nations Secretary-General included the total number of Greek Cypriots in its periodic reporting on UNFICYP's activities to the Security Council was in January 2019.

5.5 Conclusion

For more than 45 years of Cyprus' recent history, the Greek Cypriot autochthonous population of the Karpass peninsula bore the brunt of *hard ethnic cleansing* policies, followed by a milder form of discrimination, harassment and intimidation. The 1975 Third Vienna Agreement that was supposed to shield the enclaved was, in fact, a vehicle to further *hard ethnic cleansing* and segregate Cyprus into two demographically homogenous areas. The Agreement also brought on a further need to rid the Turkish-occupied part of Greek Cypriots, since Turkish Cypriot transferees had to be housed, such as the Kokkina villagers who were bussed to Yialousa before the local residents had even been expelled.

⁸⁰⁰ Nikos Stelgias, "Με το βλέμμα στην Καρπασία η Άγκυρα" [Ankara has its eye on Karpasia], *Kathimerini*, 19 December 2016, <https://www.kathimerini.gr/888476/article/epikairothta/politikh/me-to-vlemma-sthn-karpasia-h-agkyra>.

With the expulsion of Yialousa's Greek Cypriot enclave, the *hard ethnic cleansing* policies gave way to a more liveable form of *soft ethnic cleansing*. In the ensuing years, the restrictions on the enclave would be gradually lifted, and then reimposed, and then lifted again. However, to this day they remain vulnerable to policies that could end up with their expulsion, and the UN still visits each enclave at least once a year to record the conditions in which they live and problems they may voice – but not in private.

There are some signs at present that despite *soft ethnic cleansing* (“a whole raft of adverse circumstances”⁸⁰¹) whereby there is no guarantee that they will not be ousted, the sustainability of the enclave is possible, as the integrity of the family unit is more respected than beforehand. Enclave children are not barred from living with their parents, as long as they hold “TRNC” identity cards.⁸⁰² The Cyprus Government has brought about a scheme to encourage resettlement of next-of-kin. This non-linearity of *soft ethnic cleansing* could mean that there might be room for even limited revitalisation of the community, as well as a rethinking of the theoretical conceptualisation of ethnic cleansing. However, *soft ethnic cleansing* also includes the element of non-linearity. At the time of writing, it seems that the community's revitalisation may come to an abrupt stop and in a worst-case scenario, *hard ethnic cleansing* and further expulsions may also be revitalised after four decades.

⁸⁰¹ Dick Marty, “Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Greek Cypriots and Maronites Living in the Northern Part of Cyprus”, 20 February 2003.

⁸⁰² Interview with Petroulla, 2 November 2019.

6. PORTRAITS II: TURKISH CYPRIOTS AND SETTLERS

Cypriot Government figures from April 1973 estimated that some 47,000 Turkish Cypriots lived across 77 villages in the areas of Cyprus where the Government continued to exercise effectively control after the Turkish invasion.⁸⁰³ Loizos assessed that the post-1974

departure of the Turks to the north was politically and structurally the most important consequence of the invasion and partition of the island” and it was “strongly reminiscent of the 1922 population exchange between Greece and Turkey, the partition of India in 1947, and many other similar subsequent events, all apparently irreversible.”⁸⁰⁴

Clerides, writing about the Geneva peace talks, noted that:

It was obvious to all of us that Turkey would demand geographical separation of the two communities, clothing this demand in the garment of bicomunal federation with a separate area in the north for the Turks and in the south for the Greeks.⁸⁰⁵

Physical segregation of the two communities, with Greek Cypriots in one part and Turkish Cypriots separated in the other, signalled that *hard ethnic cleansing* was achieved in Cyprus in the years 1974-1975, but continued well into 1977.

The other key aspect towards Turkey’s consolidation of its territorial gains was the arrival of Turkish mainlanders. Navaro-Yashin assessed that such “repopulation practices” were necessary for the “material transformation of northern Cyprus, a distinctive dimension of the remaking and reconfiguration of a territory.”⁸⁰⁶ Towards this end, within the month of Turkey’s second invasion, it was announced that “5,000 farm workers” would be sent from Turkey “to take care of abandoned farms, orchards and herds.”⁸⁰⁷ This was undeniably *hard ethnic cleansing*: ridding an area of an unwanted group of people and repopulating it with a (more) desirable group. Their introduction epitomised the “right-peopling” theory, as these people were moved for political gains of the Turkish side in its effort to consolidate its military-political gains upon the 1974 invasion.

This chapter aims to deal with two parallel aspects of demographic change: the arrival of Turkish Cypriots on the one hand, and on the other, the arrival of the settlers from mainland

⁸⁰³ ICRC Nicosia, “Population recensée par le gouvernement en avril 1973 par rapport à celle recensée par le CICR au 20 mai 1975”, 24 May 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 7971].

⁸⁰⁴ Loizos, *The Heart Grown Bitter*, 117.

⁸⁰⁵ Clerides, *My Deposition: Volume 4*, 47.

⁸⁰⁶ Navaro-Yashin, *The Make-Believe Space: Affective Geography in a Postwar Polity*, 48.

⁸⁰⁷ Borowiec, 98.

Turkey during the 1974-1977/1978 period of *hard ethnic cleansing* and sizable demographic shifts in Cyprus. It also examines how *soft ethnic cleansing* or a less targeted and organised approach was undertaken thereafter, underlining the hybrid nature of demographic re-engineering, as it is composed of different overlapping elements.

6.1 The Turkish Cypriot community's demographic consolidation

Turkish Cypriot movement and demographic consolidation after July 1974 was a complex affair. It included swift departure for some to the newly Turkish-controlled area, detention of 3,000⁸⁰⁸ males in internment camps, clandestine transfers, and after the August 1975 Third Vienna Agreement, the transfer of almost all Turkish Cypriots.

The Cyprus-based delegates of the ICRC pressured the Government of Cyprus immediately to release all Turkish Cypriots who had been interned or detained by the Cypriot National Guard, as this contravened Article 34 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.⁸⁰⁹ In early August, the ICRC required to know from Clerides, who was acting President, the reasons behind

such a large number of arrests of Turkish Cypriots. In fact, [the ICRC finds] that the number is close to 3,000, which is considerable and may explain some of the reluctance of the other party.⁸¹⁰

The reluctance alluded to the Turkish side refusing to hand over the list of names of Greek Cypriot POWs detained by Turkish troops. The response soon came, stating that the Government was prepared to liberate all Turkish Cypriot civilian detainees in its hands, “provided that the other side is prepared to do the same.”⁸¹¹

At the beginning of August 1974, ICRC received news from the mixed village of Alaminos, that “14 summary executions at the beginning of the conflict by EOKA irregulars” had taken place.⁸¹² Hundreds from both communities tragically died in massacres, reprisals and

⁸⁰⁸ ICRC Geneva, “Telegram 84 to ICRC Nicosia”, 6 August 1974 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 35-133 CY): [ICRC 9269].

⁸⁰⁹ Borsinger, “Message pour M. Gaillard”, 30 July 1974 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 35-133 CY): [ICRC 9241].

⁸¹⁰ Borsinger, “Telegram 84 to ICRC Nicosia”, 6 August 1974 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 35-133 CY): [ICRC 9269].

⁸¹¹ ICRC Nicosia, “Telegram 105 to ICRC Geneva”, 8 August 1974 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 35-133 CY): [ICRC 9273].

⁸¹² ICRC Geneva, “Telegram 21 to ICRC Ankara”, 5 August 1974 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 35-133 CY): [ICRC 9259].

counter-reprisals, including Turkish Cypriots in Tochni,⁸¹³ Maratha, Santallari,⁸¹⁴ Aloda, and Angolemi and Greek Cypriots from, or in Ashia, Elia, Eptakomi, Palekythro, Prastio, Sysklipo, Trimithi, Voni.⁸¹⁵ These are but a few place names associated with mass killings in August 1974. The Turkish Cypriot survivors of massacres, such as those from Tochni, were some of the first to demand transfer to the Turkish-occupied area.⁸¹⁶

On 6 September 1974, Clerides and Denktash agreed to initial transfers based on the principle of family reunifications. Turkish Cypriots were allowed to go to the Turkish-occupied area and Greek Cypriot POWs would be allowed to relocate southward.⁸¹⁷ One Turkish Cypriot described how in his view the homogenisation of Cyprus' population in two respective geographical areas commenced with the exchange of prisoners:

In fact, if they hadn't started taking prisoners, everyone was going to continue with their lives, they were going to go to their fields, they were going to look after their animals. I think that if this prisoner business hadn't happened on both sides, the division wasn't going to happen in Cyprus. It was after [the prisoner exchanges] that things became like this.⁸¹⁸

The "released Turkish Cypriot detainees and Turkish prisoners of war [...] unlike Greek Cypriots who were prisoners of war of Turkey and who came back barefooted and only with the clothes they wore, [...] took their possessions,"⁸¹⁹ as they made their way to establish a new life.

⁸¹³ Sant Cassia, *Bodies of Evidence*, 61.

⁸¹⁴ Palley, *An International Relations Debacle*, 172-173, fig. S.12.

⁸¹⁵ United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council, S/11468/Add.1, 10 September 1974 details how "Allegations continue to be made by both sides about atrocities and inhuman treatment. Wherever possible UNFICYP has investigated those allegations and has continued to make available to both sides, on a confidential basis, the results of its investigations."

These above-mentioned atrocities were partly dealt with in the European Commission on Human Rights 10 July 1976 Report on the First and Second Inter-state cases in 1977, and the 2001 *Cyprus v. Turkey* Judgement, among others. Eventually, the chapter of missing persons would come under the "Committee on Missing Persons" (CMP) comprised of a Greek Cypriot, a Turkish Cypriot and a Third Member from the ICRC, which to this day works on discovering and unearthing the remains of those who died, not just in 1974 but also in the 1960s. The Committee on Missing Persons has in past years searched and, in some circumstances, located remains of people from these killings. The CMP, however, has no mandate to "attribute responsibility for the deaths of any missing persons or make findings as to the cause of such deaths."

In the attempt to locate missing persons, the names of Sevgül Uludağ and Andreas Paraschos should be mentioned. Their investigative work as Cypriot journalists uncovering information on thousands of missing persons from across the island has been instrumental in shedding light on these atrocities, but also in assisting the recovery of the remains of those who had died.

⁸¹⁶ ICRC Nicosia, "Telegram 457 to ICRC", 28 September 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.003 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 8282].

⁸¹⁷ "Position of members of the same family caught on opposite sides of the lines", 6 September 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.001 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 8221].

Clerides revealed that this was already on the agenda of the first plenary session of the Geneva Conference of 10 August 1974 (*My Deposition: Volume 4*, 49).

⁸¹⁸ Bryant, *Life Stories of Turkish Cypriot Displacement*, 52.

⁸¹⁹ Palley, 172-173: fig. S.8.

Although some would choose to transfer with their belongings, others left many of their personal effects behind, including their dowry.⁸²⁰

Already during the July 1974 Geneva talks, Turkey's foreign minister was openly arguing for the "geographical separation of the two communities."⁸²¹ The Cyprus Task Force at Henry Kissinger's State Department shared this assessment that without mass-scale population movement, Cyprus' partition "solution" was not viable:

Turkish military occupation of the island's northeastern third does not of itself constitute a viable partition solution (although it may lay the basis for one) due to the leopard-spot character of Greek and Turkish settlement. Additional and more complex arrangements, probably including exchange of populations, will be required if a stable solution is to be achieved.⁸²²

As Clerides contemplated decades later, the Turkish aim was to create:

an exclusively Turkish area in the north of Cyprus into which the Turks from the south would be moved and immigrants from Turkey would later be imported in order to change the demographic composition of the population of Cyprus and thus to create a projection of Turkey into the island.⁸²³

These assessments demonstrate a consensus of opinion that the aim was to consolidate territorial gains and towards this end, ensure that the 'right' population make this expansion 'sustainable'.

Were the prisoner exchanges not agreed to, and in what ways would homogenisation be pursued? According to a December 1974 US Defense Intelligence document, Turkey was prepared to intervene militarily if the lives of Turkish Cypriots south of the demarcation lines was in danger, as well as if the illicit moves by Turkish Cypriots to the Turkish-occupied part were stopped upon Makarios' return to Cyprus:

The safety of Turkish Cypriots in the south will be the main factor influencing a decision for a renewed Turkish offensive. Clerides and Denktash have made progress on the refugee issue and several thousand Turks have been quietly allowed to migrate to the north. If Makarios tries to stop this or if his return leads to disorders among Greek Cypriots, which threaten Turkish Cypriot safety, Turkey will initiate a new

⁸²⁰ Navaro-Yashin, 176.

⁸²¹ Clerides, *My Deposition: Volume 4*, 56.

⁸²² Laurie van Hook, ed., *Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976*. Vol. XXX, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007), Document 112. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/96606.pdf>.

⁸²³ Clerides, 86

“peace offensive” aimed at liberating “once and for all” Turkish Cypriots in the Greek-controlled area.⁸²⁴

On 14 August 1974, Turkey launched its second invasion, which ended with Ankara in control of 37% of the island’s territory. Assuming military control of the territory took only a few days, during which time the vast majority of Greek Cypriots residing in these areas fled. However, consolidating the Turkish Cypriots within the newly occupied area was a slower process, taking more than a year to establish.

Turkish Cypriots moved to the Turkish-controlled areas because of a combination of push and pull factors. The push factors included the terror as mass graves of Turkish Cypriots were uncovered, as well as the fear of being targets by Greek Cypriot nationalist zealots. These push factors were compounded by

threats from Turkish-Cypriot nationalists [who had told them that] they would be regarded as traitors to the national cause and breakers of ethnic solidarity if they did not move.⁸²⁵

It played on the sentiments of fear to underscore the argument. Loizos (1981) documented an Argaki Greek Cypriot woman who had been displaced to Paphos, who spoke of the pressure applied onto Turkish Cypriots to move:

I remember, and I feel sorry for the people who had to leave these houses. For they’ve left their homes, too. It’s so sad, what’s happened to them. They aren’t to blame, either. They said their leaders told them to leave or else the mainland Turks would come and shoot them. They had their orders. The day we arrived here, the Turkish women who were leaving told us this. They didn’t want to go [...].⁸²⁶

Another pull factor came from the “promises of Greek property” in the Turkish-controlled area that was to be distributed among the newly arrived Turkish Cypriots.⁸²⁷ Furthermore, the more Turkish Cypriots went, the less reason remained for the others to stay behind.

A telling insight into these “push and pull” factors are two contrasting television portraits documented in 1974 and 1975. One by Jonathan Dimpleby for the UK’s Thames TV in August 1974 and the other by Demetris Andreou for the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation

⁸²⁴ Laurie van Hook, ed., *Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976*. Vol. XXX, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007), Document 162. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/96606.pdf>.

⁸²⁵ Loizos, 116.

⁸²⁶ Loizos, 144.

⁸²⁷ Loizos, 116.

a year later. Dimpleby's coverage, includes Turkish Cypriots congregating in the Dhekelia British military, who noted on camera the following:

A: It is no good to live with these Greek people. We can't live with them because we know that at the end, they will find some way to kill even our brothers or our sisters. Once we find ourselves to... . My suggestion is to live under where the Turkish Cypriot administration is, under the protection of the Turkish Army.

Q: Even if that means mass migration, backwards and forwards across the land, of Greek and Turks?

A: Still, my opinion doesn't change.

A2: I think everybody here, if you ask them one-by-one, and you will find many people here who are well off, that they will not care about their land, and they will run to the place, to the north, where the Turkish administration is.⁸²⁸

After the Third Vienna Agreement in late summer 1975, Greek Cypriot journalist Demetris Andreou went to document the departure of Turkish Cypriots. He and his team from the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation had to ask crying women and gloomy-looking men whether they were "Greek or Turk". Andreou couldn't discern who was more emotionally distraught on the day of the organised departures of Turkish Cypriots to the Turkish-controlled areas.⁸²⁹

Concentrating all Turkish Cypriots into a single ethnically homogenous area had all but succeeded upon the third round of intercommunal talks in Vienna that took place in early August 1975 that allowed for the passage of Turkish Cypriots northward.

6.2 From the aftermath of the invasion to 3 August 1975 (Third Vienna Agreement)

UNFICYP's former Chief Medical Officer offered that members of each community on the "wrong" side of the ceasefire line were political bargaining chips for their respective political leaderships:

By early 1975 the island was partitioned by a border almost as real and seeming nearly as permanent as that between East and West Germany. Both sides occupied defended positions on either side of the strip of no-man's-land marking the Cease Fire Line which was policed and superintended by UNFICYP.

To this major boundary must be added the islets of humanity which finished the war on the wrong side of it: about 11,000 Greek Cypriots in the Karpas Peninsula in the

⁸²⁸ Thames TV, "Turkish invasion of Cyprus: A divided Cyprus", *This Week*, August 22, 1974, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yB1xwOfHYsM>.

⁸²⁹ CYBC, "Μετακίνηση Τουρκοκυπρίων Αύγουστος-Σεπτέμβρης 1975" [Movement of Turkish Cypriots August-September 1975], 1975, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YxFAVIJqYok>, accessed 30 March 2020.

extreme North East and about 16,000 Turkish Cypriots in enclaves of various sizes throughout the South, the “unsurrendered villages”, words reminiscent of Northern Ireland. Both sides used these people as political bargaining points.⁸³⁰

The Cypriot Government resisted the homogenisation of the Turkish-occupied area. They resisted permissions for medical evacuations to the southern part of Cyprus of Greek Cypriots with family members in the Karpass as “patients [were] not permitted to return after treatment”.⁸³¹ Thereby, because a patient would not be allowed to return, their family would most likely wish to join them instead of living apart. This was to be resisted.

Prior to the Third Vienna Agreement, Turkish Cypriots used medical reasons to be granted transfer to the north, albeit in such cases they would only be allowed to take a suitcase. In contrast, it was alleged that Greek Cypriots moving south of the ceasefire lines were able to take all their belongings and their cars.⁸³² The reasoning by the bicomunal Humanitarian Matters Sub-Committee for only permitting a single suitcase was quite simply because these instances referred to “medical and compassionate cases who were given permission to travel but who were supposed to return to the South.”⁸³³ Such examples demonstrate how excuses for even temporary transfers were used by Turkish Cypriots with the intention of a permanent move across the demarcation line to the north. This also demonstrates that Turkish Cypriots had to go to such lengths to be able to be transferred (free of charge) to the north and how much the Cyprus Government was trying to impede the departure of Turkish Cypriots from the Government-controlled areas.

Until the organised transfers after the Third Vienna Agreement, Turkish Cypriots illicitly moved northward, taking as much of their belongings as they could fit in the vehicles used. Turkish Cypriots could move around in the Government-controlled area with a “laisser-passer”.⁸³⁴ Younger and able Turkish Cypriots would use the route via the British bases to illicitly cross or pay hefty sums to Greek Cypriot drivers and guides for “clandestine

⁸³⁰ Colonel R L Bell, “Intercommunity Medicine: Partition, Peacekeeping and Public Health Cyprus 1975”, 1 January 1985, *Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps*, 131: 132-135, <https://jramc.bmj.com/content/jramc/131/3/132.full.pdf>.

⁸³¹ ICRC Nicosia, “Activities of the ICRC Delegation from 17/11 to 23/11”, 27 November 1974 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.06 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8689].

⁸³² As argued in the previous chapter, some Greek Cypriot applicants for “voluntary transfers” had the advantage of moving with their furniture and even vehicles, albeit this option was not granted to thousands expelled without effective advanced warning.

⁸³³ ICRC Nicosia, “Meeting of the Sub-Committee on Humanitarian Matters held at the Ledra Palace UN Conference Area on Tuesday, 17 June 1975 (Fourteenth Meeting)”, 17 June 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.02 / 231 Et. (35-133CY)): [ICRC 8580].

⁸³⁴ Gaulis, “Rapport succinct sur la situation des communautés chyp.turcs dans le secteur Sud de Chypre après les évacuations d’Akrotiri”, 1 February 1975: [ICRC 8375].

transfers”. Meanwhile, the destitute, old or mentally impaired Turkish Cypriots were left behind.⁸³⁵ Loizos surmised that the consolidation of all Turkish Cypriots “was a slow process, occurring throughout the early months of 1975.”⁸³⁶

As one Limassolian Turkish Cypriot woman attested to the anthropologist Bryant, her husband was detained in the city’s stadium and requested transfer to the north upon his release. His departure meant that she too would have to find means to follow with her children, at the considerable cost of 120 liras and despite barriers set up by the police to stop Turkish Cypriots from leaving:

[My husband] was a prisoner [for] 96 days. Our Greek Cypriot renter took me there several times to see him. When he saw me, he said, ‘they’re asking us where we want to be taken, what should I say?’ ‘You should go wherever everyone else is going,’ I said. He said, ‘everyone wants to go to Nicosia, everyone’s going to the north.’ ‘In that case, you go, too,’ I said. He wanted to know what would happen to us. I told him we’d find a way to get to the north. So he came to the north, almost all the men did. The only ones left in Limassol were women and old people. After some time, we heard that the women were also starting to find ways across. At that time, taxi drivers were taking Turks to the north for one or two liras, but soon the Greek Cypriot police got word and began setting up roadblocks because they wanted the Turks to stay in the south.⁸³⁷

The people who transferred in such a way were obviously unable to take all their belongings and their houses in the Government-controlled areas would remain relatively intact with furnishings. These were systematically “looted mostly by civilians (as in the northern zone, where almost all the abandoned [Greek Cypriot] houses, except in the town of Morphou, have been ransacked).”⁸³⁸

As such, as more people left, even more felt the need to join. Occasionally, to spur those Turkish Cypriots unwilling to transfer, provocations and self-inflicted damage to property by Turkish Cypriots were perpetrated to convince those apprehensive of quitting their life in the Government-controlled areas that such notions were unsustainable. The ICRC observed that:

The vast majority of this community no longer believes in a life in the South, refuses to consider it, even provokes, forces the circumstances when it can, [creating] conditions that could make it even more difficult to integrate in the Greek zone: pillaging and looting of abandoned neighbouring houses to create a climate of

⁸³⁵ Gaulis, “Rapport succinct sur la situation des communautés chyp.turcs dans le secteur Sud de Chypre après les évacuations d’Akrotiri”, 1 February 1975: [ICRC 8375].

⁸³⁶ Loizos, 116.

⁸³⁷ Bryant, *Life Stories of Turkish Cypriot Displacement*, 50.

⁸³⁸ Christian Michel, “Note de Dossier”, 7 October 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.001 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 8187].

desolation and encourage emigration (observed in Larnaca Skala), refusal to be interested in the fields, refusal of assistance in seeds (Axylou), sale of the furniture (a little everywhere), abandonment of the village by the notables (50 villages at least), flight of the father of the family, the mukhtar, the teacher. Refusal to open the school. Refusal to be assigned to a Greek hospital, refusal by Turkish hospitals of drugs offered by the Government.⁸³⁹

Likely the largest single transfer took place in January 1975. Some 11,000 Turkish Cypriots congregated at the British base in Akrotiri, where refugee camps in Happy Valley, Paramali and Forest Camps were established.⁸⁴⁰ They were to remain there until January 1975 when the UK agreed to their transfer to the Turkish-occupied area of Cyprus via Turkey.⁸⁴¹

According to the ICRC, upon their own headcounts after the evacuation of Akrotiri, some 14,000 to 15,000 Turkish Cypriots had departed, over and above the 11,000 total that had been officially announced by the British.⁸⁴² The news that the Turkish Cypriots would be moved to the northern part of Cyprus was met by Greek Cypriot public outrage. A large student protest on 17 January 1975, where one pupil died, took place against Britain's perceived enabling of the transfer, given that it was known that these Turkish Cypriots would be settled "in Greek-owned houses and property".⁸⁴³

The transfer of Turkish Cypriots from the bases resulted in a sharp decline in "community balance" as mostly older Turkish Cypriots remained.⁸⁴⁴ The ICRC further noted that there was "danger of intensification of violent reaction by police authorities" against the exodus of Turkish Cypriots, a concern that proved true some months later. The violent intimidation of four dozen Turkish Cypriots caught illicitly trying to head north from Paphos brought on the expulsion of almost 800 Greek Cypriots from the occupied area to the south as retaliation.⁸⁴⁵ This was the "catch-22" of the modalities of ethnic cleansing: blocking the illicit transfer attempt by Turkish Cypriots and the undue violence demonstrated by the

⁸³⁹ Gaulis, "Rapport succinct sur la situation des communautés chyp. turcs dans le secteur Sud de Chypre après les évacuations d'Akrotiri", 1 February 1975: [8376 and 8377].

⁸⁴⁰ ICRC Geneva, "Telegram 85 to ICRC Ankara" 16 September 1974 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.001 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 8506].

⁸⁴¹ Zuger, "Note No. 149: Communautés cyprïotes turques au sud", 6 February 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 8358].

⁸⁴² Louis Gaulis, "Rapport succinct sur la situation des communautés chyp. turcs dans le secteur Sud de Chypre après les évacuations d'Akrotiri", 1 February 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 8373].

⁸⁴³ Clerides, *My Deposition: Volume 4*, 163.

⁸⁴⁴ Zuger, "Note No. 143: Les problèmes à fin janvier 1975", 30 January 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 8347].

⁸⁴⁵ Zuger, "Note No. 143: Les problèmes à fin janvier 1975", 30 January 1975 : [ICRC 8347].

Greek Cypriot police underscored sentiments of unease and fear vis-à-vis the Government authorities, spurring further groups of Turkish Cypriots to demand transfer.

Space was needed for the transferred Turkish Cypriots and as Clerides explained, he had already relayed in negotiations with Mr. Denktash in February 1975 that this also helped realise the aim of ethnic homogenisation via the re-engineering of the demographic map of Cyprus:

it is a part of a pattern of psychological and physical pressure, which is being systematically exercised, to drive Greek families from the north. This has been intensified since 10,000 Turkish Cypriots have been allowed to move north from the British bases. The reasons for this is obvious. They want more Greek houses to put Turkish Cypriots from the south.⁸⁴⁶

Many Turkish Cypriot villages in the Government-controlled areas were still manned by “Turkish Fighters” (TMT), self-described as “unsurrendered” and under the control of General Demirel’s Turkish occupation forces.⁸⁴⁷ Some of the “Turkish Fighter commanders” were suspicious of the humanitarian assistance as the source of the aid was the Cypriot Government. Some, such as in Stavrovouni,⁸⁴⁸ were open to accepting food distributions, as long as it was delivered by UNFICYP. In Yialia, the commander proclaimed that the only acceptable aid would come “from the mother country – Turkey”, before accepting the UN and ICRC delivered goods.⁸⁴⁹ Even the most nationalist would not cut off their nose to spite their face.

On 20 March 1975, the Cypriot Government instituted a public work programme, aimed at employing Turkish Cypriots, within the strict the confines of their areas out of “fear of possible clashes between members of the two communities.”⁸⁵⁰ The programme would provide desperately needed cash to a population that was largely excluded from formal employment. Government officials administering this programme portrayed the programme’s potential failure as a result of the Turkish Cypriot community leadership’s

⁸⁴⁶ Clerides, *My Deposition : Volume 4*, 177.

⁸⁴⁷ Junod, “Weekly Activities (24.3.75-28.3.75)”, 29 March 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 8392].

⁸⁴⁸ Junod, “Rapport sur la situation générale des villages cypristes-turcs non-rendus du district de Paphos à fin janvier 1975”, 3 February 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY)) : [ICRC 8364].

⁸⁴⁹ Junod, “Rapport sur la situation générale des villages cypristes-turcs non-rendus du district de Paphos à fin janvier 1975”, 3 February 1975 : [ICRC 8368].

⁸⁵⁰ Ronald Dreyer, “Note to Harald Schmid de Grunneck”, 27 March 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 8388].

encouragement to sabotage any Governmental overtures towards the Turkish Cypriots in the Government-controlled areas.⁸⁵¹

Boycotting the Government of Cyprus, even in conditions of dire need, was a necessity in the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative. Such overtures of assistance, it was believed, only sought the complete subjugation of the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish invasion thus provided the opportunity to

Alter the balance of power in Cyprus [...] In the face of persistent Greek Cypriot resistance to any suggestions other than ones which would, after a while, involve a return to the conditions of Greek Cypriot hegemony that existed before the *coup* and the intervention, separating the two communities seemed the only available way to avoid a recurrence of all the usual trouble with the Greeks.⁸⁵²

The above examples demonstrate the hybrid nature of what led to two ethnically homogenous areas in Cyprus. Within the Turkish Cypriot community, it was a top-down and a bottom-up demand for the thorough disintegration of complex social and inter-community structures across Cyprus by the physical segregation of the two communities. The goal was consolidation of all Turkish Cypriots into a single area under Turkey's control and "security". According to the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative, the Turkish Army offered protection from Greek Cypriots, while helping realise the objective of *taksim*.

Yet the hegemonic nationalist narrative ignores that informal links on the ground and contact between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots continued and new connections were made even as ethnic homogenisation was realised. Loizos describes informal exchanges between members of the two communities even upon displacement, such as when a Greek Cypriot from Morphou arrived in Polemidhia in Limassol:

he became friendly with a Turk who had not yet left for the north. Finally, when this man, too, was leaving, the Greek asked him to visit his house in Argaki, and retrieve [the man's wedding] photo, which he did. (In spite of the military situation, some Greeks and Turks could still meet on the British bases, if they wanted to). The Turk has done this out of friendship, and had asked for nothing.⁸⁵³

Such informal exchanges went beyond handing over old photographs and mementos left behind, to actually entering into more formalised agreements over rent: "Sometimes the Turkish Cypriot owners were on the point of leaving for the north, in which case they

⁸⁵¹ Dreyer, "Note to Harald Schmid de Grunecq", 27 March 1975: [ICRC 8388].

⁸⁵² Moran, 81.

⁸⁵³ Loizos, 171-172.

commonly made formal rental agreements with the Greeks,⁸⁵⁴ who had arrived having fled their own villages now under Turkish control. Other times, the actual keys were left with Greek Cypriot neighbours.⁸⁵⁵ Such acts demonstrate that the Turkish Cypriots didn't necessarily foresee their departure to the occupied area as a complete rupture with their past lives or the demographic re-engineering as being permanent.

A Greek Cypriot from Argaki rented a shop and two flats from a Turkish Cypriot in Limassol, agreeing that "The rental shall continue from today until the day when the Cypriot Political Question is resolved."⁸⁵⁶ Another informal contract documented by Loizos provided that "Whenever I return he must hand the house over to me in the same condition as when he took charge of it. He had given me 10 [pounds] for his sojourn."⁸⁵⁷

Loizos also relayed how Greek Cypriot displaced were sorry for the departing Turkish Cypriots whose houses they were to inhabit:

They didn't want to go and they took earth from here so that they would come back again. Earth in tin cans. They have a custom like that – when you take earth from your home, and go off somewhere, it helps you to come back home again. We didn't think of doing that – we thought we were only leaving Argaki for a few days, two or three at most.⁸⁵⁸

Yet, there were recorded instances of Turkish Cypriots who did not desire transfer. Hassan Enver from "Alaminos, for the past 5 months had been living in Trikomo (northern area)" but with a previous address in Larnaca, was arrested on 7 July 1975 at the Larnaca Police Station. On 11 July 1975, Enver expressed to the ICRC his "wish to leave for the UK or, if that were not possible, to go back to Larnaca and to stay there."⁸⁵⁹

⁸⁵⁴ Loizos, 182.

⁸⁵⁵ CYBC, "Μετακίνηση Τουρκοκυπρίων Αύγουστος-Σεπτέμβρης 1975" [Movement of Turkish Cypriots August-September 1975], 1975.

This is also referenced in a 1982 Russell King and Sarah Ladbury journal article, albeit the authors mainly concentrate on the fact that the Turkish Cypriots who were to be transferred to the Turkish-occupied areas felt loss and resentment for having to move:

It was little comfort to them that they had been 'liberated' by the Turkish forces (i.e., their own side) and that the threat of annihilation was now over [...] what mattered most was what they had lost: their homes, their land, their possessions, and also their Greek Cypriot neighbours and friends. For these things material compensation was irrelevant.

See Russell King and Sarah Ladbury, "The Cultural Reconstruction of Political Reality: Greek and Turkish Cyprus Since 1974", *Anthropological Quarterly* 55, no. 1 (1982): 1–16, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3317371>.

The sense of loss was also illustrated by Vamik Volkan, *Cyprus, War and Adaptation: A Psychoanalytic History of Two Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1979).

⁸⁵⁶ Loizos, 184.

⁸⁵⁷ Loizos, 185.

⁸⁵⁸ Loizos, 144.

⁸⁵⁹ Cedric A. Neukomm, "Report on special visit to Nicosia Central Prison", 22 July 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.006 / 229 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 9150].

Kyrenia-born Hussein Ahmet lived in the “Greek sector of Nicosia”. Upon detention at the Larnaca Police Station, an ICRC delegate went to monitor his condition during which Ahmet “expressed the wish to stay in the outhern [sic.] area” because “he had always lived and worked there.” He explained that he had earlier transferred to the Turkish-occupied area but had been “subjected to harassment and had also been imprisoned,” and was “unable to find employment” and therefore returned.⁸⁶⁰

Denktash, however, was resolute that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots had to physically segregate. He expounded on his views at the UN in 1978 as follows:

The Greek Cypriots never mention the fact that 65,000 Turkish Cypriots – nearly half of the Turkish community – had to move in order to free themselves from eleven years of misuse at the hands of the Greeks. That, supposedly, is irrelevant. Those Turkish Cypriots left valuable farms, lands and buildings in the south. The Greeks, rightly, occupied that property and are using it.

[...]

What is the territory on which the so-called Federated State of Cyprus is based? I shall tell him: It is the northern part of Cyprus, where Turks had their properties – and the Turks who had properties in the southern part have left their properties in the south to the Greeks and have come up to the north. We shall discuss all this in the negotiations. We are ready to discuss all this – exchange of populations, exchange of property, compensation. Everything will be discussed.⁸⁶¹

“Everything”, according to Denktash, excluding restitution and resettlement – that is anything that would mix the two communities and undo their complete physical separation which was the Turkish side’s underlying aim throughout. As early as September 1974, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had warned his Greek counterpart that “I don’t have details in mind but I have the impression they want an exchange of population.”⁸⁶²

As the Turkish Cypriots were slowly abandoning their homes and properties in the south for a new life in the Turkish-controlled area, their houses were increasingly taken over by Greek Cypriot displaced who had fled from their own properties in the Turkish-occupied area. By

⁸⁶⁰ Neukomm, “Special visit to Ayios Dometios Police Station”, 22 July 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.006 / 229 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 9152 & 9153].

⁸⁶¹ Moran, *Rauf Denktash at the United Nations: Speeches on Cyprus*, 157 and 161.

⁸⁶² van Hook, ed., *Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976*. Vol. XXX, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Document 152.

March 1975, some 300 of the 400 Turkish Cypriot homes in Skala-Larnaca were occupied by Greek Cypriots.⁸⁶³

Not all takeovers were peaceful. In Kato Polemidhia, incidents were recorded between the autochthonous Turkish Cypriots and the incoming displaced Greek Cypriots.⁸⁶⁴ In July 1975, a Turkish Cypriot couple was attacked and molested for trying to reason with 30 Greek Cypriots who wanted to force open the door of a neighbouring Turkish Cypriot house that was under the couple's guardianship. The incident drew a crowd of 200 onlookers, lasting 30 minutes.⁸⁶⁵

Even before the first anniversary of the Turkish invasion, the Turkish side had more or less succeeded in consolidating the Turkish Cypriots. By May 1975, only some 11,000 Turkish Cypriots remained living in the Government-controlled areas, out of the 45,000 who had resided there a year before.⁸⁶⁶

In an effort to block these aims, the Greek Cypriot leadership instructed the police to bar Turkish Cypriots from moving north unless they had sought approval on medical or other permissible grounds. Arrests and even maltreatment (beatings, even threats to kill)⁸⁶⁷ of Turkish Cypriots in June 1975 at the hands of the police were increasingly documented as the frequency and number of Turkish Cypriots illicitly crossing increased.⁸⁶⁸

⁸⁶³ ICRC Limassol and Paphos, "Weekly activities in the South, 24.3.75 to 29.3.75", 29 March 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 8385].

⁸⁶⁴ ICRC Limassol and Paphos, "Weekly activities in the South, 24.3.75 to 29.3.75", 29 March 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 8385].

⁸⁶⁵ Louis Gaulis, "Report concerning Allegation of Ill-treatment of a TKCYP couple from Limassol", 5 July 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 8416].

⁸⁶⁶ "Population recensée par le gouvernement en avril 1973 par rapport à celle recensée par le CICR au 20 mai 1975", 24 May 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 7971].

⁸⁶⁷ Richard Dreyer, "Note: Alleged ill-treatment threatening of 4 TKCYP living in Limassol Turkish quarter", 26 June 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.02 / 229 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 9178-9180]; Alain Junod, "Note: Arrest of 7 TKCYP at Nicosia while attempting to go to the North", 28 June 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.02 / 229 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 9181-9182].

⁸⁶⁸ ICRC Limassol, "Rapport d'activité bi-mensuel de la délégation de Limassol : Districts de Limassol et Larnaca, période du 16 au 30 Juin 1975", 30 June 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.02 / 229 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 9176].

6.2.1 The “Milikouri incident”

The ICRC considered these cases of police misconduct against Turkish Cypriots as retribution for the increased rate of forced evictions from Karpasia during this period.⁸⁶⁹ Clerides, meanwhile, argued that the Karpass evictions were a “reprisal” for maltreatment of Turkish Cypriots during the “Milikouri incident” in the proximity of Kykkos Monastery in June 1975.⁸⁷⁰ It was a chicken-and-egg situation, but what became known as the “Milikouri incident” was a significant turning point and was used to justify the expulsion of hundreds of Greek Cypriots in the immediate aftermath.

The ICRC protested the “severe” ill-treatment of the 48 Turkish Cypriots from Paphos reprimanded on 26 June 1975 by the police when they were caught *en route* to the northern part of Cyprus.⁸⁷¹ 21 of the group “bore marks which could have been caused by ill-treatment,” opined the ICRC delegate investigating the case.⁸⁷²

Denktash seized the opportunity denouncing the Milikouri/Kykkos incident and proclaiming that “11,000 Turkish Cypriots who are held by force in the South [are] serving as pawns” and are prevented from regaining their “freedom or returning to their parents in the north.”⁸⁷³

The incident was the justification for the expulsion of 798 Greek Cypriots from the Karpass between 27 and 30 June 1975.⁸⁷⁴ The Permanent Representative of Cyprus at the UN protested these expulsions. However, Denktash had already demanded that “about a 100 people per day (negotiable)” of the remaining Turkish Cypriots be permitted to cross and if this demand would not be met, he threatened to oust 500 Greek Cypriots on a daily basis.⁸⁷⁵

⁸⁶⁹ ICRC Limassol, “Rapport d’activité bi-mensuel de la délégation de Limassol : Districts de Limassol et Larnaca, période du 16 au 30 Juin 1975”, 30 June 1975: [ICRC 9176].

⁸⁷⁰ Clerides, *My Deposition: Volume 4*, 295-296.

⁸⁷¹ Junod, “Note for the attention of Mr. Harald Schmid De Grunneck, Head of Mission: Arrest of 48 TKCYP attempting to go to the North on 26.6.75 and alleged ill-treatment on the persons arrested by GKCYP officials”: [9196] attached to de Grunneck’s letter to Clerides, 27 June 1975 included in ICRC “Note No. 279”, 30 June 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.03 / 229 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 9193-9206].

⁸⁷² Junod, “Arrest of 48 TKCYP attempting to go to the North on 26.6.75 and alleged ill-treatment on the persons arrested by GKCYP officials”: [9196].

⁸⁷³ Denktash, “Letter addressed to the Secretary-General”, 1 July 1975, S/11740 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.03 / 229 (25-133 CY)): [ICRC 9215].

⁸⁷⁴ Letter dated 2 July 1975 by the ICRC’s Head of Mission Grunneck to the Commander in Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces, General Vahid Guneri, included as annex to “Rapport Hebdomadaire Activités, 30.6.75-5.7.75”, Nicosia, 7 July 1975 (ICRC: 229(35-53 CY)): [8890].

⁸⁷⁵ Grunneck, “Procès-verbal d’entretien – Rauf Denktash”, 30 July 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049-002.06 / 229 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 8799].

Denktash was using the threat of expulsion of Greek Cypriot enclaved to consolidate all Turkish Cypriots in the areas under the Turkish side's control.

The UN Secretary-General, who was seriously concerned, wanted the issue of population transfers to be carried out upon agreement and within the bounds of the intercommunal talks between Clerides and Denktash.⁸⁷⁶ All in the name of agreements reached at the negotiation table, the UN did not prevent transfers or *hard ethnic cleansing* leading to the demographic homogenisation of the Government- and the Turkish-controlled areas in Cyprus. It seems that as long as the sides agreed, the mass movement of people, possibly permanently, was not seen as a problem if these moves had been agreed to between the sides to a conflict. It seems that it was deemed a secondary issue when faced with instituting "peace" and an end to violent conflict.

There was also a shift in the Greek Cypriot political leadership's aims, which until then aimed at preventing Turkish Cypriots crossing into and ensuring Greek Cypriots remained in the Turkish-controlled areas. Ahead of new intercommunal talks to be held in the late summer of 1975, Clerides (1992) recorded his instructions from Cyprus' President:

Makarios's view was that it was more important to keep Greek Cypriots in the north, and particularly the Karpass area, than Turkish Cypriots in the south. From information the Government of Cyprus had, about 10,000 Turkish Cypriots remained in the south and nearly as many Greeks were still in the Karpass area. [...] Makarios also did not dismiss as totally unfounded the information that should a serious incident take place against Turkish-Cypriots in the south, Turkey may use it as an excuse to mount a military operation in the south.⁸⁷⁷

6.3 Third Vienna Agreement

The shift in attitude could be explained after the Government received information

through a Turkish Cypriot agent, that thoughts were entertained and plans were made for the landing of Turkish forces in Paphos and Limassol and that Turkish Cypriots of villages in those areas were given instructions to be ready to move towards the landing areas, after the landings were made, in order to be evacuated by landing craft and taken north to the areas under Turkish control.⁸⁷⁸

⁸⁷⁶ Micheli, "Note de Dossier: À l'attention de M. Borsinger", 9 July 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049-007.03 / 229 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 9218].

⁸⁷⁷ Clerides, *My Deposition: Volume 4*, 297.

⁸⁷⁸ Clerides, 296.

Allegedly the Turkish forces would withdraw upon “evacuating the Turkish Cypriots to the north”, but not before causing extensive damage on public utilities and other government infrastructure.⁸⁷⁹ The shadow of a possible military incident that would “evacuate” all remaining Turkish Cypriots helped bring about the Third Vienna Agreement, which the ICRC had described as the “exchange of minorities”.⁸⁸⁰ The Agreement provided for facilitated transfers of Turkish Cypriots, but also was to shield the Greek Cypriot enclave. While the former provision was respected, the latter was not.

At the talks in Austria, Clerides linked the idea of those Turkish Cypriots in the south, who “really and freely wanted to go north [to] be allowed to do so, if the Turkish side would allow, as a first step, the inhabitants of the Greek sector of Famagusta to return to it.”⁸⁸¹ Denktash insisted that Famagusta was a separate chapter for discussion, but if the “remaining Turks, which according to their figures were 6,000 only in the south” would be barred from moving north then either he would have to resort to “expelling the Greeks from the north” or effectuating a “limited military operation for the rescue of the Turks in the south.”⁸⁸²

Two agreements came about, one remained confidential and the other was issued as a press communiqué. The public text of the Agreement mostly speaks of both Turkish Cypriots *and* Greek Cypriots being permitted to go northward, the latter for family reunification. The confidential section of the agreement foresaw those Greek Cypriots who had been evicted in June and July 1975 as a result of the Milikouri incident gaining the option of return.⁸⁸³

Nonetheless, the hegemonic Turkish Cypriot narrative terms the Third Vienna Agreement as an “arrangement, an exchange of population, which had to be made in order to bring safety and security to the Turks, an arrangement which was effected bilaterally, with the other side.”⁸⁸⁴ This was a deliberate whitewashing of the provisions related to the Greek Cypriots, which had almost entirely been ignored.

The Turkish Cypriot transfers took place at relative speed. UNFICYP provided the logistical support for the daily convoys, while ICRC delegates registered those who did not wish to

⁸⁷⁹ Clerides, 296.

⁸⁸⁰ Simonius, “Chypre – Evacuations, 28 July 1975”, 29 July 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.002.06 / 229 (35-53 CY)): [ICRC 8769].

⁸⁸¹ Clerides, *My Deposition: Volume 4*, 323.

⁸⁸² Clerides, 323.

⁸⁸³ Clerides, 328.

⁸⁸⁴ Moran, 154.

leave; according to one “30 of the 200 to 300 Turkish Cypriots who were still in Larnaca have expressed the wish to stay there!”⁸⁸⁵

Between 9 and 12 August 1975, some 1,263 Turkish Cypriots were transferred to the northern part of Cyprus.⁸⁸⁶ By 18 August, the ICRC was reporting that 3,000-4,000 Turkish Cypriots had crossed, with only 16 Greek Cypriots permitted to go in the same direction.⁸⁸⁷ UNFICYP figures by 9 September 1975 – just barely a month after the Agreement – demonstrated that 8,033 Turkish Cypriots had been transferred north.⁸⁸⁸

The Agreement was met with considerable backlash (out of the Greek Cypriot political parties, EDEK led the charge) because it was deemed to have played into the hands of the Turkish demand for “bizonality,” via two separate (homogenous) areas in Cyprus. In other words, it rubber-stamped – under the aegis of the United Nations – *hard ethnic cleansing*.

6.3.1 Vienna III and the UN’s role

The role of the United Nations, in facilitating the Turkish Cypriot transfers, may have been rooted in a pragmatic approach, whereby if the two community leaders agreed, it was deemed that the UN Secretary-General could not stand in the way. However, this abject decline of assuming responsibility to uphold international law or even feign countering agreed choices that undermined international humanitarian legal principles, underscores some of the fundamental problems with the United Nations’ work across the world over the decades. Rwanda, Bosnia and Haiti have become synonymous with the UN’s failure to act. Cyprus too has been beleaguered by a United Nations that has sent mediators deemed ineffective or partisan, inside a bureaucracy where personal ambition could arguably be more important than upholding the principles of the UN Charter. The UN is after all the sum of its parts, the member states. It is as strong as member states allow. It will also not counter political agreements reached by Governments, as unsavoury as they may be. This is in direct contrast to the ICRC that, as also showcased in the previous chapter, was critical of the Clerides-Denktaş agreement concerning POW exchanges, recused itself from

⁸⁸⁵ Simoniou, “Chypre”, 12 August 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35)) : [ICRC 7860].

⁸⁸⁶ ICRC Nicosia, “Telegram 1186 to ICRC Geneva”, 13 August 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 8439].

⁸⁸⁷ Simoniou, “P.V. de téléphone with Schmid de Grunec at 10:15am”, 18 August 1975 (ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.06 / 210 (35-53 CY)): [8806].

⁸⁸⁸ ICRC Nicosia, “Telegram 1208 to ICRC Geneva”, 9 September 1975 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY)): [ICRC 8447].

assisting in the Turkish Cypriot mass transfers, and repeatedly demarched Ankara for the expulsion of Greek Cypriot enclaved and the introduction of Turkish mainlanders to settle in Cyprus. Ultimately though, as much as the ICRC is also vulnerable to be swayed by internal and external political factors and has been derided as a “marginal social worker”,⁸⁸⁹ it is less at the mercy of sovereign member states and the distribution of power among them than the United Nations. The UN General Assembly and Security Council bodies, in contrast, are completely at the behest of great power politics and when it is or is not in their interest to act or implement.

As Constantinos Adamides and Michalis Kontos elucidated in their analysis of the largely negative Greek Cypriot perceptions of the UN’s role in Cyprus and what that role should be, “amidst a struggle between international justice and international anarchy”,⁸⁹⁰ they contended that:

The UN’s role is clearly structured to offer services that would facilitate negotiations between the conflict parties and not to actually resolve the dispute.⁸⁹¹

As such, if an agreement came about, however controversial in terms of international law and the UN Charter, such as the Vienna Third Agreement, the UN would not impede in the parties reaching an accord, and nor – as per UNFICYP’s role in facilitating Turkish Cypriot northbound transfers – in its implementation.

6.3.2 Vienna III: The Aim of the Turkish side

Just days after the Vienna III Agreement, Denktash himself revealed to the US Ambassador that creating bizonality had effectively been at the crux of the deal:

Denktash commented that geographic delineations are far less important than principle of bizonalism now clearly established at Vienna III, “agreed to by Clerides and known to your (American) President”. Transfer of remaining Turk Cypriots north (approximately 8,000) last essential precondition to serious negotiations. Small Greek minority will be permitted [to] reside in north assuming they accept political and administrative control of TFSC; Greeks can run their own education, worship as they wish, but will have to respect Turkish Cypriot law. Under no circumstances can TFSC agree to dilution of its population by “appreciable number” of Greek Cypriots. As to land areas, main objective is to work out arrangements whereby each federated state will be economically viable while simultaneously assuring security of Turk

⁸⁸⁹ David P. Forsythe, “The ICRC: a unique humanitarian protagonist,” *International Review of the Red Cross* 89 (2007): 63-89, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383107000902>.

⁸⁹⁰ Constantinos Adamides and Michalis Kontos, “Greek Cypriot perceptions of the United Nations”, in *Cyprus and the Roadmap for Peace*, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018), 146.

⁸⁹¹ Adamides and Kontos, “Greek Cypriot perceptions of the United Nations”, 147.

Cypriots, which still minority on island. Here, Denktash noted, “my Generals must have a say since they will never permit borders which could invite a Greek military threat some time in the future”.⁸⁹²

By autumn 1975, only 200 or so Turkish Cypriots remained in the Government-controlled areas, either because they were married to Greek or Maronite Cypriots, or because they did not wish to lose access to their pensions, or material well-being.⁸⁹³

While the Third Vienna Agreement helped reunification of Turkish Cypriot families and communities, Bryant found that it was used to coerce those Turkish Cypriots to transfer who had no wish to depart from the Government-controlled areas:

The Vienna Agreement of September 1975 enabled the reunification of families while at the same time facilitating the displacement of the 10,000 Turkish Cypriots who had resisted leaving their homes and properties. Many of those who were transferred with the Vienna Agreement say that they continued to believe for many years that they would eventually be able to return to their homes.⁸⁹⁴

Indeed, the dichotomy of temporary versus permanence was part of opposing discourses of the elites of the two communities: “Among the leading cadres of Turkish Cypriot politics and bureaucracy, there is a marked tendency to consider the forced and/or gradual migration of Turkish Cypriots to the north as a permanent movement.”⁸⁹⁵ Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriot discourse emphasises the reversible and therefore the temporary.

Temporary or permanent, the single most significant decision regarding the formal consolidation of Turkey’s occupation, via demography was the Third Vienna Agreement of August 1975, as it gave a political pretext that even the UN Secretary-General accepted for what became a legal means of enforcing ethnic cleansing, especially since the provisions to allow for Greek Cypriot resettlement in the northern part of Cyprus were never implemented because of the Turkish Army’s security concerns:

Turkish mainland military are strongly resisting implementation of Denktash’s pledges made at Vienna III to reciprocate [Government of Cyprus’] willingness [to] allow northward movement of the approximately 8,000 Turks who had remained in south. Further, they have reneged on minor liberalizing moves affecting Greeks in north to which they had agreed during the month from early August until early

⁸⁹² Crawford, “Conversation with Denktash”, 14 August 1975, 15:20, Nicosia 2514, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI02514_b.html.

⁸⁹³ Simonius, “Rapport de mission à Chypre, 4-14.12.78”, 23 January 1979: [ICRC 7238].

⁸⁹⁴ Bryant, *Life Stories*, 10.

⁸⁹⁵ Nergis Canefe, “Refugees or Enemies? The Legacy of Population Displacements in Contemporary Turkish Cypriot Society”, *South European Society and Politics* 7, no. 3 (1 September 2002): 11, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13608740708539631>.

September that it took to move Turks northward. That this is acutely embarrassing to Denktash does not seem to influence Turkish commanders. [...]

After Vienna III, UN moved to implement as many as these understandings as it could during the time it took to move Turks north, realizing that once this movement [is] accomplished the Turkish side might turn uncooperative. [...]

Since completion of Turkish movement northward, UNFICYP informs us that there has been a steady hardening of mainland command's position and even a retreat from some of the minor liberalizations earlier agreed. [...]

While the Turkish Cypriots have received almost 100 percent of the benefits due them the Greek Cypriots have yet to gain even a small portion of the benefits theoretically assured by the agreements at Vienna III.⁸⁹⁶

The Greek Cypriot enclaved never benefitted from the Third Vienna provisions that applied to them. Instead, they witnessed the arrival of Turkish Cypriots who would take over the by-now-unoccupied homes of Greek Cypriots, as well as the introduction of another group of people: settlers from mainland Turkey in a bid to populate the Turkish-controlled areas with the "preferred" people.

Philipp Ther has argued that the aim of ethnic cleansing is to remove a population from an area, and not to "murder and destroy a population group".⁸⁹⁷ This, he argues, is effected via expulsions and deportations, as well as "contractually arranged forced resettlements", to which he adds that the term "population exchange" is a euphemism to the latter concept used by proponents and perpetrators of ethnic cleansing.⁸⁹⁸

6.4 Introduction of Turkish mainland settlers: 1974-1983

Even before the Third Vienna Agreement, the ICRC considered that two issues would influence whether or not the Greek Cypriots would remain in the Karpas: the reopening of the schools that closed since June 1975, and their relations with Turkish Cypriots and settlers "who are settling steadily in the villages, one village after another moving from west to east."⁸⁹⁹ The introduction of these new arrivals symbolised the complexity of demographic re-engineering.

⁸⁹⁶ Crawford, "Non-implementation of Vienna III Agreements", 10 October 1975, 15:00, Nicosia 2999.

⁸⁹⁷ Ther, *The Dark Side of Nation-States*, 1.

⁸⁹⁸ Ther, 1-2.

⁸⁹⁹ Lennartz, "Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.11.75-31.12.75", 14 January 1976: [ICRC 7199].

The February 1975 “Protocol for Agricultural Labour Force”, a top-secret agreement between the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Ankara, provided that approximately 30,000 people from mainland Turkey would be introduced to the occupied areas.⁹⁰⁰ According to Vural, Ekenoğlu and Sonan the introduction of Turkish settlers resembled the

Ottoman massive migration policy and practice very closely. The Ottoman *sürgün* policy was a politically motivated ‘post-conquest arrangement’ aiming at transforming Moslem population into the newly captured territories to enable the Ottoman rulers to establish and secure their political control.⁹⁰¹

This policy has been used in modernity with similar aims:

[to] create a permanent presence and influence patterns of sovereignty in the settled territory [...] in the modern era of nationalism, settlers and settlements have served as mechanisms of control and territorial expansion over disputed territories.⁹⁰²

Similarly, the introduction of Turkish settlers to Cyprus was a means to consolidate Turkey’s territorial hold by radically transforming the demographic structure of the island through *hard ethnic cleansing*. It was shorthand for “right-peopling”⁹⁰³ of the Turkish-occupied area of Cyprus in a relatively short period of time, as more and more people from mainland Turkey were shipped to Cyprus. Meanwhile, as the previous chapter examined, the Greek Cypriots were effectively strangled out. Even the more than 3,500 Greek Cypriots in the remote Karpass peninsula were purported to symbolise a security threat to NATO’s second largest army.⁹⁰⁴

The normative interpretation assumes that settlers are subjects controlled by the state that sent them and would remain a collective, homogenous, obedient group, serving that state, Turkey. Empirical evidence suggests that the settler story in Cyprus is less clear-cut. For this reason, analysis of the various waves of their introduction, focusing on those settler communities that were housed in the villages that remained Greek Cypriot enclaves, is necessary.

As far back as early June 1975, US diplomats in Ankara were querying their Turkish counterparts concerning the introduction of potential Turkish mainland settlers “in new

⁹⁰⁰ Kurtuluş and Purkis, “Spatially Segregated and Socially Excluded Turkish Migrants in Northern Cyprus”, 5.

⁹⁰¹ Vural et al., 88.

⁹⁰² Haklai and Loizides, *Settlers in Contested Lands: Territorial Disputes and Ethnic Conflicts*, loc. 128.

⁹⁰³ O’Leary, Lustick, and Callaghy, *Right-Sizing the State*, 29.

⁹⁰⁴ Hoffmann, “Note No. 586: My visit with Mr. Grinling on the 20th January, to Rizokarpaso, Ayia Trias, Ayios Andronikos and Leonarisso”, 25 January 1977: [ICRC 7375].

Famagusta and other parts of Cyprus”.⁹⁰⁵ The response they received was a firm denial that the introduction of settlers was Turkish Government policy:

Some small-scale movements would have been possible because (a) seasonal migrant workers from mainland could have been brought in and housed temporarily in some such area, (b) some Turkish Cypriots who have been residing in Turkey could have returned, and (c) local Turkish commanders could have issued orders on own initiative which would have resulted in some changes in settlement pattern. However, [the Cyprus-Greece Deputy Director of the Turkish Foreign Ministry] stated categorically that while he personally would like to see a large number of mainland Turks settled in Cyprus, there was no rpt no GOT [Government of Turkey] plan for such settlement.⁹⁰⁶

The Greek Cypriot position was convinced that despite the denials, what was taking place was the illegal introduction of colonists:

Ankara’s continuing process of systematic colonization of the invaded territory of the Republic of Cyprus by the massive importation of population from Turkey to occupy the usurped homes and properties of the forcibly expelled indigenous Greek Cypriots, with the ultimate objective of altering the demographic character of the island.⁹⁰⁷

Rossides cited the *Manchester Guardian*’s 13 October 1975 article that described how by March or April 1975, some 10,000-15,000 Laz people from the northern Black Sea coast of Turkey were in Cyprus. The *Financial Times* of 15 October 1975 stated that the intention was to increase the number of settlers to 80,000.⁹⁰⁸

Even though Turkey was mired in election politicking ahead of elections in October 1975, the settlement project continued unabated. By November 1975, the US Embassy in Nicosia was estimating that a minimum of 9,000-10,000 people had been settled in Cyprus with the view of staying permanently:

Random discussion with immigrants indicate that almost all come from Central, Easter [sic.], and Northern Turkey. In Phlamoudhi, for example, the village headman explained that their group of 40 had arrived just two days earlier from Trabzon and that all their expenses had been paid for by the Turkish government. Nearly all those with whom EmbOff spoke intended to settle permanently – if Allah willed it. Several voiced the theme that they were helping Turkey to reclaim lands which rightfully belonged to it, and one zealous settler exhorted that “Athens is ours too.”⁹⁰⁹

⁹⁰⁵ Donald Bergus, “Alleged Turkish Plans to Move Turkish Mainlanders to Cyprus”, 6 June 1975, 12:32, Ankara 4427, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975ANKARA04427_b.html.

⁹⁰⁶ Bergus, “Alleged Turkish Plans to Move Turkish Mainlanders to Cyprus”, 6 June 1975, 12:32, Ankara 4427.

⁹⁰⁷ Rossides, “Letter to the United Nations Secretary-General”, 29 October 1975, A/10322, S/11860. (ICRC / BAG 231.049.010 / 231 (35)): [ICRC 7113].

⁹⁰⁸ Rossides, “Letter to the United Nations Secretary-General”, 29 October 1975: [ICRC 7115].

⁹⁰⁹ Crawford, “Turkish Migration into Northern Cyprus”, 25 November 1975, 10:53, Nicosia 3315, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI03315_b.html.

Persuading these mainland Turks to come to Cyprus was not too difficult. Their local governors or community leaders told them about the prospects in Cyprus. They themselves were afflicted by displacement due to large-scale construction of dams or highways.⁹¹⁰ The bounty of a free house and land was a major opportunity to be seized by people who otherwise knew little or nothing about Cyprus. During the initial period, transferring mainland Turks to Cyprus was done in such haste and without adequate organisation that those who arrived at Famagusta Port would have to stay there as their “destination village” had yet to be selected.⁹¹¹ The local Turkish Red Crescent would provide meals until they were able to sustain themselves.⁹¹²

Settling these people into villages where Greek Cypriots still remained frequently generated fear among the autochthonous residents due to their harassment by the newcomers. In Patriki, “serious importunities were reported to us on the part of Turkish newcomers,” subjected on the Greek Cypriot enclaved.⁹¹³ However, by March 1976, the ICRC reported that the Greek Cypriot enclaved were reluctant to talk to their delegates about the tensions that had arisen.⁹¹⁴ As there was no protection or means to seek protection, the Greek Cypriot mukhtars of Koma tou Yialou, Leonarisso, Vassili and even Rizokarpaso were reporting the anxiety felt by the Greek Cypriots “after the arrival of Turkish inhabitants in the villages.”⁹¹⁵

The influx of a great number of Turkish mainlanders in the span of a few months impelled more than a thousand Greek Cypriot enclaved to transfer to the Government-controlled areas.⁹¹⁶ By May 1976, the number of Turkish settlers was estimated at 40,000 and at the cost of “people being pushed out of their homes in increasing numbers.”⁹¹⁷ People were literally forced out of their homes: “the colonization is continuing day after day by seizing

⁹¹⁰ Bryant and Yakinthou, 27.

⁹¹¹ Jensehaugen, “The Northern Cypriot Dream – Turkish Immigration 1974–1980”, 72.

⁹¹² Jensehaugen, 74.

⁹¹³ Lennartz, “Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.11.75-31.12.75”, 14 January 1976: [ICRC 7198].

⁹¹⁴ Grinling, “Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.2.76-29.1.76”, 2 March 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7187].

⁹¹⁵ Grinling, “Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.1.76-31.1.76”, 4 February 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7193].

⁹¹⁶ Grinling, “Note to G. Hoffman: The Situation in Karpasia”, 18 May 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7178].

⁹¹⁷ Hoffmann, “Note No. 481: New situation in Karpasia”, 11 May 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7546].




Figure 2: ICRC Map of the villages “affected by Turkish settlement”
 John Grinling, “Note to G. Hoffman: The Situation in Karpasia”, 18 May 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7180].

the homes of the Greek Cypriots who are pressed to sign applications to leave the Turkish-occupied part of the island,” protested Clerides to the ICRC.⁹¹⁸

In the spring of 1976, British journalist John Fielding queried the Turkish settlers, showing that they were there to stay and not concerned that the Greek Cypriot properties in which they were housed would be returned to their original owners:

JF: As the stalemate drags on, the Turks continue to capitalise on their newly seized wealth. Here on the outskirts of Famagusta port, the new solid Greek houses are full of Turkish immigrants. This man, a tailor from the mainland, heard about Cyprus from his taxi-driver son.

JF: Why did he decide to move with his son and all his family and come to Cyprus?

I: At first, we came as a tourist we came to see, and we liked, and we applied, and we remained here.

JF: How long Mr. Barak, I think, he will be staying and his son?

I: If everything is all right, if nobody sends us back, we would like to be here, forever.

JF: Once this was a Greek garage. Now the Turkish administration rents it for twenty pounds a month to another mainland Turk, who has been given a Greek house. Do you like it here?

I2: Yes, I like it here.

JF: Are you going to stay here forever with your family?

I2: Yes.

I3: Got nice house. The wife is not working and we're doing very well.

JF: What do you pay for the house?

I3: For the time being we don't pay. It hasn't come up yet.

JF: Are you expecting to have to pay for it?

I3: Oh, yes. Yes

JF: It's the property of the government now, is it?

I3: Yes, it is, yes.

JF: When do you think you'll have to pay rent?

I3: I don't know, I don't know.

JF: Are you worried at all, are you worried at all that the original owner might somehow have some opportunity to get it back?

I3: I don't think so. No, I don't worry.

JF: You just don't think it will happen, you mean?

I3: No, I don't think so. No.⁹¹⁹

The Greek Cypriot enclaved in Rizokarpaso described the newly arrived settlers as “very tough”. In nearby Koma tou Yialou, rumours spread that four people were killed in clashes between Turkish settlers and Turkish Cypriots.⁹²⁰ Tensions exacerbated when some Greek

⁹¹⁸ Clerides, “Letter to ICRC Head of Mission in Cyprus, Georg Hoffmann”, 5 July 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7497].

⁹¹⁹ I: first interviewee; I2: second interviewee; I3: third interviewee. Thames TV, “*The Sad Face of Cyprus*”, 6 May 1976.

⁹²⁰ Grinling, “Activity Report Northern Sector from 1-30.9.76”, 30 September 1976: [ICRC 7164].

Cypriots were forced to share their properties with Turkish settlers, or would have to move to an outhouse, as their main residence was allotted to a family transferred from the Turkish mainland.⁹²¹ Without permission from the owners, Turkish settlers would overtake the fields of Greek Cypriot villagers.⁹²² The ICRC delegates witnessed settlers “moving into the houses abandoned by the Greeks. Turkish flags appear on private houses.”⁹²³

Settlers were also accused of entering the houses demanding money or stealing. One Greek Cypriot property owner spoke of being cut between the thumb and index fingers on both hands, while beatings of Greek Cypriots and other intimidation tactics were recorded by the ICRC.⁹²⁴

US Embassy officials described the tense relations between the newly arrived settlers and the enclaved Greek Cypriots as follows:

Greek Cypriots for most part have expressed concerns to UN officials about hostile attitudes and actions of mainland Turkish immigrants who are now their neighbors. This hostility does not appear to be uniform, but there have been enough incidents to arouse understandable concern and nervousness. UNFICYP officials state that Turkish Cypriot authorities appear to be sincere in their desire to avoid incidents and have thoroughly investigated the more serious ones which have occurred. Most frequent complaints to UNFICYP have been about verbal abuse, roc [sic.] throwing, knife-brandishing and thievery.⁹²⁵

The introduction of the settler population led to a further reduction of Greek Cypriots; another “push factor” towards cleansing the area of their presence. Denktash admitted to ICRC officials that this was his aim: “get the Greeks out of this ‘canton’ and fill the gaps with Turks.”⁹²⁶

Yet relations between the enclaved and the settlers weren’t always adversarial, and this had apt benefits for the enclaved. In Ayia Trias the “beneficial influence of one of the Greek Cypriots” who spoke fluent Turkish, translated into an improvement in the relations between the autochthonous villagers and the settlers.⁹²⁷ This in turn led to the enclaved granted more liberties, for example the permission to fish or swim in the sea, and for the severe curfew to

⁹²¹ Grinling, “Internal Note: situation in Karpasia”, 11 February 1977: [ICRC 7146-7147].

⁹²² Grinling, “Activity Report Northern Sector: 1-28.2.77”, 28 February 1977: [ICRC 7141].

⁹²³ Clerides, “Letter to ICRC Head of Mission in Cyprus, Georg Hoffmann”, 5 July 1976: [ICRC 7493].

⁹²⁴ Hoffmann, “My visit to Rizokarpasso and Ayia Trias on the 4th February”, 7 February 1977: [ICRC 7361].

⁹²⁵ Crawford, “Status of Greek Cypriots in north”, 17 January 1978, 00:00, Nicosia 0132.

⁹²⁶ Hoffmann, “Note No. 507: Situation in Karpasia, based on my visit to the area in the company of Mr. Grinling on 22nd and 23rd July 1976”, 26 July 1976: [ICRC 7493].

⁹²⁷ Grinling, “Activity Report Northern Sector: 1-31.3.77”, 6 April 1977: [ICRC 7134].

be lifted in January 1977.⁹²⁸ It also underlines the argument propagated by Varshney that building networks of civic engagement can prevent outbreaks of ethnic violence.⁹²⁹ In contrast, in Rizokarpaso, the presence of Turkish settlers continued to cause problems and contact between the Greek Cypriots and the Turks stayed at a minimum, while no liberties such as swimming or fishing were afforded the Rizokarpaso Greek Cypriots.⁹³⁰

In December 1976, Denktash said that the presence of the Turkish settlers was necessary, since

from the security angle the Turkish Cypriot minority had been too weak in the past and he wanted to improve the numerical relation towards the Greek majority which still would be a majority because he had [now] the intention to increase the Turkish community up to 50%.⁹³¹

Denktash claimed that these people had in the past lived in Cyprus,⁹³² but they were a foreign element hailing from geographically and culturally disparate regions, landscapes and traditions in Turkey, brought upon promises of a permanent life to a foreign land:

the difference between the Anatolian peasants and Turkish Cypriots was bigger [sic.] than the difference between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, in the rural environment.⁹³³

As Hitchens attests, that they were a

rather motley sort – unwanted in their places of origin, often with criminal records and unfamiliar with the cultural and linguistic patterns of the Turkish Cypriots.⁹³⁴

Although culturally different from the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, the settlers were not an ethnically or even linguistically homogenous group. In Ayia Trias, the settlers originated from Trabzon and were Laz and Pontic Greek-speakers⁹³⁵ in Rizokarpaso, the settlers were part Laz, from the northern Black Sea coast of Turkey, but also of Kurdish origin from Eastern Anatolia. Denktash claimed that “If they stay here for five years they

⁹²⁸ Lennartz, “Visit to Karpasia on 21st and 22nd June, 1977”, 18 July 1977: [ICRC 7317].

⁹²⁹ Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life*.

⁹³⁰ Lennartz, “Visit to Karpasia on 21st and 22nd June, 1977”, 18 July 1977: [ICRC 7317].

⁹³¹ Hoffmann, “Note No. 578: Reflection on the demarches made with Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Authorities after my visit to Karpasia on 18-19th November”, 9 December 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7424].

⁹³² Hoffmann, “Note No. 578: Reflection on the demarches made with Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Authorities after my visit to Karpasia on 18-19th November”, 9 December 1976: [ICRC 7424].

⁹³³ Hoffmann, “Note No. 578: Reflection on the demarches made with Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Authorities after my visit to Karpasia on 18-19th November”, 9 December 1976: [ICRC 7424].

⁹³⁴ Hitchens, 109.

⁹³⁵ Hoffmann, “Report of Mr. G. Hoffmann’s Mission in Cyprus 15.9. till 28.9.77”, 30 September 1977 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7312].

become Cypriot Turkish citizens. If they do not behave [then they] will be sent back to Anatolia. 800 Turks were already sent back.”⁹³⁶

Rarely does the political discourse acknowledge the diversity of ethnic identity amongst the “Turkish settlers”, such as Laz, Kurdish, Arab, Alevi, Turkish or Bulgarian. It is in the interests of all sides to identify them as solely Turkish. For the Greek Cypriots, it is a way to protest the illegality of settlements through the introduction of Turkish settlers by Turkey. For the Turkish Cypriots, it was a means to consolidate Turkishness. Arguably for the settlers themselves, their categorisation as Turks was convenient, as it was their perceived *Turkishness* that gave them homes, jobs and other benefits.⁹³⁷

The ICRC, as the main custodian of the Geneva Conventions, was alarmed by the introduction of settlers. Breaching Geneva Convention (IV) was vehemently denied by Turkey, which maintained that its sole responsibility in Cyprus is “limited to the objectives of the Treaty of Guarantee [...] and cannot be held responsible for any other alleged action”.⁹³⁸ Turkey’s Deputy Prime Minister stated that:

Those Turkish citizens present in Cyprus with the knowledge and consent of my Government are only there under an agreement with the Turkish Federal State of Cyprus to provide temporarily manpower and technical know-how.

If it was indeed the intention of the Turkish Government to change the demographic structure of Cyprus [...], Turkey could have sent the Turkish Cypriots residing in this country numbering in hundreds of thousands back to the Island with impunity from any kind of criticism.⁹³⁹

The ICRC remained unconvinced and persisted in demarching the violation of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention via the expulsion of the Karpass Greek Cypriots and the influx of people from mainland Turkey. The Turkish Government continued to wash its hands of the affair, saying that what took place in the northern part of Cyprus was the sole responsibility of Denktash. The ICRC could see through these talking points and was quick to point out that “personal experience of 7 months in Cyprus shows me that only the Turks

⁹³⁶ Hoffmann, “Note No. 578”, 9 December 1976: [ICRC 7424-7425].

⁹³⁷ Navaro-Yashin, 57.

⁹³⁸ Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, “Letter to the President of the ICRC, Alexandre Hay”, 14 January 1977 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7397].

⁹³⁹ Caglayangil, “Letter to the President of the ICRC, Alexandre Hay”, 14 January 1977: [ICRC 7397].

command the northern part of the island.”⁹⁴⁰ Even US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had quipped that “We think Denktash follows Ankara”⁹⁴¹ and not vice-versa.

This “first wave”⁹⁴² of settlers was an organised and systematic undertaking by Turkey not merely to assist in its Turkification but also to prop up the area and its economy,⁹⁴³ whose autochthonous Greek Cypriot population numbering more than 160,000 had mostly been forced out and barred from returning. Even with the consolidation of 115,000 or so Turkish Cypriots, the empty houses could not all be filled, nor all the empty fields cultivated:

the population in the north was severely depleted. An influx of new settlers was needed if the land was to be worked and the factories made operational again.⁹⁴⁴

Comparably to the Greek Cypriot enclaved, the settlers were also used as chips to be used for political bargaining. The April 1977 Greek Cypriot map tabled in the negotiations that was leaked, showed the Turkish side maintaining 20% of the island’s area from the 37% it occupied, and the Karpas under Greek Cypriot control. This caused an outcry among the settlers in Rizokarpaso,⁹⁴⁵ and a further influx of settlers in Ayia Trias was recorded,⁹⁴⁶ as an attempt to further consolidate the Turkification of the area. The ICRC had been informed that this demand for a territorial adjustment correlating to the 4:1 demographic ratio of Greek Cypriots to Turkish Cypriots in 1974, would lead the Turkish side’s hardening of its position, as follows:

1. increasing the percentage of Turkish settlers; to as high as 30%;
2. making it even more difficult for the enclaved Greek Cypriots to lead a normal life.⁹⁴⁷

Interestingly, the policy of settlements was not necessarily a one-way route to permanency. By summer 1977, it was estimated that settler numbers had decreased to 10,000-15,000 as many who had arrived initially had since returned to Turkey “because they did not like their new surroundings,” while others were forced back because of antisocial behaviour.⁹⁴⁸ After

⁹⁴⁰ Hoffmann, “Chypre: Réflexions de M. G. Hoffmann”, 21 June 1976: [ICRC 7503].

⁹⁴¹ van Hook, ed., *Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976*. Vol. XXX, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Document 157.

⁹⁴² Vural et al., 88.

⁹⁴³ King and Ladbury, “The Cultural Reconstruction of Political Reality: Greek and Turkish Cyprus Since 1974”, 11.

⁹⁴⁴ King and Ladbury, “The Cultural Reconstruction of Political Reality”, 11.

⁹⁴⁵ Hoffmann, “Karpasia after the Vienna Talks”, 18 April 1977: [ICRC 7326].

⁹⁴⁶ Hoffmann, “Karpasia after the Vienna Talks”, 18 April 1977: [ICRC 7326].

⁹⁴⁷ Hoffmann, “Karpasia after the Vienna Talks”, 18 April 1977: [ICRC 7327].

⁹⁴⁸ Hoffmann, “Report of Mr. G. Hoffmann’s Mission in Cyprus 15.5.9 till 28.9.77”, 30 September 1977: [ICRC 7313].

all, the violence and the looting may have been tolerated vis-à-vis Greek Cypriot enclaved, but incidents against Turkish Cypriots had also taken place.

The problems arising from the arrival of mainland Turks and the effects on Turkish Cypriots was included in President Makarios' lengthy address to the heads of state and government at the Non-Aligned Movement. He posited the view that Ankara's aim was

dismemberment of an independent state [which as] one of the guarantors of the independence and the territorial integrity of Cyprus [...] she herself violated the object of her guarantee. One of Turkey's pretences for her illegal action in Cyprus was the protection of the Turkish Cypriot community. It would not be far from the truth to say that even the Turkish Cypriots are victims of the invasion. What does the importation of thousands of Turks from Turkey into Cyprus have to do with the protection and welfare of the Turkish community? Serious disputes and daily incidents between the Turkish Cypriots and transplanted Turks are indicative of the discontent of the Turkish community.⁹⁴⁹

Turkish Cypriots broadly perceived the mainlanders from Turkey (*Türkiyelliler* in informal Turkish Cypriot vernacular) as being favoured by their overlords to the detriment of the "autochthonous inhabitants", the Turkish Cypriots or the *Kıbrıslılar*. However, the 115,000 Turkish Cypriots who by 1975 had been consolidated into the Turkish-controlled area were neither keen nor able to make up for the significant labour shortages in the agricultural and other sectors brought about by the ejection of a *minimum* of 164,000⁹⁵⁰ Greek Cypriots. This significant shortage meant that there was a need to fulfil the labour gap, especially since "a large proportion of the Turkish Cypriot population had traditionally been urban" and would generally be "relocated in towns".⁹⁵¹ There was a need for agricultural workers. Thereby, Turkey introduced "landless and poor peasants"⁹⁵² from the most deprived areas of Turkey

⁹⁴⁹ Address by President Makarios to the Fifth Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, 17 August 1976 (ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY)): [ICRC 7483].

⁹⁵⁰ As relayed beforehand, numbers in the Cyprus context – be they as regards the total number of settlers, missing, the displaced or even the enclaved – have always been subject to some source of controversy. This is discussed in detail in chapter 2. Ultimately, for every four Greek Cypriots ejected from the Turkish-controlled area, there was one Turkish Cypriot who transferred there. That ratio signals the concrete population decrease in the northern part of Cyprus, which without even accounting for all other variables (as well as out-migration of disgruntled Turkish Cypriots to London and elsewhere), entailed a severe economic shock, not least in terms of labour shortages, etc.

Concerning an overview of the economic effect of the 1974 Turkish military invasion, see:

Theophanous, "Economic Growth and Development in Cyprus 1960-1984".

Theophanous, "The Republic of Cyprus in Perspective: The Record and Future Challenges", 56-57.

Spyros Sakellariopoulos, *Ο Κυπριακός Κοινωνικός Σχηματισμός (1191-2004) Από Τη Συγκρότηση Στη Διχοτόμηση* [*The Cypriot Social Transformation (1191-2004): From the Establishment to Partition*], 681-687.

⁹⁵¹ Julie Scott, "Property values: ownership, legitimacy and land markets in Northern Cyprus" in *Property Relations: Renewing the Anthropological Tradition*, ed. C.M. Hann (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1998), 147.

⁹⁵² Kurtuluş and Purkis, 6.

“to whom the promise of a new life in Cyprus was attractive, even though it meant leaving their homes at short notice.”⁹⁵³ In turn, they were offered Greek Cypriot houses and land.

Although the Turkish Cypriots were also offered Greek Cypriot properties, they viewed that this was in exchange of abandoning their own properties in the Government-controlled areas. Furthermore, they were not entitled to all the benefits (such as subsidies or certain foods) given to the newly arrived mainland Turks.⁹⁵⁴ Navaro-Yahin observed that Turkish Cypriots would use Greek Cypriot “loot”, including abandoned cars,⁹⁵⁵ but “they are conscious of using other people’s belongings,”⁹⁵⁶ implying that the incoming settlers were not. Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriots viewed the “entitlements” received by the settlers with “considerable resentment,” even going as far as describing them as “economic parasites”.⁹⁵⁷

The policy of introducing mainlanders from Turkey was protested by an unlikely source: Cyprus’ former Vice President, Fazil Kuchuk. In various articles published in his opposition newspaper *Halkin Sesi*, the Turkish Cypriot nationalist warned of the ill-planned manner in which people from Turkey were brought to Cyprus and the consequences thereof.⁹⁵⁸ His personal aversion to his successor and political foe, Rauf Denktash, was well-known, but he directed his outcry at Ankara, which he held responsible, despite his long-held belief that “Cyprus is Turkish.”⁹⁵⁹

The so-called “Ministry of Resettlement” tried to house Turkish Cypriots and Turks in areas commensurate with those from which they hailed (Black Sea Turks would be allotted Greek Cypriot properties around the coast), while also mixing the population of autochthonous Turkish Cypriots, displaced Turkish Cypriots and settlers in a village.⁹⁶⁰

According to Navaro-Yashin, the distribution of properties to Turkish Cypriots was based on a non-arbitrary system, presented in legal terms, under the “Settlement, Land Allocation, and Property of Equal Value Law”. A Council of Elders declared the value of the properties Turkish Cypriot families or individuals had abandoned in the Government-controlled areas,

⁹⁵³ King and Ladbury, 11.

⁹⁵⁴ King and Ladbury, 12.

⁹⁵⁵ Navaro-Yashin, 166.

⁹⁵⁶ Navaro-Yashin, 185.

⁹⁵⁷ King and Ladbury, 12.

⁹⁵⁸ Hitchens, 110-111.

⁹⁵⁹ Hitchens, 110.

⁹⁶⁰ Jensehaugen, 75.

and then a “Regulating Commission” would assign corresponding points. Based on this points-based system, Turkish Cypriots were supposed to be allocated properties of equal value to those which they had left behind, thus maintaining the pre-war social structure. “Most properties in northern Cyprus were allocated for the settlement of Turkish-Cypriot refugees and immigrants from Turkey under a population policy in 1975.”⁹⁶¹ Borowiec explains that the system was not as fair as it claimed as “Nepotism became rampant and there were cases of village shepherds being given expensive villas.”⁹⁶² Furthermore, many “martyr” families of fallen Turkish soldiers who partook in the invasion were allotted “some of the best houses” over which decisions “the local Turkish Cypriot authorities had no say.”⁹⁶³

The secondary demographic engineering of mixing up settler populations with Turkish Cypriots and, in the Karpass, with Greek Cypriots, ran into problems and illustrated the social and class divide. Many of the settlers were not used to amenities such as indoor toilets or bathtubs and electric stoves.⁹⁶⁴ They would shelter their animals inside, thinking the houses were more like stables, and bathtubs a useful container for animal feed, while the family resided outside.⁹⁶⁵

In the Karpass, it was the Greek Cypriots who assisted these villagers with teaching them how to utilise kitchen and bathroom amenities of a modern village home, as well as what to do with the fields of carob, almond and olive trees.⁹⁶⁶ Jensehaugen demonstrated that the policy was to settle people in areas similar to those from which they hailed. However, Birand argued that this was not the case in practice:

While those villagers from [Turkey’s] woodland regions were allocated coastal settlements, traditional fishing communities of the Black Sea region, who had never seen an orange fruit until then, were endowed with robust citrus groves.⁹⁶⁷

That some settlers came from areas that were vastly different to their new surroundings is true at least for the Karpass, where the ethnic mix of the settler population (including Kurds, Pontics from the Black Sea region) illustrates that people from very disparate backgrounds

⁹⁶¹ Navaro-Yashin, 194.

⁹⁶² Borowiec, 154.

⁹⁶³ Borowiec, 154.

⁹⁶⁴ Eftychios, 14 August 2013.

⁹⁶⁵ King and Ladbury, 12.

⁹⁶⁶ King and Ladbury, 12.

⁹⁶⁷ Mehmet Ali Birand, *Diyet [Diet]* (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1990), 86, as reproduced in Mustafa Çıraklı, “Identity, Immigration And Citizenship In Northern Cyprus”, (Lancaster University, 2016), <https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/87432/1/2016ciraliphd.pdf>.

were brought to the Cyprus panhandle. What transpired was that the mainlanders were unaccustomed to the Cypriot climate and exhibited great confusion in dealing with fruits and vegetables with which they were unfamiliar, and Turkish Cypriot agronomists were required to teach them.⁹⁶⁸ As regards animal husbandry, the settlers were not used to the traditional Cypriot farm full of goats or even pigs (Christians), and thus special deliveries were made for cows from the Netherlands and sheep from Anatolia in Turkey.⁹⁶⁹ They were also given money to grow crops, which would be paid back from the profit from selling the produce.

Turkish settlers and Turkish Cypriots were acutely aware of the “symbolic markers” of the *Türkiyelliler* which to the Turkish Cypriots had “come to associate with the culture of Turkey.”⁹⁷⁰ Indeed, the Turkish Cypriots would come to “define their identity in the past couple of decades against the settlers from Turkey (and their perceived lifestyles),”⁹⁷¹ whom they viewed as outnumbering them to “extinction.”⁹⁷² In comparison to settlers, Turkish Cypriots retained more privileged jobs and constituted the political and economic elite in Turkey’s local subordinate administration. Despite this, the first wave of settlers was able to exploit the patronage from the Turkish state and the Turkish army and could claim their own power over autochthonous Turkish Cypriots.⁹⁷³

In 1985 and 1986, all Turkish Cypriots and settlers were required to participate in a new property evaluation, given that those with *torpil* (patronage) were allocated more than what they ought to have would have been entitled to receive. These people became known as the “1974 rich”.⁹⁷⁴ Furthermore, the right-wing establishment had given extra points to “fighters” or to those who had their property damaged during the war. At the same time, the Turkish Cypriots were required to “renounce their right to ownership of their property in southern Cyprus and to cede that property to the state” in exchange for getting further properties in the northern part of Cyprus.⁹⁷⁵ In this way, the Turkish Cypriot negotiating team would be able to claim – while negotiating on behalf of *all* of these Turkish Cypriots – the position to suppress the individual right to property ownership (a long-held Greek Cypriot position) and advance communal-based rights as regards the solution to the property

⁹⁶⁸ Jensehaugen, 69.

⁹⁶⁹ Jensehaugen, 73.

⁹⁷⁰ Navaro-Yashin, 57.

⁹⁷¹ Navaro-Yashin, 150.

⁹⁷² Navaro-Yashin, 60.

⁹⁷³ Navaro-Yashin, 59.

⁹⁷⁴ Navaro-Yashin, 194.

⁹⁷⁵ Navaro-Yashin, 195.

chapter. It thus allowed the Turkish side to demand the exchange of properties instead of restitution, justifying it as a humanitarian need to prevent further uprooting.

The Greek Cypriots protested this development, as it was felt that this (albeit legally contentious) attempt to expropriate Greek Cypriot properties was a form of permanently denying them the possibility of return. Despite this complex exercise, the Turkish Cypriots countered that no *legal* transfer of ownership had taken place:

UNFICYP took up the matter with the Turkish Cypriot side, which pointed out that, in line with procedures that have been in existence for some time, no actual transfer of ownership had taken place.⁹⁷⁶

This was not accurate. Article 159 (1)(b) of the “TRNC Constitution” made it abundantly clear that Greek Cypriot properties were expropriated, as follows:

All immovable properties, buildings and installations which were found abandoned on 13 February 1975 when the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was proclaimed or which were considered by law as abandoned or ownerless after the above-mentioned date, or which should have been in the possession or control of the public even though their ownership had not yet been determined [...] and [...] situated within the boundaries of the TRNC on 15 November 1983, shall be the property of the TRNC notwithstanding the fact that they are not so registered in the books of the Land Registry Office; and the Land Registry Office shall be amended accordingly.⁹⁷⁷

Furthermore, an exercise had been undertaken, granting “titles” of Greek Cypriot immovable property. At first, only Turkish Cypriots were given such “title deeds”. However, settlers demanded similar rights, and were also granted deeds to Greek Cypriot properties. To many Turkish Cypriot displaced, this seemed unjust, as settlers didn’t have points for property of equal value in the Government-controlled areas, which was the conceptual basis on which this exercise was conducted.

Together with demographic homogenisation, another element which even drew criticism from Turkish Cypriots was continued Turkification of toponyms, an exercise of hegemony, akin to filling the newly controlled landscape with Turkish symbols (flags, statues), demonstrating inevitability and permanence.

⁹⁷⁶ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/18880, 29 May 1987 and United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/19927, 31 May 1988.

⁹⁷⁷ This provision was examined by the European Court of Human Rights in the *Loizidou v. Turkey* case and dismissed the argument as legally invalid.

As Whelan argues, the exercise of changing place names aims at “making tangible specific narratives of nationhood and reducing otherwise fluid histories into sanitized, concretized myths that anchor the projection of national identity onto physical territory.”⁹⁷⁸ It is therefore an integral aspect of both *hard* and *soft ethnic cleansing* and consolidating the newly occupied territory by erasing its Greek Cypriot past and recreating it as Turkish.

Every street name, shop front, road sign or coffee house which had a Greek name or a name written in Greek has been replaced or erased. It is no exaggeration to say that nothern [sic.] Cyprus has been linguistically whitewashed.⁹⁷⁹

Name-changing started prior to 1974,⁹⁸⁰ in the late 1950s (at the time when Cyprus was experiencing its first broad-based ethnic rifts) and would include villages that had been inhabited by Turkish Cypriots but whose names were not deemed “Turkish enough”.⁹⁸¹ Already in 1957, Turkish Cypriots had printed maps of Cyprus where

Turkish village names changed by the British and the Greeks were brought to the foreground again and all the villages that were settled by Turks, but which had Greek names, were assigned proper Turkish names.⁹⁸²

The Turkification of geographical names across the Turkish-controlled area, systematically commenced on 30 November 1978.⁹⁸³ Jensehaugen posits that “Renaming villages, in addition to turning churches into mosques, was a part of the desire to ‘Turkify’ the north”.⁹⁸⁴ Tochni was such an example, which had been called “Taşkent” by the Turkish Cypriots. When the surviving inhabitants of that ill-fated village were resettled in Vouno, it was named “Taşkent”. “Akanthou” in the Karpass peninsula, inhabited by Turkish Cypriots from “Mari” close to Limassol (“Tatlisu” for Turkish Cypriots) was renamed accordingly.⁹⁸⁵ When the Turkish Cypriots of Kokkina were moved into Greek Cypriot properties in the Karpass village of Yialousa, it became “Yeni Erenköy” or “New Kokkina”. Ironically, it had been initially named “Malkent”,⁹⁸⁶ but was soon changed at the behest of the new residents. At times the renaming seemed completely random. Ayia Trias, where a sizable community of Greek Cypriot enclave has remained, the name “Sipahi” referring to the

⁹⁷⁸ Yvonne F. Whelan, “Mapping Meanings in the Cultural Landscape”, in *Senses of Place: Senses of Time*, eds., Brian J. Graham & Gregory John Ashworth (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2005), 62.

⁹⁷⁹ King and Ladbury, 6.

⁹⁸⁰ Navaro-Yashin, 49.

⁹⁸¹ Navaro-Yashin, 49.

⁹⁸² Navaro-Yashin, 4.

⁹⁸³ Navaro-Yashin, 4.

⁹⁸⁴ Jensehaugen, 61.

⁹⁸⁵ King and Ladbury, 6.

⁹⁸⁶ Crawford, “Status of Greek Cypriots in north”, 17 January 1978, 00:00, Nicosia 0132.

Ottoman cavalry corps (Muslim knights) was chosen, in contrast to Rizokarpaso which in Turkish is referred to as the relatively similar “Dipkarpaz”.

In 1987, when official demarches by the Cypriot Government were once again tabled as further place names had been changed, the UN discussed the issue with the Turkish Cypriot political leadership. The reaction left a lot to be desired:

In response to UNFICYP representations, the Turkish Cypriot side stated that most of the changes resulted from the need to bring place-names into line with modern Turkish usage. It was brought to the Turkish Cypriot side’s attention by the United Nations that this did not conform to the relevant resolution on national standardization adopted at the Third United Nations Conference on the Standardization of Geographical Names. The Turkish Cypriot side stated that they did not feel bound by decisions adopted by this Conference.⁹⁸⁷

In the years to come, UNFICYP and all other UN agencies would start using both Greek Cypriot and the Turkified place names in official documents.

The change in geographical names of places was another issue whereby “Turkish-Cypriots differentiated themselves from settlers from Turkey”.⁹⁸⁸ Especially elderly Turkish Cypriots would be disoriented by the new toponyms.⁹⁸⁹ The most alarming of these changes was when villages that had always been inhabited by Turkish Cypriots were renamed because the original did not sound Turkish enough (Konetra became Gönendere).

6.5 Consolidating secession: 1983-2004

By the time Rauf Denktash unilaterally declared “independence” of the Turkish-occupied area, it had been subjected to an intense process of Turkification. The number of original Greek Cypriot inhabitants had decreased to 879 and that of the Maronite Cypriots to 375. Settlers were housed in vacant Greek Cypriot properties by the tens of thousands, and with place names changed, new monuments erected, churches locked up and looted or converted to museums (at the best of times) or even stables, the entirety of this landscape had been stripped of its previous sociocultural and ethnic markers and heritage.

⁹⁸⁷ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/18880, 29 May 1987.

⁹⁸⁸ Navaro-Yashin, 48.

⁹⁸⁹ Navaro-Yashin, 48.

Denktash had privately and publicly toyed with a “UDI” for many years, even as far back as September 1975,⁹⁹⁰ but was not in a position to carry it out. In 1983, however, after previous peace talks collapsed, the veteran Turkish Cypriot politician struck to consolidate his fiefdom. The announcement led to an international backlash, including several Security Council Resolutions (541 and 550 being the most oft-cited) condemning this secessionist move.

Furthermore, the mass importation of Turkish settlers elicited denunciation from the international community. The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly’s Rapporteurs – Cuco in 1992 and Laakso in 2003 – condemned Turkey for its colonisation policy in Cyprus. Cuco concluded that

the settlers outnumber the indigenous Turkish Cypriot population in the northern part of the island
[and]
the presence of the settlers constitutes a process of hidden colonization and an additional and important obstacle to a peaceful negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem [...].⁹⁹¹

Cuco’s report recommended the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers instruct the European Population Committee (CDPO) to conduct an island-wide census. To this day, this provision, despite repeated pleas, has not been implemented, leaving all estimates of the total number of people in the Turkish-occupied area subject to speculation and criticism.

By the late 1980s, the organised introduction of settlers had stopped. In its place, skilled and semi-skilled Turks made their way to Cyprus, on their own, without the financial and practical assistance of the Turkish Republic, thus playing their own part in demographic re-engineering or *soft ethnic cleansing*.

These individuals were “triggered by the special economic and professional income opportunities in Northern Cyprus and radical economic changes in Turkey as well.”⁹⁹² Vural, Ekenoğlu and Sonan argue that this population group was not afforded the “economic

⁹⁹⁰ Clerides, *My Deposition: Volume 4*, 350.

In September 1975, Turkish Ambassador Inhan in Nicosia stated to his US counterpart that “Ankara had restrained [Denktash on proclaiming a UDI] heretofore but he was picking up increasing support within GOT,” which was a veiled threat after discussions in New York with the UN Secretary-General were not productive. Crawford, “Conversation with Turkish Ambassador”, 19 September 1975, 15:22, Nicosia 2815, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI02815_b.html.

⁹⁹¹ Cuco, “Report on the Demographic Structure of the Cypriot Communities”.

⁹⁹² Kurtuluş and Purkis, 7.

and political privileges” of the initial settlers. They did not acquire Greek Cypriot properties for free.⁹⁹³ Hatay details that the semi-skilled workers coming with the “second wave” were employed in the textile industries that exported to the UK.⁹⁹⁴ During this period, numerous tertiary education institutions were also established, attracting students from Turkey (and far beyond), many of whom chose to remain in Cyprus upon completion of their studies.⁹⁹⁵

Compared to Israeli, French or Ulster Protestant settler populations, Loizos maintains, the Turkish settlers in Cyprus have been characterized by “low levels of politicization in Cyprus [...] generally attributed to the largely heterogeneous character of the settler population.”⁹⁹⁶ Hatay also put forward the argument that the settler vote is less homogenous than frequently claimed.⁹⁹⁷

Vural, Ekenoğlu and Sonan counter this, noting that the “immigrant/settler population was nothing but a clientele or a natural vote base against the parties in favor of the reunification of the island,”⁹⁹⁸ that is the traditionally right-wing parties. Navaro-Yashin concurs:

DP and the UBP [which] were known to distribute citizenship, as well as other favors and benefits to settlers from Turkey in return for votes. Settlers therefore perceived these parties as serving their interests.⁹⁹⁹

Indeed, on the eve of elections, granting “citizenship rights” had been an established tradition by those in power, even to people in Turkey who had never set foot in Cyprus.¹⁰⁰⁰

Hatay has warned, however, that the traditional prominence of nationalist political parties (at least until 2002/2003) in the Turkish-occupied area was not merely down to support from the settler-community.¹⁰⁰¹ Settlers would become disgruntled with the UBP, which together with the other Cypriot political parties they supported, were “reserving state jobs for its own indigenous supporters” and not particularly concerned with the affairs of the settler-populations.¹⁰⁰² In 1984, “Yeni Doğuş Partisi” or the New Birth Party was established by

⁹⁹³ Vural et al., 89.

⁹⁹⁴ Hatay, *Population and Politics in north Cyprus*, 17.

⁹⁹⁵ Hatay, *Population and Politics in north Cyprus*, 17.

⁹⁹⁶ Haklai and Loizides, *Settlers in Contested Lands: Territorial Disputes and Ethnic Conflicts*, loc. 3263.

⁹⁹⁷ Hatay, *Beyond Numbers*.

⁹⁹⁸ Vural et al., 94.

⁹⁹⁹ Navaro-Yashin, 57.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Vural et al., 94.

Schlicher, “Turkish Cypriot Census Debate Focuses on Natives Versus ‘Settlers’”, 18 May 2007, 11:12, Nicosia 0434, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07NICOSIA434_a.html.

¹⁰⁰¹ Hatay, *Beyond Numbers*.

¹⁰⁰² Hatay, *Population and Politics in north Cyprus*, 4.

mainland Turks, gaining a considerable portion of the settler vote that would have otherwise likely gone to the traditional Turkish Cypriot nationalist parties. This new grouping was a show of force of Turkish settlers trying to find their independent political voice. They successfully voted in four candidates.¹⁰⁰³ To this day, however, the political influence of Turkish mainlanders is proportionately a lot less than their overall numbers would signify,¹⁰⁰⁴ not least because they mostly constitute the poor, agrarian, underprivileged classes.¹⁰⁰⁵

The Greek Cypriot estimate was that by the first half of 1987, some 60,000-62,000 settlers had been imported to the Turkish-controlled areas of Cyprus, and it fervently protested, via the UN, the continued violation of the Geneva Convention. In its response the Turkish side stuck to an old narrative: that these people were none other than Turkish Cypriots repatriating or seasonal workers temporarily in Cyprus:

I have been informed that the Foreign Minister of Turkey [...] that a number of Turkish Cypriots living abroad had decided to return to the northern part of the island and that 14,000 temporary and seasonal Turkish and other workers had also been admitted in view of the shortage of skilled and unskilled labour on the Turkish Cypriot side.¹⁰⁰⁶

In 1991, under the UBP's Derviş Eroğlu, "passport" requirements for Turkish citizens entering the occupied areas was lifted, heralding a new wave of entries.¹⁰⁰⁷ This came as the economy was transforming and cheap labour was needed. It led to further ideological, social and cultural rifts between the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish mainlanders. The increase in crime rates in this period was linked to the Turkish settlers.¹⁰⁰⁸

6.6 Rootless

The third wave of Turks settling in Cyprus commenced with the dawn of the new millennium and a severe financial crash in Turkey and the Turkish-controlled area of Cyprus. These mainlanders were subject to increased tightening of rules regarding citizenship status and

¹⁰⁰³ Hatay, *Population and Politics in north Cyprus*, 5.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Giving a number to the settlers has been judiciously avoided as these "remain a closely guarded secret, and even members of the Turkish Cypriot negotiating team have acknowledged that they are not aware of the accurate figures". (Haklai and Loizides, loc. 3228).

¹⁰⁰⁵ Kurtuluş and Purkis, "Spatially Segregated and Socially Excluded Turkish Migrants in Northern Cyprus". Navaro-Yashin, *The Make-Believe Space*.

Haklai and Loizides, *Settlers in Contested Lands: Territorial Disputes and Ethnic Conflicts*.

¹⁰⁰⁶ United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council, S/18880, 29 May 1987.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Gülseven, 27.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Gülseven, 228.

would thus remain under the radar as regards “official records”. However, they filled the void in a labour market that was by now heavily dependent on construction and tourism. They moved into the run-down walled city of Nicosia,¹⁰⁰⁹ with cheaper accommodation, effectively creating a ghetto. These “undocumented workers” started coming when “easing of regulations for entry” to facilitate tourism were introduced.¹⁰¹⁰ They were not afforded the rights and privileges of those that arrived before them and were strictly deemed temporary/seasonal workers.¹⁰¹¹ But many would overstay their welcome, however “the police do nothing. There is a policy that supports illegal workers from Turkey”.¹⁰¹²

These people were in Cyprus during the 2003-2004 negotiations of what became various different iterations of the “Annan Plan,” although they were among those mainlanders from Turkey who were excluded from the controversial “45,000” list of persons the United Nations allowed the Turkish Cypriots to identify to vote. While trying to prove that the Turkish Cypriots were never able to collect more than 41,000 names to be included in this list of what effectively was a “whitewashing” of the status of settlers, the argument ignored the fact that Turkish Cypriots themselves didn’t account for the number of Turkish mainlanders living beneath the radar – the people who arrived in the previous years as day-labourers living at the bottom rungs of society.

It should be noted that the provisions of the Annan Plan affected the settler population through its property provisions allowing those who had undertaken “significant improvement” to a Greek Cypriot property to be granted ownership.

Regardless of whether or not the Plan would have been accepted in the 2004 simultaneous referenda, this provision spelled out that improvements could in fact seal the deal for those who were living in Greek Cypriot properties in favour of the rights to restitution of the original owners. As Palley points out, the goalposts favouring developers and improvers greatly increased between Annan Plan III and Annan Plan V. New loopholes were added and the cut-off date was extended for improvements considered admissible for compensation and obtaining a title,¹⁰¹³ irrespective of whether the “improver” was Turkish Cypriot or mainlander. The Annan Plan, argues Palley, allowed settlers the “rights to apply to acquire

¹⁰⁰⁹ Kurtuluş and Purkis, 19.

¹⁰¹⁰ Hatay, 20.

¹⁰¹¹ Hatay, 20.

¹⁰¹² Navaro-Yashin, 92.

¹⁰¹³ Palley, 188.

title of long leases if they improved property.”¹⁰¹⁴ The US Embassy also underscored this reading of the provisions:

Turkish settlers that moved in the houses left by G/Cs with the hope for a new life could never achieved [sic.] peace as their new homes were always on the negotiation table on the community leaders. As Karpaz peninsula was negotiated to be returned to Greek Cypriot owners in some of the optional maps of UN sponsored Annan Plan for Cyprus, no investment was made in maintenance of the buildings in the village until 2004 when Greek Cypriots side rejected the plan with 76% while Turkish Cypriots side voted in favor with 65% in the separate referenda. This result transformed Turkish settlers’ fragile relation with the physical environment as they developed the belief in their continuous existence in the village.¹⁰¹⁵

The massive construction boom that had commenced in this period throughout the Turkish-controlled area and which then increased after the failed referenda, used empty Greek Cypriot properties for the purposes of construction of cheap holiday homes for foreigners (mostly from the United Kingdom). The 2006 “census” registered a *de facto* population increase from 2002, including return of Turkish Cypriots to Cyprus. This rise was ascribed to improving prospects brought about by reunification talks and Cyprus’ EU accession.¹⁰¹⁶ However, the Annan Plan’s provisions on property caused the initial building boom, requiring significant numbers of cheap labourers.

This boom, argues Theophanous, Tirkidis and Pelagidis contributed to an uptick in the economic indicators of the Turkish Cypriot economy. Specifically, they contend that it

led to an acceleration of growth and a noticeable improvement in living standards. This was simultaneously associated with a reduction in the existing gap with the economy of the government-controlled area.¹⁰¹⁷

The authors also analysed that this growth was unsustainable and without “well-designed macroeconomic and financial policies, a restructuring of the private and public sectors as well as substantial assistance from outside sources,” there would be trouble ahead.¹⁰¹⁸ The authors contended that despite the potential of the northern part of Cyprus, only via a

¹⁰¹⁴ Palley, 193.

¹⁰¹⁵ Esra Can Akbil, Giorgos Psaltis, Sebnem Hoskara Kai Voeckler, Demet Mutman, “Archis Interventions: Cyprus 2011 Activity Report”, http://www.seenetwork.org/files/2014/03/06/8/AI_CY_Activity%20Report%202011.pdf, accessed 17 April 2020.

¹⁰¹⁶ Schlicher, “Turkish Cypriot Census Debate Focuses on Natives Versus ‘Settlers’”, 18 May 2007, 11:12, Nicosia 0434, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07NICOSIA434_a.html.

¹⁰¹⁷ Theodore Pelagidis, Andreas Theophanous, and Yiannis Tirkides, “An Anatomy of the Economy of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC)”, *Journal of Modern Hellenism* (September 20, 2008), 25–26

¹⁰¹⁸ Pelagidis, Theophanous, and Tirkides, “An Anatomy of the Economy of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC)”, 25-26.

political settlement could “further economic advancement” take place.¹⁰¹⁹ The property bubble was too precarious to sustain the unprecedented levels of growth. And indeed, it soon burst with the Orams case. The global liquidity crunch of 2008 also had its effects on the property market and the economy in the northern part of Cyprus.

In this situation, many settlers were seriously considering returning to Turkey in hopes of finding a better-paid job, even ones who had lived in Cyprus all their lives.¹⁰²⁰ By 2012, the Turkish Cypriot daily *Havadis* was reporting that many mainlanders renting in Nicosia’s old city (and thus with arguably weaker ties to Cyprus) were returning to Turkey due to rising cost of living and unemployment.¹⁰²¹ No data could be found in open-sourced material to indicate how many people chose to leave Cyprus and how this affected long-term the number of mainlanders in Cyprus, that is whether and how many returned later and/or whether others tried to eke out a living in Cyprus.

With the COVID-19 pandemic, tens of thousands with vastly different backgrounds demanded repatriation. The administration’s “interior minister” Ayşegül Baybars announced that out of 52,760 foreign persons with “work permits”, some 11,282 had already departed, and 28,896 foreign students had repatriated out of a total of 56,963.¹⁰²² He further proclaimed that the Nigerian Embassy in Ankara requested assistance for the repatriation of 8,000 of its nationals who were in the northern part of Cyprus for their studies. Persons with a limited-term “residence permit” apparently totalled at 9,207, of whom 1,599 also left Cyprus amidst the pandemic. These numbers are staggering, as it demonstrates that prior to March 2020 there were at least 100,000 non-permanent residents in the Turkish-controlled areas.

6.7 Rooted

Of the various waves of Turks coming into Cyprus, it was the initial wave that elicited international condemnation of Turkey for violating Article 49 of IV Geneva. These settlers

¹⁰¹⁹ Pelagidis, Theophanous, and Tirkides, 25-26.

¹⁰²⁰ Interview with Ariadne, 1 April 2013.

¹⁰²¹ Athens News Agency, “Τούρκοι έποικοι εγκαταλείπουν τα κατεχόμενα, λόγω ανεργίας [Turkish Settlers Abandoning Occupied Areas, Due to Unemployment]”, *iefimerida.gr*, 29 February 2012, Athens News Agency, <https://www.iefimerida.gr/apenews/39038/τούρκοι-έποικοι-εγκαταλείπουν-τα-κατεχόμενα-λόγω-ανεργίας>.

¹⁰²² “Coronavirus: Baybars Statements: ‘40,000 persons have departed from the TRNC”, *Diyalog*, 17 April 2020.

had been shipped to Cyprus with much fanfare to prop up the newly occupied areas. They settled in Greek Cypriot properties and were assisted throughout the early years. Those of them who remained are now marking their fifth decade of life in the Turkish-occupied area of Cyprus.

Their presence in the Karpass peninsula was a political and strategic move. It helped the consolidation of the Turkish-occupied area. Their presence pressured many Greek Cypriot enclaved to leave, while in terms of security, keeping a check on the remainder. Yet in the interim years, these people struggled to adjust to life in unfamiliar terrain, where despite all the substantial financial and non-pecuniary benefits, they remained the “other”, a second-class citizen amongst Turkish Cypriots. Ironically, those in the Karpass became reliant on Greek Cypriots.

The fieldwork conducted has shown that often younger settler women are called on by the elderly Greek Cypriots to clean and tend for their house during the latter’s absences when visiting relatives in the Government-controlled areas. They also exchange goods (here are my olives for your supply of sugar). What has gone largely undocumented, however, is that a large number of them, including the women, speak the Greek Cypriot vernacular that they have picked up from their neighbours:

Neighbors, mostly women and children, socialize through their daily habits, learning each other’s language.¹⁰²³

Just as the Greek Cypriot children are fluent in Turkish, the settlers and their children are also adept in speaking Greek Cypriot.¹⁰²⁴ Greek is a useful skill, as it comes in handy manning small stalls outside the Apostolos Andreas Monastery with the purpose of luring a new customer base made up of Greek Cypriots crossing for the purposes of pilgrimage, visiting relatives, or sightseeing.

The ties between the Greek Cypriots and the mainlanders hailing from Turkey are not only commercial. In 1989, a love story between the then-fifteen-year-old Alexia from Rizokarpaso and the seventeen-year old Cengiz, who came with his family to the Karpass as a small child, made the news across the world. The story involved allegations of Alexia’s kidnapping to Cengiz’ extradition to Athens after he tried to track down Alexia in the

¹⁰²³ Akbil et al., “Archis Interventions: Cyprus 2011 Activity Report”.

¹⁰²⁴ Loizides, “Settlers and Mobilization in Cyprus: Antinomies of Ethnic Conflict and Immigration Politics”, 20.

Government-controlled areas. But this love story was not the first; local lore points to several couplings, and several children as well.¹⁰²⁵ Cross-community love was also highlighted in a 2020 Greek Cypriot documentary between a Rizokarpaso taverna owner and his Turkish Cypriot wife from a neighbouring village, who both fell in love after the former was widowed and the latter divorced her settler husband.¹⁰²⁶

The Greek Cypriot interviewees largely spoke of settlers in relatively endearing terms when it came to individuals and when it comes to the present. When it came to the past, (even those not born to witness the first years after the occupation when the settlers were brought in) would refer to the collective “Turks” and spoke of a period of intimidation and fear.

The “us and them” would in informal conversation in the vernacular translate to an “us, the Christians, and them, the Turks.” The term “Greek Cypriot” or “Greek” as markers of identity was not the qualifier of choice among the enclaved (mostly women) in the context of informal conversation. Meanwhile, settlers would use “Turkish”, while others would speak of being “Kurdish *Cypriot*” or “Cypriot from Turkey”.¹⁰²⁷

This self-identification of the people populating the Karpass is an interesting avenue for further exploration, especially given the nominal divergence from the mainstream ethnic identifiers in Cyprus. The generalised dichotomy of Christian v. Turk arose in the context of older women speaking, and when referring to differences between the mainland Turkish settlers and themselves. It was not provided in the context of how they viewed themselves vis-à-vis authorities, education, or compared to Greek Cypriots living south of the ceasefire lines. It is possible that in a village of majority Moslems, Christian women feel that their strongest identity is related to their religion. After all, it is the Church that is the institution that brings all members of the Greek Cypriot community together, regardless of age or gender.

An emphasis on the Turkish identity has, ironically, been the marker for settlers not just vis-à-vis Greek Cypriots, but mostly, within academic and even policy discourse, in their

¹⁰²⁵ In most of these anecdotal cases, the man is Greek Cypriot and the woman is Turkish (Kurdish/Pontiac). See Interview with Frixos and Faruk, 15 August 2013.

¹⁰²⁶ Alpha News, “17ο Επεισόδιο: Η ‘Απαγορευμένη’ Αγάπη Ενός Ελληνοκύπριου με μια Τουρκοκύπρια 04/01/2020 Β’ Σεζόν”, [17th Episode: The ‘Forbidden’ Love between a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot 04/01/2020 Second Season] 24 Hours, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZOE2H7wUMt0>.

¹⁰²⁷ Akbil et al., “Archis Interventions: Cyprus 2011 Activity Report.” Interview with Frixos and Faruk, 15 August 2013.

relation to the Turkish Cypriots. Their collective identity, for both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, has been to generalise the mainlanders' Turkishness. Even though, they are and have always been an ethnically disparate group as denoted earlier in the discussion regarding *Kibrislilar* and *Türkiyelliler*.

Yet, this ethnic generalisation of characterising those people living in the Turkish-occupied areas of Cyprus and hailing from the Turkish mainland post-1974 as distinct from Greek Cyprus and Turkish Cypriots, and placing them in the overall categorisation of "Turk" negates the complexity of their own varied self-identity narrative.

When in 2014 the then-twenty-year-old Bayram selling Greek Orthodox religious trinkets outside Apostolos Andreas Monastery was asked "where are you from?" during a chance encounter, he replied "from here, but my parents are from Turkey. I was born here; I've never been to Turkey." The term "New Cypriots" has been sarcastically coined to refer to settlers.¹⁰²⁸ In terms of political affiliations, there has also been a distinction amongst them in the Karpas villages, and not removed from their own identity, as US Embassy officials observed just prior to the 2009 voting:

Rizokarpaso is split politically along ethnic lines, with Kurds largely supporting the leftist, pro-solution Republican Turkish Party (CTP) and Black Sea Turks backing the nationalist UBP.¹⁰²⁹

6.7.1 Rooted and Voting

This period also saw a new dawn in the political landscape of Turkey, with the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, winning two-thirds of the parliamentary seats. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, former Istanbul Mayor, had been sentenced to a ten-month prison term and initially unable to take a seat and the position of Prime Minister. In March 2003 the political ban on him was withdrawn and he was able to assume Turkey's Premiership. A man who was deemed to represent "moderate Islamism," he was applauded for Turkey's economic

¹⁰²⁸ *Afrika*, the left-wing newspaper published by the contrarian Şener Levent, ran several editorials lambasting that Turkish Cypriots have become a minority, as "citizenship" is given to Turkish mainlanders, which he dubbed sarcastically as the "New Cypriots." See Çıraklı, "Identity, Immigration And Citizenship In Northern Cyprus".

Gülseven argues that the rise of a more Cypriot-centric identity in the Turkish Cypriot community after the failure of the Annan Plan has driven even nationalist parties to pay lip service to the idea of acknowledging a "Cypriot" identity. In 2009 the successful election slogan (that put Eroğlu into power) was "I am Cypriot, I am Turk, I am democrat, I am UBP". (Gülseven, 32).

¹⁰²⁹ Schlicher, "G/C Enclaved in Karpas Are Enduring, But Dwindling", 23 July 2008, 06:36, Nicosia 0559.

recovery post-2001 and for its orientation towards the EU (as well as backing the Annan Plan in 2004). In the period thereafter he has completely changed Turkey, but for all his positive reforms (most notably peace negotiations with the PKK), his grip on power led him to a dependence on nationalist voters as he was accused of increased authoritarianism and corruption and reneging positive moves, such as with the Kurds. Turkey's radical transformation under Erdoğan also had a serious impact on what was happening in Turkey's subordinate local administration in Cyprus, politically, economically, socially, religiously and culturally. In the almost two decades since his election, Turkey, which has financially propped up the secessionist entity since 1974, tightened its purse-strings through a combination of forced austerity measures and granting tenders to large Turkish conglomerates, marginalising Turkish Cypriot businesses.¹⁰³⁰

On 15 July 2016, the attempted coup against Turkey's Erdoğan was met with Turkish flags hoisted in front of the houses of the Turkish settlers throughout the Karpass region. It was the native Turkish Cypriots in the area who did not partake – many of whom vote for nationalist Turkish Cypriot parties that are against a federal solution. This use of a national symbol was an indication of nationalism that had not been so bluntly expressed since the early and very difficult years of the settlers' introduction. Was this marker of "solidarity" with Turkey's presence wholesale amongst the entire settler population in the Karpass, regardless of ethnic background? There seemed to be no such distinction to an outside observer. The Greek Cypriot enclaved stated that it was "all of them" who had hoisted flags.

The flying of the Turkish flags symbolised not only the new political milieu in the Turkish-occupied area, but depicts the changing Turkey under the AKP:

today Turkish nationals on the island have many options for accessing the Turkish government and political networks in Turkey. Indeed, in some instances it is easier for them to access Turkish government officials than to access local [Turkish Cypriot] officials in any effective way. Building on the AKP's encouragement of what Jenny White (2002) calls 'vernacular politics' has provided a vehicle for new political agents to emerge, ones who achieve their goals through the AKP and other Turkish political networks, even as they 'defend' Turkey.¹⁰³¹

The introduction of mainland Turks to Cyprus had completely changed the demographic landscape of Cyprus. They were both the pawns of *hard* and *soft* ethnic cleansing – ordered

¹⁰³⁰ Nikos Moudouros, "Erdoğan's Cyprus: Another Aspect of the Turkish Model", in *Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem*, ed. Jonathan Warner, David W. Lovell & Michalis Kontos, (UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016), 112-132.

¹⁰³¹ Hatay, *Population and Politics in north Cyprus*, 9.

or cajoled by the occupying power – but also its direct and indirect perpetrators, via the intimidation and criminality towards Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and by living off the spoils of ethnic cleansing.

In the 2004 referenda, a 56% majority in the settler villages had voted “no” versus the 64% overall Turkish Cypriot “yes” vote.¹⁰³² This despite the AKP Government’s public support for the Plan. Through kinship ties in Turkey, some settlers are enjoying political power in the Turkish Cypriot community, in ways that have truly transformed some into Ankara’s Trojan horse or “passive instruments of the policies of Turkish elites”.¹⁰³³ The settlers continue to lack the “card of sociocultural capital”¹⁰³⁴ of the Turkish Cypriots, including the social ties and kinship networks within Cyprus via (illicit) patronage (“torpil” for Turkish Cypriots, “μέσσω” for Greek Cypriots). But the Turkish Cypriots don’t have the same networks in Turkey, which ultimately pulls the levers since Turkey’s grip over northern Cyprus continues and is arguably becoming ever tighter. It remains to be seen how in future elections the settler vote will influence issues. In the 2017 Turkish referendum on changing the country’s constitution, only 41.6% of those eligible to vote in Cyprus cast ballots, and, interestingly, 55% rejected the reforms, compared to the 85% of the electorate in Turkey that voted “yes” by 51%.

[D]uring the discussions on the latest economic aid protocol with Turkey, Ankara demanded all people from Anatolia who have been residing in Turkish Cyprus for a period of five or more years should all be given citizenship and the Turkish Cypriot government accepted that demand. This was repeatedly refuted by the Turkish Cypriot government, but particularly pro-Greek segments in the Turkish Cypriot leftist groups continue that propaganda.¹⁰³⁵

Furthermore, Erdoğan’s Government changed the physical and educational landscape of the northern part of Cyprus. Between 2002 and 2016, it has reportedly built 36 new mosques, including the mega-Hala Sultan mosque with a 3,000 capacity.¹⁰³⁶ As Gülseven argues, these changes emanating from the AKP in Ankara were not wholly embraced by the Turkish Cypriot community:

¹⁰³² Hatay, *Beyond Numbers*, ix.

¹⁰³³ Haklai and Loizides, loc. 3782.

¹⁰³⁴ Navaro-Yashin, 58.

¹⁰³⁵ Yusuf Kanli, “New residence regulation in North Cyprus”, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 1 October 2019, <https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/yusuf-kanli/new-residence-regulation-in-north-cyprus-147011>.

¹⁰³⁶ Burak Bekdil, “Turkey’s Erdoğan Even Alienates Turkish Cypriots”, 25 February 2020, <https://www.meforum.org/60470/are-turkish-cypriots-done-with-ankara>

some policies of the AKP were perceived as an existential threat to the secular lifestyle of many Turkish Cypriots including some who traditionally supported nationalist parties.¹⁰³⁷

This led to demonstrations¹⁰³⁸ and the further deterioration of relations between then leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, Mustafa Akıncı, and Turkey's strongman, Erdoğan.¹⁰³⁹ On 12 October 2019, the Turkish Cypriot leader surprisingly publicly criticised Turkey's "Operation Peace Spring" in northern Syria on his Facebook page:

Even though we called the offensive in 1974 Operation Peace, it was a war and blood was spilled. Now, even if we say Operation Peace Spring, what is being spilled is not water, it is blood. For this reason, it is my greatest wish that dialogue and diplomacy come into play as soon as possible.¹⁰⁴⁰

The reaction from Ankara was swift:

all hell broke loose. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said that Akıncı's words (which also likened potential annexation with Turkey to Russia's invasion of Crimea) were 'very unfortunate.' Erdoğan's staunchest (and nationalist) supporter, Devlet Bahçeli, called Akıncı a 'traitor' and accused him of 'behaving like a Greek Cypriot'. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu said: 'I've never worked with a more unreliable politician.'¹⁰⁴¹

But the rift did not stop there. Several months later, Akıncı took the unprecedented step of airing his grievance with Turkey in an international newspaper. He stated that he was concerned that unless reunification of Cyprus under a federal model was achieved, the "north would grow increasingly dependent on Ankara and could end up being swallowed up, as a de facto Turkish province."¹⁰⁴²

Akıncı's statements should be framed in terms of the leadership contest originally scheduled for April 2020 but which went into lockdown together with the rest of Cyprus as a result of

¹⁰³⁷ Gülseven, 35.

¹⁰³⁸ Bekdil, "Turkey's Erdoğan Even Alienates Turkish Cypriots", 25 February 2020.

¹⁰³⁹ Bekdil, "Turkey's Erdoğan Even Alienates Turkish Cypriots", 25 February 2020.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Akıncı reportedly changed the setting of the post from "public" to "private" after the severe criticism he received, as many Turkish Cypriot politicians called for his resignation in an emergency session of the legislature.

"Akıncı stands ground in Facebook fallout: Turkish Cypriot assembly scrambling for unity after Akıncı comments on Turkish offensive in Syria", *Kathimerini*, 15 October 2019, <https://knews.kathimerini.com.cy/en/news/akinci-stands-ground-in-facebook-fallout>.

¹⁰⁴¹ Bekdil, "Turkey's Erdoğan Even Alienates Turkish Cypriots", 25 February 2020.

¹⁰⁴² Luke Harding, "Turkish Cypriot leader warns Cyprus is facing permanent partition: Mustafa Akıncı says differences between island's two sides are growing more entrenched", *Guardian*, 6 February 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/06/turkish-cypriot-leader-warns-cyprus-facing-permanent-partition-mustafa-akinci>.

the global COVID-19 pandemic. It was postponed until mid-October, during which time he called out direct Turkish election meddling in favour of nationalist Ersin Tatar running on a mandate for a two-state solution and stronger ties with Ankara.¹⁰⁴³

In a tightly contested race, the vast majority of mainland Turks and their descendants lent their votes to Tatar. In the electoral periphery that includes the Karpass peninsula where mainlanders are in the majority, some 70% voted for Tatar, in contrast to 2015 when the then nationalist incumbent Derviş Eroğlu just managed over 50% of that region's vote. It has thus been contended that the autochthonous Turkish Cypriots mostly favoured Akıncı, whereas the voting mainlanders preferred the policy of stronger ties to Turkey, as expressed by Tatar.¹⁰⁴⁴

However, a simplistic divide between settler and autochthonous Turkish Cypriot voter preference does not provide an accurate picture as it fails to contextualise it within the framework of rampant rumours of election meddling and electoral fraud with Turkey's endorsement and involvement. *The Guardian* described that “reports emerged of flagrant vote-buying and threats of deportation for mainland settlers who refused to endorse Tatar.”¹⁰⁴⁵ Former CHP member of the Turkish Grand National Council, Aykan Erdemir, a staunch critic of the AKP Government in Turkey went even further in his election analysis. Erdemir wrote that despite the fact that “Turkey historically has a pattern of weighing in on behalf of pro-Ankara candidates, Erdogan's meddling reached unprecedented levels this time around.”¹⁰⁴⁶ These included initial attempts to unify the opposition to field a single candidate, followed by announcing financial support packages from Turkey, and thereafter “threats directed against Akıncı,” and his family members, re-inaugurating (despite COVID restrictions prohibiting gatherings) the underwater pipeline between Turkey and the northern part of Cyprus after hasty repairs just before the first round of voting, and Tatar flanking

¹⁰⁴³ Menelaos Hadjicostis, ‘Hardliner Wins Turkish Cypriot Leadership Election’, *Associated Press*, 18 October 2020, <https://apnews.com/article/turkey-mustafa-akinci-ankara-greece-cyprus-b0d000e4c1140168fe10448ee08b3aa2>.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Moudouros, “Ο Τατάρ εκπροσωπεί την πολιτική της υπακοής” [Tatar represents the policy of obedience], *Ανατολικότερα [Further East]* (blog), 26 October 2020, <https://anatolikotera.wordpress.com/2020/10/26/o-tatar-ekπροσωπει-tην-politiki-tis-upakohis/>

¹⁰⁴⁵ Helena Smith, ‘Erdogan Met by Protests from Turkish Cypriots during Visit’, *Guardian*, 15 November 2020, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/15/erdogan-met-by-protests-from-turkish-cypriots-during-visit-northern-cyprus>.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Erdemir, “FDD: Erdogan Meddles in Northern Cyprus Elections”, 14 October 2020, <https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/10/14/erdogan-meddles-cyprus-elections/>.

Erdoğan as he announced the controversial reopening of the Varosha beachfront in the face of both domestic and international condemnation.¹⁰⁴⁷

Although the accusations of meddling were subsequently whitewashed by the new Tatar regime, the low voter turnout (just above 62%) could potentially be ascribed to the fear generated pre-electorally. If threats were made to the leader of the community (Akıncı), it is not hard to accept that members of the electorate were similarly pressured, especially by playing on vulnerabilities, such as deportation for settlers not backing Ankara's chosen candidate. Proof at least of voter buying has not been discerned, but photographing of ballots was reported.¹⁰⁴⁸ As such, while it is easy to state the obvious, that the mainlander vote pushed Tatar into the lead, there may be a lot more to this story, which will surely be analysed in months and years to come. Regardless, the "settler vote" was also marred by low(er) turnout. If all mainlanders were a homogenous group, with similar ideological affiliations to Turkey's preferences, it is not outlandish to assume that voter turnout would have been higher.

One way to discern the 2020 state of the settler vote will likely be in the upcoming "legislative elections" and to see the vote profile of those who will support the Rebirth Party (Yeniden Doğuş Partisi), formed by settlers in 2017 and advocating complete support for Ankara's policies, over the UBP.

As of yet, the Rebirth Party has not gained a foothold in established Turkish Cypriot political fora, amassing 7% in the 2018 "parliamentary elections", below the required threshold. Its limited share of the overall total also demonstrates that the mainland Turkish settler population's political loyalties are not homogenous. However, 7% of the electorate could swing any vote that is predicted to be tight.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Erdemir, "FDD: Erdogan Meddles in Northern Cyprus Elections", 14 October 2020.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Jean Christou, "Akıncı Hopes Results of Election Will Be Beneficial for Cyprus (Update 1)", *Cyprus Mail*, 18 October 2020, <https://cyprus-mail.com/2020/10/18/akinci-hopes-results-of-election-will-be-beneficial-for-cyprus-update-1/>.

6.8 The Flipside of the Coin: Turkish Cypriots and the Government-controlled areas

It would be remiss not to mention the socioeconomic impact of the opening of the initial crossing points in 2003 on the Turkish Cypriot community. Despite potent criticism that President Tassos Papadopoulos received as a hardliner and nationalist, a week after the crossing points opened, his Government issues a series of measures regarding the Turkish Cypriot community.

These measures were in fact built on a 1981 Council of Ministers decision, under then President Spyros Kyprianou, to provide all Turkish Cypriots residing in the Government-controlled areas with free healthcare. A week after the 2003 opening of the crossing points, Papadopoulos' Government expanded this provision by granting all Turkish Cypriots, regardless of residence, access to free healthcare, as well as fee subsidies for children enrolled in private schools (these measures were revoked under Anastasiades with the severe financial crisis in 2013¹⁰⁴⁹).

The measures, together with easier access to Government services for the Turkish Cypriots with the opening of crossing points, meant almost an immediate sharp increase in requests for Republic of Cyprus identity cards and passports.¹⁰⁵⁰ By 1 May 2004 these official documents offered the four freedoms throughout the European Union (including free movement of persons) to those individuals who were in their possession, by virtue of Cyprus' accession to the Union. It is thus not surprising that according to the latest publicly available figures dating to April 2018, the number of Turkish Cypriots who hold both Republic of Cyprus identity cards and passports amount to 80,644, while those in possession of only identity cards are 110,734 and those only holding passports are 83,950.¹⁰⁵¹ Adding the number of persons granted both IDs and passports, as well as the number of those Turkish Cypriots solely with Cypriot identity cards, the total amounts to 191,378 – significantly higher than the 175,000 Turkish Cypriots quoted in this *Phileleftheros* article as the

¹⁰⁴⁹ “80.664 Τ/κ με ταυτότητα και διαβατήριο της Δημοκρατίας” [80,664 TCs with Republic identity cards and passports], *Phileleftheros*, 1 April 2018, <http://rss.philenews.com/eidiseis/politiki/article/507509/80-664-t-k-me-taftotita-kai-diabatirio-tis-dimokratias>.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Tania Khadder, “Turkish Cypriots Line up for Passports”, *Cyprus Mail*, 25 April 2003, <http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/cmnews/2003/03-04-25.cmnews.html#03>.

¹⁰⁵¹ “80.664 Τ/κ με ταυτότητα και διαβατήριο της Δημοκρατίας” [80,664 TCs with Republic identity cards and passports], *Phileleftheros*, 1 April 2018.

aggregate of Turkish Cypriots registered with the Civil Registration and Migration Department.¹⁰⁵²

The irony has not been lost on Cypriots on both sides of the buffer zone when it emerged that even Turkish Cypriot nationalist politicians and their relatives have been issued Republic of Cyprus passports and IDs, amongst others UBP heavyweights Ersin Tatar and Hüseyin Özgürün.¹⁰⁵³

Since 2014 Turkish Cypriots not residing within the Government-controlled areas were provided eligibility to cast their vote in the European Parliament elections. Beyond the mainstream parties, Action (Δράση/Eylem), the Cyprus Socialist Party, and *Avrupa* editor Şener Levent all sought to gain votes¹⁰⁵⁴ from the 606,916 registered voters of whom 58,637 were Turkish Cypriots.¹⁰⁵⁵ Nonetheless, with the significant 56% abstention, and only 1869 Turkish Cypriots exercising their right to vote (with some 150 turned away) it was probably not surprising that not a single Turkish Cypriot was voted in.

This changed drastically at the 2019 European Parliament elections, when AKEL included academic Niyazi Kızılyürek on its ballot, one of the nine Turkish Cypriots candidates running in the election.¹⁰⁵⁶ Kızılyürek garnered 25,051 votes (second most popular of the AKEL candidates), well beyond the 5604 Turkish Cypriots who exercised their right to vote¹⁰⁵⁷ out of the registered 80,862.¹⁰⁵⁸

¹⁰⁵² “80.664 Τ/κ με ταυτότητα και διαβατήριο της Δημοκρατίας” [80,664 TCs with Republic identity cards and passports], *Phileleftheros*, 1 April 2018.

¹⁰⁵³ Fani Toli, “Ministers of Unrecognized Turkish-Cypriot Government Use Republic of Cyprus Passports”, *Greek Reporter*, 13 October 2011, <https://greece.greekreporter.com/2011/10/13/ministers-of-unrecognized-turkish-cypriot-government-use-republic-of-cyprus-passports/>.

Patrick Dewhurst, “Fury over Turkish Cypriot politicians with Republic of Cyprus passports”, *Cyprus Mail*, 17 February 2010, <https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Fury+over+Turkish+Cypriot+politicians+with+Republic+of+Cyprus...-a0219118041>

Jean Christou, “Hardline Turkish Cypriot Politician Spotted Obtaining RoC Passport and ID”, *Cyprus Mail*, 3 July 2015, <https://99549445.com/2015/07/03/hardline-turkish-cypriot-politician-spotted-obtaining-roc-passport-and-id/>.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Ministry of Interior - Electoral Service, ‘European Elections 2014’, European Elections 22-25 May 2014, http://www.euroelections2014.gov.cy/en/05_Candidates.htm.

¹⁰⁵⁵ “80.664 Τ/κ με ταυτότητα και διαβατήριο της Δημοκρατίας” [80,664 TCs with Republic identity cards and passports], *Phileleftheros*, 1 April 2018.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Yiannos Katsourides, “First Reaction on the Electoral Results in Cyprus”, 27 May 2019, <https://www.transform-network.net/en/focus/overview/article/ep-2019-the-european-left-one-mouth-many-voices/first-reaction-on-the-electoral-results-in-cyprus/>.

¹⁰⁵⁷ “First Turkish Cypriot MEP Envisions Himself as Division Healer”, *Kathimerini*, 31 May 2019, <http://www.ekathimerini.com/241140/article/ekathimerini/community/first-turkish-cypriot-mep-envisions-himself-as-division-healer>.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Katsourides, “First Reaction on the Electoral Results in Cyprus”, 27 May 2019.

The Turkish Cypriots who never left their primary residence to transfer northwards with the Vienna Third Agreement have been mostly concentrated in Limassol, and their numbers increased with the opening of the crossing points. As US Embassy cables revealed in 2007, at the time:

Demographers estimate they number between 800 and 1500; the last official count (2003) revealed a population of 1317, roughly three times that of the enclaved Greek Cypriots in Karpass.¹⁰⁵⁹

One of those Turkish Cypriots who had remained south of the ceasefire lines, Ibrahim Aziz, successfully took Cyprus to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, demanding as a resident of the Government-controlled areas to be included in the Republic's electoral roll, which he had been denied on the grounds that Constitutionally the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot electoral rolls were separate and until the 1964 Law of Necessity is lifted he cannot vote nor stand in the elections.¹⁰⁶⁰ Strasbourg refuted these legal grounds in 2004 and thereafter, Turkish Cypriot permanent residents in the Government-controlled areas were granted their electoral rights. Aziz did not stop there: he further sued Turkey's subordinate local administration for demanding that he, as a Turkish Cypriot, had to cross using the "TRNC identity card", another case he won in 2011.¹⁰⁶¹

Aziz is but one of the growing numbers of Turkish Cypriots in the Government-controlled areas, many of whom have made their primary residence south of the ceasefire lines after the 2003 opening of the crossing points. Their numbers fluctuate given the economy and job opportunities (the primary reason for a Turkish Cypriot to decide to stay or move). Some 650-700 Muslim, "Turkish"-speakers have made their homes in Limassol and Paphos districts, who in fact are Roma Cypriots, and who self-identify as *Gurbetties* and speak *Gurbetcha*.¹⁰⁶² As a whole this community faces various problems including abject poverty, discrimination and anti-gypsyism, further exacerbated by the effects of COVID-19 lockdowns.¹⁰⁶³ While this community is marginalised, they cannot be wholesale written off

¹⁰⁵⁹ Jane Zimmerman, "South's Turkish Cypriots Cite Discrimination, Needs," 18 June 2007, 14:03, Nicosia 521, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07NICOSIA521_a.html.

¹⁰⁶⁰ *Aziz v. Cyprus*, No. 69949/01 (European Court of Human Rights 22 June 2004).

¹⁰⁶¹ Theo Panayides, "Turkish Cypriot Caught between Two Sides", *Cyprus Mail*, 12 August 2020, <https://99549445.com/2020/08/12/insisting-on-being-cypriot/>.

¹⁰⁶² Chryso Pelekani and Loizos Symeou, "Civil Society Monitoring Report on Implementation of the National Roma Integration Strategies in Cyprus: Focusing on Structural and Horizontal Preconditions for Successful Implementation of the Strategy", European Commission, May 2018, <http://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/98364c8c-b1ab-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1>.

¹⁰⁶³ Christos Charalambous, "Ξεχασμένοι Στο Περιθώριο Οι Κύπριοι Ρομά" [Cypriot Roma Forgotten on the Sidelines], *Dialogos*, 12 April 2020, <https://dialogos.com.cy/xechasmenoi-sto-perithorio-oi-kyprioi-roma/>.

by a Government subjected to international and regional obligations, including UN and Council of Europe Treaty Bodies and European Union regulations, providing an essential safety net. While there is not enough evidence to underwrite the reasons why members of this community have chosen the Government-controlled areas as their permanent residence,¹⁰⁶⁴ it is plausible to argue that their current situation is still better than what they had faced previously in the northern part of Cyprus. Although the Roma Cypriots are not the focus of this dissertation, the growing community in Limassol and Paphos pose an abject story of ethnic cleansing reversal, whereby through choice they have decided to reside permanently in the Government-controlled areas.

As regards the broader Turkish Cypriot community, between 2005 and 2015, out of a reported 197 complainants of incidents and/or cases of a racial nature and/or with racial motive brought to the police in the Government-controlled areas, 30 were by Turkish Cypriots.¹⁰⁶⁵ However, these numbers may not reflect the true scale, since it was assessed that

the police lack knowledge on the identification and investigation of hate crime incidents. Most hate crimes are treated merely as offences under the general penal code without taking into account the hate motive(s). As a result, most hate crime incidents remain unidentified and therefore unprosecuted and essentially invisible.¹⁰⁶⁶

Despite incidents of hate crimes, consistently over a million Turkish Cypriot crossings would be recorded annually. However, the 2020 global public health crisis, similarly to many other areas of the world, affected freedom of movement including crossings in Cyprus, by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots across the ceasefire lines. Prior to the initial Spring 2020 lockdown, the Government moved to close the operation of four of the nine crossing points in February 2020. The announcement led to separate but simultaneous demonstrations on both sides of the Ledra Street crossing point, which were marred by scuffles with police.¹⁰⁶⁷ Two weeks later, Kudret Özersay announced that all nine crossing points would cease to operate within the broader framework of lockdowns and curfews brought on by the

¹⁰⁶⁴ Pelekani and Symeou, “Civil Society Monitoring Report on Implementation of the National Roma Integration Strategies in Cyprus: Focusing on Structural and Horizontal Preconditions for Successful Implementation of the Strategy”, European Commission, May 2018

¹⁰⁶⁵ Andriana Kossiva, “National Report on Hate Crime Monitoring: Cyprus”, Nicosia: Together: Fighting Against Racism, August 2016, http://www.together-project.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/eng-NationalReportCyprus_Fin-web.pdf.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Kossiva, “National Report on Hate Crime Monitoring: Cyprus”.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Andreou, “Police Say They Were Forced to Use Defensive Spray on Ledra St Protesters (with Videos) (Update 5)”, *Cyprus Mail*, 7 March 2020, <https://99549445.com/2020/03/07/police-say-they-were-forced-to-use-defensive-spray-on-ledra-st-protesters/>.

spreading pandemic. As detailed in the previous chapter, UN humanitarian deliveries to the enclaved were also curtailed by these measures.

In May, Anastasiades and Akıncı agreed to the reopening of crossings, but the leaders' accord was undermined by Akıncı's political rivals who were vying for his seat and who had control of legislative decisions. The Government allowed for crossings of all Cypriot citizens and permanent residents to cross from the agreed date in June. However, only Turkish Cypriot students and workers with jobs in the Government controlled areas, as well as Greek Cypriot and Maronite enclaved were permitted to cross back northward through five of the nine crossing points, by the edicts of Akıncı's rivals, thus effectively curtailing the number of people who could pass from one side of the ceasefire lines to the other.¹⁰⁶⁸

The situation was further mired as the second wave of the pandemic hit the island and after the Turkish Cypriot leadership contest that Tatar narrowly won. On 13 December 2020 new measures were announced more or less barring everyone from crossing, but for students and those needing medical care for a period of ten days.¹⁰⁶⁹ Curbing crossings, and therefore physical contact between people living on either side of the ceasefire lines is likely to have long-term negative effects not only on the enclaved of the Karpas and the Maronite villages, the teachers who cross to work at the Rizokarpas schools, but also on Turkish Cypriots who are employed in the Government-controlled areas.

In 2005, it was estimated that 7400 Turkish Cypriots commuted for work to the Government-controlled areas.¹⁰⁷⁰ This number had soared to more than 10,000 before the 2012-2013 financial crisis,¹⁰⁷¹ but most certainly by 2020 has decreased to 1500¹⁰⁷² and will likely

¹⁰⁶⁸ Cyprus News Agency, "UNFICYP Closely Monitors Situation Regarding the Crossing Points", *In-Cyprus*, 21 June 2020, <https://in-cyprus.philenews.com/unficy-closely-monitors-situation-regarding-the-crossing-points/>.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Andreou, "Coronavirus: North Says No Crossing South for Work until December 25 (Updated)", *Cyprus Mail*, 14 December 2020, <https://cyprus-mail.com/2020/12/14/coronavirus-north-says-no-crossing-south-for-work-until-december-25/>.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Cyprus Government, "Annex to the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, Third Report", 16 May 2006, <https://rm.coe.int/government-comments-on-the-third-report-on-cyprus/16808b563e>.

¹⁰⁷¹ Cyprus Government, "Common core document forming part of the reports of States parties", 19 December 2012, UN Treaty Bodies Database, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=HRI%2FCORE%2FCYP%2f2012&Lang=en.

Pelagidis, Theophanous, and Tirkides, 4.

¹⁰⁷² Agence France-Presse, "Turkish Cypriots Protest Closure of Island Crossings", *France 24*, 15 May 2020, <https://www.france24.com/en/20200515-turkish-cypriots-protest-closure-of-island-crossings>.

continue in the future as a result of the socioeconomic impact of the pandemic, as well as the uncertainty of the crossing points.¹⁰⁷³

The European Commission's 2019 Annual Report on the Green Line Regulation denoted that 1,295,689 Turkish Cypriot and 2,399,269 crossings of Greek Cypriots were recorded for that year.¹⁰⁷⁴ Comparing the 2020 there will be a sharp decrease. The question is how the political powerplays across the island will affect those most affected by any decisions as regards the operations of the crossing points.

This “flipside of the coin” while an important part of the overall Cyprus story of recent decades, is an element that could pose future avenues of investigation as to how its plays into the overall understanding of demographic movements and potentially demographic reversals upon Cyprus' 1974 *de facto* partition.

6.9 Conclusion

Although their total will not be known until an impartial census takes place, this chapter has shown how beyond the transfer of Turkish Cypriots, the introduction of Turkish mainlanders has changed the demographic structure of Cyprus, helping consolidate Turkey's military enterprise brought on by its invasion in 1974.

While consolidating bizonality was without a doubt an integral aim of the Turkish side in the immediate aftermath of 1974, I argue that the introduction of settlers was only one component of the *hard ethnic cleansing* and demographic re-engineering of Cyprus that was pursued. The large numbers of settlers were needed not only to right-people the area but to make it economically sustainable.

Once the territorial consolidation was established (circa the summer of 1977), a milder *soft ethnic cleansing* commenced by which time only a couple of thousand Greek Cypriots remained in the remote Karpass peninsula. Almost every single Turkish Cypriot in Cyprus

¹⁰⁷³ “Checkpoints Partially Resume Operation after Three Months”, *Kathimerini*, 9 June 2020, <https://knews.kathimerini.com.cy/en/news/checkpoints-partially-resume-operation-after-three-months>.

¹⁰⁷⁴ European Commission, “Sixteenth report on the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 866/2004 of 29 April 2004 and the situation resulting from its application covering the period 1 January until 31 December 2019,” 18 June 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/com_2020_239_f1_report_from_commission_en_v4_p1_1079406.pdf.

was living north of the ceasefire lines. Together with this, a new group had been introduced in an erratic yet organised manner. Once these components were in place (Turkish Cypriots consolidated, settlers brought in to fill the void and the vast majority of Greek Cypriots expelled), a more subtle form of *soft ethnic cleansing* sufficed vis-à-vis the Greek Cypriot enclaved.



7. CONCLUSION

By the autumn of 1974, only some 20,000 Greek Cypriots had remained “enclaved” north of the ceasefire lines, while almost ten times that number had fled the fighting and the Turkish advance in July and August. As the weeks and months passed, the number of Greek Cypriot enclaved shrank rapidly. By the time the Third Vienna Agreement was signed in early August 1975, with provisions seeking to allow the Greek Cypriot enclaved to lead a normal life, their total had halved. The decrease was swift as communities and villages were ousted. The Turkish side’s aim seemed to be the complete removal of the autochthonous Greek Cypriot community from the areas of Cyprus now under Turkish occupation.

In 1976, Georg Hoffmann of the ICRC warned his headquarters in Geneva that the Karpass peninsula’s “Yialousa will be the last village to go [since] the Turkish Cypriot authorities, backed by the Turks, will not admit any exception.”¹⁰⁷⁵ Hoffmann thus raised his concerns that rendering the Turkish-controlled areas of Cyprus ethnically homogenous was fast becoming a reality.

As this examination finds, Hoffmann was both right and wrong. Yialousa was indeed the last village in the Turkish-occupied areas from which the autochthonous Greek Cypriots were expelled in organised drives as a bookend to the *hard ethnic cleansing* policies that had commenced with the 1974 Turkish invasion. However, Hoffmann was wrong in another aspect: when Yialousa’s Greek Cypriots were expelled, they were not the last of the Karpass enclaved. The Greek Cypriots of Ayia Trias and Rizokarpaso have remained to this day, experiencing decades of harsher and then lighter forms of discrimination, intimidation and harassment in the form of *soft ethnic cleansing*.

In analysing the demographic shifts that took place since 1974, via the examination of primary source material complemented by first-hand accounts by the enclaved and others, this thesis aimed to understand the demographic re-engineering that took place in Cyprus and to contextualise what happened in Cyprus within the framework of ethnic cleansing.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Hoffmann, “Note No. 507: Situation in Karpasia, based on my visit to the area in the company of Mr. Grinling on 22nd and 23rd July 1976”, 26 July 1976: [ICRC 7492].

Ethnic cleansing has not been legally classified in international law and is not an independent crime. Meanwhile, genocide has been defined via the 1948 Convention, but only after the perpetrators of the Holocaust were tried for “crimes against humanity”. Although the attempts to hone in on a legal definition have yet to reach effective consensus, there is increasing accord within academia that ethnic cleansing encapsulates the removal of a group of people from a specific territory.¹⁰⁷⁶ It is thus separate from than the physical destruction of that group (genocide), since ethnic homogenisation that results from ethnic cleansing does not necessarily entail the physical destruction of the group, but other means of “purging” the territory. As discussed in detail in the literature chapter, some academics argue that ethnic cleansing is a step that may lead to genocide,¹⁰⁷⁷ while others posit that genocide is a form of ethnic cleansing¹⁰⁷⁸ or a subcategory of it,¹⁰⁷⁹ and still others who completely distinguish the two.¹⁰⁸⁰

Ethnic cleansing in Cyprus has not been examined in great detail within this specific lens of inquiry except for a few exceptions (Bell-Fialkoff) that usually only look at a single snapshot in time (the events of 1963 and 1974).¹⁰⁸¹ Yet, despite journalistic shorthand describing Cyprus as *de facto* partitioned into two homogenous areas, ethnic purification of the Turkish-occupied areas was never fully realised. Not all Turkish Cypriots transferred to the northern part of Cyprus, and a small pocket of Greek and Maronite Cypriots never left their ancestral homes there. Furthermore, as discussed earlier in the thesis, it is arguable whether autochthonous Turkish Cypriots constitute a majority in the Turkish-occupied area. This has led the examination into how and why this could happen. Why were small pockets of Greek Cypriot and Maronite Cypriot groups of people littered across the Karpass panhandle and the Morphou region allowed to remain? And does a small pocket of the “other” remaining represent merely a glitch or an oversight in the execution of a policy of ethnic cleansing? If not, why not? These were the wider questions that formed the basis of the investigation in trying to examine ethnic cleansing in Cyprus post-1974.

Especially in the first half of the twentieth century, with the advent of modernity and nationalism, ethnic (and not religious) identity increasingly constituted a reason spurring a

¹⁰⁷⁶ Várdy, et al., *Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe*.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Sémelin, *Purify and Destroy*.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy*.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Ther, *The Dark Side of Nation-States*.

¹⁰⁸¹ Bell-Fialkoff, *Ethnic Cleansing*.

shift in the demographic map of Cyprus. But moves solely resulting from ethnic disparity or conflict (and not also tied to modernity and urbanisation) were limited in that they did not bring about a complete disruption. It was Turkey's 1974 invasion of Cyprus that created the largest, most sweeping and swiftest demographic transformation in Cyprus' modern history, based solely on ethnic identity. Essentially within a few weeks, Cyprus was *de facto* partitioned in to two contiguous areas and ethnic segregation had been partially achieved. Over 160,000 Greek Cypriots from the Turkish-controlled areas of Cyprus became displaced.

Loizos and Zetter, among others, have demonstrated that most of the Greek Cypriot displaced were under the impression that the displacement generated by the invasion was temporary. They fled the Turkish advance without most of their personal belongings, believing they would have the opportunity to return, sooner rather than later.¹⁰⁸² Months passed without political breakthrough in the negotiations taking place between Clerides and Denktash. Meanwhile, Turkey's consolidation of the territory its troops had occupied was taking root, as the over 45,000 Turkish Cypriots from areas south of the ceasefire lines began to transfer in ever increasing numbers.

Beyond illicit crossings by Turkish Cypriots, the Clerides-Denktash agreement in September 1974 to allow Turkish Cypriot POWs to be released into the Turkish-occupied areas gave the initial political blessing to the demographic consolidation of the Turkish Cypriot community in the areas under Turkey's control. By the summer of 1975, some 10,000 Greek Cypriots had remained in the Turkish-occupied areas with more than 10,000 Turkish Cypriots in the Government-controlled areas.¹⁰⁸³ The early August 1975 Vienna Third Agreement, which in Turkish Cypriot hegemonic nomenclature is referred to as the "population exchange agreement" greenlighted the transfer northward of the remaining Turkish Cypriots south of the ceasefire lines.

While the Vienna Third Agreement also provided for the safeguarding of the Greek Cypriots remaining north of the ceasefire lines, ultimately, as this dissertation has sought to demonstrate, it did no such thing as they were at greater risk of expulsion. Some of the Turkish Cypriot transferees post-Vienna, such as those from the village of Kokkina, were

¹⁰⁸² Loizos, *The Heart Grown Bitter*.

Zetter, "We Are Strangers Here" - Continuity and Transition: The Impact of Displacement and Protracted Exile on the Greek Cypriot Refugees'.

¹⁰⁸³ Clerides, *My Deposition: Volume 4*, 297.

settled in the village of Yialousa even while the autochthonous villagers were still present. The autochthonous residents were thus coerced to leave in what was the last episode of organised mass expulsion of Greek Cypriots since 1974.

While somehow no decision was taken to expel the remaining 2000 Greek Cypriots in the Karpass peninsula in June 1977, these people were denied the possibility of a dignified life. The secondary schools remained closed, doctors and other health professionals they were supposed to have been able to access via the Vienna Agreement were not allowed return, and the community was economically strangled out of their livelihoods with the only real option of farming or fishing. Families had to make the choice of whether to allow their twelve-year olds to “go it alone” and attend secondary school in the Government-controlled areas as orphans or keep the family unit together and unified and thus “opt” for transfer, becoming displaced. As such, instead of granting the possibility to return to normal life, the remaining enclaved were subjected to “ethnic policing” and discrimination, harassment and intimidation, while increasing numbers of settlers from the Turkish mainland were introduced.

In sum, the almost complete overhaul of Cyprus’ demography since 1974 was comprised of the following four elements:

1. ridding the Turkish-controlled area of its autochthonous Greek Cypriots;
2. transferring the Turkish Cypriots in the Government-controlled to the Turkish-occupied area;
3. settling people from the Turkish mainland into the Turkish-occupied area;
4. repressing the small minority of enclaved Greek Cypriots by barring them from leading a “normal” existence, which forced many on a smaller scale, at the level of the family unit, to leave.

Upon examining these four elements, one can draw certain hypotheses; that these elements did not take place sequentially, but that not all took place in the same period of time, or most definitely not at the same pace. On occasion, one or more elements came to the fore, but all four arguably “co-existed” in the period of 1974-1977. Arguably, the third and fourth elements have never fully ceased.

Researching the post-1974 history of Cyprus, both through archival primary sources, especially of the ICRC that was on the ground documenting the demographic changes, as

well as listening to the personal experiences of the enclaved, central themes began to emerge. *Ethnic cleansing* could no longer be neatly packaged into a monolithic and linear concept, nor envisaged as taking place in a short space of time if one were to account for all four aforementioned parameters.

Instead, the examination offered the need for a more complex and nuanced redefining of *ethnic cleansing*. Therefore, to account for this hybridity and long-term/ongoing effects in the Cyprus context, this thesis sought to examine three basic hypotheses, as follows:

1. The “mass removal of a targeted population from a given territory”¹⁰⁸⁴ took place between the summers of 1974 and 1977. This occurred alongside the “right-peopling” of the Turkish-occupied area of Cyprus, which included two disparate elements: one was the consolidation of all Turkish Cypriots in the Turkish-occupied area and the other comprised of the introduction of settlers from mainland Turkey. This rapid and comprehensive demographic re-engineering, with overlapping components, took place within a short space of time. It was very different in its modalities to what took place after 1977-1978. As such, I found the term *hard ethnic cleansing* useful in describing this particular period and distinguishing it from what followed.
2. Extrapolating from the Cyprus case, another hypothesis for contention was that ethnic cleansing could not merely be defined within the constraints of the swift removal of an undesired population in a relatively short span of time and the filling of that void by a more desirable group or groups of people. Otherwise, the story of the Karpass peninsula would arguably have ended with no Greek Cypriots or Maronite Cypriots remaining after 1978. This was not the case. A community of some 2,000 Greek Cypriot enclaved still lived in Karpasia in the summer of 1977, together with some 300 Maronite Cypriots. As detailed in this thesis, the enclaved experienced continued discrimination, intimidation and harassment in various forms, from limitations to freedom of movement, to problems exercising freedom of worship and – likely the gravest of them all – the inability to educate their children in their villages. However, the remaining villagers of Ayia Trias and Rizokarpaso were not subjected to organised mass expulsion orders. It was a different type of suppression, one that would lead to smaller groups, often family units, deciding that they can no longer endure the situation and thus transferring south of the ceasefire lines. Such indirect policies of coercion and “ethnic

¹⁰⁸⁴ Várdy et al., 3.

policing” still led to further homogenisation of the area via the decrease of the “other” (in this case, the enclaved).¹⁰⁸⁵ This more nuanced, persistent policy is what I describe as constituting *soft ethnic cleansing*.

3. At any given time, *soft ethnic cleansing* could potentially change into *hard ethnic cleansing*, as symbolised by the Greek Cypriots of Yialousa who were living in conditions of intimidation and harassment (*soft ethnic cleansing*), but then suddenly were forced to leave (*hard ethnic cleansing*). The ICRC’s Hoffmann, at the beginning of this chapter described his conviction that the villagers of Yialousa would be the last of the Greek Cypriot enclaved to go. The reason behind this assumption was that they were as “self-sustainable” a Greek Cypriot community as there could be under the circumstances of subjugation, and thus had the greatest possibility to endure the harassment and ill-treatment. What Hoffmann could not foresee was that Yialousa was picked to house the Turkish Cypriots from Kokkina who allegedly liked Yialousa so much that they selected it for their community’s resettlement. This meant, that the autochthonous Greek Cypriots living there had to go, even though, as previously described, many of the houses were not eventually used by the Turkish Cypriots.

Within this conceptual framework, just as examining how *soft ethnic cleansing* can precede *hard ethnic cleansing* as well as follow on from it, it is also important to ponder if and how *soft ethnic cleansing* may be resisted and even overcome. The Cyprus Government’s recent programme to assist resettlement of enclaved family members to the Karpass could potentially offer a point of mitigation by effectively countering population decline. The other less apparent element is how the settler community is versed in the Greek Cypriot vernacular, thus effectively meaning that any concept of “Turkification” has not worked. Instead of the Greek Cypriot enclaved being forced to all speak Turkish, the Karpass region’s inter-communal *lingua franca*, built on socio-economic necessities over the years, is Greek Cypriot.

The quotidian social networks in these rural settings that have developed over the decades, following on from Ashutosh Varshney’s thesis, decrease the possibility of

¹⁰⁸⁵ Ron, *Frontiers and Ghettos*, 190.

tensions and conflict.¹⁰⁸⁶ Although the resettlement to the Karpass of those Greek Cypriots who had for many years not lived there remains at low levels (50 applicants and various bureaucratic hurdles to which they are subjected from the Turkish side),¹⁰⁸⁷ even these few examples could not take place if there was any organised resistance from settlers. In fact, if such networks did not exist it may well be that increased levels of transfers would take place, as they did in the mid- to late-1970s.

This non-linearity of *soft ethnic cleansing* could mean that there might be room for even limited revitalisation of the community, as well as a rethinking of the theoretical understanding of ethnic cleansing. The notion that *soft ethnic cleansing* while in place could be reversed, may also provide opportunities for significant further research, not least in comparison to the Bosnia-Herzegovinan context, where after the Dayton Accords resettlement policies had been instituted.

The historian Donald Horowitz maintains that the assumption that partition or secession will lead to “more homogenous states” is based on a false premise.¹⁰⁸⁸ He contends that instead of ethnic homogeneity the result is “merely likely to effect a reordering of heterogeneity”.¹⁰⁸⁹ By examining the post-1974 situation in Cyprus, Horowitz’ thesis has significant bearings on the fact that despite the hegemonic nationalist narrative and aim of Turkification, the Turkish-occupied areas are not, in fact, ethnically Turkish. Beyond the very small pockets of Greek Cypriot enclaved in the Karpass and Maronite Cypriot enclaved in the Morphou region (who are not included in any census figures), the settlers from mainland Turkey are an ethnically mixed group. Increasingly, it is not just the Turkish Cypriots on the political left who are asserting a separate identity from Turkey. Thus heterogeneity may pose some local cracks within the hegemonic narrative of successful Turkification.

Furthermore, the academic understanding of ethnic cleansing encapsulates a sense of permanence to the ethnic purges that have taken place in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Allowing a more nuanced understanding of the modalities, by juxtaposing *hard*

¹⁰⁸⁶ Ashutosh Varshney, “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond”, *World Politics* 53, no. 3 (2001): 362-98, which later further expanded the author’s thesis in his seminal book *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002).

¹⁰⁸⁷ Andreou, “Govt expects strong interest in scheme to resettle villages in north”, *Cyprus Mail*, June 19, 2019. “Government Relocation Scheme to Turkish-Held Villages: The Problems and the Numbers”, *In-Cyprus/Phileleftheros*, January 22, 2020.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 589.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Horowitz, 590.

ethnic cleansing with *soft ethnic cleansing*, one can also build on the possibility that elite-driven aims at ethnic homogenisation may be curtailed.

The latter term, *soft ethnic cleansing*, was used by James Ron in the context of ethnic harassment of non-Serbs living in Serbia and Montenegro during the Yugoslav wars and who were spared expulsion. Ron himself borrowed the expression from a Serbian lawyer at Belgrade's Humanitarian Centre.¹⁰⁹⁰ The context of the former Yugoslavia has long been a study of *ethnic cleansing*, but also of its reversal if one takes the Bosnian example, where resettlement was one of the elements of the Dayton Agreement. In this sense a comparative examination of Cyprus with the former Yugoslav context could yield further insights into investigating instances of both *hard* and *soft ethnic cleansing*.

Although it is not possible to examine all relevant and pending issues related to this topic, this thesis has attempted to focus on the Greek Cypriot enclaved and the community's survival despite the adversity because it has largely remained an undocumented history.

From the very early years of the occupation, the Turkish Army viewed the Greek Cypriot enclaved in the Karpass as a security threat.¹⁰⁹¹ It was the reason for the non-implementation by the Turkish side of the provisions of the Vienna Third Agreement which pertained to the enclaved.¹⁰⁹² Ultimately, the Ayia Trias and Rizokarpaso Greek Cypriots were spared expulsion and they remained the last vestiges of a Greek Cypriot outpost in the occupied area of Cyprus. Their presence was persistently used by the Greek Cypriot side in the negotiations throughout the years to bargain for the return of the Karpass to Greek Cypriot administration. Even before Vienna III, President Makarios contended that it was more important that 10,000 Greek Cypriots remain in the Turkish-occupied area than the remaining Turkish Cypriots in the Government-controlled areas being barred from transferring.¹⁰⁹³ Throughout the intervening years, the enclaved have been used by the Greek Cypriots to push for territorial adjustments under their direct jurisdiction that included the villages of the Karpass peninsula with the excuse that communities of Greek Cypriots continue to reside in the area.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Ron, *Frontiers and Ghettos*, 84.

¹⁰⁹¹ Crawford, "Displaced Cypriots: Part II, Political Aspects", 2 February 1976, 14:10, Nicosia 0303.

¹⁰⁹² Hoffmann, "Meeting with the Turkish Ambassador, Candemir Ünhon", Nicosia, 20 January 1977: [ICRC 7391].

¹⁰⁹³ Clerides, 297.

The first iteration of the Annan Plan of November 2002 included two maps, one of which incorporated the Karpass peninsula as part of the territorial adjustments in favour of the Greek Cypriots. The other map included other areas for territorial adjustment. Although the second iteration of the Plan that came a few weeks later included the maps with the Karpass peninsula, the subsequent versions of the plan (March 2003, April 2004) completely discarded the map with the Karpass villages coming under Greek Cypriot control. Instead, the villages of the Karpass were to receive “special status”. It was to be the last time that territorial adjustments included the Karpass, although not for want of trying by the Greek Cypriot side.

Strategically, the Karpass which is situated some 80 kilometres south of Turkey’s southern coast, is deemed to pose a strategic threat, both in terms of oil/gas explorations, but also for Turkish shipping. The likelihood that the Karpass would ever be included in future territorial adjustments is extremely slight, especially when the region of Morphou – long-established to return to Greek Cypriot control – is now also in dispute and posed as one of the “six” outstanding issues from the failed talks in Crans Montana in the summer of 2017.

Given that they will likely never formally become Greek Cypriot constituent state/federated unity areas, could the Greek Cypriot enclaved share the fate of the Istanbul Greeks? Instead of symbolising the bastion of resistance to the consolidation of ethnic purification, will they be subjected to pogroms whenever trouble brews in Cypro-Turkish and Greco-Turkish relations, especially if there is a solution to the Cyprus question? Are the enclaved a useful pawn for the Turkish side? Would the intermittent threat of expulsion and/or increased intimidation and harassment be a means of retaliation for other political issues? Will the enclaved Maronite Cypriot villagers also share a similar fate, or will they be more fortunate, and their communities permitted to prosper?

These are some of the lines of inquiry for future research projects within the Cyprus framework. However, ethnic cleansing is by no means exclusively a Cyprus, or Eastern Mediterranean or European issue. Examples of attempts at ethnic homogenisation have taken place all over the world. However, a thorough examination, detecting the patterns and levels of harassment, as well as the trends in expulsions could further illuminate the notions of *hard* and *soft ethnic cleansing* as they relate to other incidents.

What the Cyprus context lacks is a political settlement. As stated above, it is doubtful that the Karpass will be included in any potential territorial adjustments. Furthermore, with a developing situation where Turkey and Tatar's leadership is espousing a two-state solution instead of the heretofore federal reunification model, it is difficult to examine a glass ball to see what the future holds. But even if one contends, for the sake of argument, that a settlement is reached (regardless of what type) there is no way of knowing whether provisions of any agreement can truly safeguard the Karpass Greek Cypriots. This is underscored in view of the fact that the Third Vienna Agreement of 1975, instead of shielding the enclaved and bettering their lives, became a vehicle for ethnic cleansing.

By examining what took place in the Karpass peninsula since 1974, this thesis has intended to add conceptual nuance to ethnic cleansing, while also trying to deliberate on whether the locals on the ground may provide a resilience to *soft ethnic cleansing* policies in potentially perplexing ways, possibly in the hope to counter the effects of the "total eradication of a community,"¹⁰⁹⁴ even if not politically, at least demographically and culturally.

7.1 Potential future research

According to Ashutosh Varshney, when communities develop links with civil society groups and other organisations across ethnic delineations, tensions can be resolved more easily and violence mitigated.¹⁰⁹⁵ This holds for the Greek Cypriot enclaved. The ties of the Greek Cypriot enclaved to institutional, economic, political frameworks and associations at least locally means that, by default, relatives who seek resettlement in the Karpass are able to navigate those links more easily compared to 1974 Greek Cypriot displaced from other parts of Cyprus. Furthermore, the recent Government scheme encouraging resettlement of the relatives and friends of the Greek Cypriot and Maronite enclaved may practically assist in revitalising the Greek Cypriot enclaved community.¹⁰⁹⁶ Whether these incentives, as well as the civil society connections across ethnic groups allowing for cordial relations in the Karpass, can posit the framework for even a partial reversal of the systemic ethnic cleansing

¹⁰⁹⁴ Sémelin, "What is Genocide?", 81-89.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Ashutosh Varshney, "Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond," *World Politics* 53, no. 3 (2001): 362-98, which later further expanded the author's thesis in his seminal book *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002).

¹⁰⁹⁶ Andreou, "Govt Expects Strong Interest in Scheme to Resettle Villages in North".

of Greek Cypriots from the Karpass remains to be seen especially given the current political context where Turkey is on record for seeking a “two-state solution”.¹⁰⁹⁷

The Dayton Agreement ensured “the right of all residents to return to their homes, freedom of movement, and the possibility of voting in democratic elections in one’s own hometown even when not physically present.”¹⁰⁹⁸ It was a way to provide redress to the 2.2 million displaced persons of the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia. Twenty-five years on, Annex VII has not reached a *status quo ante* of the mixed, integrated communities prior to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Initially refugees returned to areas where their ethnic group was in the majority. The success of return and repossession is questionable. However, the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina were given the right to return and repossess their original homes. They had the right to choose.

While the situation in Bosnia is arguably vastly different from Cyprus, it is an example where ethnic cleansing took place and a modicum of its reversal had subsequently happened. One of the consistent themes from the interviews with the enclaved was the hope to bring back a *status quo ante* with resettlement of Greek Cypriots to the peninsula. Therefore, lessons learnt from the Bosnia example could be a potential field of new research on which to build for the Cyprus case, and the Cyprus case could inform other examples of ethnic cleansing, *hard* and *soft*.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Andreou, “Cavusoglu Tells UN Envoy Federation No Longer Possible”, *Cyprus Mail*, 16 December 2020, <https://cyprus-mail.com/2020/12/16/cavusoglu-tells-un-envoy-federation-no-longer-possible/>.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Lynne Jones, *Then They Started Shooting: Growing Up In Wartime Bosnia* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2004), 131.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adamides, Constantinos, and Michalis Kontos. 'Greek Cypriot perceptions of the United Nations'. In *Cyprus and the Roadmap for Peace*, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018).
- Agence France-Presse. 'Chance to Save Ancient Language'. *Kathimerini*, 7 December 2016. <https://www.ekathimerini.com/214375/article/ekathimerini/community/chance-to-save-ancient-language>.
- . 'Turkish Cypriots Protest Closure of Island Crossings'. *France 24*, 15 May 2020. <https://www.france24.com/en/20200515-turkish-cypriots-protest-closure-of-island-crossings>.
- Akbil, Esra Can, Giorgos Psaltis, Sebnem Hoskara, Kai Voeckler, and Demet Mutman. 'Archis Interventions: Cyprus 2011 Activity Report'. *Erste Stiftung*, 2011, 21. http://www.seenetwork.org/files/2014/03/06/8/AI_CY_Activity%20Report%202011.pdf.
- 'Akinci Stands Ground in Facebook Fallout: Turkish Cypriot Assembly Scrambling for Unity after Akinci Comments on Turkish Offensive in Syria'. *Kathimerini*, 15 October 2019. <https://knews.kathimerini.com.cy/en/news/akinci-stands-ground-in-facebook-fallout>.
- Alecou, Alexios. *Communism and Nationalism in Postwar Cyprus, 1945-1955: Politics and Ideologies Under British Rule*. Springer, 2016.
- Alpha News. '16ο Επεισόδιο: Εγκλωβισμένοι της Καρπασίας 28/12/2019 Β' Σεζόν [16th Episode: The Enclaved of the Karpass 28/12/2019 Second Season]'. *24 Hours*, 28 December 2019. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0cqE1A5n4U0>.
- . '17ο Επεισόδιο: Η "Απαγορευμένη" Αγάπη Ενός Ελληνοκύπριου με μια Τουρκοκύπρια 04/01/2020 Β' Σεζόν [17th Episode: The "Forbidden" Love between a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot 04/01/2020 Second Season]'. *24 Hours*, 4 January 2020. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZOE2H7wUMt0>.
- . 'Κατεχόμενο Ριζοκάρπασο: Γάμος Μετά Από 27χρόνια [Occupied Rizokarpaso: Wedding after 27 Years]'. *24 Hours*, 19 May 2018. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eWTWrayWIEE>.
- Andersen, Dr. Erik. 'Medical Report on Visit to Morphou', 11 September 1974. ICRC / BAG 231.049.007 / 231 (35). ICRC.
- . 'Special Report: Ayios Epiktitos', 18 September 1974. ICRC / BAG 231.049.007 / 231 (35). ICRC.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London and New York: Verso, 1983.

- Andreou, Evie. 'Cavusoglu Tells UN Envoy Federation No Longer Possible'. *Cyprus Mail*, 16 December 2020. <https://cyprus-mail.com/2020/12/16/cavusoglu-tells-un-envoy-federation-no-longer-possible/>.
- . 'Coronavirus: North Says No Crossing South for Work until December 25 (Updated)'. *Cyprus Mail*, 14 December 2020. <https://cyprus-mail.com/2020/12/14/coronavirus-north-says-no-crossing-south-for-work-until-december-25/>.
- . 'Govt Expects Strong Interest in Scheme to Resettle Villages in North'. *Cyprus Mail*, 19 June 2019. <https://cyprus-mail.com/2019/06/19/govt-expects-strong-interest-in-scheme-to-resettle-villages-in-north/>.
- . 'Police Say They Were Forced to Use Defensive Spray on Ledra St Protesters (with Videos) (Update 5)'. *Cyprus Mail*, 7 March 2020. <https://99549445.com/2020/03/07/police-say-they-were-forced-to-use-defensive-spray-on-ledra-st-protesters/>.
- Arendt, Hannah. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. 2017th ed. London: Penguin UK, 1951.
- Ashworth, Gregory John, and Brian J. Graham, eds. *Senses of Place: Senses of Time*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005.
- Asmussen, Jan. 'Early Conflicts between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot Communities in Cyprus'. *The Cyprus Review* 16, no. 1 (2004): 87–106. <http://cyprusreview.org/index.php/cr/article/view/361>.
- . *'Wir waren wie Brüder': Zusammenleben und Konflikentstehung in ethnisch gemischten Dörfern auf Zypern* ["We were like brothers". *Co-existence and the Upcoming of Conflict in Ethnical Mixed Villages in Cyprus*]. Hamburg: LIT Verlag Münster, 2001.
- Association for Diplomatic Studies & Training. 'Country Reader: Cyprus, 1948-2004', n.d. <https://www.adst.org/Readers/Cyprus.pdf>.
- Athens News Agency. 'Τούρκοι έποικοι εγκαταλείπουν τα κατεχόμενα, λόγω ανεργίας [Turkish Settlers Abandoning Occupied Areas, Due to Unemployment]'. *iefimerida.gr*, 29 February 2012. <https://www.iefimerida.gr/apenews/39038/τούρκοι-έποικοι-εγκαταλείπουν-τα-κατεχόμενα-λόγω-ανεργίας>.
- Attalides, Michael A. *Cyprus, Nationalism and International Politics*. Edinburgh: Q Press, 1979.
- Ayhan, Aktar, Niyazi Kizilyürek, and Umut Ozkirimli. *Nationalism in the Troubled Triangle: Cyprus, Greece and Turkey*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- Baeriswyl, Rene. 'Report on the Activities in Morphou Area from 5.11.74-11.11.74, Annex II of Note No. 92 "Rapport de Visite de Villages En Zone Nord", 25 November 1974. ICRC / BAG 229.049-002.01 / 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.

- Bagshaw, Simon. 'Benchmarks or Deutschmarks? Determining the Criteria for the Repatriation of Refugees to Bosnia and Herzegovina'. *International Journal of Refugee Law* 9, no. 4 (1997): 566–92. <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/1501>.
- Barber, Tony. 'Turkey Hints at Strike on Cypriot Missiles'. *Independent*. 11 January 1997. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/turkey-hints-at-strike-on-cypriot-missiles-1282572.html>.
- Barry, Frederick. (*Colonial Government*): *Report on the Census of Cyprus, 1881 with Appendix*. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1884.
- BBC, 'Russia Vetoes Bosnia Genocide Motion'. *BBC News*, 8 July 2015. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33445772>.
- Beattie, Clay. *The Bulletproof Flag: Canadian Peacekeeping Forces and the War in Cyprus*. Maxville, Ottawa: Optimum Publishing International, 2007.
- Bekdil, Burak. 'Turkey's Erdoğan Even Alienates Turkish Cypriots'. Middle East Forum. Accessed 22 May 2020. <https://www.meforum.org/60470/are-turkish-cypriots-done-with-ankara>.
- Bell, R. L. 'Intercommunity Medicine: Partition, Peacekeeping and Public Health Cyprus 1975'. *Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps* 131, no. 3 (1 August 1985): 132–35. <https://doi.org/10.1136/jramc-131-03-03>.
- Bell-Fialkoff, Andrew. 'A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing'. *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1993-06-01/brief-history-ethnic-cleansing>.
- . *Ethnic Cleansing*. New York: St. Martin's, 1996.
- Bergus, Donald. 'Alleged Turkish Plans to Move Turkish Mainlanders to Cyprus', 6 June 1975. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975ANKARA04427_b.html.
- Beyli, Behzat Aziz. 'Letter by the ICRC's Turkish Cypriot Liaison to ICRC Head of Mission Gruneck', 7 July 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- Birand, Mehmet Ali. *30 Hot Days*. London, Istanbul: K. Rustem & Brother, 1985.
- Bordo, Michael D., Alan M. Taylor, and Jeffrey G. Williamson. *Globalization in Historical Perspective*. University of Chicago Press, 2003.
- Borel, D. 'Compte Rendu D'entretien: D. Borel-Pierre Du Pasquier', 12 August 1974. ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- Borel, J. F. 'Chypre', 22 October 1974. ICRC / BAG 231.049.010 / 231 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- Borowiec, Andrew. *Cyprus: A Troubled Island*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000.
- Borsinger, Melchior. 'Chypre: Remise de la note destinée au gouvernement du Chypre', 23 July 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049-007.03 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.

- . ‘Letter Addressed the Secretary General of the Australian Red Cross Society, L. G. Stubbings’, 5 August 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 Exp. (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Letter Addressed to Ambassador Coskun Kirca, Permanent Representative of Turkey to the UNO in Geneva’, 9 April 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Letter to Dr. Ziyad Hakki’, 31 July 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Letter to Turkey’s Deputy Prime Minister, Tüvan Feyzioğlu’, 16 June 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Note à l’attention des membres du Conseil exécutive, concerne Chypre’, 9 July 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.03 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Note à M. J.-P. Hocke, Directeur des Operations’, 21 May 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Telegram 84 to ICRC Nicosia’, 6 August 1974. ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 35-133 CY. ICRC.
- Borsinger, Michel. ‘Message pour M. Gaillard’, 30 July 1974. ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 35-133 CY. ICRC.
- Brey, Hansjörg. ‘Turkey and the Cyprus Question’. *The International Spectator* 34, no. 1 (January-March 1999): 111–21. https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/iai/iai_99brh01.html#txt2.
- Brey, Hansjörg, and Günter Heinritz. ‘Ethnicity and Demographic Changes in Cyprus: In the “Statistical Fog”’. *Geographica Slovenica* 24 (1993): 201–22. https://giam.zrc-sazu.si/sites/default/files/gs_clanki/GS_2401_201-222.pdf.
- Brown. ‘Clerides-Denktaş Substantive Negotiations (Session No. 2), January 17, 1975’, 17 January 1975. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI00212_b.html.
- Browning, Christopher R. *Nazi Policy, Jewish Workers, German Killers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- . *The Path to Genocide: Essays on Launching the Final Solution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Browning, Christopher R., and Jürgen Matthäus. *The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939-March 1942*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007.
- Bryant, Rebecca. *Imagining the Modern: Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus*. London: I.B. Taurus, 2004.
- . *Life Stories: Turkish Cypriot Community*. Displacement in Cyprus: Consequences of Civil and Military Strife, Report 2. Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2012.

- . *The Past in Pieces: Belonging in the New Cyprus*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010.
- Bryant, Rebecca, and Christalla Yakinthou. *Cypriot Perceptions of Turkey*. Istanbul: TESEV, 2012. https://www.tesev.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/report_Cypriot_Perceptions_Of_Turkey_EN.pdf.
- Cagaptay, Soner. 'The November 2002 Elections and Turkey's New Political Era'. *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 6, no. 4 (December 2002). <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2002/issue4/jv6n4a6.html>.
- Caglayangil, Ihsan Sabri. 'Turkish Deputy Prime Minister, Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil's Letter Addressed to the President of the ICRC, Alexandre Hay', 14 January 1977. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- Calic, Marie-Janine. 'Ethnic Cleansing and War Crimes, 1991-1995 – Part Three', 27 June 2014. <http://www.transconflict.com/2014/06/ethnic-cleansing-and-war-crimes-1991-1995-part-3-276/>.
- Calotychos, Vangelis, ed. *Cyprus And Its People: Nation, Identity, And Experience In An Unimaginable Community, 1955-1997*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1998.
- Canefe, Nergis. 'Refugees or Enemies? The Legacy of Population Displacements in Contemporary Turkish Cypriot Society'. *South European Society and Politics* 7, no. 3 (1 September 2002): 1–28. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13608740708539631>.
- Carver, Michael, ed. *Cyprus in Transition, 1960-1985*. Trigraph, 1986.
- Case of Apostolides v. Orams (Judgement), No. C-420/07 (European Court of Justice 28 April 2009).
- Case of Aziz v. Cyprus, No. 69949/01 (European Court of Human Rights 22 June 2004).
- Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro (International Court of Justice 26 February 2007).
- Case of Cyprus v. Turkey, Judgement (Just Satisfaction), No. 25781/94 (European Court of Human Rights 12 May 2014).
- Case of Cyprus v. Turkey, Judgement (Merits), No. 25781/94 (European Court of Human Rights 10 May 2001).
- Case of Demopoulos and others v. Turkey (Admissibility), No. 46113/99, 3842/02, et al., (European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber 1 March 2010).
- Case of Loizidou v. Turkey, No. (Article 50) 40/1993 (European Court of Human Rights 28 July 1998).
- Case of The Gambia v. Myanmar (Application) (International Court of Justice 11 November 2019).

- Case of Jorgic v. Germany, (Application), No. 74613/01 (European Court of Human Rights 12 July 2007).
- Case of Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (Merits), No. 46347/99 (European Court of Human Rights 22 December 2005).
- Charalambous, Christos. ‘Ξεχασμένοι Στο Περιθώριο Οι Κύπριοι Ρομά [Cypriot Roma Forgotten on the Sidelines]’. *Dialogos*, 12 April 2020. <https://dialogos.com.cy/xechasmenoi-sto-perithorio-oi-kyprioi-roma/>.
- Charalambous, Loucas. ‘How Was It Possible to Honour the Fighters of 63?’ *Cyprus Mail*, 12 January 2014. <https://cyprus-mail.com/2014/01/12/how-was-it-possible-to-honour-the-fighters-of-63/>.
- Christiansen, Adrienne. ‘Crossing the Green Line: Anti-Settler Sentiment in Cyprus’. *Macalester International* 15, no. 15 (Winter 2005): 22. <https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1397&context=macintl>.
- Christou, Jean. ‘Akinci Hopes Results of Election Will Be Beneficial for Cyprus (Update 1)’. *Cyprus Mail*, 18 October 2020. <https://cyprus-mail.com/2020/10/18/akinci-hopes-results-of-election-will-be-beneficial-for-cyprus-update-1/>.
- . ‘Hardline Turkish Cypriot Politician Spotted Obtaining RoC Passport and ID’. *Cyprus Mail*, 3 July 2015. <https://99549445.com/2015/07/03/hardline-turkish-cypriot-politician-spotted-obtaining-roc-passport-and-id/>.
- . ‘Utter Confusion over Population in the North’. *Cyprus Mail*, 27 March 2019. <https://cyprus-mail.com/2019/03/27/utter-confusion-over-population-in-the-north/>.
- CNN. ‘Papadopoulos in Shock Cyprus Win’. *CNN World*, 16 February 2003. http://articles.cnn.com/2003-02-16/world/cyprus.election_1_tassos-papadopoulos-accession-rauf-denktash?_s=PM:WORLD.
- Çıraklı, Mustafa. ‘Identity, Immigration And Citizenship In Northern Cyprus’. Lancaster University, 2016. <https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/87432/1/2016ciraklihd.pdf>.
- Clerides, Glafkos. *Cyprus: My Deposition - Volume 1*. Nicosia: Alithia Publishing, 1989.
- . *Cyprus: My Deposition - Volume 2*. Nicosia: Alithia Publishing, 1989.
- . *Cyprus: My Deposition - Volume 3*. Nicosia: Alithia Publishing, 1990.
- . *Cyprus: My Deposition - Volume 4*. Nicosia: Alithia Publishing, 1992.
- . ‘Letter to ICRC Head of Mission in Cyprus, Georg Hoffmann’, 5 July 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- Clochard, Olivier. ‘Jeux de frontières à Chypre: quels impacts sur les flux migratoires en Méditerranée orientale? — Géoconfluences’, 17 December 2008. <http://geoconfluences.ens-lyon.fr/doc/typespace/frontier/FrontScient8.htm>.

- Cohen, Jonathan. 'Cyprus: Solution Talks' First-Reading Concludes, UNSyG S A Downer and Leaders "Cautiously Optimistic", 13 August 2009. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09NICOSIA533_a.html.
- Committee 'Dome' Greek Cypriot Internees. 'Letter Addressed to the Chief Delegate of the ICRC', 13 January 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- Committee on Missing Persons. 'About the CMP'. CMP: Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus, n.d. <http://www.cmp-cyprus.org/content/about-cmp-0>.
- Convers, Michel. 'Chypre', 23 September 1974. ICRC / BAG 231.049.001 / 231 (35). ICRC.
- . 'Note No. 7: Concerne: Procédure pour rapports de visite', 20 August 1974. ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 229(35-133 CY). ICRC.
- Coordinating Committee for the Enclaved People in the Turkish Occupied Area of Cyprus. 'Letter to ICRC DG for Europe and North America, Melchior Borsinger', 21 August 1979. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- Cordell, Karl, and Stefan Wolff. *Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict*. London and New York: Routledge, 2011.
- Coufoudakis, Van. 'US-Turkish Relations and the Obama Administration: The Impact on Greece and Cyprus'. *In Depth* 7, no. 3 (June 2010). <http://www.rcenter.intercol.edu/Newsletter/In%20Depth/volume%207%20issue%203/article02.htm>.
- Council of Europe. 'Official Report of Debates: 2003 Ordinary Session (Third Party), 23-27 June 2003'. Volume III, Sittings 17 to 24, Pages 559 to 839. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, December 2004.
- Crawford, William. 'Anticipated Movement of Turk Cypriot Population', 11 September 1974. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974NICOSI03041_b.html.
- . 'Clerides-Denkash Private Meeting, September 20', 21 September 1974. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974NICOSI03236_b.html.
- . 'Conversation with Denktash', 14 August 1975. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI02514_b.html.
- . 'Conversation with Denktash', 19 April 1976. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1976NICOSI01024_b.html.
- . 'Conversation with Greek Ambassador', 7 August 1975. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI02443_b.html.
- . 'Conversation with Turkish Ambassador', 19 September 1975. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI02815_b.html.
- . 'Conversation with Turkish Ambassador', 19 September 1975. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI02815_b.html.

- . ‘Denktash Hints At Postponement of Expulsion Plan’, 22 July 1975. Department of State. https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI02283_b.html.
- . ‘Denktash-Clerides Meeting, September 20’, 21 September 1974. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974NICOSI03233_b.html.
- . ‘Displaced Cypriots: Part I, An Overview’, 27 January 1976. Department of State. http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1976NICOSI00262_b.html.
- . ‘Displaced Cypriots: Part II, Political Aspects’, 2 February 1976. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1976NICOSI00303_b.html.
- . ‘Expulsion of Greek Cypriots from Turkish Controlled Areas of Cyprus’, 1 July 1975. Department of State. http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI02090_b.html.
- . ‘Expulsion of Greek Cypriots in Karpass’, 30 June 1975. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI02083_b.html.
- . ‘Greek Cypriot Expulsion/Departures from Northern Cyprus’, 18 July 1975. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI02249_b.html.
- . ‘Greek Cypriots in Turkish-Controlled North’, 25 July 1975. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI02327_b.html.
- . ‘ICRC Concern over Expulsions from Northern Cyprus’, 14 May 1976. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1976NICOSI01324_b.html.
- . ‘Karpass Trip Report’, 17 December 1974. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974NICOSI04500_b.html.
- . ‘Non-Implementation of Vienna III Agreements’, 10 October 1975. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI02999_b.html.
- . ‘Return of Greek Cypriots to Northern Cyprus’, 4 September 1975. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI02677_b.html.
- . ‘Status of Greek Cypriots in North’, 17 January 1978. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1978NICOSI00132_d.html.
- . ‘The Last Days of a Greek Cypriot Village’, 29 April 1976. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1976NICOSI01132_b.html.
- . ‘Turk Cypriot Resettlement Program’, 18 February 1975. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI00659_b.html.
- . ‘Turkish Immigration to Cyprus’, 19 February 1976. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1976NICOSI00442_b.html.
- . ‘Turkish Migration into Northern Cyprus’, 25 November 1975. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI03315_b.html.

- . ‘UNFICYP Observations in Kyrenia and Famagusta Districts’, 5 September 1975. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI02683_b.html.
- . ‘Visit to Turkish Occupied Area’, 24 January 1975. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI00332_b.html.
- . ‘Weckmann Resigns’, 8 August 1975. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NICOSI02450_b.html.
- Crawford, William, and Charles Stuart Kennedy. ‘Interview with William R. Crawford Jr.’, 24 October 1988. Library of Congress. <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/service/mss/mfdip/2004/2004cra05/2004cra05.pdf>.
- Cuco, Alfons. ‘Report on the Demographic Structure of the Cypriot Communities’. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, Council of Europe Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, 27 April 1992. Council of Europe. <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=6916&lang=EN>.
- CYBC, ‘DISY Omirou’. *Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation: News in English*. 24 October 2002. <http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/riken/2002/02-10-24.riken.html>.
- . ‘Μετακίνηση Τουρκοκυπρίων Αύγουστος-Σεπτέμβρης 1975’ [Movement of Turkish Cypriots August-September 1975]’. CYBC, 1975. www.youtube.com/watch?v=YxFAVIJqYok.
- Cyprus Government. ‘Annex to the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, Third Report’, 16 May 2006. <https://rm.coe.int/government-comments-on-the-third-report-on-cyprus/16808b563e>.
- . ‘Common core document forming part of the reports of States parties’, 19 December 2012. UN Treaty Bodies Database, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=HRI%2FCORE%2FCYP%2F2012&Lang=en.
- . Submissions re Cyprus v. Turkey, No. Application number 8007/77 (European Court of Human Rights 30 August 1986).
- . ‘Γραφείο Επιτρόπου Προεδρίας [Office of the Presidential Commissioner]’. Accessed 19 April 2020. http://www.presidentialcommissioner.gov.cy/anthropos/anthropos.nsf/index_gr/index_gr?opendocument.
- Cyprus Mail. ‘Maronites to Return to Villages in the North (Updated)’. *Cyprus Mail*, 27 July 2017. <https://cyprus-mail.com/2017/07/26/maronites-return-villages-north/>.
- Cyprus News Agency. ‘Commissioner for Humanitarian Issues Outlines Task in Hand to CNA’. *Cyprus News Agency*, 6 February 2014. <http://www.cna.org.cy/webnews-en.aspx?a=be48ee8f55514616a6109b9f05895766>.
- . ‘Europarlament President Regrets Outcome of G/C Referendum’, 25 April 2004. <http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/cna/2004/04-04-25.cna.html#04>.

- . ‘IPC Has No Funds to Settle Thousands of Cases’. *Cyprus Mail*, 5 June 2019. <https://cyprus-mail.com/2019/06/05/ipc-has-no-funds-to-settle-thousands-of-cases/>.
- . ‘Preventing Covid-19 While Continuing Humanitarian Deliveries “a Key Priority”, UNFICYP Spokesman Tells CNA’. *Cyprus News Agency: News in English*, 27 March 2020. <http://www.cna.org.cy/WebNews-en.aspx?a=d21fa03715404950a7ce9b8098be0ef1>.
- . ‘UNFICYP Closely Monitors Situation Regarding the Crossing Points’. *In-Cyprus*, 21 June 2020. <https://in-cyprus.philenews.com/unficyyp-closely-monitors-situation-regarding-the-crossing-points/>.
- . ‘Συντονιστική Επιτροπή Καρπασίας: Η Καρπασία να τεθεί υπό ελληνοκυπριακή διοίκηση [Coordination Committee of the Karpasia: The Karpas to be placed under Greek Cypriot control]’. *The Cyprus Times*, 22 August 2017. <https://cyprustimes.com/syntonistikiki-epitropi-karpasias-i-karpasia-na-tethei-ypo-ellinokypriaki-dioikisi/>.
- . ‘Το Κατοχικό Καθεστώς Έκλεισε Το Οδόφραγμα Του Λήδρα Πάλας’ [Occupied Regime Closes Ledra Palace Crossing Point]. 6 November 1996. <http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/kypegr/1996/96-11-06.kypegr.html#06>.
- Cyprus Red Cross Society. ‘Nicosia Branch’. Accessed 24 May 2020. <http://www.redcross.org.cy/en/branches--youth-section/nicosia-branch-history->.
- Davies, Rodger. ‘Denktash on Intercommunal Talks’, 11 July 1974. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974NICOSI01313_b.html.
- Davutoğlu, Ahmet. *Stratejik Derinlik, Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu* [Strategic Depth: Turkey's International Position]. Istanbul: Küre Yayinlari, 2001
- Dekleris, Michael. *Κυπριακό: Η Τελευταία Ευκαιρία, 1972–1974* [The Cyprus Problem: The Last Opportunity, 1972-1974]. Athens: I. Sideris, 2003.
- Demetriou, Olga. *Life Stories: Greek Cypriot Community*. Displacement in Cyprus: Consequences of Civil and Military Strife, report 1. Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2012.
- Denktash, Rauf. ‘Letter to Alexandre Hay, President of the ICRC’, 31 January 1977. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Letter Addressed to ICRC Head of Mission in Nicosia, Harald Schmid de Grunecq’, 24 May 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.06 / 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Letter addressed to the Secretary-General by the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the UNO, S/11740.’, 1 July 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.03 / 229 (25-133 CY). ICRC.
- . *The Cyprus Triangle*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982.
- Dewhurst, Patrick. ‘Fury over Turkish Cypriot politicians with Republic of Cyprus passports’. *Cyprus Mail*, 17 February 2010.

<https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Fury+over+Turkish+Cypriot+politicians+with+Republic+of+Cyprus...-a0219118041>

Diez, Thomas, and Nathalie Tocci, eds. *Cyprus: A Conflict at the Crossroads*. Manchester University Press, 2013.

Diyalog. 'Coronavirus: Baybars Statements: '40,000 persons have departed from the TRNC'. *Diyalog*, 17 April 2020.

Drevet, Jean-François, and Andreas Theophanous, eds. 'Cyprus and the EU: Appraisal and Challenges', *Notre Europe*, no. 58 (n.d.): 96.

Dreyer, Ronald. 'Note: Alleged Ill-Treatment Threatening of 4 TKCYP Living in Limassol Turkish Quarter', 26 June 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.02 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.

———. 'Note to Harald Schmid de Grunneck', 27 March 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY). ICRC.

Efty, Alex. 'Modern Romeo-and-Juliet Drama : Marriage Rouses Passions on Cyprus'. *Los Angeles Times*, 26 March 1989. <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-03-26-mn-769-story.html>.

Emerson, Michael, and Natalie Tocci. *Cyprus as Lighthouse of the East Mediterranean: Shaping EU Accession and Re-Unification Together*. Brussels: CEPS, 2002.

Erdemir, Aykan. 'FDD: Erdogan Meddles in Northern Cyprus Elections'. <https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/10/14/erdogan-meddles-cyprus-elections/>. FDD, 14 October 2020. <https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/10/14/erdogan-meddles-cyprus-elections/>.

Erdemir, Aykan, and Philip Kowalski. "'Blue Homeland" and the Irredentist Future of Turkish Foreign Policy'. *War on the Rocks*, 30 September 2020. <https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/blue-homeland-and-the-irredentist-future-of-turkish-foreign-policy/>.

Euripides. *Euripides: Iphigenia in Tauris*. Edited by M. Platnauer. Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 1984.

European Commission, 'Commission Statement Following the Outcome of the Referendum in Cyprus', 24 April 2004. http://www.europa.eu-un.org/articles/en/article_3431_en.htm.

———. 'Sixteenth report on the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 866/2004 of 29 April 2004 and the situation resulting from its application covering the period 1 January until 31 December 2019', 18 June 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/com_2020_239_f1_report_from_commission_en_v4_p1_1079406.pdf.

European Court of Human Rights. 'Press Release Issued by the Registrar, 469, "Two Chamber Judgements Concerning Turkey"'. European Court of Human Rights, 24 June 1998. <https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng->

- Gjevori, Elis. 'Turkey's "Blue Homeland": Striking a Balance in the Eastern Mediterranean'. *Turkey's 'Blue Homeland': Striking a Balance in the Eastern Mediterranean*. 7 August 2020. <https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/turkey-s-blue-homeland-striking-a-balance-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-37356>.
- Gkildakis, Antonios. 'Another 50-60 Maronites Ask to Be Resettled to Their Turkish-Occupied Villages, Photiou Tells CNA'. *Cyprus News Agency*, 16 November 2018. <http://www.cna.org.cy/WebNews-en.aspx?a=a6a0c3035ea44c8d9017c6cde123490d>.
- . 'Humanitarian Aid to the Enclaved Underway amid Restrictions, UNFICYP to Accompany the Convoy'. *Cyprus News Agency*, 14 April 2020. <http://www.cna.org.cy/webnews-en.aspx?a=4746c101f525494ab48ae533edee0b46>.
- Grinling, John. 'Activity Report Northern Sector: 1-28.2.77', 28 February 1977. ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . 'Activity Report Northern Sector: 1-31.3.77', 6 April 1977. ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . 'Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.1.76-31.1.76', 4 February 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . 'Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.2.76-29.1.76', 2 March 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . 'Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.3.76-30.4.76', 12 May 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . 'Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.5.76-30.6.76', 7 July 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . 'Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.7.76-31.8.76', 31 August 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . 'Activity Report Northern Sector from 1-30.9.76', 30 September 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . 'Activity Report Northern Sector from 1-30.11.76', 30 November 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . 'Activity Report Northern Sector from 1-31.10.76', 31 October 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . 'Internal Note: Situation in Karpasia', 11 February 1977. ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . 'Internal Note: The Situation in Karpasia,' Nicosia, 11 November 1976 (). [ICRC 7442-7443]', 11 November 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . 'Letter Addressed Cyprus Red Cross VP Ziyad Hakki', 27 August 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.

- . ‘Letter Addressed Cyprus Red Cross VP Ziyad Hakki’, 7 September 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Minutes of Meeting with Orhan Bilgehan, Minister of Interior’, 18 February 1977. ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Note: Protection of the GKCYP Population in the Karpasia District’, 10 May 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Note to G. Hoffman: The Situation in Karpasia’, 18 May 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Position Paper: Population Transfers in Kyrenia District (1.1.76-23.3.76)’, 24 March 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Report Northern Sector: 1-31.1.77’, 31 January 1977. ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- Grüneck, Harald Schmid de. ‘Concerne: Dome Hotel’, 10 October 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Evolution probable de la situation des minorites cypriotes-grecques dens les secteurs ouest et centres des territoires sous controle de l’armée Turque’, 22 February 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Letter to General Bedrettin Demirel, Commander in Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces in Cyprus’, 10 March 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Letter Addressed to Rauf Denktash’, 9 April 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.009 / 231 (35). ICRC.
- . ‘Letter to General Vahid Güneri, Commander in Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces in Cyprus, Nicosia’, 23 September 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Letter to Glafkos Clerides’, 27 June 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049-007.03 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Letter to Rauf Denktash’, 2 July 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Letter to Rauf Denktash’, 8 October 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Letter to the Commander in Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces, General Vahid Guneri’, 2 July 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Letter to Turkish Armed Forces Commander General Vahid Guneri’, My 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.06 / 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Lettre adressée par le Dr. Ziyad Hakki à M. le Président Eric Martin’, 28 July 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.

- . ‘Minutes of Meeting, 2 June 1975’, 4 June 1975. (ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Note No. 283: Brèves réflexions sur l’évolution de cette situation’, 30 June 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Procès-verbal d’entretien – Glafkos Clerides’, 12 November 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Procès-verbal d’entretien – Rauf Denktash’, 30 July 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.002.06 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Situation générale à fin octobre 1975 des minorités CYPGK dans les territoires sous contrôle CYPTK’, 31 October 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Your Note 127 Dated 21.3.75 LS/SW: Prisoners/Detainees’, 3 April 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 210 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- Gülseven, Enver. ‘Identity Contestations in the Turkish Cypriot Community and the Peace Process in Cyprus’. *Athens Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 6, no. 1 (11 December 2019): 21–38. <https://doi.org/10.30958/ajms.6-1-2>.
- Gürdeniz, Cem. ‘What Is the Blue Homeland in the 21st Century?’ *United World International*, 31 July 2020. <https://uwidata.com/12952-what-is-the-blue-homeland-in-the-21st-century/>.
- Gürel, Ayla, and Kudret Özersay. *The Politics of Property in Cyprus: Conflicting Appeals to ‘Bizonality’ and ‘Human Rights’ by the Two Cypriot Communities*. Vol. 3. Nicosia: PRIO, 2006. <https://cyprus.prio.org/Publications/Publication/?x=1174>.
- Hadjicostis, Menelaos. ‘Hardliner Wins Turkish Cypriot Leadership Election’. *Associated Press News*, 18 October 2020. <https://apnews.com/article/turkey-mustafa-akinci-ankara-greece-cyprus-b0d000e4c1140168fe10448ee08b3aa2>.
- Hadjikyriacou, Antonis. “The Province Goes to the Center: The Case of Hadjiyorgakis Kornesios, Dragoman of Cyprus,” in *Living in the Ottoman Realm: Sultans, Subjects, and Elites*, Eds., Christine Isom-Verhaaren and Kent F. Schull (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), 238-253.
- Hadjilyra, Alexander-Michael. ‘The Turkish-Cypriots: Distribution of Turkish-Cypriot Population, According to the 1946, 1960 and 1973 Censuses’. n.d. https://www.academia.edu/34209782/The_Turkish-Cypriots.
- Hakki, Ziyad. ‘Dr. Ziyad Hakki’s Letter Addressed to the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva, Mr. Erich Martin, Nicosia’, 25 July 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- Haklai, Oded, and Neophytos Loizides, eds. *Settlers in Contested Lands: Territorial Disputes and Ethnic Conflicts*. Kindle. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015.

- Hann. *Property Relations: Renewing the Anthropological Tradition*. Cambridge New York Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Hannay, David. *Cyprus: The Search for a Solution*. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2005.
- Harding, Luke. 'Turkish Cypriot Leader Warns Cyprus Is Facing Permanent Partition'. *The Guardian*, 6 February 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/06/turkish-cypriot-leader-warns-cyprus-facing-permanent-partition-mustafa-akinci>.
- Harman, Rabia. 'Performing Social Forgetting in a Post-Conflict Landscape: The Case of Cyprus', n.d., 307.
- Hart, Parker T. *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War: Cyprus, a Firsthand Account of Crisis Management, 1965-1968*. Duke University Press, 1990.
- Hatay, Mete. *Beyond Numbers: An Inquiry into the Political Integration of the Turkish 'Settlers' in Northern Cyprus*. Nicosia: PRIO Cyprus Center, 2005.
- . *Is the Turkish Cypriot Population Shrinking? An Overview of the Ethno-Demography of Cyprus in the Light of the Preliminary Results of the 2006 Turkish-Cypriot Census*. Oslo, Norway: International Peace Research Institute, 2007.
- . *Population and Politics in North Cyprus: An Overview of the Ethno-Demography of North Cyprus in the Light of the 2011 Census*. 2. Oslo (PRIO): Peace Research Institute, 2017.
- Hay, Alexandre. 'Letter to Rauf Denktash', 4 January 1977. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . 'Letter to Turkish Deputy Prime Minister, Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil', 4 January 1977. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- Hazou, Elias. 'Politicians Unite in "disgust" at Attacks on Turkish Cypriots'. *Cyprus Mail*. 20 January 2009. <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-192331690.html>.
- Helms, Elissa. *The New Bosnian Mosaic: Identities, Memories and Moral Claims in a Post-War Society*. Routledge, 2016.
- Hill, George. *A History of Cyprus: Volume 1: To the Conquest by Richard Lion Heart*. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940.
- . *A History of Cyprus: Volume 2: The Frankish Period 1192-1432*. Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948.
- . *A History of Cyprus: Volume 3: The Frankish Period, 1432-1571*. Vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948.
- . *A History of Cyprus: Volume 4: The Ottoman Province. The British Colony, 1571-1948*. Vol. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952.
- Hitchens, Christopher. 'Extract: The Trial of Henry Kissinger (III)'. *The Guardian*, 26 February 2001. <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2001/feb/26/extract.features11>.

- . *Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger*. London: Verso, 1997.
- Hobsbawm, Eric J. *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Hoffmann, Georg. ‘Base de discussion au conseil exécutive, du jeudi 3 Juin 1976’, 2 June 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Chypre: Réflexions de M. G. Hoffmann, Chef de délégation à Nicosie, sur la mission effectuée du 9 au 16 juin 1976 à Ankara par MM. Borsinger, L. Jaquinet et G. Hoffmann’, 21 June 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Concerne: Impasse dans le rapatriement des PG’, 30 September 1974. ICRC / BAG 231.049.001 / 231 (35). ICRC.
- . ‘General Report: Your Notes Nos. 222 and 223’, 17 January 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Internal Note: Concerning the Telephone Conversation between Mr. Borsinger and Mr. Hoffmann on 21st May 1976’, 22 May 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Karpasia after the Vienna Talks’, 18 April 1977. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Meeting with the Turkish Ambassador, Candemir Ünhoğlu on the 14th January, and President Denktash on the 15th January, 1977’, 20 January 1977. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Monthly Report: 21 November-31 December 1975’, 12 January 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘My Visit to Rizokarpasso and Ayia Trias on the 4th February, Accompanied by Mr. Grinling’, 7 February 1977. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Note No. 477: “Future of the Delegation of ICRC”’, 3 May 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Note No. 481: New Situation in Karpasia’, 11 May 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Note No. 507: Situation in Karpasia, Based on My Visit to the Area in the Company of Mr. Grinling on 22nd and 23rd July 1976’, 26 July 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Note No. 559: Reflections Concerning the Presence of ICRC in Cyprus’, 4 November 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Note No. 570: Visit to Karpasia by Mr. Hoffmann and Mr. Grinling on 18th to 19th November, 1976’, 22 November 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.

- . ‘Note No. 578: Reflection on the Demarches Made with Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Authorities after My Visit to Karpasia on 18-19th November’, 9 December 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Note No. 580: Reflections Concerning the Demarches of ICRC in the Present Situation’, 15 December 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Note No. 586: My Visit with Mr. Grinling on the 20th January, to Rizokarpaso, Ayia Trias, Ayios Andronikos and Leonarisso’, 25 January 1977. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Note No. 602: Reflections on Greek Cypriot Refugee Problems Based on a Visit in an Old People’s Home and Various Camps or Camp-like Refugee Agglomerations in Nicosia and Some Former Turkish Villages Resettled by Greeks from the North: Mallia, Ayios Nicolaos, Kithasi, Stavrokono, Yialia Pelathousa, Plataniskia, Ayios Thomas (Evdhimou) (*)’, 3 March 1977. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Pressure on GKCYPs in the North to Leave the Turkish-Controlled Area’, 22 March 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Rapport de M. G. Hoffmann sur sa visite à Chypre et à Ankara du 14 avril au 3 mai 1975’, 27 May 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.01 / 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Reflections on the Present Situation’, 3 February 1977. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Report for the Summer Months 1976, 1st May-31st August’, 31 August 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Report of Mr. G. Hoffmann’s Mission in Cyprus 15.9. till 28.9.77’, 30 September 1977. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Telegram No. 1303 to ICRC Geneva’, 17 March 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- Hoffmeister, Frank. *Legal Aspects of the Cyprus Problem: Annan Plan and EU Accession*. BRILL, 2006.
- Holland, Robert. *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959*. Clarendon Press, 1998.
- Holland, Robert, and Diana Markides. *The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850-1960: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850-1960*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Hook, Laurie van, ed. *Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976. Vol. XXX. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1974. <https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v30/pdf/frus1969-76v30.pdf>.
- Horowitz, Donald L. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Second edition. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.

- Hunt, David, ed. *Footprints in Cyprus: An Illustrated History*. 1990 ed. London: Trigraph, 1982.
- ICRC, Geneva. 'Note Verbale Addressed to the Chief Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces in Cyprus, General Bedrettin Demirel, Nicosia', 26 September 1974. ICRC / BAG 231.049.007 / 231 (35). ICRC.
- . 'Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of Turkey in Geneva to International Committee of the Red Cross', 3 August 1974. ICRC / BAG 229.049.001 / 229 (35). ICRC.
- . 'Telegram 21 to ICRC Ankara', 5 August 1974. ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 35-133 CY. ICRC.
- . 'Telegram 23 to ICRC Ankara', 6 August 1974. ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . 'Telegram 85 to ICRC Ankara', 16 September 1974. ICRC / BAG 231.049.001 / 231 (35). ICRC.
- . 'Telegram 296 to ICRC Nicosia', 10 September 1974. ICRC / BAG 231.049.001 / 231 (35). ICRC.
- . 'Telegram 22344 to ICRC UN', 5 August 1974. ICRC / BAG 229.049.001 / 229 (35). ICRC.
- . 'Telex to the DG of the UN Geneva', 29 July 1974. ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- ICRC, Limassol. 'Rapport d'activité bi-mensuel de la délégation de Limassol: Districts de Limassol et Larnaca, période du 16 au 30 Juin 1975', 30 June 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.02 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- ICRC, Limassol and Paphos. 'Weekly Activities in the South, 24.3.75 to 29.3.75', 29 March 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- ICRC, Nicosia. 'Activities of the ICRC Delegation from 17/11 to 23/11, NR 666', 27 November 1974. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.06 / 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . 'Aide-Memoire as to ICRC Activity in Cyprus', 14 April 1977. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . 'Annexe II: Note: The Present Medical Situation on the Island at the Time of Departure of the MMT's', 9 June 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229(35-53 CY)). ICRC.
- . 'Cases of Intimidation and Ill-Treatment in Karpasia Area', 8 March 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.06 / 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . 'Cyprus: Report on Visit to Three Greek Cypriot Communities in the Morphou Region', November 1974. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.01 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.

- . ‘Développement de la situation à Chypre depuis le 17 juin 1975’, 30 June 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Elementary Schools in Karpasia’, 14 April 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.06 / 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Logistic North: Weekly Activities, 16-21.6.75’, 21 June 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY) 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Meeting of Mr. G. Clerides and Mr. R. Denktash at Ledra Palace UN Conference Area, Monday 30 September 1974’, 9 October 1974. ICRC / BAG 231.049.001 / 231 (35). ICRC.
- . ‘Meeting of the Sub-Committee on Humanitarian Matters Held at the Ledra Palace UN Conference Area on Tuesday, 17 June 1975 (Fourteenth Meeting)’, 17 June 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.02 / 231 Et. (35-133CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Note No. 206: Entretien avec M. Rauf Denktash, le 14 avril 1975 à 0800, en présence de M. Celik’, 18 April 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.06 / 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Note No. 283: Développement de la situation à Chypre, depuis le 17 Juin 1975’, 30 June 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.03 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Note to Weekly Activities Report: Logistics North’, 21 April 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY) 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Population recensée par le gouvernement en avril 1973 par rapport à celle recensée par le CICR au 20 mai 1975’, 24 May 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Position of Members of the Same Family Caught on Opposite Sides of the Lines’, 6 September 1974. ICRC / BAG 231.049.001 / 231 (35). ICRC.
- . ‘Problems and Difficulties in the North: Period 1-14 November 1974’, 13 November 1974. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.06 / 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Rapport Hebdomadaire Activités, 14.7.75-19.7.75’, 18 July 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY) 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Rapport Hebdomadaire Activités, 23.6.75-30.6.75’, 2 July 1975. CRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Rapport Hebdomadaire Activités, 30.6.75-5.7.75’, 7 July 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Rapport Sur La Visite de Deux Concentrations de Civils Chypriotes Grecs à Morphou’, 19 November 1974. ICRC / BAG 229.049-002.01 / 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Situation Report of Larnaca Tis Lapithou (Kyrenia District)’, 28 June 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.

- . ‘Students Willing to Teach in Elementary School’, 12 April 1975. ICRC BAG 229.049.002.06 / 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Telegram 61 to ICRC Geneva’, 31 July 1974. ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Telegram 80 to ICRC Geneva’, 3 August 1974. ICRC / BAG 231.049.007 / 231 (35). ICRC.
- . ‘Telegram 81 to ICRC Geneva’, 3 August 1974. ICRC / BAG 231.049.002 / 231 (35). ICRC.
- . ‘Telegram 98 to ICRC Geneva’, 6 August 1974. ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Telegram 105 to ICRC Geneva’, 8 August 1974. ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 35-133 CY. ICRC.
- . ‘Telegram 165 to ICRC Geneva’, 16 August 1974. ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Telegram 193 to ICRC Geneva’, 20 August 1974. ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Telegram 247 to ICRC Geneva’, 27 August 1974. (ICRC / BAG 231.049.007 / 231 (35). ICRC.
- . ‘Telegram 250 to ICRC Geneva’, 27 August 1974. ICRC / BAG 231.049.007 / 231 (35).
- . ‘Telegram 324 to ICRC Geneva’, 6 September 1974. (ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Telegram 457 to ICRC Geneva’, 28 September 1974. ICRC / BAG 231.049.003 / 231 (35). ICRC.
- . ‘Telegram 1154 to ICRC Geneva’, 23 July 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.03 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Telegram 1167 to ICRC Geneva’, 29 July 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.06 / 229(35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Telegram 1186 to ICRC Geneva’, 13 August 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Telegram 1201 to ICRC Geneva’, 29 August 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Telegram 1204 to ICRC Geneva’, 5 September 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY). ICRC.

- . ‘Telegram 1208 to ICRC Geneva’, 9 September 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Telegram 1221 to ICRC Geneva’, 2 October 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Weekly Activities Report, 5.5.75-10.5.75’, 12 May 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Weekly Activities Report, 12.5.75-17.5.75’, 17 May 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Weekly Activities Report, 14.4.75-19.4.75’, 21 April 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Weekly Activities Report, 19.5.75-24.5.75’, 26 May 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- Immovable Property Commission. ‘Homepage’. Accessed 18 April 2020. <http://www.tamk.gov.ct.tr/english/index.html>.
- . ‘Information Booklet: Property Rights of Greek Cypriot Residents of the Karpaz and Their Heirs’, 2013, 26. <http://www.tamk.gov.ct.tr/dokuman/Karpaz%20Booklet.pdf>.
- ‘In The Hague, Annan Holds Talks on Finalizing Cyprus Deal’. UN News Centre, n.d. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=6398&Cr=cyprus&Cr1=>.
- In-Cyprus. ‘Government Relocation Scheme to Turkish-Held Villages: The Problems and the Numbers’. *Phileleftheros*, 22 January 2020. <https://in-cyprus.philenews.com/government-relocation-scheme-to-turkish-held-villages-the-problems-and-the-numbers/>.
- Ingrao, Charles, and Thomas A. Emmert, eds. *Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies*. Washington, D.C. and West Lafayette: United States Institute of Peace Press and Purdue University Press, 2010. https://issuu.com/gradjanskeinicijative/docs/ingrao-emmert_scholars_initiative_final.
- Intercross, Zuger. ‘Telegram 84 to ICRC Geneva’, 3 August 1974. ICRC / BAG 231.049.002 / 231 (35). ICRC.
- . ‘Telegram 666 from ICRC Nicosia to ICRC Geneva: Activities of the ICRC Delegation from 17/11 to 23/11’, 27 November 1974. ICRC / BAG 231.009-002 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- Ioannides, Christos P. *In Turkey’s Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province*. Illustrated edition. New Rochelle, N.Y: Aristide D. Caratzas, 2011.
- Jensehaugen, Helge. ‘The Northern Cypriot Dream – Turkish Immigration 1974–1980’. *The Cyprus Review* 26, no. 2 (Fall 2014): 57–83.

- Joseph, J. *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union*. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1997. <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-0-333-98345-4>.
- Junod, Alain. 'Note: Arrest of 7 TKCYP at Nicosia While Attempting to Go to the North', 28 June 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.02 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . 'Note for the Attention of Mr. Harald Schmid De Grunec, Head of Mission: Arrest of 48 TKCYP Attempting to Go to the North on 26.6.75 and Alleged Ill-Treatment on the Persons Arrested by GKCYCYP Officials', 26 June 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049-007.03 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . 'Note: Temporary Detention of Ali Besim', 28 June 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.02 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . 'Rapport sur la situation générale des villages cyprotes-turcs non-rendus du district de Paphos à fin janvier 1975, Paphos', 3 February 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . 'Weekly Activities (24.3.75-28.3.75), Paphos', 29 March 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. *Civil Wars*. Wiley, 2018.
- . *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Kanli, Yusuf. 'New Residence Regulation in North Cyprus'. *Hurriyet Daily News*, 1 October 2019. <https://www.hurriyetsdailynews.com/opinion/yusuf-kanli/new-residence-regulation-in-north-cyprus-147011>.
- Karaca, Salah Zeki. 'Counsellor of the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia, Salah Zeki Karaca's Letter Addressed to ICRC Head of Mission, Laurent Marti', 16 August 1974. ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- Kathimerini. 'Checkpoints Partially Resume Operation after Three Months'. *Kathimerini*, 9 June 2020. <https://knews.kathimerini.com.cy/en/news/checkpoints-partially-resume-operation-after-three-months>.
- . 'Υπόμνημα επέδωσαν οι Καρπασίτες στον Πρόεδρο: Ζητούν όπως τεθεί υπό ελληνοκυπριακή διοίκηση, εφόσον επιτευχθεί λύση του Κυπριακού [The Karpasites presented a memorandum to the President: They demand that it be placed under Greek Cypriot administration, if a solution to the Cyprus problem is reached]'. *Kathimerini*, 8 April 2014. <https://www.kathimerini.com.cy/gr/politiki/167886/?ctype=ar>.
- . 'First Turkish Cypriot MEP Envisions Himself as Division Healer'. *Kathimerini*, 31 May 2019. <http://www.ekathimerini.com/241140/article/ekathimerini/community/first-turkish-cypriot-mep-envisions-himself-as-division-healer>.
- Katsiaounes, Rolandos. *Labour, Society, and Politics in Cyprus During the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century*. Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1996.

- Katsourides, Yiannos. 'First Reaction on the Electoral Results in Cyprus'. transform! europe, 27 May 2019. <https://www.transform-network.net/en/focus/overview/article/ep-2019-the-european-left-one-mouth-many-voices/first-reaction-on-the-electoral-results-in-cyprus/>.
- Kaymak, Erol, Alexandros Lordos, and Nathalie Tocci. *Building Confidence in Peace: Public Opinion and the Cyprus Peace Process*. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2009.
- Keller, N. de. 'Main Violations of the Geneva Conventions Witnessed by I.C.R.C. Delegates in the Northern Zone Since the Beginning of 1975', 29 January 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . 'Main Violations of the Geneva Conventions Witnessed by I.C.R.C. Delegates in the Northern Zone Since the Beginning of 1975', 29 January 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . 'Report on ICRC Visit to Karpasia, Famagusta District', 10 October 1974. ICRC / BAG 231.049.007 / 231 (35). ICRC.
- Ker-Lindsay, James. *EU Accession and UN Peacemaking in Cyprus*. Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2005.
- . *The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know*. Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Khadder, Tania. 'Turkish Cypriots Line up for Passports'. *Cyprus Mail*, 25 April 2003. <http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/cmnews/2003/03-04-25.cmnews.html#03>.
- King, Russell, and Sarah Ladbury. 'The Cultural Reconstruction of Political Reality: Greek and Turkish Cyprus Since 1974'. *Anthropological Quarterly* 55, no. 1 (1982): 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3317371>.
- Kontos, Michalis, and George Bitsis. 'Power Games in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republic of Cyprus: The Trouble with Turkey's Coercive Diplomacy.' *The Cyprus Review* 31, no.1 (2018): 51-70.
- Kossiva, Andriana. 'National Report on Hate Crime Monitoring: Cyprus'. Nicosia: Together: Fighting Against Racism, August 2016. http://www.together-project.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/eng-NationalReportCyprus_Fin-web.pdf.
- Koumettou, Josephine. 'Ban on Crossings to UN, Diplomatic Missions for a Week, Says Ozersay'. *In-Cyprus*, 12 April 2020. <https://in-cyprus.philenews.com/ban-on-crossings-to-un-diplomatic-missions-for-a-week-says-ozersay/>.
- Koumoulides, John T. A., ed. *Cyprus in Transition, 1960-1985*. 1st edition. London: Trigraph, 1986.
- Kressel, Neil Jeffrey. *Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror*. New York: Plenum Press, 1996.

- Ktoris, Sotos. 'AKEL and the Turkish Cypriots (1941–1955)'. *The Cyprus Review* 25, no. 2 (2013): 15–38.
- . *Τουρκοκύπριοι: Από Το Περιθώριο Στο Συνεταιρισμό (1923–1960) [Turkish Cypriots: From Marginalisation to Partnership 1923–1960]*. Athens: Papazisi, 2013.
- Küng, F. Peter. 'Report on Economical and Food Situations of the Greek-Cypriot Population Living in the North', 1 January 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . 'Situation of the GKCYP Population Living in the North of Cyprus by End June 1975', 28 June 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . 'Visit to Karpasia Thursday 16 and Friday 17.1.1975 for Distribution of Individual Parcels and Red-Cross Food Parcels to Very Needy People', 17 January 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . 'Weekly Activities Report, 14.4.75-19.4.75: Specific Problems', 21 April 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.03 / 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- Kuo, Kendrick, and Harris Mylonas. 'Nation-Building and the Role of Identity in Civil Wars'. *Ethnopolitics*, 5 November 2019: 1–21. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2019.1684095>.
- Kurtuluş, Hatice, and Semra Purkis. 'Spatially Segregated and Socially Excluded Turkish Migrants in Northern Cyprus: An Alternative Perspective'. *İ.Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 48 (14 December 2013): 1–22.
- Kyle, Keith. 'Cyprus: In Search of Peace'. London: Minority Rights Group, 1997. <https://web.archive.org/web/20070208042536/http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main.html>.
- Laakso, Jakko. 'Report on the Colonization by Turkish Settlers of the Occupied Part of Cyprus'. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, 2003. <http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=10153&lang=EN>.
- Lacher, Hannes, and Erol Kaymak. 'Transforming Identities: Beyond the Politics of Non-Settlement in North Cyprus'. *Mediterranean Politics* 10, no. 2 (1 July 2005): 147–66. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629390500124341>.
- Lambrou, Giannis. *Ιστορία του Κυπριακού: Τα χρόνια μετά την ανεξαρτησία: 1960-2008 [History of Cyprus Problem: The years After Independence: 1960-2008]*. Athens: Parga, 2008.
- Landa, Ronald D., James E. Miller, David S. Patterson, and Charles S. Sampson, eds. *Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus*. Vol. X, Part 1. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v10p1/d293>.

- Lemkin, Raphael. *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress*. 2008th ed. Clark, New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange, 1944.
- Lennartz, Alain. ‘Activity Report Northern Sector: 1-31.12.76’, 4 January 1977. ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.11.75-31.12.75’, 14 January 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Note No. 437: Activity Report Northern Sector from 1.1.1976 to 31.1.1976’, 10 February 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.011 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Visit to Karpasia on 21st and 22nd June, 1977’, 18 July 1977. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- Leonidou, John. ‘Maronites Ponder Kormakitis Return’. *Cyprus Mail*, 17 October 2010. <http://archive.is/OpqiV>.
- Liasi, Toula. *Τετράδιον Αναμνήσεων: Ημερολόγιον, 15 Ιουλίου 1974-29 Αυγούστου 1975* [Notebook of Memories: Diary, 15 July 1974-29 August 1975]. *Phileleftheros*, 21 July 2019. Nicosia: Proteas Press Ltd., 2019.
- Lieberman, Benjamin David. *Terrible Fate: Ethnic Cleansing in the Making of Modern Europe*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006.
- Lim, Preston Jordan. *The Evolution of British Counter-Insurgency during the Cyprus Revolt, 1955–1959*. London: Malgrave Macmillan, 2018.
- Loizides, Neophytos. ‘Contested Migration and Settler Politics in Cyprus’. *Political Geography* 30, no. 7 (1 September 2011): 391–401. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2011.08.004>.
- . ‘Settlers and Mobilization in Cyprus: Antinomies of Ethnic Conflict and Immigration Politics’. Presented at the American Political Science Association, Toronto, 2009. <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.522.5501&rep=rep1&type=pdf>.
- Loizides, Neophytos G., and Basak Ekenoglu. ‘Refugees, Settlers and Diasporas in the Cyprus Conflict’’. In *Cyprus and the Roadmap for Peace: A Critical Interrogation of the Conflict*, edited by Michalis Michael and Yucel Vural, 119–35. Edward Elgar, 2018.
- Loizos, Peter. *The Greek Gift: Politics in a Cypriot Village*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975.
- . *The Heart Grown Bitter: A Chronicle of Cypriot War Refugees*. CUP Archive, 1981.
- Makarios III, Archbishop/President. ‘Address at the Fifth Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries Held in Colombo, Sri Lanka’, 17 August 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.

- Mallinson, William. *Cyprus: A Modern History*. London and New York: I.B. Taurus, 2005.
- Mann, Michael. *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Markides, Diana Weston. *Cyprus 1957-1963: From Colonial Conflict to Constitutional Crisis: The Key Role of the Municipal Issue*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2001.
- . ‘The Politics of Honour and the Greek Divide at Cypriot Independence’. *Cyprus Review* 22, no. 2 (Fall 2010): 123-138.
- Marti, Laurent. ‘Activités CICR – collaboration avec les Forces armées’, 26 September 1974. (ICRC / BAG 231.049.009 / 231 (35). ICRC.
- Marty, Dick. ‘Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Greek Cypriots and Maronites Living in the Northern Part of Cyprus’, 20 February 2003. <http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=10020&lang=EN>.
- Matsoukaris, A. ‘Extracts from Statements to Cyprus Police by Greek Cypriots Held at the Seray Police Station, Nicosia and Released by the Turks on 28/7/75, Appendix to Letter Addressed to ICRC Head of Mission in Nicosia, Harald Schmid de Grunneck’, 29 July 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.06 / 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- Mayes, Stanley. *Makarios: A Biography*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1981.
- Maziad, Marwa, and Jake Sotiriadis. ‘Turkey’s Dangerous New Exports: Pan-Islamist, Neo-Ottoman Visions and Regional Instability’. Middle East Institute, 21 April 2020. <https://www.mei.edu/publications/turkeys-dangerous-new-exports-pan-islamist-neo-ottoman-visions-and-regional>.
- McGarry, John. *Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order*. OUP Oxford, 2001.
- Melakopides, Costas. ‘Euro-Mediterranean Peacebuilding: The Exit from the Cypriot-Greco-Turkish Labyrinth’. In *Euro-Med Integration and the “Ring Of Friends”: The Mediterranean’s European Challenge, Vol IV*. Edited by Peter G. Xuereb. European Documentation and Research Centre, 2003. <http://aei.pitt.edu/1646/>.
- Melamid, Alexander. ‘The Geographical Distribution of Communities in Cyprus’. *Geographical Review* 46, no. 3 (1956): 355–74. <https://doi.org/10.2307/211885>.
- Michael, Michalis N., Eftihios Gavriel, and Matthias Kappler, eds. *Ottoman Cyprus: A Collection of Studies on History and Culture*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2009.
- Michael, Michális S., and Yücel Vural, eds. *Cyprus and the Roadmap for Peace: A Critical Interrogation of the Conflict*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018.
- Michalarou, Christos. ‘Πάνω από €17,5εκ. σε 12 μήνες ξόδεψαν οι Τουρκοκύπριοι στις ελεύθερες περιοχές [In 12 months Turkish Cypriots spent over €17.5 million in the free areas]’. *Economy Today*, 14 January 2019.

https://economytoday.sigmalive.com/oikonomia/kypros/5835_pano-apo-eu175ek-se-12-mines-xodepsan-oi-toyrkokyprioi-stis-eleytheres.

Michel, Christian. 'Note de Dossier', 7 October 1974. ICRC / BAG 231.049.001 / 231 (35). ICRC.

Micheli, A. Dominique. 'Note de Dossier: À l'attention de M. Borsinger', 9 July 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049-007.03 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.

Micheli, M. 'Note', 6 August 1974. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.06 / 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.

Middle East Online. 'Turkish Cypriots Block UN Aid Convoy to Greek Cypriots'. MEO, 22 March 2018. <https://middle-east-online.com/en/turkish-cypriots-block-un-aid-convoy-greek-cypriots>.

Migdalovitz, Carol. 'Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations'. CRS Issue Brief for Congress. US Congress, 2002.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus. 'Historical Review'. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Cyprus, 2006. http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/cyprus01_en/cyprus01_en?OpenDocument#.

Ministry of Interior - Electoral Service. 'European Elections 2014'. European Elections 22-25 May 2014. http://www.euroelections2014.gov.cy/en/05_Candidates.htm.

Mirbagheri, Farid. *Cyprus and International Peacemaking 1964-1986*. London: Routledge, 2014.

Misiaouli, Anna. 'Νέα Κίνηση Προς Τους Μαρωνίτες [New Move towards Maronites]'. *Dialogos*, 20 October 2018, sec. Featured. <https://dialogos.dgmedialink.com/351803-2/>.

Moran, Michael, ed. *Rauf Denktash at the United Nations: Speeches on Cyprus*. Huntingdon: Eothen Press, 1997.

Morgan, Tabitha. *Sweet and Bitter Island: A History of the British in Cyprus*. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010.

Moudouros, Nikos. 'Erdoğan's Cyprus: Another Aspect of the Turkish Model'. In *Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem Edited by Jonathan Warner, David W. Lovell and Michalis Kontos*. Accessed 22 May 2020. https://www.academia.edu/30270178/Erdo%C4%9Fan_s_Cyprus_Another_Aspect_of_the_Turkish_Model.

———. "Ο Τατάρ εκπροσωπεί την πολιτική της υπακοής" [Tatar represents the policy of obedience], *Ανατολικότερα [Further East]*(blog), 26 October 2020, <https://anatolikotera.wordpress.com/2020/10/26/ο-τατάρ-εκπροσωπεί-την-πολιτική-της-υπ/>

Müftüleri-Bac, Meltem, and Aylin Güney. 'The European Union and the Cyprus Problem 1961-2003'. *Middle Eastern Studies* 41, no. 2 (March 2005): 281–93. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4284362>.

- Mulaj, Klejda. *Politics of Ethnic Cleansing: Nation-State Building and Provision of In/Security in Twentieth-Century Balkans*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008.
- Muller, Jerry Z. 'Us and Them: The Enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism'. *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 2 (2008): 18–35. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20032578>.
- Munger, Bernard. 'Note: La situation en Karpasie', 22 September 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.010 / 231 (35). ICRC.
- Mylonas, Harris. *The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Naimark, Norman M. *Fires of Hatred*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.
- Navaro, Yael. 'De-Ethnicizing the Ethnography of Cyprus: Political and Social Conflict Between Turkish Cypriots and Settlers from Turkey'. In *Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History and an Island in Conflict*, 84–99. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006.
- Navaro-Yashin, Yael. *The Make-Believe Space: Affective Geography in a Postwar Polity*. Kindle. Duke University Press Books, 2012.
- Neukomm, Cedric A. 'Letter to Col. O'Sullivan, UNFICYP, Nicosia', 5 September 1974. CRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . 'Report on Special Visit to Nicosia Central Prison', 22 July 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.006 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . 'Special Visit to Ayios Dometios Police Station', 22 July 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.006 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- Offsite Team. 'Συνολικά 6.657 αιτήσεις στην “επιτροπή ακίνητη ιδιοκτησίας” [A total of 6657 applications at the “immovable property commission”]'. *Offsite*, 10 January 2020. <https://www.offsite.com.cy/eidiseis/topika/synolika-6657-aitiseis-stin-epitropi-akiniti-idioktisias>.
- Olander, Magnus. 'General Resume of Conditions in the Karpas', 12 May 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- O'Leary, Brendan, Ian S. Lustick, and Thomas Callaghy, eds. *Right-Sizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- O'Malley, Brendan, and Ian Craig. *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*. Bloomsbury Academic, 2001.
- Öner, N. Aslı Şirin and Deniz Genc. 'Continuity or Change in Turkey's Mass Migration Policy: From 1989 Émigrés to Syrian “Guests”'. *Turkish Migration Conference 2015 Selected Proceedings*. Accessed 20 May 2020. https://www.academia.edu/16168129/Continuity_or_Change_in_Turkey_s_Mass_Migration_Policy_From_1989_%C3%A9migr%C3%A9s_to_Syrian_guests.
- Palley, Claire. *An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary-General's Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004*. Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2005.

- Panayides, Theo. 'Turkish Cypriot Caught between Two Sides'. *Cyprus Mail*, 12 August 2020. <https://99549445.com/2020/08/12/insisting-on-being-cypriot/>.
- Pantelides, Elias. *Βιώματα Κύπρος 1974 [Laconic Tales Cyprus 1974]*. Nicosia: Ekdoseis Elia Epiphaniou, 2018.
- Papadakis, Yiannis. 'Disclosure and Censorship in Divided Cyprus: Toward an Anthropology of Ethnic Autism'. In *Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History and an Island in Conflict*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006.
- . *Echoes from the Dead Zone*. London: I.B. Taurus, 2005.
- Papadakis, Yiannis, Nicos Peristianis, and Gisela Welz, eds. *Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History, and an Island in Conflict*. Indiana University Press, 2006.
- Papageorgiou, Panagiotis, ed. *Καρπασία: 'ες γην των Αγίων και των ηρώων': πρακτικά Α' Επιστημονικού Συνεδρίου Panagiotis Papageorgiou, Καρπασία: Πρακτικά Α' Επιστημονικού Συνεδρίου [Karpasia: Proceedings of the First Scientific Conference "In the Land of Saints and Heroes"]*. Limassol: Σωματείο Ελεύθερη Ενιαία Καρπασία, 2010.
- Patrick, Richard A. *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict: 1963-1971*. Department of Geography Publication Series 4. Waterloo, Iowa: University of Waterloo Press, 1976.
- Pelagidis, Theodore, Andreas Theophanous, and Yiannis Tirkides. 'An Anatomy of the Economy of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" (TRNC)'. *Journal of Modern Hellenism* 25–26 (20 September 2008). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1931229.
- Pelekani, Chryso, and Loizos Symeou. 'Civil Society Monitoring Report on Implementation of the National Roma Integration Strategies in Cyprus: Focusing on Structural and Horizontal Preconditions for Successful Implementation of the Strategy.' European Commission, May 2018. <http://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/98364c8c-b1ab-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1>.
- Percival, D.A. *Census of Population and Agriculture 1946 Report*. Nicosia: Government Printing Office, 1949.
- Peristianis, Nicos. 'Cypriot Nationalism, Dual Identity, and Politics'. In *Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History, and an Island in Conflict*, 100–120. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006.
- Phileleftheros. '80.664 Τ/κ με ταυτότητα και διαβατήριο της Δημοκρατίας [80,664 TCs with Republic identity cards and passports]'. *Phileleftheros*, 1 April 2018. <http://rss.philenews.com/eidiseis/politiki/article/507509/80-664-t-k-me-taftotita-kai-diabatirio-tis-dimokratias>.
- . 'Οι εγκλωβισμένοι ψήφισαν με την ελπίδα της επανένωσης [The Enclaved Voted in the Hope of Reunification]'. *Phileleftheros*, 26 May 2019. <https://www.philenews.com/koinonia/eidiseis/article/709244/oi-egglobismenoi-psifisan-me-tin-elpida-tis-epanensis>.

- PIO. 'Resumption of Direct Talks'. Recent Developments. Accessed 4 October 2011. <http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/EF86A31D71D4E4C5C225783800382313?OpenDocument>.
- . 'Toward a Unified Cyprus: The Myth of Turkish Cypriot "Isolation"'. Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus, 2010. [http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/A40EC9DFCDD35C8DC225759400248930/\\$file/Toward%20a%20Unified%20Cyprus%20%281.9%20MB,%202010%29.pdf](http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/A40EC9DFCDD35C8DC225759400248930/$file/Toward%20a%20Unified%20Cyprus%20%281.9%20MB,%202010%29.pdf).
- PIO, and Statistical Service. 'Cyprus in Figures: 2019'. Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus, 2019. [https://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/All/C91603BD82050327C22582030022C7F2/\\$file/CYPRUS_IN_FIGURES-2019-EN-201219.pdf?OpenElement](https://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/All/C91603BD82050327C22582030022C7F2/$file/CYPRUS_IN_FIGURES-2019-EN-201219.pdf?OpenElement).
- Pouyouros, Andreas. 'Letter to the ICRC's Melchior Borsinger', 14 September 1979. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- PRIO Cyprus Centre. 'Internal Displacement in Cyprus: Mapping the Consequences of Civil and Military Strife'. Internal Displacement in Cyprus, n.d. <http://www.prio-cyprus-displacement.net/default.asp?id=24>.
- Protocols to the 2003 Treaty of Accession. Accessed 28 May 2011. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12003T/htm/L2003236EN.093100.htm>.
- Qerimi, Qerim. "'All You Can Do Is Pray": Implications for Human Rights Advocacy of the Lack of Recognition of Ethnic Cleansing as an International Crime on Its Own'. *Journal of Human Rights Practice* 10, no. 3 (26 December 2018): 508–23. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jhuman/huy027>.
- Reuters, 'Cyprus Vote Produces Upset Victory, Laid to Peace Proposal'. *The New York Times*, 17 February 2003. <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/17/world/cyprus-vote-produces-upset-victory-laid-to-peace-proposal.html>.
- Richmond, Anthony. *Global Apartheid: Refugees, Racism, and the New World Order*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Richter, Heinz. *A Concise History of Modern Cyprus, 1878-2009*. Harrassowitz Verlag: Peleus, 2010.
- Roberts, Steven V. 'Greek Cypriots, Bowing to Pressure, Are Leaving Northern Cyprus; Hopes for Political Solution Fade'. *The New York Times*, 1 November 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- Ron, James. *Frontiers and Ghettos: State Violence in Serbia and Israel*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.
- Rossides, Zenon. 'Letter to the United Nations Secretary-General, 2 July 1975', 3 July 1975.
- . 'Letter to the United Nations Secretary-General, A/10322, S/11860', 27 October 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.010 / 231 (35). ICRC.

- . ‘Letter to the United Nations Secretary-General and Annex: Violations of the Vienna Agreement of 2 August in the Intercommunal Talks’, 29 January 1976.
- Said, Edward W. *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978.
- Sakellaropoulos, Spyros. *Ο Κυπριακός Κοινωνικός Σχηματισμός (1191-2004) Από Τη Συγκρότηση Στη Διχοτόμηση [The Cypriot Social Transformation (1191–2004): From the Establishment to Partition]*. Athens: Topos, 2017.
- Salem, Norma. *Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and Its Resolution*. New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1992.
- Saltiel, Leon. *The Holocaust in Thessaloniki: Reactions to the Anti-Jewish Persecution, 1942-1943*. London: Routledge, 2020.
- Sanschagrin, Johanne. ‘The Dark Side of Nation-States: Ethnic Cleansing in Modern Europe’. *Canadian Studies in Population* 44 (13 December 2017): 217-8. <https://doi.org/10.25336/P6289S>.
- Sant Cassia, Paul. *Bodies of Evidence: Burial, Memory and the Recovery of Missing Persons in Cyprus*. Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007.
- Sassen, Saskia. *Guests and Aliens*. New York: New Press, 1999.
- Schabas, William A., and William Schabas. *Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Scherer, John L. *Blocking the Sun: The Cyprus Conflict*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1997.
- Schlicher, Ronald. ‘G/C Enclaved in Karpas Are Enduring, But Dwindling’, 23 July 2008. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08NICOSIA559_a.html.
- . ‘Turkish Cypriot Census Debate Focuses on Natives Versus “Settlers”’, 18 May 2007. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07NICOSIA434_a.html.
- . ‘Turkish Cypriot Economy Enjoying Double-Digit Growth’, 18 May 2006. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06NICOSIA757_a.html.
- Schnabel, Albrecht, and Ramesh Thakur, eds. *Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship*. Tokyo; New York: United Nations University Press, 2000.
- Scott, Julie. ‘Property Values: Ownership, Legitimacy and Land Markets in Northern Cyprus’. In *Property Relations: Renewing the Anthropological Tradition*, 142–59. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1998.
- Sémelin, Jacques. ‘Analysis of a Mass-Crime. Ethnic Cleansing in the Former Yugoslavia (1991-1999)’. In *Spectre of Genocide: Mass Murder in a Historical Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

- . *Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.
- . ‘What Is Genocide?’ *European Review of History* 12, no. 1 (March 2005): 81–89. doi.org/10.1080/13507480500047837.
- Shelton, Dinah. *Remedies in International Human Rights Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- SigmaLive. ‘Φωτίου: Ξανά Στην ΟΥΝΦΙΚΥΠΙ Το Θέμα Των Εγκλωβισμένων [Fotiou: The Issue of Enclaved Again with UNFICYP]’, 10 October 2017. <https://www.sigmalive.com/news/politics/460803/fotiou-ksana-stin-ounfikyp-to-thema-ton-egklovismenon>.
- Simonius, Lix. ‘Chypre’, 14 October 1974. ICRC / BAG 231.049.001 / 231 (35). ICRC.
- . ‘Chypre’, 30 January 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.06 / 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Chypre’, 12 August 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35). ICRC.
- . ‘Chypre – Evacuations’, 29 July 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049-002.06 / 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Chypre – Votre Note no. 519’, 10 February 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049-012 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Chypre: avenir de la délégation’, 5 January 1977. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Chypre: Expulsion de Cypristes grecs du Nord et Immigration turque en provenance d’Anatolie’, 10 May 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Compte rendu d’entretien/téléphone – M.C. Neukomm (Nicosie) et Simonius & Borsinger’, 21 July 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.03 / 229 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Compte reundu d’entretien: Téléphone - G. Hoffmann’, 25 February 1977. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Compte reundu d’entretien:G. Hoffmann, Nicosie’, 11 February 1977. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘CR Turc’, 29 July 1974. ICRC / BAG 229.049.007.04 / 35-133 CY. ICRC.
- . ‘Divers’, 30 January 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘En Chypre: Divers’, 15 January 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Letter to the Deputy Secretary General of the Australian Red Cross Society, N. Minogue’, 23 March 1977. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.

- . ‘Procès-verbal d’entretien du 9.13.78 avec le Gouvernement Cyprite’, 23 January 1979. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘P.V. de téléphone - Schmid de Grunec, 10:15’, 18 August 1975. ICRC / BAG 229.049.002.06 / 210 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Rapport de mission à Chypre, 4-14.12.78’, 23 January 1979. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Rapport de Mission à Chypre, 28.5.1979-6.6.1979’, 3 July 1979. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Rapport de mission à Chypre du 14.01.1980-24.01.1980’, 14 February 1980. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Téléphone - G. Hoffmann, Chef délégation Nicosie’, 18 August 1976. ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Téléphone – Philipp Zuger’, 28 January 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Visite au Cypriotes grecs résident au Nord de l’île’, 5 December 1978. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Visite aux Cypriotes turcs résident au Sud’, 11 December 1978. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Visite Faite: Andreas Mavrommatis, Ambassadeur – “Récente mission à Chypre”’, 3 January 1979. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Visite reçue: Andreas Pouyouros, Ambassadeur: Chypre’, 14 September 1979. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Visite reçue: Mr. Arim, Représentant permanent adjoint, Mission Permanent de la Turquie à Genève’, 2 September 1974. ICRC / BAG 231.049.007 / 231 (35). ICRC.
- Smith, Anthony. *Nationalism and Modernism*. London: Routledge, 2013.
- Smith, Helena. ‘Erdoğan Met by Protests from Turkish Cypriots during Visit’. *Guardian*, 15 November 2020. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/15/erdogan-met-by-protests-from-turkish-cypriots-during-visit-northern-cyprus>.
- Solomou, Emiliou, and Hubert Faustmann, eds. *Colonial Cyprus, 1878-1960: Selected Readings from the Cyprus Review*. Nicosia: University of Nicosia Press, 2010.
- Soulioti, Stella. *Fettered Independence: Cyprus, 1878-1964, Volume One*. Modern Greek Studies, University of Minnesota, 2006.
- . *Fettered Independence: Cyprus, 1878-1964, Volume Two*. Modern Greek Studies, University of Minnesota, 2006.

- . ‘Letter to Melchior Borsinger, ICRC Delegate General for Europe and North America’, 29 December 1978. ICRC / BAG 231.049.013 / 231 (35-53CY). ICRC.
- Söyler, Mehtap. *The Turkish Deep State: State Consolidation, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*. New York: Routledge, 2015.
- Spirgi, Dr. E. M. ‘Incident in Karpasia during Evacuation of Ioannis Harpas, 6 Years Old’, 13 October 1974. ICRC / BAG 231.049.007 / 231 (35). ICRC.
- . ‘Incident in Karpasia during Transfer Operation on 10 October 1974’, 16 October 1974. (ICRC / BAG 231.049.007 / 231 (35). ICRC.
- . ‘Position Paper on Medical Situation in Karpasia’, 5 December 1974. ICRC / BAG 231.049.007 / 231 (35). ICRC.
- Stefanovic, Djordje, and Neophytos Loizides. ‘The Way Home: Peaceful Return of Victims of Ethnic Cleansing’. *Human Rights Quarterly* 33, no. 2 (2011): 408–30. <https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.2011.0029>.
- Stelgias, Nikos. ‘Turkish-Cypriot Leader Insists on Two-State Solution’. *Kathimerini*, 30 November 2020. <https://www.ekathimerini.com/259700/article/ekathimerini/news/turkish-cypriot-leader-insists-on-two-state-solution>.
- . ‘Με το βλέμμα στην Καρπασία η Άγκυρα [Ankara has its eye on Karpasia]’. *Kathimerini*, 19 December 2016. <https://www.kathimerini.gr/888476/article/epikairothta/politikh/me-to-vlemma-sthn-karpasia-h-agkyra>.
- Stern, Laurence Marcus. *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy*. New York: Times Books, 1977.
- Stylianou, Petros. ‘Letter to the ICRC President’, 14 October 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 Exp. (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . ‘Letter to the ICRC President’, 17 July 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 Exp. (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- Sudetic, Chuck. ‘Breaking Cease-Fire, Serbs Launch Attacks Into Bosnia’. *The New York Times*, 15 April 1992. <https://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/15/world/breaking-cease-fire-serbs-launch-attacks-into-bosnia.html>.
- Thames TV. ‘The Sad Face of Cyprus’. *This Week*, 1976. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3YcbVFAPg_o.
- . ‘Turkish Invasion of Cyprus: A Divided Cyprus’. *This Week*, 22 August 1974. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yB1xwOfHYsM>.
- Theophanous, Andreas. ‘Economic Growth and Development in Cyprus 1960-1984’. *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook* 7 (1991): 105–132.

- . ‘Reassessing the Prospects for a Solution of the Cyprus Problem’. *In Depth* 12, no. 4 (September 2015). http://cceia.unic.ac.cy/wp-content/uploads/IN_DEPTH-2015_12_4.pdf.
- . ‘Revisiting the Cyprus Question and the Way Forward’. *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 15, no. 4 (2017): 37–50.
- . ‘The Anatomy of the Economic “Miracle” 1974-1994’. *The Anatomy of a Change: Cyprus After*, 1996.
- . *The Cyprus Question and the EU: The Challenge and the Promise*. Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 2004.
- . *The Political Economy of a Cyprus Settlement*. PRIO Cyprus Center, 2008. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/88144/2008_Political%20Economy%20of%20a%20Cypus%20Settlement.pdf.
- . *The Political Economy of a Federal Cyprus*. Research and Development Center, Intercollege Press, 1996.
- . ‘The Republic of Cyprus in Perspective: The Record and Future Challenges’. *Cyprus and the EU: Appraisal and Challenges*, Notre Europe, no. 58 (September 2012).
- Theophanous, Andreas, and Odysseas Christou. ‘The Cyprus Question and the Role of the UN: An Overall Assessment’. *Journal of Modern Hellenism* 30 (1 January 2014): 73–89.
- Ther, Philipp. *The Dark Side of Nation-States: Ethnic Cleansing in Modern Europe*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2014.
- Toal, Gerard (Gearóid Ó Tuathail), and Carl T. Dahlman. *Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and Its Reversal*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Toli, Fani. ‘Ministers of Unrecognized Turkish-Cypriot Government Use Republic of Cyprus Passports’. *Greek Reporter*, 13 October 2011. <https://greece.greekreporter.com/2011/10/13/ministers-of-unrecognized-turkish-cypriot-government-use-republic-of-cyprus-passports/>.
- Tomaras, Apostolos. ‘Θα μείνει για πάντα ως ο «θκειος Σαββής» της Καρπασίας [“Uncle Savvis” will always stay]’. *Kathimerini*, 1 May 2019. <https://www.kathimerini.com.cy/gr/kypros/tha-meinei-gia-panta-os-o-thkeios-sabbis-tis-karpasias>.
- Tuathail, Gearóid Ó (Gerard Toal), and John O’Loughlin. ‘After Ethnic Cleansing: Return Outcomes in Bosnia-Herzegovina a Decade Beyond War’. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 99, no. 5 (30 October 2009): 1045–53. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00045600903260671>.
- Uludağ, Sevgül. ‘Yeraltı Notları’ [‘Underground Notes’], 17 April 2008. https://www.stwing.upenn.edu/~durduran/hamambocu/authors/svg/svg3_17_2008.html.

- UNFICYP. 'COVID-19 Case Confirmed in Cyprus'. UNFICYP, 10 April 2020. <https://unficyp.unmissions.org/covid-19-case-confirmed-cyprus>.
- . 'Press Statement on Humanitarian Deliveries'. UNFICYP, 4 October 2017. <https://unficyp.unmissions.org/press-statement-humanitarian-deliveries>.
- United Nations General Assembly. 'Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly: The Situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina', 7 April 1993. United Nations.
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 'Subregional Operations Profile: South-Eastern Europe', 2015. United Nations. <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48d766.html>.
- . 'UNHCR Presents Bosnia Repatriation Plan: Meetings Coverage and Press Releases', 17 January 1996. United Nations. <https://www.un.org/press/en/1996/19960117.ref1131.html>.
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 'Briefing Note on UNHCR and Annex 7 in Bosnia and Herzegovina'. Briefing Note. Bosnia and Herzegovina, October 2007. United Nations. <http://www.unhcr.ba/updatedec07/DPOct07.pdf>.
- United Nations Secretary-General. 'Developments in Cyprus for the Period 18 September to 2 October 1974', 3 October 1974. United Nations.
- . 'Further Report on Developments in Cyprus', 5 August 1974. United Nations.
- . 'Remarks at the Closing of the Cyprus Talks by Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, Burgenstock, Switzerland', 31 March 2004. [http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Statement by Secretary General March 31.pdf](http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Statement%20by%20Secretary%20General%20March%2031.pdf).
- . 'Letter to the Security Council,' 10 February 1993. United Nations.
- . 'Letter to the Security Council,' 27 May 1994. United Nations.
- . 'Report Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Decision 1996/112', 7 February 1997. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the General Assembly', 25 October 1977. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 4 September 1974. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 10 September 1974. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 17 October 1974. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 31 October 1974. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 6 December 1974. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 9 June 1975. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 6 September 1975. United Nations.

- . 'Report to the Security Council', 8 December 1975. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 5 June 1976. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 7 June 1977. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 31 May 1978. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 31 May 1979. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 30 November 1979. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 1 June 1982. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 1 June 1983. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 1 December 1983. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 31 May 1985. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 29 May 1987. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 30 November 1987. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 31 May 1988. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 30 November 1988. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 31 May 1989. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 7 December 1989. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 17 May 1990. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 7 December 1990. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 31 May 1991. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 31 May 1992. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 1 December 1992. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 9 June 1993. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 7 June 1994. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 10 December 1995. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 7 June 1996. United Nations.
- . 'Report to the Security Council', 5 June 1997. United Nations.

- . ‘Report to the Security Council’, 8 December 1997. United Nations.
- . ‘Report to the Security Council’, 10 June 1998. United Nations.
- . ‘Report to the Security Council’, 7 December 1998. United Nations.
- . ‘Report to the Security Council’, 8 June 1999. United Nations.
- . ‘Report to the Security Council’, 29 November 1999. United Nations.
- . ‘Report to the Security Council’, 26 May 2000. United Nations.
- . ‘Report to the Security Council’, 30 May 2001. United Nations.
- . ‘Report to the Security Council’, 1 April 2003. United Nations.
- . ‘Report to the Security Council’, 27 May 2003. United Nations.
- . ‘Report to the Security Council’, 24 September 2004. United Nations.
- . ‘Report to the Security Council’, 3 December 2007. United Nations.
- . ‘Report to the Security Council’, 11 January 2019. United Nations.
- . ‘Report to the Security Council on Developments in Cyprus’, 21 August 1974. United Nations.
- United Nations Vienna. ‘Text of the Press Communiqué on the Cyprus Talks Issued in Vienna’. Interim Reports of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 370 (1975), Documents S/11789 and Add.1-2, Annex, 5 August 1975, 2 August 1975. United Nations.
- Uslu, Nasuh. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations, 1959-2003*. New York: Nova Publishers, 2003.
- Vance, Cyrus. ‘ICRC Cyprus’, 28 April 1977. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1977STATE095893_c.html.
- Várdy, Steven Béla, T. Hunt Tooley, and Agnes Huszar Vardy, eds. *Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe*. Social Science Monographs. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003.
- Varnava, Andrekos. ‘Karpasia, the Strategically Important “Bit” of Cyprus’. *Neos Kosmos English Weekly*, March 2003, 4. https://minerva-access.unimelb.edu.au/bitstream/handle/11343/34239/66699_Varnava_Karpasia.pdf?sequence=1.
- Varnava, Marilena. *Cyprus Before 1974: The Prelude to Crisis*. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019.

- Varnavas, Pantelis. *Κοινοί Εργατικοί Αγώνες Ελληνοκυπρίων και Τουρκοκυπρίων (Γεγονότα Μέσα Από την Ιστορία) [The Common Labour Struggles of Greek and Turkish-Cypriots (Events Through History)]*. Nicosia: Pancyprian Federation of Labour, 1997.
- Varshney, Ashutosh. *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002.
- . ‘Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond’. *World Politics* 53, no. 3 (2001): 362–98. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25054154>.
- Vasileiou, Vasos. ‘Αναστάτωση επικρατεί ανάμεσα στους εγκλωβισμένους: Δεκαεπτάχρονος Ελληνοκύπριος εγκλωβισμένος αλλαξοπίστησε’ [Turmoil among enclaved: 17 year-old Greek Cypriot enclaved converts’]. *Phileleftheros*, 3 May 2016. <http://www.philenews.com/el-gr/top-stories/885/311446/dekaeptachronos-ellinokyprios-egklovismenos-allaxopistise>.
- Volkan, Vamik D. *Cyprus - War and Adaptation: A Psychoanalytic History of Two Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1979.
- Vural, Yücel, Başak Ekenoğlu, and Sertaç Sonan. ‘Politically Motivated Migration: The Case of Turkish Migration to Northern Cyprus’. In *Turkish Migration Conference 2015: Selected Proceedings*. London: Transnational Press London, 2015.
- Wacker, Dr. Ph. ‘Medical Report on the Investigation of Three Rape Cases in Ayios Amvrosios’, 18 September 1974. ICRC / BAG 231.049.007 / 231 (35). ICRC.
- Warner, Jonathan, David W. Lovell, and Michalis Kontos, eds. *Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem*. 1 edition. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016.
- Weber, Max. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. Translated by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. Abingdon: Routledge, 1991.
- Webster, Craig, and Stanislav Ivanov. ‘Placement of Romanian and Bulgarian Embassies: EU Aspirations and Community Legacy’. *South-Eastern Europe Journal of Economics* 1 (2007): 103–20.
- Wedeen, Lisa. ‘Reflections on Ethnographic Work in Political Science’. *Annual Review of Political Science* 13 (1 June 2010): 255–72. <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1691305>.
- Whelan, Y. F. ‘Mapping Meanings in the Cultural Landscape’. In *Senses of Place: Senses of Time*, 61–72. Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2005. [https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/en/publications/mapping-meanings-in-the-cultural-landscape\(ab81db4a-d331-4514-be57-1e2bd07c4fc4\).html](https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/en/publications/mapping-meanings-in-the-cultural-landscape(ab81db4a-d331-4514-be57-1e2bd07c4fc4).html).
- Xiouris, Stelios. ‘Οι Εγκλωβισμένοι Τα Πρώτα Θύματα Του Τατάρ Και Της Λύσης 2 Κρατών [The Enclaved the First Victims of Tatar and the Two-state Solution]’. *24sports.com.cy*, 1 December 2020. <https://www.24sports.com.cy/gr/news/nea/politiki/oi-egklobismenoi-ta-prwta-thymata-toy-tatar-kai-tis-lysis-2-kratwn>.

- Xypolia, Iliia. *British Imperialism and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus, 1923-1939: Divide, Define and Rule*. Routledge, 2017.
- Yazgan, Pinar, Ibrahim Sirkeci, Prof Dr Mustafa Ökmen, Pinar Yazgan, Deniz Eroğlu, and Ibrahim Sirkeci. *Turkish Migration Conference 2015 - Selected Proceedings*. London: Transnational Press London, 2015. https://www.academia.edu/22658744/Turkish_Migration_Conference_2015_-_Selected_Proceedings.
- Zaman, Amberin. 'Pulse Returns to Maronite Village in Cyprus'. *Los Angeles Times*, 21 March 2005, Los Angeles Times edition. <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2005-mar-21-fg-cyprus21-story.html>.
- Zetter, Roger. 'Reconceptualizing the Myth of Return: Continuity and Transition Amongst the Greek-Cypriot Refugees of 1974'. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 12, no. 1 (1 January 1999): 1–22. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/12.1.1>.
- . 'The Greek-Cypriot Refugees: Perceptions of Return under Conditions of Protracted Exile'. In *Cyprus in Transition: 1960-1985*. London: Trigraph, 1986. <https://doi.org/10.1177/019791839402800204>.
- . 'We Are Strangers Here' - Continuity and Transition: The Impact of Displacement and Protracted Exile on the Greek Cypriot Refugees'. In *Cyprus and Its People: Nation, Identity, and Experience in an Unimaginable Community, 1955-1997*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1998.
- Zimmerman, Jane. 'South's Turkish Cypriots Cite Discrimination, Needs', 18 June 2007. Department of State. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07NICOSIA521_a.html.
- Zuger, Philipp. 'Letter to President Makarios', 5 February 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.012 / 231 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . 'Letter to R. Denktash', 13 December 1974. ICRC / BAG 229.049-002.06 / 229 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- . 'Note No. 143: Les problèmes à fin janvier 1975', 30 January 1975. CRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- . 'Note No. 149: Communautés cypriotes turques au sud', 6 February 1975. CRC / BAG 231.049.005.01 / 231 (35-133 CY). ICRC.
- Zutter, Philippe, and Bernard Munger. 'Report on Maltreatment in Ayios Andronikos', 3 March 1975. ICRC / BAG 231.049.008 / 231 (35-53 CY). ICRC.
- Six-Grade Rizokarpaso Gymnasium. 'Μαθητές 2004-2005 < Εξατάξιο Γυμνάσιο Ριζοκαρπάσου [Six-Grade Rizokarpaso Gymnasium, Students 2004-2005]'. Accessed 14 April 2020. <http://gym-rizokarpaso-amm.schools.ac.cy/index.php?id=matets-2004-2005>.

**APPENDIX I: UNSG REPORTS: “GREEK CYPRIOTS
REMAINING IN THE AREA UNDER TURKISH
CONTROL”¹⁰⁹⁹**

Date (yyyy.mm.dd)	Report number	Total “Greek Cypriots remaining in the north” ¹¹⁰⁰
1974.09.04	S/11488/Annex	20,000
1974.10.31	S/11488/Add.2 Annex	15000
1974.12.06	S/11568	15000
1975.02.18	S/11624	N/A
1975.06.09	S/11717*	10500
1975.08.05	Vienna III Agreement S/11789 and Add.1-2	N/A
1975.12.08	S/11900 and Add.1	9000
1976.06.05	S/12093	7371
1976.10.30	S/12222	4,817
1976.12.09	S/12253	3631
1977.04.30	1977 High Level Agreement S/12323	N/A
1977.06.07	S/12342 and Add.1	2000
1977.12.01	S/12463 and Add.1	1814
1978.05.31	S/12723	1731
1978.12.01	S/12946	1572
1979.05.31	1979 10 Point Agreement S/13369	1548
1979.11.30	S/13672	1421
1980.06.03	S/13972 and Add.1	1314
1980.12.01	S/14275	1206
1981.05.27	S/14490	1180
1981.12.01	S/14778	1076
1982.06.01	S/15149	1050
1982.12.01	S/15502	952
1983.06.01	S/15812	914
1983.12.01	S/16192	879
1984.06.01	S/16596	844
1984.12.14	S/16858	788
1985.05.31	S/17227	767
1985.11.30	S/17657	727
1986.05.31	S/18102	723
1986.12.02	S/18491	699
1987.05.29	S/18880	678
1987.11.30	S/19304	661
1988.05.31	S/19927	652
1988.11.30	S/20310	639

¹⁰⁹⁹ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/12253, December 9, 1976.

¹¹⁰⁰ United Nations Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, S/16596, June 1, 1984.

Date (yyyy.mm.dd)	Report number	Total “Greek Cypriots remaining in the north”¹¹⁰⁰
1989.05.31	S/20663	620
1989.12.07	S/21010	611
1990.05.17	S/21340	593
1990.12.07	S/21981	597
1991.05.31	S/22665	576
1991.11.30	S/23263	564
1992.05.31	S/24050	551
1992.12.01	S/24917	544
1993.06.09	S/25912	537
1993.11.22	S/26777	544
1994.06.07	S/1994/680	535
1994.12.12	S/1994/1407	527
1995.06.15	S/1995/488	520
1995.12.10	S/1995/1020	492
1996.06.07	S/1996/411	487
1996.12.10	S/1996/1016	486
1997.06.05	S/1997/437	479
1997.12.08	S/1997/962	477
1998.06.10	S/1998/488	462
1998.12.07	S/1998/1149	458
1999.06.08	S/1999/657	453
1999.11.29	S/1999/1203	432
2000.05.26	S/2000/496	427
2000.12.01	S/2000/1138	428
2001.05.30	S/2001/534	428
2001.11.30	S/2001/1122	427
2002.05.30	S/2002/590	428
2003.05.27	S/2003/572	421
2003.11.12	S/2003/1078	423
2004.05.26	S/2004/427	411
2004.09.24	S/2004/756	<i>not included</i>
2005.05.27	S/2005/353	404
2005.11.29	S/2005/743	397
2006.05.23	S/2006/315	385
2006.12.01	S/2006/931	389
2007.06.04	S/2007/328	384
2007.12.03	S/2007/699	384
2008.06.02	S/2008/353	375
2008.11.28	S/2008/744	372
2009.05.15	S/2009/248	367
2009.11.25	S/2009/609	364
2010.05.28	S/2010/264*	361
2010.11.26	S/2010/605	357
2011.05.31	S/2011/332	356
2011.11.30	S/2011/746	351
2012.06.29	S/2012/507	347
2013.01.07	S/2013/7	347

Date (yyyy.mm.dd)	Report number	Total “Greek Cypriots remaining in the north”¹¹⁰⁰
2013.07.05	S/2013/392	347
2013.12.30	S/2013/781	347
2014.07.09	S/2014/461	343
2015.01.09	S/2015/17	345
2015.07.02	S/2015/517	345
2016.01.06	S/2016/11	342
2016.07.08	S/2016/598	332
2017.01.09	S/2017/20	329
2017.07.10	S/2017/586	333
2018.01.09	S/2018/25	335
2018.07.06	S/2018/676	<i>not included</i>
2019.01.11	S/2019/37	328
2019.07.10	S/2019/562	<i>not included</i>
2020.01.07	S/2020/23	<i>not included</i>


 UNIVERSITY of NICOSIA

APPENDIX II: UNFICYP REVIEW, JUNE 1995: RECOMMENDATIONS

**Excerpt from United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council,
S/1995/1020, December 10, 1995**

24. In its humanitarian review, UNFICYP set out its concerns about the situation of the Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the northern part of the island and made a number of recommendations for remedial action by the Turkish Cypriot authorities. With regard to the Greek Cypriots, UNFICYP recommended that:

- (a) All restrictions on land travel within the northern part of Cyprus should be lifted;
- (b) Access to and religious use of the monastery at Apostolos Andreas and the church there by the Greek Cypriots of the Karpas peninsula and their clergy should be unrestricted;
- (c) All restrictions preventing offshore fishing by the Greek Cypriots of the Karpas should be lifted;
- (d) Karpas Greek Cypriots and their visitors should be allowed to travel between the Karpas and the buffer zone crossing point in their own vehicles or in regular public transportation without police escort;
- (e) Karpas Greek Cypriots should be allowed visits from close relatives who normally reside outside the northern part of Cyprus;
- (f) There should be no hindrance at any time to children of Karpas Greek Cypriots returning to their family homes without formality;
- (g) Karpas Greek Cypriots should be allowed to bequeath fixed property in the Karpas to their next of kin, and in the event that such beneficiaries normally reside outside the northern part of the island, they should be allowed to visit bequeathed properties without hindrance or formality;
- (h) All Karpas Greek Cypriot students attending secondary schools or third-level institutions in the south should be allowed to return to their homes on weekends and holidays;
- (i) Secondary schooling for Greek Cypriots should be facilitated in the Karpas, and teachers and school supplies for Greek Cypriots should be allowed to be provided from the south without hindrance;
- (j) The constant presence of the Turkish Cypriot police in the daily lives of the Karpas Greek Cypriots should be ended;
- (k) Unrestricted availability of private telephones to Karpas Greek Cypriots should be permitted when they become generally available, and Karpas Greek Cypriots should be permitted to make private telephone calls from locations in the Karpas other than police stations without the presence of any official or other person;
- (l) Restrictions on hand-carried mail and newspapers should be lifted;
- (m) Karpas Greek Cypriots should be permitted visits by Greek Cypriot doctors and medical staff;
- (n) Provision of funds from outside the northern area should be permitted for the renovation and maintenance of Greek Cypriot schools and churches in the Karpas area;
- (o) Restrictions on UNFICYP's freedom of movement to and from as well as within the Karpas area should be lifted;

(p) Restrictions on the discharge by UNFICYP of its humanitarian and other functions with regard to Karpas Greek Cypriots should be lifted and liaison posts should be established where the greatest number of Greek Cypriots live in the north at the villages of Rizokarpaso and Ayias Trias. (The sole remaining permanent UNFICYP presence in the Karpas, a small liaison post, remains confined, with no freedom of movement, in the village of Leonarisso, where only 9 Greek Cypriots still reside.)

25. Concerning the Maronites living in the northern part of the island, UNFICYP's review recommended that:

(a) All restrictions on freedom of movement between the two parts of the island for all Maronites located in the north and for family members of such persons normally located in the south or elsewhere should be lifted;

(b) A medical centre in Kormakiti should be established and supported, staffed by Maronite medical personnel, to serve the three Maronite villages of Asomatos, Karpasha and Kormakiti and, pending its establishment, a Maronite doctor and nurse should be permitted to visit these villages;

(c) Maronite homes in these three villages should be connected with private telephones and, pending this, publicly accessible telephones should be installed in each of the three villages;

(d) Free, normal, unescorted UNFICYP access to the three villages and to Maronite homes there should be facilitated;

(e) The water supply to Kormakiti village should be improved;

(f) Maronites should be permitted periodically to visit, restore and tend to their holy places located in the northern part of the island but, for the most part, away from the four villages in the north-west where they have resided in modern times.

For the response of the Turkish Cypriot authorities, see annex IV.

Annex IV

MEASURES BEING IMPLEMENTED BY THE TURKISH CYPRIOT AUTHORITIES IN RESPECT OF GREEK CYPRIOTS AND MARONITES LOCATED IN THE NORTHERN PART OF CYPRUS ^{1/} (30 November 1995)

1. Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north may go to the south at any time after notifying the police station in the area where they reside. Such persons may remain absent from the north for up to 15 consecutive days at a time. There is no limit on the number of such 15-day journeys that an individual may make. However, if the authorities in the north conclude that the person has taken up residence in the south, he/she will not be permitted to return to the north.

2. Greek Cypriot schoolchildren (males up to 16 years of age and females up to 18 years of age) and Maronite schoolchildren (males and females up to 18 years of age) from families living in the north and who are attending school in the south may visit their parents resident in the north during holidays (official, religious, mid-term, summer and weekends) without any restrictions as regards duration.

^{1/} The present annex contains a record of the points conveyed orally by the Turkish Cypriot authorities to UNFICYP. The text was subsequently shown to the Turkish Cypriot authorities, which confirmed its accuracy.

3. Greek Cypriots located outside the northern part of Cyprus and having close relatives located in the north (i.e., spouse, father or mother, son or daughter, brother or sister) may visit those relatives once a month for the day. Such Greek Cypriots will have to apply to the Turkish Cypriot authorities at the Ledra Palace crossing point five days in advance.

4. Maronites located outside the northern part of Cyprus may visit their close relatives who are located in the north (i.e. spouse, father or mother, brother or sister, son or daughter, uncle or aunt, grandparent or grandchild or cousin) once a month for up to three days. Such Maronites will have to apply to the Turkish Cypriot authorities at the Ledra Palace crossing point 48 hours in advance.

5. As regards access to the northern part of the island, the Turkish Cypriot authorities will treat nationals of countries other than Cyprus who are of Greek Cypriot or Maronite origin in the same manner that they treat other nationals of the country concerned. In this way, such nationals may visit the northern part of the island by applying to the Turkish Cypriot authorities when crossing at the Ledra Palace crossing point.

6. Greek Cypriots located in the northern part of the island, after informing the police where they live of their destination and the duration of their stay, may undertake day-time travel to Nicosia, Famagusta and Kyrenia. At these locations, they may circulate freely. In Kyrenia, they may travel eastwards to Villa Firtina and westwards to Celebrity Hotel. Greek Cypriots may use the following routes of access to these locations:

- - Between the Karpas and Famagusta.
- - Between Famagusta and Nicosia.
- - Between Nicosia and Kyrenia.

The persons concerned may use public transportation as well as private vehicles, provided these are registered and insured in the north and provided they carry plates and the drivers have licences issued by the Turkish Cypriot authorities. They may visit Celebrity Hotel and other tourist installations in the vicinity, Mare Monte, Deniz Kizi and Jasmine Court hotels and restaurants on the roadways such as St. Tropez, Mirabelle, etc.

7. Maronites located in the northern part of the island, after informing the police where they live of their destination and the duration of their stay, may undertake day-time travel to Nicosia, Morphou, Kyrenia and Famagusta. At these locations, they may circulate freely. In Kyrenia they may travel eastwards up to Villa Firtina. For this purpose, they may use the following routes:

- - Between Myrtou and Morphou.
- - Between Myrtou and Kyrenia.
- - Between Myrtou and Nicosia (southern route).
- - Between Nicosia and Famagusta.

The persons concerned may visit Celebrity Hotel and other tourist installations in the vicinity, Mare Monte, Deniz Kizi and Jasmine Court hotels and restaurants on the roadways such as St. Tropez, Mirabelle, etc.

8. Telephones for public and private use will be installed in the villages where Greek Cypriots and Maronites live. This will be done as soon as the ongoing infrastructural work is completed.

9. Where necessary, the upkeep of Greek Cypriot and Maronite places of worship and education in the northern part of the island will be carried out in accordance with current regulations.


10. There has never been any restriction on the circulation in the northern part of the island of newspapers published in south Cyprus. On a daily basis, newspapers and magazines may be obtained from the south through the Ledra Palace crossing point and may be brought freely to villages in the north inhabited by Greek Cypriots and Maronites.

11. Greek Cypriots located in the north may visit Apostolos Andreas Monastery on religious holidays, provided they do so in groups of no less than 20 persons.

12. The Turkish Cypriot authorities will carry out improvements to the infrastructural facilities in the region where Maronites live. These improvements will cover, inter alia, the water supply and road systems as well as the establishment of a medical centre in the Kormakiti area.

13. Some of the important Maronite holy places in the remote areas of the northern part of the island may be repaired, provided the Vatican makes necessary funds available through the Turkish Cypriot authorities.

14. Mail may be channelled to and from Greek Cypriots and Maronites located in the north only through the mail service established by the Turkish Cypriot authorities.



APPENDIX III: LIST OF INTERVIEWS

NUMBER	INTERVIEWEE ALIAS	CATEGORY/TITLE	PLACE	DATE
1	Ariadne	GC enclaved woman	Ayia Trias	2013.04.01
2	Bella	GC enclaved woman	Ayia Trias	2013.08.12
3	Chryso and Christos	GC enclaved mother and high school-aged son	Ayia Trias	2013.08.12
4	Demetra	GC enclaved woman	Rizokarpaso	2013.08.13
5	Eftychios	GC enclaved man	Rizokarpaso	2013.08.14
6	Frixos and Faruk	GC enclaved man and “Kurdish-Cypriot”	Rizokarpaso	2013.08.15
7	Gavriella	GC former Yialousa resident	Nicosia	2013.10.23
8	Harry	UNFICYP Officer	Nicosia	2014.07.15
9	Iris	UNPOL Officer	Nicosia	2014.07.17
10	Kalia	GC enclaved woman	Ayia Trias	2014.07.27
11	Laoura	GC enclaved woman	Ayia Trias	2015.06.14
12	Marios	GC enclaved man	Ayia Trias	2015.09.25
13	Nitsa	GC enclaved woman	Rizokarpaso	2016.08.27
14	Olga	GC former Ayia Trias resident	Limassol	2016.09.11
15	Petroulla	GC former Ayia Trias resident	Larnaca	2019.11.02
16	Roulla	GC former Ayia Trias resident	Nicosia	2019.11.08
17	Silia	Former Ayia Trias resident	Geneva	2019.11.22
18	Tasoula	Teacher, Rizokarpaso	Telephone interview	2020.04.12
19	Vaso	GC enclaved woman	Telephone interview	2020.04.20